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FOR THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BIRTH  
OF CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS

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Андрей Ролёнок

AUTONOMY, DEMOCRACY, REVOLUTION:  
FOR THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BIRTH  
OF CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS

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*Abstract.* This article is an extended introduction to the thematic column of *Topos* dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the birth of Cornelius Castoriadis (1922–1997), a famous French philosopher of Greek origin. The text aims to critically actualise the intellectual legacy of Castoriadis and justify its significance in the context of the current situation. The author considers such topics as the irrelevance of Castoriadis's ideas in the post-Soviet intellectual context; the multiplicity of his professional identities (philosopher, economist, psychoanalyst, political activist, etc.) and the milestones of his biography; the fragmentary and thematically diverse nature of his work; the unique and radical character of his philosophical project; the complexity of his narrow disciplinary, ideological and methodological identification, etc. Addressing Castoriadis's intellectual legacy in this column is a call to continue philosophical enquiries based on the valuable insights that can be found in his texts, as well as in the whole perspective of the normative horizon of the autonomy project.

*Keywords:* Castoriadis, post-Soviet context, democracy, autonomy, revolution, social theory, psychoanalysis, post-Marxism.



11 марта 2022 года известному французскому философу (экономисту и психоаналитику) греческого происхождения Корнелиусу Касториадису (1922-1997) исполнилось бы 100 лет. Это символическое событие было отмечено проведением ряда научных мероприятий в Беларуси и Литве, в частности, круглого стола на тему «Интеллектуальное наследие Корнелиуса Касториадиса: истоки, рецепции, критика, актуальность» (11.03.2022, г. Минск, Беларусь), а также специальной тематической секции на «Конгрессе исследователей Беларуси» (октябрь 2022 года, г. Каунас, Литва). Часть материалов, опубликованных в данной рубрике, выросли и сформировались на почве этих дискуссий, проходивших на различных площадках, вопреки неблагоприятным внутрисполитическим и внешнеполитическим обстоятельствам.

Материалы рубрики нацелены на то, чтобы актуализировать интеллектуальное наследие Касториадиса, расширить дискуссию о его творчестве, соотнести с другими мыслителями, с которыми он систематически взаимодействовал в течение своей жизни. Понятия, вынесенные в заглавие рубрики — автономия, демократия, революция, — обозначают некоторые приоритетные акценты в творчестве Касториадиса. При этом авторы рубрики обращаются к более широкой тематике: критической актуализации идей Касториадиса в современном контексте; интеллектуальному и историческому контексту становления мышления Касториадиса (разрыв с марксизмом, влияние психоанализа, критика структурализма и др.); ряду ключевых идей концепции Касториадиса, таких как критика бюрократического капитализма, креативность, социальное воображаемое, магма и др.); имплицитной и эксплицитной рецепции идей Касториадиса в современной социальной и политической теории (в частности, в творчестве таких мыслителей, как Юрген Хабермас, Аксель Хоннет, Зигмунт Бауман, Ханс Йоас и др.).

\*\*\*

Творчество Касториадиса является ярким примером междисциплинарного мышления и трудно поддается однозначной дисциплинарной идентификации в рамках академического поля. Он бросал вызов устоявшемуся разделению гуманитарных и социальных наук. Он писал тексты/эссе по философии, антропологии, психоанализу, лингвистике, социологии, экономике, политике, искусству и др. Касториадиса в этой связи можно даже назвать энциклопедистом (в классическом понимании).

Трудности идентификации возникают также при попытке соотнесения интеллектуального наследия Касториадиса с основными направлениями мысли (интеллектуальными -измами) в рамках XX столетия: марксизм, структурализм, функционализм, постмодернизм и др. Неслучайно американский философ Ханс Йоас



при попытке концептуального ситуирования концепции Касториадиса делает это в негативном ключе, позиционируя его как антимарксиста, антиструктуралиста и антифункционалиста (Йоас & Кнёбль 2011). Касториадиса позиционируют также в позитивной манере как философа автономии (креативности или социально-го воображения). Некоторые исследователи обращают внимание на наличие определенных концептуальных синтезов в творчестве Касториадиса, который соединяет Марксову критику общества (капитализма) и фрейдовскую критику рационализма.

Многие исследователи, включая белорусского философа Владимира Фурса, указывают на уникальность философии Касториадиса и на то, что он стоит особняком. Хотя при этом уточняется наличие связующего нормативного основания в форме проекта автономии.

«Однако его философские размышления не были сами по себе. Они всегда были связаны с более широким проектом автономии как политики в сильном и явном смысле (*la politique*), направленной на радикальное исследование и преобразование существующего института общества (особенно беспрекословного подчинения последнего тому, что Касториадис называет “безграничным стремлением к (псевдо)рациональному господству”» (Adams 2014b: xi).

Касториадис предлагает уникальный и глобальный проект по пересмотру всей западной философии и созвучен в этом замысле философии Фридриха Ницше или Мартина Хайдеггера. С целью решения этой задачи Касториадис призывает вернуться назад к древнегреческой философии и афинской демократии как примерам социально-исторического творения, схватывающим онтологическую новизну, которая ускользала от традиционной философии.

Творческое наследие Касториадиса отличается разнообразием тематики. В частности, исследовательница наследия Касториадиса Сюзи Адамс (Adams 2014a) выделяет в качестве ключевых 19 концептов в рамках его интеллектуального проекта: автономия, гетерономия, социальные воображаемые означивания, креативное воображение, *paideia*, капитализм, социализм, демократия, творение *ex nihilo*, магия, *psyche*, *legein* and *teukhein* и др.

Некоторые исследователи, несмотря на междисциплинарность и тематическое разнообразие творчества Касториадиса, стремятся обосновать наличие в нем концептуального единства и общей/сквозной темы. Так, например, переводчик на английский язык и исследователь наследия Касториадиса Дэвид Эймс Кёртис (Curtis 2014) предлагает в качестве такой темы «рост незначительности» («*the rising tide of insignificance*»)<sup>1</sup> и настаивает на

1 На французском языке (в оригинале) — «*la Montée de l'insignifiance*», на английском — «*the rising tide of insignificance*». На русский язык этот термин

наличии «магматического единства в напряжении» («a magmatic unity-in-tension») в творчестве Касториадиса. Исходя из этого, он резко критикует попытку разделения творчества Касториадиса на «раннего» / «позднего» и считает, что нет конкретной точки такого разделения, каких-либо отличительных тем или набора подходов, которые бы в одностороннем порядке отличали «до» от «после».

«Сейчас существует тенденция противопоставлять раннего, “политического” или “революционного” Касториадиса более позднему, описываемому по-разному как “интеллектуал”, “академик”, “философ” и так далее, как будто эти два набора терминов всегда должны быть взаимно и полностью исключаящими друг друга. ... Такое дихотомное временное разделение творчества Касториадиса не выдерживает критики» (Curtis 2002: 178).

Стоит отметить, что Касториадис также подчеркивал свою приверженность некоторым проблематикам на протяжении всего творчества. Так, описывая свои самые ранние работы, когда они были переизданы в Афинах в 1988 году, он заметил следующее:

«В этих работах можно обнаружить проблематику, интенсивность которой определила всю мою дальнейшую траекторию. Прежде всего, конечно, вопрос политики, осознание необходимости радикальных социальных изменений, вера в творчество широких народных масс и ключевой характер демократического проекта» (Castoriadis 1988: 10 (цит. по: (Karalis 2014a: 1).

Одной из основных тем, к которой обращался Касториадис и которая сохраняет свою актуальность в современной ситуации, является *критика тотального и фрагментарного бюрократического капитализма*. В разгар холодной войны он идеологически находился между двумя мирами — критиковал и советский тоталитаризм, и западную представительскую демократию. Касториадис был особо едким критиком сталинизма и советского тоталитарного режима (тотального бюрократического капитализма), несмотря на первичную приверженность марксизму и политиче-

не имеет устоявшегося перевода и может передаваться как «рост незначительности», «прилив незначительности», «прилив ничтожности», «растущая волна несущественного» и т.д. Это одна из центральных тем творчества Касториадиса, которая особенно актуализировалась после распада СССР. Содержательно она отсылает к целому комплексу идей и проблематик: кризис западного общества, критика общества потребления и телевидения, уход в личную жизнь и апатия граждан, деполитизация и всеобщий конформизм, исчезновение социального и политического конфликта и др. Под данным названием Касториадис опубликовал в 1996 году 4-ю книгу серии «Перекрестки лабиринта» (*Carrefours du labyrinthe*).

ский активизм в поле коммунистического движения. В его интерпретации бюрократия в СССР стала институтом, трансцендентным по отношению к обществу, и превратилась после национализации собственности в новый эксплуататорский класс (для схватывания данного феномена Касториадис даже предлагал использовать отдельное понятие «стратократия»). В тексте «Перед лицом войны» (1980) Касториадис писал:

«Единственная “Идеология”, которая остается или может оставаться живой в России, — это великорусский шовинизм. Единственное воображаемое, которое сохраняет историческую действенность, — это националистическое или имперское воображаемое. Этому воображаемому не нужна партия, разве что в качестве маски, и, прежде всего, как инструмент пропаганды и действия для международного проникновения. Его органическим носителем является армия» (Castoriadis 1980: 51).

Согласно Касториадису, угроза тоталитарного искушения не исчезла после краха тоталитарных режимов/проектов XX века. «Следующий проект может оказаться не менее чудовищным и, возможно, иметь ещё более крупные возможности успеха, чем прецедент, уже существовавший» (Castoriadis 1983: 122).

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Интеллектуальное наследие Касториадиса можно назвать *фрагментарным*. Он не писал (за редким исключением) больших книг и предметных исследовательских монографий. В большинстве случаев его тексты представляли собой статьи, переработанные доклады или эссе, написанные по случаю на различные темы и впоследствии антологизированные (включенные в антологию, сборник, ридер и т.д.). Даже его основной философский труд (*magnum opus*) «Воображаемое установление общества» (1975), благодаря которому он стал широко известен, состоит из двух частей, первая из которых была опубликована в журнале «Социализм или Варварство» в 1964–1965 годах как серия отдельных статей. Именно в указанном журнале в период с 1949 по 1965 год было опубликовано большинство текстов Касториадиса под различными псевдонимами (самыми известными из которых были Поль Кардан и Пьер Шолье).

Несмотря на обозначенную фрагментарность, ко многим темам он возвращался на протяжении всей жизни, в числе которых смело можно назвать проект индивидуальной и коллективной автономии (как альтернатива «рациональному» господству капитализма), демократию и революцию.

Его биографию и карьеру также трудно назвать типичной для академического мыслителя в узком смысле, когда время учебы

сменяется преподаванием и исследованиями в университете и/или исследовательских центрах. У него было множество профессиональных идентичностей. Он был политическим активистом как в Греции, так и во Франции после вынужденной эмиграции в 1945 году; основал вместе с Клодом Лефором политическую группу и одноименный журнал «Социализм или Варварство» в 1948–1967 годах (деятельность и идеи которой оказали влияние на майские события 1968 года); работал с 1948 по 1970 год профессиональным экономистом в Организации экономического сотрудничества и развития (ОЭСР); стал практикующим психоаналитиком с 1973 года; был философом, преподавателем и исследователем (директор по исследованиям в парижской Высшей школе социальных наук (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales) с 1980 по 1995 год, его семинары собирали широкую аудиторию).

В молодом возрасте Касториадис приобрел важный для будущего всемирно известного критического мыслителя/философа экзистенциальный опыт: 1) жизнь в государстве под контролем диктатора (Иоаннис Метаксас (Ioannis Metaxas), 2) участие и активистская деятельность в рамках коммунистических и троцкистских организаций/партий, 3) немецкая оккупация, 4) вынужденная эмиграция во Францию (Париж) в 1945 году из-за политического преследования (в том числе со стороны Гестапо), 5) пребывание в статусе беженца (до 1970 года у него не было французского гражданства). Этот опыт способствовал осознанию Касториадисом необходимости радикальной трансформации современного общества в направлении автономии и прямой демократии, а также выработке у него чувства отвращения к сталинизму, фашизму и его аналогам.

## (Не)востребованность Касториадиса

Значимость идей Касториадиса не является само собой разумеющейся в постсоветском академическом/интеллектуальном контексте, как, собственно, и исторический масштаб его фигуры как требующей коммеморации и символического соотнесения (по случаю 100-летнего юбилея).

На постсоветском русскоязычном пространстве наследие Касториадиса незаслуженно обделяют вниманием: он представлен слабо<sup>2</sup>, как с точки зрения оригинальной литературы (переведены

2 Масштаб проблемы становится более очевидным, если для наглядности сравнить объемы переводов на русский язык Касториадиса и его современника Мишеля Фуко. У последнего переведены десятки книг, сборники статей и интервью, почти все курсы лекций в Коллеж де Франс, множество отдельных статей, не говоря про объемы критической и интерпретативной литературы на русском языке. У Касториадиса, как мы уже выяснили, пере-

на русский язык книги «Воображаемое установление общества» (2003 [1975]) и «Дрейфующее общество» (2012 [2005]), большая статья «“Рациональность” капитализма» (2010 [1997]) и несколько небольших статей и интервью), так и критической литературы (можно выделить тексты В. Фурса, О. Оришевой, И. Нежелской, В. Мазина, С. Гашкова и др.). На белорусский язык, к сожалению, не переведено ни одной книги, статьи или даже интервью Касториадиса.

Факт множественности профессиональных идентичностей автора (философ, экономист, психоаналитик, политический активист и др.), как и многие вехи его биографии, также являются неизвестными и непроработанными в постсоветском контексте. Чаще всего Касториадиса позиционируют в качестве философа и активиста левой политической группы и одноименного журнала «Социализм или Варварство», а деятельность в качестве экономиста, практикующего психоаналитика, академического исследователя и преподавателя упоминается лишь вскользь. Симптоматично, например, игнорирование Касториадиса при конструировании истории психоанализа в русскоязычном контексте (он не включается в тематические сборники, энциклопедии и антологии — см., например, энциклопедию В. Лейбина (Лейбин 2006)). Редким, если не единственным, исключением из этой практики являются публикации Виктора Мазина (Мазин 2010), в которых Касториадис позиционируется не только как мыслитель, обращающийся к теории психоанализа (Фрейд, Лакан и др.), но и как практикующий психоаналитик.

В узком смысле востребованность означает наличие рецензий и референций в академическом поле (индекс цитирования и т.д.), включая также интегрированность в университетские учебные программы (программы учебных курсов по тем или иным специальностям). Работы Касториадиса не оказались слишком востребованными в преподавательской практике в постсоветском университетском пространстве в целом и белорусском в частности. В Беларуси это всегда оставалось на уровне индивидуальной приверженности тех или иных интеллектуалов и профессорско-преподавательского состава (В. Фурс, Г. Миненков, О. Оришева, П. Барковский, О. Шпарага и др.). Если обратиться к кейсу Европейского гуманитарного университета (Вильнюс, Литва), то можно заключить, что к идеям Касториадиса обращались фрагментарно и эпизодически в рамках специальных курсов по критической социальной теории, теории идентичности и др. в рамках бакалаврских и магистерских программ подготовки сту-

ведены лишь 2 книги, одна из которых сборник посмертно изданных статей и интервью («Дрейфующее общество»), единицы отдельных статей и единицы отдельных интервью.

дентов (по специализациям философия, культурные исследования, медиа и коммуникация и др.).

Невостребованность идей Касториадиса в постсоветском интеллектуальном контексте требует специального обсуждения. Здесь лишь зафиксируем потенциальные причины данной невостребованности: 1) «идеологическая неблагонадежность» в советский период (Касториадис критиковал СССР), 2) сложность дисциплинарной и методологической/концептуальной идентификации (принадлежность к конкретной академической дисциплине и интеллектуальному течению/подходу), 3) существенное присутствие темы критики западного общества потребления и представительской демократии в его творчестве могли «отпугнуть» переводчиков и интеллектуалов в период перестройки и либерального «бума» в 90-е.

Стоит заметить, что в западном, включая французский, контексте идеи Касториадиса также продолжительное время не были широко известны, ибо до 1970 года (до момента получения французского гражданства) он публиковался под различными псевдонимами (Поль Кардан, Пьер Шолье и др.). Полноценная интеграция в академическую сферу состоялась поздно, начиная с 80-х (получения должности в парижской Высшей школе социальных наук).

Интересный факт о проблеме распространения идей Касториадиса во французском контексте приводят Ханс Йоас и Вольфганг Кнёбль в своих лекциях по социальной теории. Они писали о том, что, начиная с 1950-х годов, во французской научной жизни доминировал структурализм и «из-за этого неструктуралистам в гуманитарных и социальных науках было невероятно сложно пробиться к читающей публике во Франции, тем более что их позиция, помимо всего прочего, обычно критиковалась за «субъективизм». (Йоас и Кнёбль 2011: 575).

В числе факторов маргинализации и невостребованности Касториадиса во французском академическом контексте стоит упомянуть уникальность и радикальность его интеллектуального проекта, сложность дисциплинарной, идейной и методологической идентификации этого автора.

«Такая манера мышления бросала вызов доминирующим философским школам своего времени; она опровергала детерминизм позитивистской мысли и отвергала гипердетерминизм структурализма и постструктурализма. Такой радикальный вызов традициям объясняет маргинализацию, которая была навязана ему и его философии французским философским истеблишментом» (Karalis 2014b: XV).

Первые переводы сочинений Касториадиса на английский язык появились лишь в 1984 году. «Воображаемое установление общества» было переведено на английский в 1987 году (спустя 12 лет пос-

ле публикации в оригинале на французском), на немецкий — в 1984 году, на греческий (со специальным приложением) — в 1978 году.

С междисциплинарным восприятием идей Касториадиса (за пределами философского поля) также возникали проблемы. Например, Х. Йоас в статье «Институционализация как творческий процесс: социологическая значимость политической философии Корнелиуса Касториадиса» (Joas 1989), писал о том, что социологи часто игнорировали наследие Касториадиса, несмотря на явные пересечения его концептуальных мотивов с социологическим дискурсом (институционализация, теория социального действия, трансформация социальной реальности, индивид-общество, социализация и др.).

Однако после смерти Касториадиса в декабре 1997 года (и далее последние 25 лет) общественный и научный интерес к его творчеству только возрастает, а его работы становятся более заметными и влиятельными в современных дебатах о гражданском обществе, демократии и идентичности.

Новые научные публикации (монографии, коллективные сборники, критические статьи) и диссертации о его концепции и идеях появляются все чаще в разных странах мира, а также постоянно проходят различные конференции, симпозиумы и семинары (включая мероприятия по случаю юбилейной даты) во Франции, Греции и других странах.

Продолжаются посмертные публикации его французских сборников и семинаров периода Высшей школы социальных наук в Париже. На английском языке также стали доступны все 6 книг серии «Перекрестки лабиринта» (*Carrefours du labyrinthe*), выходят антологии (*A Socialisme ou Barbarie Anthology* 2018) и тематические номера журналов (*Castoriadis Ex Nihilo* 2020), а также продолжают публиковаться переводы семинаров (*Castoriadis* 2023 [2004]).

Дополнительно значимость идей Касториадиса подтверждается обращением к его интеллектуальному наследию со стороны крупных мыслителей современности. Теория общества Касториадиса была предметом интерпретации и критики со стороны таких известных мыслителей XX–XXI веков, как Юрген Хабермас, Аксель Хоннет, Винсент Декомб, Жан-Франсуа Лиотар, Ричард Рорти, Шанталь Муфф, Ханс Йоас, Зигмунт Бауман и др.

Значимость Касториадиса в широком историческом контексте объясняется не только содержанием его теоретического наследия, но и его праaxis-ом, влиянием его активностей и творчества на процессы социальных трансформаций (уместно вспомнить, например, деятельность группы «Социализм или Варварство» и ее (прямое и косвенное) влияние на протестное движение во Франции в мае 1968 г.). Он был не только теоретиком, но и практиком, политическим активистом, который стремился реализовать свои идеи и способствовать раскрытию креативного потенциала и расширению автономии.

Значимость Касториадиса сегодня объясняется, таким образом, не только историко-философским интересом к его интеллектуальному наследию, но и поиском нормативных оснований социальной жизни. Всплеск нового авторитаризма в глобальном контексте (Ролёнок 2022) и война в Украине как никогда актуализировали проект индивидуальной и коллективной автономии Касториадиса.

«Среди творений человеческой истории одно в высшей степени особенное: то, которое позволяет обществу поставить само себя под вопрос: создание идеи автономии, способности к рефлексии, критики и самокритики, вопроса, который не знает никакого ограничения и не соглашается ни на какое ограничение. Это творение одновременно и демократии, и философии. Творение, в котором философ не признает никакого внешнего ограничения своей мысли, и демократии, которая не знает никакого внешнего ограничения своих возможностей, за исключением ограничений, которые вытекают из ее самоограничения» (Касториадис 2007 [1994]).

Основные вехи биографии Касториадиса, в особенности его экзистенциальный опыт политического беженца, также созвучны той ситуации, в которой оказались многие белорусские интеллектуалы после протестных событий 2020–2022 годов в Беларуси, а также украинские интеллектуалы после начала полномасштабной войны в Украине.

### Структура рубрики

Рубрика включает две авторские статьи, два перевода (на белорусский и английский языки) и одно интервью. Открывают рубрику статьи белорусских философов Григория Миненкова и Павла Барковского, которые были подготовлены на основании докладов, сделанных авторами в рамках Конгресса исследователей Беларуси (г. Каунас, Литва) в октябре 2022 года на специальной секции, посвященной 100-летию юбилею Касториадиса.

Текст Г. Миненкова предлагает оригинальный ракурс рассмотрения проекта индивидуальной и коллективной автономии Корнелиуса Касториадиса в контексте нового космополитизма. Для автора язык описания социальной реальности, предложенный Касториадисом, вполне органично может быть использован для понимания новейших тенденций в развитии космополитических практик. Новый космополитизм, согласно автору, возрождает проект автономии, переводит его из чисто теоретического измерения в практическое и позволяет обсуждать его практическую реализацию.



Автор в своем тексте формулирует много интересных и сильных тезисов. Так, например, профессор Г. Миненков предупреждает о том, что «вероятно, именно в XXI столетии мы вышли к возможному решению проблемы соотношения универсализма и партикуляризма, поскольку отсутствие такого решения чревато сегодня опасностью гибели человечества. Развитие дискурса и практик автономии может стать одним из эффективных средств такого решения, способствуя поиску инклюзивной версии универсализма и тем самым адекватному обращению к проблеме признания различий».

Заслуживает особого внимания обращение Г. Миненкова к идее пайдеи в ее связи с творческим воображением в интерпретации Касториадиса. Радикальное творческое воображение лежит в основе пайдеи как ядра политического сообщества и ключевого фактора космополитической инклюзивности. Пайдеия — центральное измерение любой политики автономии. Мы перестаем делить человеческий мир на «нас» и «их», мы перестаем считать свое представление о мире единственно значимым. Посредством этого обращения к идее пайдеи автор удачно подводит читателя к задаче критики эксплицитных и имплицитных проявлений современного колониализма.

Статья П. Барковского приобретает особую актуальность в контексте эволюции политического режима в Беларуси на фоне протестных событий 2020–2022 годов и войны в Украине. Автору удалось креативно осовременить классическую для политической теории проблему сравнения тоталитарных политических режимов и придать ей новое звучание посредством обращения к идеям таких мыслителей, как, например, Лешек Колаковский и особенно Корнелиус Касториадис. Текст П. Барковского показывает специфику тоталитарных (нацистского и коммунистического) типов воображаемого, которые могут представлять определенную угрозу для современных обществ даже после исчезновения соответствующих государств, выступавших системными носителями идей фашизма, нацизма и коммунизма.

Особый пафос текста заключается в том, что, вооружившись аргументацией Касториадиса, автор стремится выступить в роли апологета левого проекта против обвинения в тоталитарности в контексте дискредитации коммунистической/социалистической идеи в СССР. В этом контексте он риторически вопрошает, означает ли принадлежность к левой идеологии автоматическую истинность обвинения в тоталитарности? В поисках ответа автор вслед за Касториадисом обращается к рассмотрению основных типов социальной гетерономии, характерных для тоталитарных/авторитарных режимов и неолиберального капитализма, представленного западным обществом потребления. Именно проект коллективной автономии, предложенный Касториадисом, ста-

новится тем ответом (альтернативой гетерономии и угрозам тоталитаризма), к которому склоняется автор.

Особым гостем нашей специальной рубрики стал Дэвид Эймс Кёртис (David Ames Curtis), который внес существенный вклад в популяризацию и распространение идей Касториадиса в мире посредством своих замечательных переводов его работ на английский язык, содержательных предисловий и концептуальных статей, а также деятельности в рамках проекта Cornelius Castoriadis/Agora International Website<sup>3</sup>. Он выступал с докладами о Касториадисе на различных международных конференциях в Канаде, Франции, Германии, Греции, Мексике, Южной Кореи и США.

В номере представлено наше интервью-переписка с провокационным, вероятно, названием «*Всё, что Вы всегда хотели знать о Корнелиусе Касториадисе, но боялись спросить у Дэвида Эймса Кёртиса*», в котором затрагиваются в числе прочего вопросы о личности и жизни самого переводчика, о биографии, творчестве, идеях Касториадиса и актуализации его наследия в контексте современной ситуации.

Мы также публикуем перевод на белорусский язык статьи-некролога, написанной Кёртисом в год смерти Корнелиуса Касториадиса и раскрывающей основные этапы жизненного и интеллектуального пути философа. Перевод также содержит специальное введение для белорусской аудитории журнала, которое Дэвид любезно согласился написать. Мы искренне благодарим его за то, что откликнулся на нашу инициативу.

В данной рубрике будет также представлен перевод на английский язык обзорной статьи о Касториадисе белорусского философа Владимира Фурса (1963–2009), который собственно и ввел в научный оборот в рамках белорусского (и шире — русскоязычного) интеллектуального пространства концепцию Касториадиса. Данный перевод призван поспособствовать распространению идей Фурса среди более широкой (англоязычной) аудитории. Статья знакомит читателей с основными идеями политической философии Касториадиса (проект индивидуальной и коллективной автономии, гетерономия, социальные воображаемые означивания, магма и др.). Для презентации критических идей Фурса касательно концепции Касториадиса к тексту статьи специально (в качестве приложения) добавлены фрагменты из других статей автора. Публикация этого перевода является символическим жестом благодарности Владимиру Фурсу за его вклад в «прокачку» адептов

3 Cornelius Castoriadis/Agora International Website — это международный веб-сайт, размещенный по адресу <https://www.agorainternational.org/index.html> и содержащий библиографии и вебографии как текстов самого Касториадиса, так и критической литературы о нем на 21 языке, включая белорусский.

критической теории в беларусском (и не только) интеллектуальном пространстве.

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Обращение к интеллектуальному наследию Касториадиса, реализованное в данном номере/рубрике, не является призывом строго следовать его философской концепции и исключительно через ее призму интерпретировать и понимать современность в целом и Беларусь в частности. Подобное понимание превратило бы интеллектуальное наследие Касториадиса в разновидность идеологии, а его исполнителей-популяризаторов — в адептов «касториадисанства», что кардинально не соответствует духу его философского проекта. Но это и не формальное коммеморативное мероприятие. Как писал Д. Кёртис, «простое согласие с его предложениями сделало бы его монументальным, а не великим» (Curtis 2002: 184). Мысль Касториадиса открыта для дальнейшей проблематизации, прояснения и обсуждения. И наше обращение к этой мысли является, скорее, призывом критически актуализировать его идеи и продолжить философское вопрошание, опираясь на ценные интуиции, которые можно обнаружить в его текстах.

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# ПРОЕКТ АВТОНОМИИ К. КАСТОРИАДИСА В КОНТЕКСТЕ НОВОГО КОСМОПОЛИТИЗМА

Григорий Миненков

THE AUTONOMY PROJECT OF C. CASTORIADIS  
IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW COSMOPOLITANISM

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**Abstract:** The author addresses the prospects of the new cosmopolitanism project, which appears as a choice focused on individuality and its survival as an integrity in diversity. This reveals the relevance of Castoriadis's autonomy project. The author believes that Castoriadis's language of describing social reality can be used quite organically to characterise the latest trends in the development of cosmopolitan practices. The substantiation of the formulated assumptions is the purpose of this article. The article shows that new cosmopolitanism is an attempt to find an inclusive solution to the problem of universalism, which classical modernity and old cosmopolitanism failed to solve. The development of the discourse and practices of autonomy can become one of the effective means of such a solution. The main idea of the paper is that the projects of autonomy and new cosmopolitanism have similar goals and a direction, and they are a means of implementing cosmopolitan attitudes, or the process of cosmopolitanization. New cosmopolitan theories speak primarily of others, of otherness and autonomy. Autonomous societies can develop and implement cosmopolitan programs. If there is no adequate reflexivity in a heterogeneous society, then autonomous societies are reflexive by their very nature. The new cosmopolitanism revives the project of autonomy, takes it from a purely theoretical dimension to a practical one, and allows to discuss its practical implementation. To clarify this parallel, it is important to consider Castoriadis's interpretation of the political dimension of



social life. In this case, we are talking about developing cosmopolitan citizenship, which represents the highest level of individual autonomy. The article shows the most important role of creative imagination in its interpretation by Castoriadis in solving the identified problems and establishing various institutions of society. The article concludes that *paideia* is the central dimension of any policy of autonomy, which gives form to social chaos. Thus, we stop to divide the human world between 'us' and 'them' – us: the only real human beings; the others: savages, barbarians, heathens, we stop considering our representation of the world as the only meaningful one. This is the essence of cosmopolitanism as it is interpreted by the new cosmopolitanism.

*Keywords:* autonomy, new cosmopolitanism, imagination, universalism, democracy, *paideia*

## Введение

С самого начала своей истории человечество живет разобщенно. В то же время это состояние разобщенности всегда сопровождала мечта о единстве человечества, или космополитическая мечта. Казалось бы, речь идет об утопии, хотя и сохраняющейся многие столетия. И тем более сегодня, когда в Европе возродились демоны истории, которые, думали мы, навсегда ушли в прошлое после Второй мировой войны. Однако та тяга к единству человечества, которая обнаружилась в противостоянии этим демонам, говорит скорее об усилении космополитической мечты. Нужен только поиск таких средств ее реализации, которые учитывали бы новые характеристики социальной реальности, исходящие из социальной неопределенности как ключевой особенности состояния нынешнего общества и концепции модернити, акцентирующей множественный и интерактивный характер последней, что ставит качественно новые задачи перед социологическим воображением. На мой взгляд, значительную помощь в осмыслении и решении этой задачи может оказать нам социально-теоретическая концепция французского мыслителя Корнелиуса Касториадиса.

Касториадис в своем творчестве практически не обращается к космополитизму непосредственно; тем не менее представляется, что сформулированные им идеи вносят существенный вклад в интерпретацию особенностей динамики общества XXI столетия, в прояснение эффективных путей продвижения к космополитическому будущему человечества. Более того, язык описания социальной реальности, используемый Касториадисом, вполне органично может быть использован для характеристики новейших тенденций развития космополитических практик. Обоснование предлагаемой интерпретации идей Касториадиса и составляет цель данной статьи. При этом в центре наших рассуждений

находится соответствующая интерпретация проекта автономии Касториадиса как ответа на расширяющуюся возможность ответственного и свободного творчества людьми законов собственной жизни, а также множественного установления вариантов и перспектив социального движения и преодоления новых форматов гетерономии (в понимании этого концепта Касториадисом), зачастую упакованных в самые продвинутые новейшие технологии. При решении поставленных задач я стремился опираться на следующую идею Касториадиса, весьма созвучную, как представляется, направленности размышлений, излагаемых в статье:

«Каждое общество определяет и разрабатывает образ естественного мира, универсума, в котором оно живет. Оно пытается создать целостное единство означающих, где должны найти свое место как объекты и природные существа, играющие важную роль в жизни коллектива, так и сам коллектив и, наконец, определенный “порядок мира”. Этот образ, это более или менее структурированное видение всей совокупности наличного человеческого опыта затрагивает рациональные прослойки данной реальности, но располагает и подчиняет их значениям, источник которых — не рациональное (да и не иррациональное в позитивном смысле), а воображаемое» (Касториадис 2003: 167–168).

Очевидно, что обосновываемые в статье предположения требуют дальнейшего критического обсуждения, которому я и надеюсь содействовать данной публикацией.

### Новый космополитизм и перспективы проекта автономии

В последние десятилетия мы наблюдаем широкое возрождение и распространение в обществе космополитических идей и социальных практик (см. подр.: Миненков 2021, 2023). Многие теоретики говорят о космополитическом повороте в социальных науках, о том, что социологическое воображение все более требует нового рода воображения, которое может быть названо воображением космополитическим (Delanty 2009). Один из ведущих аналитиков современного космополитизма У. Бек во многих своих работах рассуждает о процессе «космополитизации реальности», что в концептуальном плане делает, по его мнению, необходимым переход исследовательских подходов к обществу от «методологического национализма» к «методологическому космополитизму», и это оказывается фундаментальным вызовом для социальных наук, долгое время развивавшихся, как правило, на основе методологического национализма, или фактического отождествления общества и государства (Бек 2008). Сегодня требуется

развитие космополитического мировоззрения как предпосылки и результата концептуальной реконфигурации наших способов восприятия мира. Причем данное мировоззрение предлагается рассматривать не просто как набор общих и абстрактных идей о прекрасном будущем человечества, как то было в прежних концептуализациях космополитизма, но как основу программы соответствующих космополитических практик, отвечающих реальным потребностям конкретных социумов и социальных групп. Не случайно в последние десятилетия развиваются программы так называемой космополитической социологии, стремящейся предлагать пути космополитических действий в конкретных областях социальной жизни (образование, право, сетевое взаимодействие и др.) (см., напр.: Cicchelli 2019; Delanty 2009, 2019, 2020; Köhler 2006; Skrbiš, Woodward 2013).

Такой «практический поворот» космополитических идей связан прежде всего с тем, что космополитизм на нынешнем историческом этапе из идеологии узких образованных групп, каким он был, как правило, прежде, превратился в ключевую характеристику образа жизни и повседневных практик практически всех жителей планеты, которые тем самым массово становятся реальными субъектами или агентами космополитических действий, причем далеко не всегда ясно осознавая подобное превращение, а в ряде случаев и сопротивляясь ему. Иными словами, космополитизм сегодня во многом приобретает статус обязательного и даже принудительного социального измерения, что и делает данный феномен столь социологически значимым. Цитируем в этой связи Бека:

«Что мы подразумеваем под “космополитической перспективой”? Это ощущение глобальности и безграничности. Это каждодневное, учитывающее опыт истории, рефлексивное осознание двойственного характера различий и культурных противоречий, среди которых мы все блуждаем. Она обнажает не только “страдание”, но и возможность выстроить собственную жизнь и отношения в обществе в условиях смешанной культуры. В то же время это взгляд скептический, лишенный иллюзий и самокритичный» (Бек 2008: 5).

Речь, иными словами, идет об опыте переживания социальными акторами общего и одновременно множественного мира, о характере их деятельности в таком мире, о том, как индивиды, группы и институты обращаются с инаковостью и сходством, открытостью и закрытостью. Согласно определению К. Аппиа, космополитизм — это «универсальность плюс различие», выражение нашей общей человечности плюс привычки, традиции, обычаи и творения людей в конкретных исторических контекстах, уникальные элементы, которые побуждают нас «серьезно относиться



к ценности не только человеческой жизни вообще, но и конкретных человеческих жизней» (Appia 2006: XV).

В основе космополитического воображения лежат три фундаментальные предпосылки – вера в общность человечества, принятие соответствующего набора моральных обязательств по отношению к другим и способность трансцендировать персональные границы и проявлять интерес к другим культурам (Cicchelli 2019: 3). Это те линзы, через которые смотрят на мир “жители” сетевого общества, вдохновляясь на противостояние всякого рода авторитаризму. И именно в них видят своих основных врагов архаические социально-политические структуры, настаивающие на том, что они охраняют самобытность и аутентичность. На самом деле реальные отношения между универсальным и партикулярным позволяют сделать вывод, что различные социальные группы и культуры не изолированы друг от друга, между ними имеет место постоянный обмен опытом; глобализация лишь сделала эти процессы более активными, массовыми и фактически необратимыми. Поскольку “глобальный другой находится среди нас” (Бек), для космополитического подхода становится критически важным на реальном эмпирическом материале определить, как индивиды и группы справляются с различиями и множественностью.

За 25 столетий своего существования космополитизм прошёл несколько циклов упадка и возрождения, а также концептуальных трансформаций. Классический космополитизм, имеющий свои истоки в античном стоицизме и достигший расцвета в эпоху Просвещения, ориентировался на утверждение в не столь отдалённом будущем некоего единого всеобщего правильного социального порядка, будь то просветительский, либеральный, коммунистический или иной мир. Иными словами, доведенный здесь до предела рационализм имел тенденцию превращаться в авторитарную и тоталитарную политическую структуру, внутри себя вполне логичную и убедительную, не понимающую, как же можно ей противостоять в ее искренних стремлениях утвердить стабильность и благополучие в обществе. И, конечно, нельзя забывать о европоцентристском облике классического космополитизма. Все эти черты с течением времени побуждали к острой критике космополитизма. Именно поэтому сегодня речь идет о так называемом новом космополитизме, который не является прямым наследником более старых его форм (Бек 2008; Köhler 2006; Vertovec, Robin 2002).

Новый космополитизм отличает себя от прежних его версий тем, что уходит от традиционных универсалистских принципов и стремится представить себя как реалистичный или, по крайней мере, реализуемый космополитизм, пытаясь найти “третий путь” между партикулярными и универсальными измерениями социальной жизни. Новый космополитизм — это космополитизм различий; он описывает особый модус обращения с инаковостью

других, который не растворяет их в универалистских принципах, не абсолютизирует и не эссенциализирует их особые свойства, как то характерно для классического космополитизма. Признание инаковости и, соответственно, агентности других становится базовым принципом нового космополитизма. Культурные различия не выстраиваются в иерархию инаковости и не разрешаются универсально, а принимаются как таковые, при этом устанавливается, так сказать, посредничество между глобальным и локальным уровнями. Иными словами, ключевой элемент нового космополитизма выражается в том, что реалии мира все больше меняются в сторону множественной принадлежности, нечетких различий и гибридных идентичностей, т. е. имеет место движение от логики “или/или” к логике “и то/и другое”. Космополитический субъект не представляется ни однозначным, ни предписываемым, ни стабильным, ни полностью отброшенным или свободно плавающим, но скорее рассматривается способным привязать себя к разным местам в одно и то же время, что явно отвечает возможностям и особенностям сетевого общества. Акцент делается не только на преодолении ограничений партикулярных единиц, то есть не только на аргументе освобождения, но и на идее сложных идентичностей и локальностей. Ряд исследователей (Аппиа, Бек и др.) ключевой чертой такого космополитизма называют укорененность, что открывает перспективу инклюзивности космополитизма. Речь идет о том, как универсальные ценности нисходят с уровня философской абстракции на уровень повседневной жизни людей, приобретают локальное измерение, о некоем синтезе универалистского и партикуляристского содержания. Подчеркнем также, что новый космополитизм уходит от европоцентристских утопий. Не случайно одним из основных его источников стала постколониальная теория, о чем не стоит забывать при встрече с попытками традиционно отождествлять космополитизм с европоцентризмом (см. подр.: Köhler 2006).

Сказанное означает, что повседневная жизнь современного индивида формируется процессами глобальной мобильности, а потому каждый вынужден включаться в рефлексивную оценку того, как его/ее персональный опыт вовлечен в транснациональные сети коммуникации. Именно поэтому важной чертой нового космополитизма является развитие рефлексивности, задающей конкретные вопросы о том, как практически утверждать такие условия, которые способствовали бы соединению реальных процессов космополитизации и мышления космополитических акторов. Разговор о новом космополитизме вовсе не означает проповедь некоей утопической социальной гармонии. Напротив, это сложный и драматический процесс, предполагающий каждый раз новый рефлексивный выбор, отнюдь не гарантированный в своей реализации. Каждый из нас постоянно оказывается в той или иной пограничной культурной зоне, что требует от нас согласо-

вания непрерывно пересекающих границы потоков культурных символов и артефактов. И тут не стоит быть утопистами: нарастание космополитизации может вести и к негативным реакциям на нее, к взрыву социальной архаики, что мы и наблюдаем сегодня в ряде регионов. Именно в этом моменте решающее значение приобретает рефлексивность, часто подавляемая всякого рода антикосмополитической пропагандой. В качестве одного из ответов на подобные ситуации можно вести речь о так называемом «децентрализованном космополитизме», обращенном к сложной сети кросс-культурных и самоорганизующихся коллективов (Parastergiadis 2019). Речь, иными словами, идет об опыте переживания социальными акторами общего и одновременно множественного мира, о характере их деятельности в таком мире, о том, как индивиды, группы и институты обращаются с инаковостью и сходством, открытостью и закрытостью, что предполагает отказ от жесткой логики идентичности.

Это означает, что новый космополитизм не может утвердиться сам по себе, он требует многообразной социальной активности. И именно на этом пути возможно выживание общества, в силу чего особое значение приобретает институционализация космополитизма. Это делает необходимым обращение к понятию критического космополитизма. Как отмечает Диленти, «космополитизм в качестве нормативной критики обращается к феноменам, которые, как правило, находятся в противоречии со своим социальным контекстом и потому они стремятся его преобразовать» (Delanty 2020: 126). При этом, продолжает автор, имеющая в этом случае место

«релятивизация универсализма выражает постуниверсализм эпистемологической структуры космополитизма, поскольку выступает за универсализм, который не требует всеобщего согласия или того, чтобы каждый отождествлял себя с одной единственной интерпретацией. В зависимости от социального контекста или исторической ситуации социальные акторы будут по-разному интерпретировать и использовать универсальные правила» (ibid.).

В этой связи особенно важным для нас оказывается концепт повседневного космополитизма, поскольку космополитическими все более становятся сами обстоятельства человеческого бытия. Космополитизм – это уже не некие просвещенческие игры интеллектуалов в духе кантовского его понимания, не экзотика, характерная для наиболее продвинутых обществ и социальных групп; космополитизм все белее охватывает реальную повседневность, так сказать, приходит в наши дома, заглядывает во все окна, проникает со всех экранов и дисплеев, обнаруживается на прилавках всех магазинов и т. д., иными словами, становится банальным, привычным и в определенной мере даже принудительным изме-

рением человеческой жизни, что позволяет нам вести речь о становлении массового космополитического мировоззрения, даже если его носители могут и не подозревать о таком социальном феномене, как космополитизм. Конечно, мы не можем утверждать, что глобальный мир стал полностью космополитичным. Тем не менее,

«было бы ошибкой недооценивать, упускать из виду или отрицать то, что большое количество культурных репертуаров, глобальных знаков, транснациональных воображаемых и общих иконографий и нарративов, с одной стороны, а также защита, продвижение и гибридизация идентичностей, с другой, создали мир, который в культурном отношении является одновременно множественным и общим. Разнообразие прославляется больше, чем когда-либо, в то время как сейчас человечество имеет все большее количество общих черт» (Cicchelli 2019: XVII).

Именно в этом контексте нам важно обратиться к концепции автономии Касториадиса.

Творчество Касториадиса всегда было направлено на поиск путей эффективной трансформации общества в направлении возможностей свободного развития индивида и на формулирование и обоснование таких концептуальных структур, которые делали бы адекватной творческую силу социально-исторического воображения перспектив свободной индивидуальности. И это, как представляется, весьма близко к основной интенции космополитического воображения, а именно, индивид должен быть способен вообразить единый и общий мир, в котором он находится во взаимодействии с другими, оставаясь самим собой, мир как единство многообразия. Еще раз подчеркнем, что новый космополитизм выступает в качестве выбора, уводящего от противопоставления различных моделей социального процесса, ориентированного на индивидуальность и ее выживание в качестве целостности в многообразии. И именно здесь видится актуальность проекта автономии Касториадиса, стремившегося ответить на вопрос о том, как индивиду оставаться самим собой в условиях нарастающего многообразия социальных структур и институтов.

«Если мы утверждаем, — подчеркивает Касториадис, — что современное общество имеет тенденцию к автономии, если мы хотим работать над ее осуществлением, то прежде всего потому, что рассматриваем автономию как способ существования человека, рассматриваем ее как ценность, признаем в ней наше главное устремление — устремление, превосходящее наши личные особенности, — то единственное, что мы можем публично защищать со всей ясностью нашего сознания и со всей его последовательностью» (Касториадис 2003: 115).

Автономное общество, по Касториадису, предполагает признание трех качественных характеристик, как можно заметить, содержательно весьма близких к названным выше фундаментальным предпосылкам космополитического воображения: во-первых, само общество является источником своей формы, своих смыслов и законов; во-вторых, созданные людьми социальные законы и нормы не даны раз и навсегда и как таковые могут быть коллективно — и публично — проблематизированы, подвергнуты сомнению и изменены; в-третьих, нет никаких заранее заданных границ для человеческого сообщества — кроме очень общих, экзистенциальных ограничений, таких как, например, смертность человека — и, как таковой, социальный коллектив сам должен устанавливать свои пределы (Adams 2014: 2). При этом автономное общество предполагает автономных индивидов, и наоборот. Проект коллективной автономии направлен на достижение «иног отношения» между устанавливающим и установленным обществом и, тем самым, на высвобождение коллективной креативности, что, в свою очередь, предполагает развитие способности членов общества участвовать в его рефлексивной и делиберативной деятельности. Для этого требуется создание институтов, которые способствовали бы наибольшей индивидуальной автономии (Castoriadis 1997b: 132–133). Свобода (или автономия) индивида невозможна без свободы коллектива — и, соответственно, коллективная автономия означает свободу заинтересованных индивидов. Что наиболее важно, без установленной обществом возможности (или способности) воздействовать на социальные структуры и изменять их люди никогда не смогут быть свободны больше, чем в узком, приватном смысле.

Подчеркнем также, что для Касториадиса прорыв к автономному обществу был исторически редким явлением, ибо только древние греки и современный Запад достигли его, и то лишь частично. По словам мыслителя,

«в качестве зародыша автономия возникает тогда, когда на сцену вырывается открытое и неограниченное вопрошание — вопрошание, имеющее отношение не к “фактам”, а к социальным воображаемым означиваниям и их возможному обоснованию. Это момент творения, и он возвещает о новом типе общества и новом типе людей. Я намеренно говорю о зародыше, поскольку автономия, как социальная, так и индивидуальная, является проектом. Возникновение неограниченного вопрошания создает новый социально-исторический эйдос: рефлексивность в полном смысле слова, или саморефлексивность, а также личность и воплощающие ее институты» (Castoriadis 1991: 163).

Деятельность, направленную на содействие автономии других, Касториадис рассматривает в качестве праксиса:

«Мы называем *praxis*’ом действие, в котором другой или другие предстают как автономные существа и как главный источник такого рода независимости. Истинная политика, истинная педагогика и истинная медицина в той степени, в какой они когда-либо существовали, принадлежат *praxis*’у» (Касториадис 2003: 87–88).

Для праксиса автономия другого или других есть одновременно и цель, и средство. Праксис стремится к развитию автономии как к цели и использует для этой цели автономию как средство, и именно этим характеризуется динамизм и неограниченность утверждения автономии, ее креативная суть, невозможность свести выбор образа действия к простому расчету. И именно в этом пункте, как представляется, можно видеть предельную близость проекта автономии и проекта нового космополитизма: оба проекта определяются высоким уровнем рефлексивности, свободой, стремлением согласовать свои интересы с интересами других, уважением к инаковости, в конечном счете — постоянно возобновляемой креативностью. И, конечно, следует непременно учитывать их многоуровневость.

Автономии Касториадис противопоставляет гетерономию, выступающую синонимом социального отчуждения, имеющего место тогда, когда общество не узнает в «воображенных» установлениях свои собственные продукты, воспринимает их как некую прочную и неизменную реальность. Состояние автономии означает рефлексивное создание социальных установлений — норм, законов, обычаев и практик — при сохранении пространства для их оспаривания, переоценки и переформирования по мере накопления опыта и появления дополнительных аргументов. Гетерономия, напротив, закрыта для таких вопросов и отказывается нести ответственность за формирование установлений, приписывая их создание внешним силам и авторитетам, например, богам, природе, разуму и т. п. Находясь под властью дискурса другого, субъект начинает воспринимать себя тем, кем он не является, оказываясь «во власти приобретенного самостоятельности воображения, присвоившего себе право определять для субъекта как реальность, так и его желания» (Касториадис 2003: 118). Скажем, отказ от космополитической установки выступает как подчинение себя дискурсу Другого, например, колониального, угнетающего субъекта. Автономия означает установление новых отношений между дискурсом Другого и субъектом, установление власти сознательного над бессознательным. Как подчеркивает Касториадис, следуя своим психоаналитическим установкам,

«автономия сводится в таком случае к следующему: мой дискурс начинает занимать место дискурса Другого, чуждого мне дискурса, находящегося во мне, имеющего власть надо мной и через меня говорящего» (Касториадис 2003: 117).

Заметим при этом, что нельзя упрощенно трактовать соотношение автономии и гетерономии как просто взаимно исключающих друг друга противоположностей. В таком случае идея автономии Касториадиса будет выглядеть полностью утопической. В действительности Касториадис подчеркивает их взаимодействие, что как раз и позволяет мыслителю называть автономию проектом, а не просто принципом, и тем самым видеть перспективы ее реализации в меняющемся обществе. И общество, и индивид являются источниками собственных установлений, и в этом смысле они автономны. Однако индивид, или психика, в терминах Касториадиса, формирует себя, учитывая формы, доступные ему/ей в социально-историческом окружении. И это означает, что социализация выступает внутренне гетерономным процессом, т. е. психика формируется в социального индивида в соответствии с дискурсами другого (Касториадис 2003: 385). На первичной стадии своего развития человеческий субъект представляет собой гетерономное социальное установление. Однако в процессе дальнейшего развития индивидом может/должно быть усвоено решающее измерение автономного общества — предписание выражать сомнение в дискурсах другого. О. Шпарага, подчеркивая необходимость учета взаимодействия, а не просто противопоставления автономии и гетерономии, вводит любопытный концепт альтерономии как третьего понятия в этой связке, “которое, с одной стороны, выражает позитивную роль в моем самоопределении среди других, а с другой — позволяет видеть среди образцов для интериоризации такие, которые значимы для других и для меня или которые я разделяю с другими” (Шпарага 2018: 121). Речь идет о дополнении цели самореализации целью реализации Другого, или сообщества, что становится основой интересубъективного взаимопонимания и согласия, развития практик взаимного признания. Можно спорить о выборе самого термина, но выделение такого посредствующего звена весьма важно, в том числе и для обоснования рассматриваемой в статье гипотезы.

Это означает развитие внутреннего диалога, взвешивание дискурсов и принятие решения об отношении к ним. Иными словами, автономный индивид постоянно взаимодействует с дискурсами другого, с инаковостью, с различием, учитывает их, а не просто утверждает себя как нечто особое в своем индивидуальном самостоянии. Следовательно, понятие автономной субъективности Касториадиса радикально отличается от атомистической или монадической свободы, характерной для классического либерализма. Автономия Касториадиса не есть изоляция, напротив, она развивается в поле многообразия, в окружении гетерономий, вырабатывая свое рефлексивное отношение к его элементам. И именно этим задаются практики воображаемого социального означивания, но при этом то, какой набор сигнификаций выйдет на поверхность и кристаллизуется в конкретной организации

социальной жизни, принципиально непредсказуемо (Касториадис 2003: 122).

Следовательно, дорога к будущему, полагает Касториадис, может и должна быть открыта через социальное и политическое пробуждение, возрождение проекта индивидуальной и коллективной автономии, то есть через волю к свободе, что потребует пробуждения творческого воображения. Необходимо творить новый образ общества с новыми ценностями. Таким будущим и выступает космополитическое общество, хотя непосредственно о нем Касториадис не говорит. Здесь очевидна идейная перекличка Касториадиса и Бека: только через развитие проекта индивидуальной и коллективной автономии, через новые воображаемые установления (методологический космополитизм, а не национализм, по Беку) можно поменять смысл жизни людей и остановить саморазрушение общества. И здесь нет предопределенности, но есть конкретные конstellации определенных социальных действий на основе автономии с присущей ей рефлексивностью (см. подр.: Оришева 2007).

Полагаю, можно сделать вывод, что проекты автономии и нового космополитизма имеют весьма близкие цели и содержательную направленность, стремясь к гармоничному сочетанию универсального и индивидуального на основе рефлексивного выбора. Проект автономии можно считать средством реализации космополитических установок, или процесса космополитизации, сочетания многообразных дискурсов в их некотором единстве, ибо «стремление к автономии предполагает желание этой автономии для всех, а ее полная реализация может быть представлена лишь как коллективное творчество», учитывая, что «проблема автономии заключается в том, что субъект сталкивается в самом себе со смыслом, еще не ставшим его собственным, который он должен трансформировать», другие же присутствуют здесь и «как инаковости, и как самость субъекта», что и задает соответствующие социальные отношения (Касториадис 2003: 123). Проект индивидуальной и коллективной автономии

«не утопия, а социально-исторический проект, который может быть осуществлен, и ничто не указывает на его невозможность. Его осуществление зависит лишь от трезвой активности отдельных людей и народов, от их понимания, воли и воображения» (Касториадис 2012: 9).

То же мы можем сказать и о и проекте нового космополитизма как своеобразной, скажем так, инкарнации проекта автономии, предполагающей взаимное рефлексивное проецирование социальных перспектив.



## Воображение и политические практики реализации автономии: к новому универсализму

Очевидно, что реализация проекта автономии способствует расширению социального многообразия и умножению встреч с инаковостью. Соответственно, и перед проектом автономии, и перед новым космополитизмом стоит проблема современной интерпретации универсализма. Собственно, новый космополитизм во многом и есть попытка найти решение проблемы универсализма, с которой не справились классическая модернити и старый космополитизм. Стремление задать единственную и «правильную» модель общества неизбежно вело к насилию, подавлению партикулярностей и взрыву сопротивления универсалистским схемам социального развития. Вероятно, именно в XXI столетии мы вышли к возможному решению проблемы соотношения универсализма и партикуляризма, поскольку отсутствие такого решения чревато сегодня опасностью гибели человечества. Развитие дискурса и практик автономии может стать одним из эффективных средств такого решения, способствуя поиску инклюзивной версии универсализма и тем самым адекватному обращению к проблеме признания различий.

«Поскольку космополитический мир является общим и множественным, а инаковость выступает повсеместной, необходимо разработать конкретную методологическую основу, предназначенную для понимания того, как люди социализируются, имея дело с разнообразными формами инаковости, выходящими за пределы национальных границ, и как они управляют динамикой принадлежности на различных уровнях» (Cicchelli 2019: XIX).

Именно с решением этой задачи связаны современные поиски адекватной интерпретации социального универсализма.

Позиция, разделяемая разными теоретиками, заключается в том, что универсализм является необходимым идеалом, во многом зависящим от случайных обстоятельств и различных потребностей, посредством которых он артикулируется. Любая попытка расширить форму универсализма всегда будет по-новому вписывать партикуляристскую перспективу. Поскольку главная предпосылка космополитического мировоззрения состоит в том, что

«человеческий вид может быть понят только в том случае, если к нему будут относиться как к единому субъекту, в рамках которого признаются и уважаются все формы различий, различия же концептуализируются как характеристики, внутренне присущие сущностному единству всех людей» (Fine 2007: X),

прояснение отношений между универсальным и партикулярным остается главной задачей этого подхода. Универсализм в этом

случае выступает как интеллектуальный ресурс, который делает возможным признание и принятие универсальностей. Как отмечает Э. Балибар, универсализм больше нельзя определять так, как если бы он обладал однозначной культурной характеристикой или развивался сугубо линейно. В действительности «идеальная универсальность» всегда формируется в промежутке между теорией и практикой, и универсализм — это не фиксированный моральный кодекс, но критическая перспектива, неизменно далекая от полной инклюзивности (Balibar 2002: 165). Иными словами, универсалистские притязания опираются на определенные и контекстно-зависимые позиции, благодаря взаимодействию которых они создают оценочный механизм для интерпретации конкретных ситуаций. Новый космополитизм выступает в этом плане как своеобразный постуниверсализм, признающий различие и автономию в контексте развития солидарности автономных индивидов.

Особенно важно при этом подчеркнуть, что новый космополитизм стремится уйти от картезианской субъект-объектной философии сознания, согласно которой когито задает смысл и характер отношений между Я и миром. Мыслящий субъект провозглашает себя образцовым гражданином мира, не задумываясь о том, как другие воспринимают этот мир. В результате конструируется упрощенная картина единого и общего мира, господствовавшая на протяжении всего периода классической модерности, т. е. автономия подменяется гетерономией. Новые космополитические теории говорят в первую очередь о других, об инаковости и автономии, и лишь изредка — о человечестве или мире в целом. Новый космополитизм — это космополитизм различий между автономными субъектами; он описывает особый модус обращения с инаковостью других, который не растворяет их в универсалистских принципах, не абсолютизирует и не эссенциализирует их особые свойства. Отсюда понятно, почему одна из главных черт нового космополитизма — попытка установить посредничество между глобальным и локальным уровнями, акцент на идее сложных идентичностей и локальностей. Гетерономные общества неспособны к космополитизму. Они ригидны, закрыты, чужды обновлению и могут только навязывать другим свой образ. Автономные общества могут вырабатывать и реализовывать космополитические программы. Если в гетерономном обществе отсутствует рефлексия, то автономные общества рефлексивны по своей природе. Они способны к реформированию. Автономная деятельность лежит в основе творчества и инновации. В этой связи обратимся в контексте нашей темы к интерпретации Касториадисом проблемы воображения

Суть своей социальной теории Касториадис видел в признании неограниченной креативности общества и истории, в основе чего лежит воображение в единстве с автономией: именно благо-

даря «непрерывной, по сути своей необусловленной» функции воображаемого создаются рациональность и реальность (Касториадис 2003: 102–103).

«Все, что проявляется в истории и через историю, не является определенной последовательностью определенного. Это скорее обнаружение радикальной инаковости, имманентное творчество, нетривиальная новизна» (Касториадис 2003: 238).

Концепция Касториадиса выходит за границы стандартных подходов к воображению. Согласно Касториадису, творчество — это не реконфигурация существующих элементов и не сборка, являющаяся результатом внешнего давления. Творчество происходит *ex nihilo*, что находит свое выражение в очень важном для Касториадиса концепте «радикального воображения». Если бы это было не так, полагает Касториадис, мы не смогли бы наблюдать разновидности социальных форм, т. е. обществ, универсумы значений которых уникальны и не могут быть реконструированы «с нуля». Пока радикальное воображение способно действовать, личность не может быть полностью детерминирована.

«Построение любым обществом собственного мира, — подчеркивает Касториадис, — есть, по существу, создание мира значений, его социальных воображаемых означиваний, которые организуют ... мир природы, восстанавливают свойственный обществу социальный мир, ... определяют способы формирования социализированных и гуманизированных индивидуумов и устанавливают мотивы, ценности и иерархии социальной (человеческой) жизни. Общество опирается на первый естественный слой, но только для того, чтобы возвести фантастически сложное (и удивительно связанное) здание означиваний, которые наделяют смыслом все и вся» (Castoriadis 1991: 41).

И здесь мы видим прямые коннотации с проектом нового космополитизма, свидетельствующие о его близости с проектом автономии. Если основной характеристикой космополитического осознания является то, что в идеале оно охватывает все человечество, выходя за рамки соседства и родственных отношений, а также принадлежности к стране рождения, то эту способность, или космополитическую оптику, можно развить только с помощью воображения. Космополитическое мировоззрение требует колоссальных усилий, внутренней перестройки человеческой психики, умения подняться в рамках своих воображаемых означиваний над всем многообразием современного человеческого мира. Такие особенности практик космополитического воображения ведут нас к ядру человеческой автономии — онтологическому открытию. Как отмечает Касториадис,

«автономия — это не закрытие, а скорее открытие: онтологическое открытие, возможность выхода за пределы информационной, познавательной и организационной замкнутости, характерной для устанавливающих себя, но гетерономных существ» (цит. по: Elliott 2002: 164).

Это вызов установленным значениям и институтам, но только таким может быть путь к космополитическому обществу, формирование которого представляется сегодня условием спасения человечества. И еще в этой связи цитата из Касториадиса:

«Если автономное общество — это такое общество, которое явным образом само себя учреждает, (...) общество, которое знает, что оно само себе полагает свои установления и означивания, то это значит, что оно также знает, что у него нет иного источника, кроме его собственного установления и основывающей деятельности, никаких внесоциальных “гарантий”» (Castoriadis 1997a: 316).

Сказанное означает, что судить о социальном воображаемом мы можем только косвенно, на основании последствий, но непосредственно оно никогда перед нами не предстает. И тут заключены загадка, возможность и перспектива автономии и ее практического развертывания в контексте ценностей нового космополитизма, в отличие от полной тривиальности и примитивности замкнутой в себе гетерономии. И это, кстати, позволяет нам наглядно видеть неубедительность стандартных обвинений космополитизма в утопизме, фактически гетерономных по своим истокам.

Предложенная выше интерпретация проектов автономии и космополитизма показывает, что они представляют собой политические проекты, а точнее, в определенной степени единый политический проект, где автономия находит в новом космополитизме свою современную форму дискурсивной и практической реализации. Фактически новый космополитизм, скажем так, оживляет проект автономии, выводит его из только теоретического в практическое измерение. С целью прояснения этой параллели важно учесть интерпретацию Касториадисом политического измерения социальной жизни, которое всегда находилось в центре его поисков.

Для Касториадиса политика — это процесс субъективации, в котором отсутствует четкая грань между индивидом и обществом, поскольку они конституируют друг друга. Политика представляет собой практическую коллективную деятельность, креативную по своей природе, которая стремится к прозрачности и объектом которой является целостный институт общества. О политике в собственном смысле слова, полагает Касториадис, можно говорить тогда, когда установления общества ставятся под

вопрос, т.е. политика эксплицирует взаимосвязь устанавливающей ипостаси общества с установленной. Следовательно, продолжая мысль Касториадиса, мы можем сказать, что реализация нового космополитизма в формате признания и утверждения разнобразия, с чем не справлялся старый космополитизм, есть политическая практика установления коллективной и индивидуальной автономии, отвечающая новейшим социальным тенденциям. При этом, опять же следуя пониманию социального процесса Касториадисом, подчеркнем, что достижение такого результата ничем не гарантировано, человеческое бытие трагично. И тем не менее наше воображение побуждает нас стремиться к желаемому результату и не камуфлировать трагизм. Вполне понятно, почему Касториадис в этой связи актуализирует аристотелевский концепт фронеzisа как способности выносить суждения в обстоятельствах, в которых сложно найти какие-либо объективированные правила вынесения суждения (Castoriadis 1997: 114).

Одним из наиболее значимых измерений творчества Касториадиса является попытка связать друг с другом идеи и практики демократии и социальной креативности (Оришева, 2007). Для Касториадиса демократия — это форма правления, которая признает и поддерживает тот факт, что общества создают сами себя. Демократия в таком понимании стремится к политизации и самоограничению там, где невозможны никакие гарантии. И это проект с трагическим подтекстом, так как нет способа гарантировать, что люди всегда будут стремиться реализовывать лучшие альтернативы (Castoriadis 1997a: 267f). Опыт греков показывает, что «демократия есть режим доксы, т. е. хорошо взвешенного мнения, той способности, которая помогает нам формировать мнение по вопросам, не поддающимся геометрическим рассуждениям» (Касториадис 2012: 160). И опять же ядром демократического проекта является принцип автономии, ориентированной на развитие гражданства, составляющей, так сказать, «вещество» последнего. В своей реальности демократия оказывается исключительным социально-историческим институтом в силу явного и рефлексивного признания социального характера установления общества. Другими словами, демократия для Касториадиса — это режим (политической) саморефлексии, ориентированной на прояснение того, какие законы мы должны иметь и по каким причинам, проект разрушения замкнутости на коллективном уровне (Castoriadis 1991: 20–21).

В этом контексте Касториадис переосмысливает проблему соотношения публичного и частного. Он полагает, что сложилась упрощенная ее трактовка в форме сведения этого соотношения только к двум элементам, и с целью ее преодоления предлагает вернуться к древнегреческим концептам, а именно, мы должны различать три измерения социального: *oikos* (дом, частную сферу), *ekklesia* (собрание народа, публичную сферу) и *agora* (рынок

и место встречи, публично-частную сферу). При тоталитаризме три эти сферы тотально спутаны. При либерализме имеет место преобладание публично-частной сферы (рынок, экономика) над публичной сферой и подавление последней.

«Демократия — это правильное сочленение (articulation) трех сфер и становление публичной сферы как подлинно общественной. Это требует участия всех в управлении общими делами, что, в свою очередь, требует институтов, побуждающих к участию и дающих людям такую возможность. В свою очередь, это невозможно без действительного политического равенства. ... Общество не может сделать всех равными так, чтобы все стали бы способны пробежать сто метров за десять секунд или прекрасно сыграть Аппассионату. Но оно может сделать их равными в отношении их действительного участия в любой существующей в обществе установленной власти» (Касториадис 2012: 11).

Это и есть становление того, что Касториадис называет социально-историческим бытием, что, как представляется, и выражает процесс космополитизации через реализацию проекта автономии (Castoriadis 1991: 36–37).

Космополитизация, будучи процессом, включающим индивидов во всеобщую взаимосвязь и в каком-то смысле задающим им общие параметры социальных отношений, одновременно побуждает их к индивидуализации и автономизации реакций на данный процесс, поскольку каждый может его реализовать с учетом локальных особенностей и потребностей в контексте транслокального взаимодействия. Конечно, речь при этом не идет о формировании некоего единого глобального субъекта, как о том мечтал старый космополитизм; многообразие автономных действий в гетерономном поле сохраняется. Политически это означает утверждение культуры подлинной делиберации. В центре здесь находятся понимание, интерпретация и практики решения проблемы инаковости при отказе от просветительской абсолютизации одной (научной) рациональности, которая якобы должна была в перспективе вообще снять названную проблему. Фактически речь в этом случае идет о развитии космополитического гражданства, представляющего, вероятно, высший уровень индивидуальной автономии.

Такое гражданство является альтернативой национализму и патриотизму как основе политического сообщества.

«В этом контексте космополитическое гражданство следует понимать на языке культурного сдвига коллективных идентичностей, включающего признание других. Космополитическое гражданство характеризуется уменьшением значения территории, в частности, измеряемой местом рождения при определении

гражданских прав. Кроме того, космополитическое гражданство предполагает меньший акцент на лежащей в его основе коллективной идентичности, поскольку космополитическое политическое сообщество не должно опираться на основополагающее культурное сообщество» (Delanty 2009: 127).

Это означает, что границы между космополитизмом и анти-космополитизмом больше не прочерчиваются исключительно по контурам наций, этнических групп и религий, но прокладываются между терпимостью и нетерпимостью, между способностью жить с противоречиями в общем социальном пространстве и стремлением к их подавлению и т. п. (Бек 2008: 165). Очень четко сформулировал этот космополитический вызов К. Рамфорд:

«Космополитизм требует от нас признать, что мы все позиционируемся одновременно как аутсайдеры и инсайдеры, как отдельные индивиды и члены группы, как “Я” и “Другой”, как локальные и глобальные. Космополитизм — это релятивизация нашего места в глобальных фреймах, позиционирование самих себя по отношению к множеству сообществ, постоянное пересечение территории локальных и коммунальных границ» (Rumford 2008: 14).

### Космополитизм, автономия, пайдейя (вместо заключения)

В ходе наших рассуждений мы пришли к выводу, что в конечном счете космополитизм — это преодоление автономным субъектом различного рода границ. Именно в этом аспекте наглядно видна концептуальная и практическая близость проектов автономии и нового космополитизма. И самым сложным тут является преодоление не внешних, а внутренних, ценностных границ, формируемых, как правило, уже в раннем возрасте в рамках гетерономных практик и несомых нами везде, где бы мы ни находились. От индивидуального или коллективного субъекта автономии требуется наличие способности критически рассматривать характер воздействия его/ее приоритетов и ценностей на других акторов, что ставит особые задачи перед политическими и образовательными практиками. Иными словами, поскольку инклюзия является основополагающим принципом любой космополитической ориентации на мир, ее реализация в решающей степени зависит от развития соответствующих образовательных практик, пользующихся институциональной поддержкой. Именно этот аспект был центральным в основополагающей работе М. Нуссбаум «Космополитизм и патриотизм» (2006), опубликованной в 1994 г. и ставшей источником практически всех последующих дискуссий о космополитизме.

Учитывая утверждаемую нами сущностную близость проектов автономии и нового космополитизма, вполне естественно обратиться к интерпретации Касториадисом сути образования, или пайдеи, как он обычно предпочитает говорить. К проблемам образования, трактуемым в духе античной пайдеи как части почти всех институтов, целью которых является подготовка новых поколений людей, развитие прежде всего субъективности, Касториадис обращается во многих своих работах (см. Straume 2013). Речь у мыслителя идет об образовании, направленном на утверждение проекта автономии и, соответственно, на развитие демократии как практического воплощения данного проекта.

Жизнь в демократическом обществе, подчеркивает Касториадис, означает наличие у нас интересов ко всему, что нас окружает в обществе, что и есть интерес к самой нашей пайдеи. И сам этот интерес является частью нашей пайдеи как процесса и этоса. Конечно, обращение к пайдеи вызывает ряд вопросов, ответы на которые нужно искать. Но при этом важно понять, что пайдеия есть

«все то, что в данном обществе, в рамках его публичной сферы, выходит за пределы того, что является просто функциональным или инструментальным, и, что наиболее важно, представляет собой невидимое измерение, позитивно выделяемое членами общества. Другими словами, пайдеия – это то, что относится к публичному присутствию воображаемого данного общества, *stricto sensu*, и воображаемого поэтического, *sensu lato*, поскольку это поэтическое воображаемое субстанциируется и воплощается в произведениях, установках и действиях, выходящих за рамки функционального и инструментального» (Castoriadis 2012: 71–72).

Функция образования — упорядочивать эту публичность в демократическом ключе, вносить в нее смыслы и означивания. А потому, подчеркивает Касториадис, придание хаосу формы — это лучшее возможное определение пайдеи (*ibid.*: 75). В определенном смысле власть (сила) пайдеи — величайшая из всех политических властей (сил), каждое общество скрепляется ею. Эта «изначальная власть» определяется центральными воображаемыми означиваниями общества, говорящими о том, что имеет смысл и значение, а что нет (Castoriadis 1991: 150). Представляется, что также мы можем охарактеризовать и функции космополитического образования.

Как можно понять, пайдеия сопоставляется Касториадисом с социализацией. Но иногда он также говорит о «подлинной пайдеи» или о «подлинном образовании», отличая их от «калечащего образования». Это такие пайдеия и образование, которые имеют место в автономной среде (политическая демократия) и направлены на автономию. Тем самым формируются индивиды, способные к саморефлексивной деятельности, исходящие из радикального



воображения и являющиеся источником индивидуального вклада в социально-историческое творчество (Castoriadis 1997b: 133). Правда, Касториадис нигде четко не проясняет, в чем конкретно выражается неподлинная пайдейя, учитывая, что без пайдейи не обходится ни одно общество, в том числе и не характеризующееся автономией. Страуме полагает, что Касториадис не нашел здесь адекватного термина. По ее мнению, концептуально подлинная пайдейя ближе всего к сути понятия *Bildung* в немецкой лингвистической традиции (Straume 2013: 222–223). В определенном смысле с этим можно согласиться, не забывая при этом, что Касториадис всегда стремился уйти от традиций классического немецкого идеализма

Фокусом образования для демократии должны быть, по Касториадису, социальные воображаемые означивания, в рамках которых другой мир рассматривается как возможный, желательный и осуществимый. С этой точки зрения «подход к знаниям, навыкам и ценностям» получает дополнительное социальное измерение, которое состоит не только из репрезентаций, но также из намерений, побуждений и аффектов (Castoriadis 1991: 337). Субъект образования является реляционным проектом, который находится в постоянном движении к освобождению своей способности делать и действовать в мире вместе с другими. Наиболее человеческим качеством является наша способность к радикальному воображению, воображению, способному создавать что-то новое. Согласно Касториадису, не рациональность, а творческое воображение является основным компонентом нетривиального мышления, и именно это лежит в основе пайдейи как ядра политического сообщества. Касториадиса здесь интересует то, как свобода, составляющая суть проекта автономии, конкретно используется индивидами, и именно на обретение навыков адекватного, т. е. не ограничивающего права и свободы других людей, ее использования направлена пайдейя (Adami 2015). «Только образование (*пайдейя*) граждан в качестве граждан может наделить “общественное пространство” ценным, существенным содержанием. Причем пайдейя это не вопрос только книг и академических кредитов» (Castoriadis 1991: 113). Пайдейя — это образование «от рождения до смерти», центральное измерение любой политики автономии (ibid: 173).

И здесь очевидна проблема поиска смысла.

«Его можно найти только в качестве следствий нашего проекта автономии. Пытаясь познать, понять других независимо от “практического использования” этого понимания, мы выходим за пределы замкнутости смысла нашего собственного установления. Мы прекращаем делить человеческий мир между “нами” и “ними” — нами: единственными настоящими людьми; другими: дикарями, варварами, язычниками и так далее. Мы перестаем считать

наше собственное установление общества единственно хорошим, разумным, истинно человеческим, а чужие установления — курьезами, абберациями, “примитивным вздором” (Энгельс) или божьей карой за их дьявольскую природу. Мы также перестаем считать наше представление о мире единственно осмысленным» (Castoriadis 1991: 37-38).

Фактически, это и есть суть космополитизации, как она трактуется новым космополитизмом. В этом положении Касториадиса, на мой взгляд, выражена суть идеи, лежащей в основе данной статьи.

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WORKING WITH THE IMAGINARY  
IN THE FASCIST AND COMMUNIST SOCIETIES  
AND OVERCOMING SOCIAL HETERONOMY  
IN THE THEORY OF C. CASTORIADIS

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*Abstract:* The article raises the question of fundamental identification and difference between the totalitarian regimes of fascism/Nazism and communism, followed by a discussion of their status in the first period of the post-Soviet political transit. The main arguments in favour of identifying both types of totalitarianism and marking fundamental moments of distinction were reflected in the polemic of A. Besançon and L. Kołakowski. Criticism of the totalitarianism of fascist and communist types in the works of the French philosopher of Greek origin Cornelius Castoriadis allows seeing the features that connect most totalitarian regimes despite the difference in their ideological programs, which can represent a certain threat even for modern societies. It also highlights those points of the Russian (Soviet) project of Communist society that allow differentiating between the Nazi and Communistic types of the Imaginary. Finally, the article considers the main types of public heteronomy, characteristic of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, as well as the neoliberal model of consumption society. According to Castoriadis, they are contrary to the ideas of social emancipation, replacing it with their principles of (pseudo) rational domination, against which his own project of collective social autonomy stands.

*Keywords:* Castoriadis, fascism, communism, heteronomy, totalitarianism



## Introduction

The twentieth century in the history of humankind is viewed as a time of triumph of totalitarian societies. Communism and fascism, despite the difference between their ideological structures, often induce their general conceptualization as totalitarian regimes within political theory. Indeed, such elements of the structural organization of communist and fascist societies as a systematic policy of repressions and violence against political opponents, terror against civil society and struggle with any manifestations of dissent, militarization and search for enemies outside and inside the state – look like common features of all totalitarian regimes. And to a certain extent, this can disregard the difference between communism and fascism in terms of influence on society. Therefore, discussions emerge from time to time among researchers of contemporary totalitarianism about the essential resemblance of the fascist and communist policies and the possibilities of their closer comparison not only as totalitarian regimes.

The other side of these discussions is a general accusation aimed at left-wing intellectual projects and movements of being totalitarian by nature in terms of their ideas, which is supposed to be confirmed by the history of the communist states of Europe and the world. To answer the questions, whether there is still a fundamental difference between such forms of totalitarian societies as communist, Nazi and fascist, and whether belonging to the left ideology automatically means being totalitarian by nature, it is important to consider the arguments of the most prominent representative of post-Marxism – the French thinker of Greek origin Cornelius Castoriadis, in the scope of his project of collective social autonomy.

### 1. The differences and similarities between communism and fascism: on the margins of the post-Soviet debates

Against the background of the collapse of the USSR as the most influential communist state in 1991, as well as due to the disappearance of the block of socialist states in Europe and the beginning of the post-communist transition, there emerged very revealing discussions among European intellectuals about the legacy of the communist regime and its comparison with the crimes of another totalitarian system which was destroyed and condemned in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Among others, the polemic between the French political scientist and sovietologist Alain Besançon and the Polish ex-Marxist philosopher and publicist Leszek Kołakowski, which took place on the pages of the Polish Russian-language monthly “New Poland” in 1999 (Nazism i komunizm, 1999), can be considered as a very characteristic feature.

A. Besançon’s arguments in favour of a closer identification of both regimes in history boil down to the fact that their historical and

ideological difference is explained by imperfect European politics of memory rather than their essential dissimilarity. The crimes of fascism and Nazism, according to the French thinker, are simply more obvious and pronounced compared to the crimes of the Soviet regime which also killed millions of its citizens, but did it less conspicuously and on the periphery of European politics, thereby causing a certain “amnesia” about itself. We are constantly reminded of the crimes of Nazism by Jewish society which internationally promotes the policy of recognizing the criminal nature of the Holocaust and commemorating the victims of fascist policies. It should be noted that, at the same time, Soviet communism, although it also killed many Jews and shared everyday anti-Semitism to a certain extent even at the state level, never came to “the solution of the Jewish question”, the core of its home policy. The civil society and counter-elites of the post-Soviet countries were so demoralized and weakened during the existence of the communist regimes in Europe that after the collapse of the system they did not have the power to raise their voices for the final condemnation of the crimes of Stalinism and communism. At the same time, Western societies were unable to cope with two threats at once, so they reduced their perception of the danger of communism, directing all their efforts to the destruction of Nazism.

Apart from the distorted European politics of memory, Alain Besançon refers to two more arguments that are on the ideological plane. On the one hand, he considers it a political error that fascism and communism are placed on different poles of the ideological spectrum (“right” and “left”), while their ideologies are much closer. To be fair, the ideology of German National Socialism does, at least at the level of rhetoric, seem closer to the “left” than the “right” pole, although the exemplary Italian fascism was predominantly the right-wing conservative type of discourse and practice. On the other hand, Besançon insists that “the greatest achievement of the Soviet ideologues was that they spread and imposed their system of classification of political regimes: they opposed socialism to capitalism, and they identified socialism with the Soviet system” (Nazism i communism, 1999: 15). As a result, we can hypothesize that the author sees the ideological closeness of communism and fascism in the fact that they do not fall clearly into the defined framework of the “right”-“left” dichotomy and probably form some other hybrid ideological focus.

His opponent, philosopher and publicist Leszek Kołakowski does not deny that “both systems were similar according to many and at the same time very important parameters” (Nazism i communism, 1999: 17-18), but insists that the differences between the systems should not be ignored, and they are quite obvious. So, Kołakowski does not agree with Trotsky’s idea about the different “class nature” of Bolshevism and Nazism which simultaneously preserve their external authoritarian similarity, but he claims that the difference lies in the very idea of communism, which is significantly distorted by the Soviet ideological

system. This idea, he believes, in itself attracts those people who strive for the truth and believe in humanity and the principles of building a society of justice, and this, in his opinion, explains why, on the one hand, so many critics of communism remain faithful to socialist ideals, clearly emphasizing the criminal nature of the Soviet totalitarian machine, and on the other hand, there are so many of those who were able to rejoin the work of building a socialist society, returning to the system from the Stalinist camps and remaining loyal to the ideal. In contrast to the adherents of the ideas of communism, former Nazis have nowhere to evolve except towards a complete rejection of their former views. “Communism was a descendant of the Enlightenment, albeit a degenerate one, while Nazism was an ugly bastard of romanticism” (Nazism i communism, 1999: 18) – Kołakowski insists polemically.

Another important difference between the communist and the Nazi regimes, as Kołakowski believes, is their attitude to deception: “communism was the embodiment of falsehood, a monumental lie, almost sublime in terms of its scale” (Nazism i communism, 1999: 16). While the fascist totalitarian system declared the supremacy of a certain race or nation, it also carried out policies that fully corresponded to these views, and therefore did not require a major deception of society, more or less openly manipulating the chauvinism and xenophobia of the masses. At the same time, the communist type of totalitarianism disguised itself as internationalism and humanism, equality and justice, freedom and the struggle for peace, although in practice it rather realized the complete opposites of these values, in accordance with the popular slogans from G. Orwell’s novel: “War is peace!”, “Freedom is slavery!” and “ignorance is strength!” Bolshevism, although it was initially a terrorist regime, Kołakowski continues, was forced to hide under the mask of universal deception, which reached its climax in the period of late Stalinism. It is noteworthy that here Kołakowski refers to Castoriadis’s ironic statement that the very name of the communist state – “the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” – is a quadruple lie.

The next distinction that Kołakowski makes is more polemical, as he claims that the “ideological authenticity” of communism allowed it to be more productive and creative in the field of culture, producing a large number of worthy works in various genres of art, while Nazism brought “only destruction and vandalism”. The statement is polemical regarding the controversy surrounding the general issue of Nazi aesthetics: “Olympia” by Leni Riefenstahl, paintings and sculptures in the genre of “romantic realism” by Adolf Ziegler or Arno Brecker, the opera “Carmina Burana” by Carl Orff staged in 1937, etc. This, to a certain extent, can be considered an ideological manipulation on the part of the Polish philosopher, taking into account completely different terms of existence of both systems. Moreover, the love for modernism and realism in both regimes seems to have been mutual. Technological and industrial progress was also equally demonstrated by both regimes,

although this again could not be so much their merit, but a certain trend that captured all European nations at the time.

Kołakowski's main thesis is that we should not equate within the single concept of "communism" the socio-political and socio-cultural situations that existed at the same time in the Soviet Union, the countries of the Warsaw Pact or, for example, "red" Cambodia, because "communism" here is rather a generic concept, which does not remove the question of the variety of types of communist societies. The same applies to the differences between communism and Nazism: they undoubtedly exist, although they share a common belonging to a totalitarian type of regime.

What is important for Kołakowski, he recognizes a partial capacity of communist regimes for limited internal evolution and even the presence of elements of self-criticism (as, for example, Khrushchev's well-known report), but he emphasizes that, objectively, the communist ideology is incompatible with freedom of speech and any significant liberalization of public life. In addition, one of the important observations about the structure of the communist society is its inhomogeneity (it cannot be said that the party and its apparatus, as an ideological monolith, remained exclusively the conductor of the communist idea) that, according to Kołakowski, can partially explain "strange and unexpected" election successes of post-communist parties in most countries, which has left the "empire of Evil". Although, to be fair, this partial success of parties that have retained a certain connection with the communist ideology in the post-communist space can also be attributed to the lack of consistent processes of decommunization and systematic condemnation of the crimes of communism, at least in the countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Thus, the general similarity between fascist (Nazi) and communist regimes, as well as their shared criminal nature, is not denied within the polemic, although there is a dispute about the number and quality of those differences that nevertheless make these regimes different. In this regard, we can turn to the argument presented in this context by the famous French researcher of Greek origin, Cornelius Castoriadis, who in his life not only had the opportunity to come into contact with the ideological and repressive practices of both systems, but also tried to find an answer to these questions: where does a repressive society come from? and what do we need to develop a project of social autonomy that opposes both fascist and communist versions of totalitarianism?

## 2. Similarities and differences of totalitarian systems in the theory of C. Castoriadis

Since he was 13 years of age, Cornelius Castoriadis became fascinated by the ideas of Marx and interested in politics, and at the age of 15 he



was already an active member of the communist youth movement, and later a member of the Communist Party of Greece during the autocratic rule of General Metaxa and the fascist occupation of the country. However, he quickly joined more radical, Trotskyist circles which nevertheless forced him to seek refuge in France, where he lived and worked until the end of his life. Becoming gradually disillusioned with the Stalinist version of communism, as well as with its more radical Trotskyist or Maoist interpretations, Castoriadis, who became one of the theorists of Western post-Marxism, offers his own project of collective autonomy and emancipation, harshly criticizing the totalitarian practices of both the Soviet communist ideology and the right-wing Nazi and neo-Nazi populism. However, his attitude to both systems also reflects the dynamics of fixing both elements of similarity and significant differences, as well as the previous polemic of Kołakowski and Besançon.

As Cornélius Castoriadis points out: “Communism and Fascism *are not* as a matter of fact two ways, as monstrous as they are, of resolving the problems of the modern age. Both destroy the societies they seize hold of and can endure only so long as their combination of lies and terror can hold up” (Castoriadis, 2010a: 242). What unites both regimes is slavery, into which society collapses, as well as other signs of totalitarianism, first of all, “the distinction between the public and the private is abolished, the private sphere of each citizen is absorbed by the established power, and the public sphere itself becomes the secret and ‘private property’ of the dominant group” (Castoriadis, 2010a: 242). At the same time, the threat of communism, from the cosmohistorical standpoint, is considered by Castoriadis to be more dangerous, since Nazism will limit its project to an appeal to one nation and its global ambitions for domination, which inevitably leads to its defeat, while communism reaches a more universalistic goal and can be adapted by every society, expanding its influence to new regions.

Nevertheless, in order to be able to compare both regimes, let alone talk about their probable commonality, one must first analyse the understanding of the reasons for the emergence and nature of each of them in the version of Castoriadis. The thinker does not agree with Roland Barthes’ well-known statement that a kind of natural fascism is simply in the language, to the extent that each language is a conductor of direct or indirect authoritarianism, since the roots of social heteronomy and violence should be sought not at all in language, which, after all, is a means to reach agreements between people and is what “liberates me” (Castoriadis, 2003b: 28).

Castoriadis sees the historical reasons for the emergence of fascist and Nazi impulses, which later pervaded societies, in other things. It is widely believed that fascism arises as a result of a crisis, but it is clear that a crisis alone is not enough for this. “There needs to be a capacity to believe and an unleashing of passion, each one connected to the other, each one nourishing the other” (Castoriadis, 2003c: 40),

emphasises Castoriadis. This statement somewhat echoes François Lyotard's well-known idea that the era of grand narratives was possible only in times when people were ready to enthusiastically embrace a new ideology and support it with the energy of their emotions (Lyotard, 1984). Based on this, the functioning of a fascist society requires people to be willing to die and kill for an Idea, the belief in which is dogmatic, and rage and obsession are made far more important social virtues than reasoning or pragmatic calculation. To a certain extent, this relationship of belief and civic pathos may be characteristic of both fascist and communist societies, but the desire for open expression of one's emotions is often much more pronounced under a fascist regime.

However, almost contrary to the previous statement, Castoriadis warns of the threat of growth, including neo-Nazi and generally authoritarian movements in societies that may be gripped by panic or consist of an apathetic population (Castoriadis, 2003e: 116). Such impartiality and inability to manage one's own emotions soberly can often lead to a desire for a "strong hand" and a simple solution to complex socio-political and crisis situations. The question that remains open, however, is this: Is the presence of a crisis in civil society and the absence of natural immunity against authoritarianism sufficient for the rise and consolidation of a fascist society or a social organism prone to febrile or epileptic reactions is needed for the proper functioning of the virus of Nazism?

What unites all totalitarian regimes, bringing communism and fascism together, is the already mentioned desire to establish a regime of total slavery and "(pseudo)rational (pseudo)mastery", says Castoriadis. Every totalitarian regime is "the extreme, the delirious form of this project of total mastery" (Castoriadis, 2003d: 226). Its intention to completely subordinate each person is exhaustively depicted in G. Orwell's well-known dystopia where the totalitarian triumph of Big Brother over the will and freedom of Winston Smith is achieved not when the hero agrees that  $2 + 2$  does not equal 4, but when he convinces himself that he really loves his master, that is, he has completely internalized the program of mastery. And although every totalitarian regime is doomed to an early death, this does not guarantee the impossibility of its return later. Totalitarianism of this kind can arise in those societies where the demand for total mastery can be actualized again.

According to Castoriadis, authoritarianism is possible where a "crisis of democracy" can be observed, which he sees even in the post-war world. First of all, the corruption of democracy begins with the destruction of its ethos: "responsibility, shame, frankness (*parrhêsia*), checking up on one another, and an acute awareness of the fact that the public stakes are also personal stakes for each one of us". Castoriadis speaks of the shamelessness of all anti-democratic regimes. The presence of such a civic and political virtue as shame (*shame*, αἰδώς) is important for politics to remain a sphere of responsibility, and "the

absence of shame is *ipso facto* contempt for others and for the public” (Castoriadis, 2003g: 6). It is the absence of shame, from the point of view of Castoriadis, that characterises such regimes as fascism and communism. The feeling of shame, in turn, is responsible for weighing one’s own and other people’s words, striving to be responsible for what is said and avoiding manipulation. A sense of shame is usually something that is completely absent in the regime of state propaganda: it does not hesitate to say mutually exclusive things, contradict itself or falsify facts<sup>1</sup>. A long practice in shameless speech and action leads to another mark of the totalitarian regime – the corruption of meanings and mental mechanisms under the influence of totalitarian hoaxes: if for fifty years it has been said that the Stalinist regime is an advanced form of democracy, writes Castoriadis, it is not surprising if the bearers of such ideologies begin to believe that the same “Athenian democracy (or self-management [*autogestion*]) is equivalent to totalitarianism” (Castoriadis, 2003g: 8). Such a destruction of meanings in some ways corresponds to the practice of violating the “correctness of names”, which the ancient Chinese sage Confucius spoke about. When things begin to be called by their wrong names, the common space of meaningfulness is destroyed<sup>2</sup>.

The importance of book-review criticism is driven by the mechanisms of public criticism: when this sphere begins to decline or becomes an ideological appendage to the political strategy of power, the institution of public authority and thinking begins to crumble. Within authoritarian regimes, it is not that criticism itself disappears, including literary criticism as a separate institution, but it ceases to solve social problems and becomes a tool for imposing certain ideological dogmas and a means of fighting against dissenters, actually ceasing to be criticism and turning into a tool of repression. However, Castoriadis considers an even more significant feature of the “crisis of the epoch” and the transition to “pathetic times” – “its impotence to create or to recognize the new, has been reduced to rehashing, re-masticating, spitting out, and vomiting up forever a tradition it is not even truly capable of knowing and bringing to life” (Castoriadis, 2003g: 8). Although the totalitarian regimes of the 20<sup>th</sup> century gave birth to modern forms of life and art (although the real source of their birth may have been the revolutionary pathos that preceded the later reaction), they very quickly collapse to pave the way for the most banal and fruitless attempts to return to the romantic times of the “Teutonic ancestors”, “imperial Rome” or idealized “simple people’s life”, the culture of “Aryan” art, “romantic” or “social” realism, whose works can

1 More details on how authoritarian and totalitarian regimes use similar techniques for propaganda purposes can be seen in (Ellul, 1973). I also touch upon this topic in relation to modern politics here (Barkouski, 2018).

2 I also wrote more about the politics of changing names and other ways of post-political domination of the consciousness of the masses here: (Barkouski, 2016)

often be considered as evidence in favor of the cultural “secondary nature” of totalitarian art. Clearly, Castoriadis means not only culture in the broad sense of the word, but also forms of social life which are very quickly cemented and reduced to rigid and ugly forms imitating a turn to traditions, but in fact only helping to support the structure of authoritarian rule.

What is also important to note among the general characteristics of totalitarian regimes, both communist and Nazi, is their specific attitude to the idea of truth: it is no longer possible to “ground it rationally”. That is, not only truth itself, but even the establishment for its acceptance turn out to be corrupt: it is impossible for the supporters of these ideologies to prove the paradoxical or deceptive nature of their arguments, because nothing can force them to recognise the existence of any objective arguments or positions that differ from their views. “No more than you can ever, faced with a sophist, a liar, or an imposter, ‘force him to admit’ the truth (to each argument, he will respond with ten new sophisms, lies, and impostures), can you ‘prove’ to a Nazi or a Stalinist the preeminence of liberty, equality, or justice” (Castoriadis, 1984: 195). Similar manipulations of the concept of truth are demonstrated today by the current Russian or Belarusian authorities, who are trying to hide the objectivity of some high-profile event at the international and political level under a large number of fake reports and paradoxical versions of interpretation, as it happened, for example, with the crash of the Malaysian passenger Boeing over the territory of Donbass in 2014 (Mölder and Sazonov, 2019) or the forced landing of the Ryanair aircraft on the territory of Belarus in 2021 (Darmanin and Kuznetsov, 2022), or in the form of outright lies under the guise of truth from official persons of the Russian Federation in advance of the Russian intervention in Ukraine in February 2022 (Bort, 2022). Similarly, the Stalinist and Nazi regimes once refused to recognize their own aggressiveness and violence, “explaining” their military campaigns and interventions solely as provocations against them or as their attempts to prevent “conspiracies” on the part of their victims and their allies<sup>3</sup>.

The destruction of the authority of truth is necessary for a totalitarian regime in order to control its own population and to instill in it the idea of the “fairness” of the political course pursued by the totalitarian state. It is not accidental that in G. Orwell’s dystopia the Ministry of Truth is engaged in direct propaganda under the slogan “Ignorance is knowledge”, and the rewriting of history according to the “truth” of a historical moment is placed at the core of the state ideology. Distortion of history and propaganda manipulations are a certain ideological base of a totalitarian society, both in the past and in the

3 An example of this is the Nazi operation Gleiwitz (Kuzniar, 2015) and the incident at the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war (Nenye et al., 2015).

present. According to Castoriadis, you will never be able to “deduce” the socialist idea from a certain demand for truth or place it in an “ideal communicative situation”, because, as the thinker observes, it seems that the very idea of truth and the idea of liberty do not simply coexist in parallel with each other, but create a close connection and “have no meaning, ultimately, except together”. It is difficult for a slave to hold on to the truth, because his “freedom” to speak the truth will always depend on the will of his master. A rational debate with representatives of the ideology of Nazism or Stalinism is impossible for three reasons. First, you will never be able to prove to them the validity of your maxims (their value base). Second, they will not simply argue with you in this manner<sup>4</sup>: “Nazis and Stalinists do not discuss, they just draw their guns” (Castoriadis, 1984: 215). Third, our statements lose relevance for us only because we are used to giving more or less certain content to the terms like “person”, “humanity”, etc., which does not always coincide with the definitions of these notions by representatives of certain ideologies. Today this is made extremely clear in discussions about the concepts of “democracy” and “Western values” held by representatives of autocracies around the world.

However, for Castoriadis, the problem of totalitarian regimes, such as Stalin’s communism or Nazism, lies deeper than ignoring basic values or the attitude to truth: it is their attack on the “species essence of man”, as defined by classical Marxism. The accusations against modern totalitarianism by Castoriadis sound even stronger than against traditional Marxist criticism of the capitalist state and society, because the “crisis” or “death” of capitalist society at certain stages of its revolutionary transformations did not lead to the automatic rejection of the system of exploitation, but the latter transformed into other forms. It is in the totalitarianism of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that the exploitative strategy of the capital reached its greatest clarity: “We have seen that during capitalism’s period of decadence and organic crisis this state of things changes and that, in particular, the victory of fascism allows capital to dictate imperatively to the workers their working conditions”, and hence, the long-term effect of the victory of fascism, in particular, “the transformation of the proletariat into a class of modern-day industrial slaves” (Castoriadis, 1988d: 136-137). However, the position of the majority of the proletariat in Stalin’s time also looks similar to the above diagnosis, although for slightly different economic and ideological reasons: “Communism in its realized state represented a monstrous hijacking of the revolutionary workers’ movement. It placed in power

4 Anti-Soviet culture attributes to the famous Czech communist and internationalist of the 1930s, K. Radek, a joke, a wordplay in the Russian language, difficult to convey in translation, which is apt in this context: “It is impossible to argue with Stalin: you give him a citation, he gives you an exile” (in Russian, “ссылка” means both an “exile” (as punishment) and “citation” of a literary source) (Gordon, 2022).

a new dominant class, the bureaucracy of the Party-State, which exploited and oppressed the population as no other regime known in history has done” (Castoriadis, 2010a: 243).

What exactly coincides with the “economic logic” of capitalism, fascism, and even Stalinism, and what Castoriadis himself strongly disagrees with, is the construction of a certain hierarchy of labor relations, when more “scarce” and advanced work requires, they say, higher pay, which becomes the foundation for social inequality and labor discrimination, denying in the long run the very idea of a classless society. Castoriadis sees this as a contradiction to the ideas of Marx and early Lenin and observes that today any most advanced labour has sufficient “raw material” for production, meaning a large number of skilled and trained workers to perform it (Castoriadis, 1988d: 149-150).

When Castoriadis tries to offer a diagnosis of the communist regime that was established in Russia after 1917, he does not refrain from harsh assessments: “the Russian Revolution had led to the instauration of a new type of exploitative and oppressive regime in which a new ruling class, the bureaucracy, had formed around the Communist Party. I called this regime total and totalitarian bureaucratic capitalism” (Castoriadis, 2003f: 125). This is not a “degenerated workers’ State”, as Lev Trotsky once called it, but, the researcher believes, its complete opposite. Calling the Stalinist regime a system of bureaucratic capitalism, Castoriadis criticises, however, the popular theory of “state capitalism” and considers it not very appropriate in the case of the USSR, basing on 4 main arguments:

“(a) the instauration and stabilization of this regime (which normally ought to have been the product of an overdevelopment of capitalism) not in the advanced countries (the United States, Germany, England) but in a backward country; (b) the absence of almost any connection between today’s bureaucrats and former capitalists; (c) the way in which the bureaucracy came to power; and (d) the Russian policy in the glaxis, a policy of assimilation that in its first phase totally dispossessed the capitalists (which would be absurd if the regime to be set up were State capitalism)” (Castoriadis, 1988c: 54).

On the other hand, continues Castoriadis, “in order to fulfill the requirements of its economic policy (which depends upon continuous State growth), and by carrying out its social policy (which requires a large base of support against both the bourgeoisie and against the proletariat), it actually prepares for the triumph of new strata that are to form its political and economic bureaucracy” (Castoriadis, 1988b: p. 63). Stalinism, like fascism, engages in political mystification and fights with the trusts allegedly for the rights of the deprived, the workers, generally the “middle class” who were exploited, but in fact, they rather enter into a new historical alliance with the petty bourgeoisie, generating a specific social stratum in the position of new exploiters.

In general, analysing the roots of Russian communism and especially the model built in the 1930s by Joseph Stalin, Castoriadis sees here a greater influence of the imperial legacy of the Russian state on its politics in those years than the actual ideas of Marxism: “What remains, therefore, is this very deep-rooted tradition, anchored in people’s souls, of obedience to the authority of the czar or his successor” (Castoriadis, 2010b: 231), he writes, which all Russian reformers, starting from Peter I, Catherine II, Alexander II, Stolypin and Gorbachev himself failed to overcome. What Stalin did in fact, he replaced the previous religious imaginary with a totalitarian one, so that instead of the ideas of Caesarism, the idea of the “laws of history” embodied in him came to the fore with a similar effect. In his criticism of Soviet Communism, which he sometimes calls the “Russian-Communist Empire”, Castoriadis has been quite consistent since 1945. This is partly due to his personal disillusionment with the Communist Party of Greece, of which Castoriadis was a member for a short time, and which appeared to him to be a “chauvinistic and a totally bureaucratic organization” (Castoriadis, 2003f: 125), or a totalitarian micro-community. Considering the fact that the Communist Party of Greece at that time was led by a conscious Stalinist Nikos Zachariadis, who adopted many management tools from the experience of the Soviet bureaucracy, this forced Castoriadis to critically assess the pseudo-Marxist nature of the communist movement in the USSR.

Castoriadis draws attention to the fact that Stalin’s communism and its descendants received technical and ideological means of terror, interference in people’s daily lives and manipulation of their consciousness, which are incomparable in the historical perspective. He succeeded in subordinating himself and destroying the international labour movement, “subordinating it to Russia’s imperialist policy”, corrupting and prostituting the ideas and vocabulary of the revolutionary movement, discrediting the ideas of social transformation and making the capitalist regime a “paradise on earth” for the mass consciousness, which disoriented itself and weakened the left movement to a great extent after the fall of the Soviet totalitarian system. Soviet communism changed the original impulse of Marxism and replaced it with its own orthodoxy. And where there is orthodoxy, there arises a dogma and the keeper of this dogma (a new faith) – the own Church in the form of the Communist Party and its instrument of maintaining purity, modern inquisition – in the form of the KGB. Thus, the Marxist ideal of emancipation in the USSR is replaced by the secular confession of communism, “a mystificatory and pseudoreligious messianism” (Castoriadis, 2010a: p. 246), which requires more faith and devotion from its followers than the presence of a critical mind or aspiration for justice.

The worst thing that the Soviet communist system did in anthropological terms was that it gave birth to a new type of person whom Castoriadis calls the “disciplined individual”, who in some ways resembles a cadaver, “both enthusiastic and passive”. In practice this

anthropological mode fell into two main types — “the cynical, lying, manipulative bureaucrat obsessed with power, and the regular citizen, apathetic and fearful, who flees all responsibility and who cheats as much as he can in order to preserve for himself a miserable niche in which to live” (Castoriadis, 2010a: 244)<sup>5</sup>. In each case, it killed all elements of the democratic — if they ever existed in the Soviet system — from the very beginning. For Castoriadis, this explains the reasons for the rise of chauvinist and nationalist ideas in the post-Soviet countries, because they are based on this collapse of the communist man.

Another witty observation by Castoriadis is a statement that can be connected to the previous description: there is the thirst in communist regimes (not only in Soviet Russia) for perverse and pathological forms of culture in their undisguised discrimination of the beautiful. Castoriadis defines it as a society based on “affirmative hatred of beauty”, that is, the inability to create beauty and even consciously resist it (Castoriadis, 2010c: 90)<sup>6</sup>, which can be compared with the ancient Greek idea of the obligatory connection between the aesthetic and moral qualities of a person, the ideal *καλοκαγαθία*. The corruption of morality and its replacement with the principles of loyalty to the party discipline and conformity to the party line is combined here with the support of forms of cultural life that not only parasitize on the forms of beauty, but also give rise to the communist kitsch, faded and dull late-Soviet aesthetics: the vagueness of the art of socialist realism, the bulkiness of its architecture, excessive pomp theatrical parades and performances.

Totalitarian suppression of society and ideological manipulation, according to Castoriadis, are not an accidental feature of the Soviet communist or Nazi society, but a natural effect of the activities of the state ideological apparatus. In his famous work “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”, the French Marxist researcher Louis Althusser emphasizes:

“Given the fact that the ‘ruling class’ in principle holds State power (openly or more often by means of alliances between classes or class fractions), and therefore has at its disposal the (Repressive) State Apparatus, we can accept the fact that this same ruling class is active in the Ideological State Apparatuses insofar as it is ultimately the ruling ideology which is realized in the Ideological State Apparatuses, precisely in its contradictions. Of course, it is a quite different thing to act by laws and decrees in the (Repressive) State Apparatus and to ‘act’ through the intermediary of the ruling ideology in the Ideological State Apparatuses” (Althusser, 1994).

- 5 This assessment of Castoriadis correlates in many respects with the description of the “red man” made by the Belarusian writer, Nobel laureate Sviatlana Alexievich in her documentary novel *Secondhand Time. The Last of the Soviets*.
- 6 Castoriadis covers this topic in more detail here (Castoriadis 1982).



Therefore, it is impossible, Cornelius Castoriadis continues in the same vein, for the goal of totalitarian rule in society to be an “external” phenomenon in relation to the Apparatus or for the Apparatus to be simply a “means” to achieve some other goals through it. This aim itself brings together this Apparatus and keeps it in motion: “it is conveyed through its very mode of being, inscribed in its daily life and functioning; it is constantly nourished by the external and internal activities of the organization, at the same time that it nourishes them” (Castoriadis, 1993a: 284). It is for this reason that even before the moment of their actual domination in the state, the Communist and Nazi parties carried a totalitarian impulse in their core, were “totalitarian microsocieties”. In the Soviet Union, Castoriadis points out, the Summit of the Central Committee of the Communist Party actually established its totalitarian power in the country by first exercising its complete domination over the Communist Party as a mass organization, and this “embryonic realization of unlimited power” over the whole society became possible precisely because of the victory of the bureaucracy over the democratic structure of the party organization (Castoriadis, 1993a: 285).

### 3. Different types of social heteronomies and their opposition to the project of collective autonomy

Based on the previous arguments, one might think that, in fact, there are no significant differences between different types of totalitarianism, and in this regard, for Castoriadis, the difference between fascists and Communist-Stalinists is completely irrelevant. But it is not quite so. According to Castoriadis, at the base of the totalitarian Russian communism represented lies magma, the main principles of which are the following: 1) the ugly twisted principle of emancipation, 2) the “rational”-capitalist principle of managing society and the economy, 3) the religious principle in the “orthodox”, a theocratic form, where church dogma was replaced by “ideology” which for most of its adherents actually did not fundamentally change anything (Castoriadis, 2003a: 380). These principles are not a recipe or elementary composition, but they formed a certain recognizable “spirit” or “style” of this regime. The idea of freedom and emancipation of society remains at the core of the communist image, Castoriadis thinks, sharing the beliefs of Leszek Kołakowski: this initial impulse of freedom within communism compels, in his opinion, even permanent opponents of the communist bureaucracy, who were disappointed in the project of the USSR as a communist state, or later social democrats to do it or share the radical ideas of Marxist-Bolshevik messianism. Nazism, or fascism, in this sense never stands for a universal formula of liberation and therefore, together with the disappointment in its institutional form, does not lead to its replacement by some other Nazi ideal: in this sense, the slogans “Forward to the victory of communism!” and “Germany

above all” have a completely different symbolic dimension and historical contextualization.

The problem of the communist system lies in the initial unrealistic model that is chosen for the construction of the state. In his most famous work Cornelius Castoriadis points out:

“If by communism (‘higher phase’) is meant a society in which all resistance, all depth, all opaqueness would be absent; a society that would be purely transparent to itself; in which everyone’s desires would spontaneously harmonize with everybody else’s, or, in order to harmonize would require merely an airborne dialogue which would never be weighted down by the gum of symbolism; a society that would discover, formulate and realize its collective will without having to pass through institutions, or in which institutions would never pose a problem – if this is what is meant, then we must clearly state that this is an incoherent reverie, an unreal and unrealizable state whose representation should be eliminated. This is a mythical formation, equivalent and analogous to that of absolute knowledge or of an individual whose ‘consciousness’ has absorbed his entire being. No society will ever be totally transparent, first because the individuals that make it up will never be transparent to themselves, since there can be no question of eliminating the unconscious” (Castoriadis, 1987: 111).

The Nazi imaginary is much more consistent in its desire for absolute domination, which, however, is disguised as good for the nation or the people’s state – in its ugliness and absurdity, it remains, nevertheless, uncontroversial. According to Castoriadis, the triumph of fascist and Nazi ideology in the countries that were in the position of European losers – with the absence of foreign colonies and the opportunity to transfer part of the burden of their economy to them, was almost historically inevitable. This occurs at a time when “the whole of economic development between 1930 and 1939 is characterized by the increasingly important economic role played by the State qua supreme organ of coordination and management of the national capitalist economy, and by the beginnings of an organic fusion between monopoly capitalism and the State” (Castoriadis, 1988a: 83). The Nazi and fascist imaginary mystifies and manipulates the consciousness of the masses in an attempt to revolutionize the “middle class” and direct it completely to support the cult of the State and the centralized military economy, which must become the national salvation and the main national interest – an idea in itself extremely reactionary-capitalist at its core. The origins of Nazism and fascism should be sought not in the idea of freedom and emancipation, but in the idea of national superiority and competition of states, in something like corporate competitions, where nations defend the colours of their team in a global competitive struggle.

Does this mean, however, that the totalitarian projects of communism or Nazism/fascism are tightly bound to a specific time and historical-national and economic context, and that they are impossible to repeat today? The answer to this question is complex. On the one hand, as stated earlier, for the emergence of real totalitarian societies, one political or economic crisis is not enough, an appropriate degree of faith and liberation of feelings is needed, which today seems quite unlikely in most developed Western societies. Therefore, most of the ultra-right or ultra-left parties remain completely marginal and are puppets of more significant political and economic forces. On the other hand, certain elements characteristic of probable new totalitarian regimes can be found even now, according to Castoriadis. He pays particular attention to the new “green movement”, or the activities of eco-organizations. He is confused by the fact that behind the very idea of “ecology” there is no clear political project, and this makes the idea of political future ambivalent:

“The effort to take these things into account has to be integrated into a political project, one that of necessity goes beyond ‘ecology’ alone. And if there is no new movement, no reawakening of the democratic project, ‘ecology’ can very well become integrated into a neofascist ideology. Faced with a worldwide ecological catastrophe, for example, one can very readily see authoritarian regimes imposing draconian restrictions on a panic-stricken and apathetic population” (Castoriadis, 2003e: 116-117).

To prevent such a threat, Castoriadis himself considers it necessary to include environmental demands into the framework of a radical democratic project, “that the reappraisal of present-day society’s values and orientations, which is implied by such a project, be indissociable from the critique of the imaginary of ‘development’ on which we live”. The reluctance of environmental organisations to be “neither with the left nor with the right” often leads them to political indiscernibility and fixation exclusively on the solution of environmental issues without taking into account the whole complex of necessary social transformations, which often turns them into forms of lobbying or radical activist movements with anti-capitalist pathos, but without a transparent program of action. Castoriadis is quite skeptical about the success of the “Green” party even in Germany, since having completely integrated itself into the existing parliamentary system and quickly rid of the principle of rotation and recall of its deputies, as an eco-movement it has almost completely lost its meaning, actually turning into a centrist party of measured reforms. But the non-systemic environmental movement which can rely on the fact that a large-scale environmental disaster will open the eyes of society, is also historically incorrect: “An ecological catastrophe, for instance, could very well lead to a series of quasi-fascist dictatorships — ‘The holiday is over.

This is your ration for the coming month: ten liters of oxygen, two gallons of petrol, etc. That's all” (Castoriadis, 2010d: 219).

Castoriadis tends to raise the question about the origins of the “underlying fragility built into the psychopolitical personality of Western man”, which originates from the revolutionary events in France in 1789, or maybe earlier, and is connected with the struggle against injustice, absolutism, oppression of freedom to give birth, in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, to masses of people enthusiastically willing to join totalitarian movements, carry out furious party propaganda and ugly large-scale repressions and to organise concentration camps for dissenters. Even the events of the revolutionary May of 1968 in France not only gave birth to a movement of resistance to bureaucracy, authoritarianism, pseudoknowledge, etc., but also added many new members to the clearly totalitarian (Stalinism, Maoism) or potentially totalitarian (Trotskyism) movements from a number of civil activists of the French revolutionary events (Castoriadis, 1993a: 298).

Castoriadis also sees signs of a totalitarian mindset in the so-called “new democracy” program in post-war France, inspired by the French Communist Party. Their main theses aimed at the middle class still contain the same totalitarian message, he notes, exporting Stalinism to Western countries: 1) the fight against trusts as a global evil that provokes economic crises and the rise of fascists to power; 2) calls for “people’s democracy” and reliance on the proletariat as the most progressive social class in building democracy; 3) ensuring social stability through the transition to a planned economy; 4) involvement of middle-class members as cadres of the new society (Castoriadis, 1988b: 62-63). It is clear that we are talking about “democracy” in the same sense, meaning the concept of democracy has long covered the authoritarian regimes of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries around the world. But the typical path to totalitarianism is shown here as finding an exaggerated enemy and mobilizing society to fight against them, idealizing certain forms of social, political and economic life as a means of solving complex problems of the present, and aggressive recruiting of new supporters.

Thus, signs of a totalitarian society can be found in the new world even after the destruction of the most obvious states which are systemic carriers of the ideas of fascism — Nazism and communism. But does this mean for Castoriadis that there is no alternative to the dilemma of choosing between a totalitarian society and a liberal one, as suggested, for example, in K. Popper’s famous work *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Popper, 1994)? In fact, what unites authoritarian and totalitarian regimes with conditionally liberal-democratic regimes in the concept of Cornelius Castoriadis is their heteronomous character, which he tries to contrast with his own project of social and political autonomy. But what exactly is a heteronomous society? Castoriadis clarifies:

“Heteronomy has been confused, I mean identified, with domination and exploitation by a particular social stratum. But domination and exploitation by one particular social stratum is but one of the manifestations (or realizations) of heteronomy. The essence of heteronomy is more than that. You find heteronomy in primitive societies, actually in all primitive societies, yet you cannot really speak, in such societies, of a division into dominant strata and dominated strata. So, what is heteronomy in a primitive society? It is that people strongly believe (and cannot but believe) that the law, the institutions of their society have been given to them, once and for all, by somebody else – the spirits, the ancestors, the gods, or whatever – and are not (and could not be) their own work” (Castoriadis, 2003b: 25-26).

In other words, we are talking about the subordination of the system of social control by certain political forces which assume the sole responsibility and right to speak on behalf of society and to prove laws and principles to public life on their own. This clearly manifests itself in totalitarian societies which are imbued with the idea of mastery, which is completely incompatible with the idea of autonomy, because autonomy, according to Castoriadis, primarily contains the idea of “self-limitation”, which automatically nullifies the transition to the dominance and mastery of a single force in society and also cancels the desire for its arrival. It is also incompatible with the corporate principle adopted in business communities, since, according to the author, it contains in its inference the same totalitarian impulse, which does not allow it to be extended to the construction of society as a whole and allows itself to be criticized in relation to economic life.

According to Castoriadis, what the early Marxists and the later supporters of Marxism-Leninism were wrong about in their uncritical acceptance of the development of capitalist practices, is the idea of the development of productive forces as a universal measure for all phenomena, the very principle of production as the social norm that should, when necessary, give birth to a new social order, as well as ideas of endless technological progress, which nevertheless formed ideas about the world that undermined the foundations of the project of collective autonomy (Castoriadis, 2003d: p. 226). Castoriadis also considers the short-sightedness, or “paradoxical blindness” of Marx himself as the fact that he allegedly does not notice the bourgeois roots of all those phenomena that he considers to be natural components of the society described by him, so that the very idea of the bourgeoisie and its culture can be seen as the natural core of the Marxist social project “and the few hints he provides makes one think that he saw ‘communist society’ only as an extension and enlargement of this same culture” (Castoriadis, 2003i: 284). Castoriadis considers Marx’s “catastrophic illusion” to be the non-imaginary “laws of the historical process”, which give rise to belief in some objective “social theory of change” and, as a result, lead to communist orthodoxy and dogma, while the roots of

real collective autonomy must be sought in spontaneous and horizontal activity of masses.

Thus, the heteronomy of totalitarian societies lies in their tendency to build closed structures of domination, or rather “(pseudo)rational (pseudo)mastery”, totalitarian parties as totalitarian micro-societies, which turn inside out even the idea of freedom and emancipation, from which followers of communist ideology initially depart. Castoriadis also sees the roots of the problem, as Hannah Arendt did in her time (Arendt, 1951), in the totalitarian society’s destruction of the private/intimate sphere and its placement in the plane of the agora – public/private and even more so, the ecclesia – public/public sphere. Communist regimes tried to make their population necessarily “happy”, while “happiness” (poverty alleviation, or other incarnations of this approach) should not be the subject of politics, because the real subject of politics is “freedom” or liberation, according to Castoriadis (Castoriadis, 2010e: 101). Addressing Richard Rorty’s dilemma: what should a society be like – “without poverty” or “good to Socrates’ existence”, Castoriadis emphasises that absolutely no society will ever be as favourable as possible for the existence of Socrates who need freedom of opinion and critical thinking. Rather, the ideal that he himself recognizes as the ideal of a “free society” is precisely such a society that must create a project of social autonomy, producing an environment conducive to the existence of a new Socrates.

In turn, Castoriadis sees the roots of the heteronomy of Western liberal “(pseudo)democracy” in the creation of a conformist consumer society, which is governed by the principle of political apathy and is not very interested in active political life. Being the editor of the magazine “Socialism or Barbarism” for a long time, Castoriadis defines the latest barbarism not as fascism, a declassified society or a return to the Stone Age, but as the state of his contemporary societies, both in the West and in the East:

“It is precisely this ‘air-conditioned nightmare’, consumption for the sake of consumption in private life, organization for the sake of organization in collective life, as well as their corollaries: privatization, withdrawal, and apathy as regards matters shared in common, and dehumanization of social relationships. This process is well under way in industrialized countries, but it also engenders its own opposites. People have abandoned bureaucratized institutions, and ultimately they enter into opposition against them. The race after ‘ever higher’ levels of consumption and ‘ever newer’ consumer objects sooner or later condemns itself by its very absurdity” (Castoriadis, 1993b: 46–47).

The project of collective autonomy, proposed by Cornelius Castoriadis, must be a response to the heteronomy that was generated and sometimes continues to be generated by totalitarian regimes of the communist or Nazi-fascist types, despite the difference in the sources

of their origin and the key principles of the construction of heteronomy, as well as to that version of the heteronomous society that modern practices of over-consumption and social apathy give rise to, which correspond to the policies of neoliberal societies. At the same time, we must understand the difference between these types of heteronomy and lack of freedom in order to be able to find an appropriate civil response to them, according to the famous thinker.

## Conclusion

Thus, with the collapse of the Soviet system and the beginning of the post-communist transition in Eastern Europe, discussions arose about the crimes of the Soviet system and their general similarity to the legacy of Nazi totalitarianism. In the version of the French political scientist Alain Besançon, the definitions of classical political science about the difference between communism and fascism, the distorted politics of memory regarding communist crimes in the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and the similarity of their repressive social practices, mass genocide and state interference in people's private lives require critical revision. At the same time, however, elements of essential distinction were also noted, which, according to the Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski, can be reduced to the distortion of the original humanistic and socialist pathos in the Soviet version of communism, a more systemic level of social deception, the "poverty" of Nazi aesthetics compared to the wealth of culture behind the times of communism, the inhomogeneity of the promotion of its ideology among the masses.

The French philosopher and political scientist of Greek origin, Cornelius Castoriadis, who strongly criticises both versions of totalitarian society and offers his own version of the project of social emancipation which would overcome the principle of social heteronomy, offers to look at the similarities and differences of these historical totalitarianisms in their essential basis. Despite the fact that in the historical perspective, Castoriadis considers the threat of communism to be more significant for humanity than Nazism or fascism due to its universalist nature, he believes that communism and Nazism really have a number of common features that unite them within the totalitarian form of social relations. This is the systemic slavery in which the workers in both systems find themselves, the destruction of the sphere of privacy, the emphasis on (pseudo)rational total domination over history and society, the corruption of meanings and the sense of shame (of the moral mode of existence), the barrenness of ideas and images, the manipulation of the concept of truth and tendency to sophistical exaggerations, general degradation of the "species essence of man".

At the same time, Castoriadis notes the rooting of the project of Russian communism, especially Stalinism, in the earlier ideas of

Russian imperialism, its reliance on a new social ruling class – the bureaucracy, which also continues the processes of exploitation of the masses, the mystification of the idea of communism and mixing it with a religious type of belief, which led to the dogmatization of the idea and the emergence of the institution of secular inquisition, the creation of a new anthropological type – a disciplined individual who is located in the gap between cynicism and apathy, the distortion of the canons of aesthetics and the creation of ugly forms of the “beautiful”. But both communism and fascism, along with Nazism, were guided, according to Castoriadis, by the common desire in their core, the party apparatus, for unlimited mastery as an implementation of the principle of totalitarian micro-society, which turns its own ideology into a state Ideological Apparatus.

Castoriadis consistently criticises those types of heteronomous social projects that are implemented in modern totalitarian societies and the neoliberal projects of consumer society, offering an alternative to them in the form of his own project of collective autonomy. The historical “style”, or “spirit”, of the communist system was determined by such features of its totalitarianism as a twisted principle of emancipation, a “rational”-capitalist principle of management, a religious principle of interpreting one’s own ideology. Its utopianism lies in the concept of an absolutely transparent community, harmonised at the level of its individual and social desires. The Nazi imaginary, which tries to exploit the enthusiasm of the masses, does so in the interest of a reactionary-capitalist policy of state competition and the desire for world domination. Nevertheless, this totalitarian impulse does not disappear in historical times and can be, according to Castoriadis, revived in recent history with appropriate moods in society caused by manifestations of a crisis, such as an ecological one.

Castoriadis critically assesses the “psychopolitical fragility” of Western democracy and the desire for emancipation, which often turns into projects of total dehumanization, repression and lies. The project of social autonomy is possible where there is an awareness at the level of society that social institutions and ideas are the product of a specific historical social struggle, and not a monolithic social form brought down “from above”. The modern version of consumer society, in turn, bears the mark of “barbarism”, which, for Castoriadis, comes down to the processes of privatisation, escapism and apathy, as well as the dehumanization of public relations. Therefore, in order to move towards social emancipation, we must distinguish different types of social heteronomies, which have their own unconditional distinctiveness, in their desire to replace social development with the project of their (pseudo)rational mastery. At the same time, the criminal and totalitarian nature of communist ideology and society, especially during the Soviet era, should not be an accusation against any “left” perspective, which, after all, is the project of collective autonomy of Cornelius Castoriadis himself.



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EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS WANTED  
TO KNOW ABOUT CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS  
BUT WERE AFRAID TO ASK  
DAVID AMES CURTIS

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*Abstract:* Andrey Rolyenok's conversation/correspondence with David Ames Curtis on Cornelius Castoriadis's legacy, its preservation, promotion, and critical updating in the context of the current socio-political situation took place in January–March 2023. The contribution of the Agora International Association to the development and extension of Castoriadis's work is considered in the interview. The origins of Castoriadis's thought (break

- 1 David Ames Curtis (1956–), who studied Philosophy at Harvard, is a translator, editor, writer, and citizen activist. He has worked as a multiracial community organizer in the Carolinas and as a feminist union organizer at Yale University, where he also directed research for Henry Louis Gates Jr.'s Black Periodical Fiction Project. Curtis's translations and writings appear in American, European, and Australian journals and books. For each translation, he writes a Translator's Foreword, each time new and each time improvised, to express, through philosophical reflection, how he himself has been transformed. Curtis coordinates a Bibliographers' Collective for the Cornelius Castoriadis/Agora International Website. He has spoken at conferences in Canada, France, Germany, Greece, South Korea, Mexico, and the USA.



with Marxism, revision of psychoanalysis, influence of Martin Heidegger's ideas, return to ancient philosophy, etc.) are evoked. Key ideas of Castoriadis are reconstructed and contextualized (the project of individual and collective autonomy, creativity, and the rising tide of insignificance). The problem of the reception and critique of Castoriadis's ideas in contemporary social thought is articulated (e.g. in Zygmunt Bauman's theory of liquid modernity).

*Key words:* Castoriadis, David Ames Curtis, Socialisme ou Barbarie, autonomy, heteronomy, creativity, psychoanalysis, Marxism, the rising tide of insignificance

**Andrey Rolyenok:** Although translators often remain in the shadow of authors, David Curtis can hardly be reduced to Cornelius Castoriadis.

**David Ames Curtis:** Certainly. I was fortunate to work closely with Cornelius Castoriadis for the last thirteen years of his life and have translated and edited more than a million words of his writings. Part of my practice as a translator-editor is to create an imaginary character who would be Castoriadis as a native English-speaking author (while somehow preserving his distinctive voice as a native Greek speaker who learned French at an early age from his Voltaire-inspired Greek father and who spoke English very well). But I also emerge regularly from that creative process to reflect philosophically on how I myself have been transformed by this extended experience of original third-person voicing and to recover/recreate my own voice. By way of highlighting differences: Castoriadis's aesthetic taste at times veered frankly toward what I consider the bombastic — High Gothic cathedrals and Wagner (though also jazz) — while I admire Frank Lloyd Wright and Free Jazz.

**A.R.:** You have translated various authors. Cornelius Castoriadis, Claude Lefort, Jean-Pierre Vernant, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, and Jean-Jacques Lebel are among them. Where does your passion for the French language come from?

**D.A.C.:** I would not speak in terms of a “passion for the French language.” I did learn French in Junior and Senior High School in suburban eastern Massachusetts, becoming a *lauréat régional* in the *Concours National de Français*, and I continued reading and writing about texts in French while at Harvard University. I had worked in a grassroots Civil Rights organization in Virginia and as a multiracial community organizer in the Carolinas before being hired by Professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. as a researcher for the Afro-American Studies Department at Yale University, where I also helped organize the largest American strike on the issue of “comparable worth” with Local 34, Yale's feminist

labor union of secretaries and other “pink-collar” workers. It was because my life-partner, the choreographer Clara Gibson Maxwell (who, like me, studied Philosophy at Harvard but who had herself attended a Paris *lycée* her last year before college), wanted to move back to France to dance that I reinvented myself as a translator, writing to Castoriadis to propose translating more of his work (I was already compiling an extensive French-and-English bibliography of his writings before arriving in Paris to meet him in person).

**A.R.:** Generally speaking, you are a complex creative person. You are passionate about music (jazz) and sports (baseball). What are your other hobbies? What are you working on at the moment (translation, book, article)?

**D.A.C.:** Thanks for the compliment. I generally don’t like to speak about myself personally in public settings, except insofar as that might foster autonomous philosophical reflection, political action, and artistic creation in myself and others while offering an account of material I have made public (there is a duty to provide a “self-presentation” to one’s audience, the classical historian and essayist Pierre Vidal-Naquet has said). Yes, it is true that I love jazz and baseball, two original American cultural forms (as well as another one, cinema — in my case especially American films of the late 1940s). Our Appalachian Springs Foundation is currently sponsoring a monthly jazz music and interview series, “Third Thursdays”<sup>2</sup> in Cambridge, Massachusetts that is inspired by the “Harmolodic” musical theory of Clara’s longtime collaborator, the late Pulitzer-Prize-winning composer and saxophonist Ornette Coleman. “Harmolodics,” which gives equal value to *harmony*, *motion* or *rhythm*, and *melody* — hence this magmatic neologism — articulates a profoundly *democratic* conception of participation, where anyone in a collective setting can, while listening and responding to others, help to steer an improvised collaboration in new and unforeseen directions. We have also funded Nathaniel Draper’s experimental film that takes the choreography-for-film investigations of Maya Deren into the digital age and a work of “poetic cinema” directed by Anastasia Melia Eleftheriou that uses the Greek myth of Tantalus to illustrate/dramatize ecological and water-access issues. The 80<sup>th</sup> Annual Gathering of The Thoreau Society hosted the Virtual World Premiere of Clara’s latest dance film/social documentary. Revolving around an 1859 excerpt from Henry David Thoreau’s *Journal*: “What we call wildness is a civilization other than our own,” *Thoreau’s Henhawk Visits Mexico* is a 39-minute video of a choreographic/musical/video-projection/spoken-word performance for a colloquium at the early 16<sup>th</sup>-century Casa de la Primera Imprenta de América (House of the First Printing Press in

2 <https://dbryantmusic.com/third-thursdays/>

the Americas) in Mexico City, with the active participation of students from the Cátedra Interinstitucional Cornelius Castoriadis (CICC) for this bilingual event.<sup>3</sup> One of the CICC attendees, Ana Julia, who has worked with the Amuzgos, an indigenous people in Guerrero State, on their pirate-radio project in an area suffering from water-access issues, was particularly interested in Thoreau's involvement in native culture and civil disobedience. The audiovisual record of the post-performance student discussion with our artistic-technical team about the relevance today of Thoreau's views on art, nature, native peoples, somatic practices (yoga), and social change forms the emotionally gripping and thoughtfully fascinating final section of our new video. We are now seeking a venue for *Henhawk's* Live World Premiere.

**A.R.:** In 1990, you co-founded the Agora International Association (AI). If I understand the mission of the project correctly, AI is about the emancipation of knowledge, free access to Castoriadis's ideas and the possibility to circulate them. This is relevant because digital and economic inequalities in academia continue to exist in the contemporary world (paid access to databases, problems of independent researchers without academic affiliation, etc.). Is the AI project a life project for you? What is its purpose and significance? You devote a great deal of attention to supporting it. Please, tell us a little more about the team and the inner workings.

**D.A.C.:** In plain sight of everyone, Agora International has quietly created for the Cornelius Castoriadis/Agora International Website a self-managed Bibliographers-Webographers Collective (currently in twenty-one languages, including Russian and Ukrainian, and soon Belarusian, Czech, Farsi, Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian).<sup>4</sup> Each bibliographer-webographer is responsible for, and signs, his/her own work while also remaining responsible to the Collective. No censorship is exercised, so that everyone can know everything written in these languages by and about Castoriadis and/or his postwar revolutionary group *Socialisme ou Barbarie*<sup>5</sup> and thus can reply, in full knowledge of the relevant material and as they see fit, to anything already published, with these new responses then added to the extant bibliographies/webographies. We currently have 2,650+ individual and organizational free subscribers who themselves share with our bibliographers-webographers new information about potential references and who may write to correct or supplement existing ones.<sup>6</sup> In this way, a constructive and horizontal (nonhierarchical) international dialogue is

3 The trailer may be viewed at: <https://vimeo.com/kaloskaisophos/thoreau-henhawk-visits-mexico-trailer>

4 <https://www.agorainternational.org/bibliographies.html>

5 See also our sister websites: <https://soubscan.org> and <https://soubtrans.org>

6 For a subscription, people may write to: [contact@agorainternational.org](mailto:contact@agorainternational.org).

established, limited only by each person's linguistic capacities and internet access. Those who welcome a non-“spectacular” presentation of this project may view a 16-minute video I created for a CICC colloquium.<sup>7</sup>

Someone who once came from the Danish Ministry of Culture to the Agora International headquarters (in reality, our Paris apartment) was surprised/disappointed, given the evident breadth and depth of our work, to discover that there weren't dozens of paid research assistants working like little elves in small cubicles eight hours a day. All our CC/AI Website bibliographers-webographers are volunteers sharing information that informs and benefits themselves as well as others worldwide. Some have created major complementary projects conducted in their own languages, such as the aforementioned Cátedra Interinstitucional Cornelius Castoriadis (Spanish)<sup>8</sup> and the Verein für das Studium und die Förderung der Autonomie (German).<sup>9</sup>

**A.R.:** What has Agora International organized or published to commemorate the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Castoriadis? I know of 6 volumes of *Crossroads in the Labyrinth*. What other events or publications have you been involved in?

**D.A.C.:** Agora International does not publish anything on its own, besides actual bibliographical-webographical-videographical references/links and contributions from students and teachers to our “Teaching Castoriadis” section.<sup>10</sup> On their own initiative, people associated with the CC/AI Website did organize Castoriadis 100<sup>th</sup>-birthday celebrations, for example in Greece. And in our “News” section,<sup>11</sup> we announced to our subscribers various other events that took place around the world about which we were informed (the strength of our website derives from the grassroots circulation of pertinent information, going from the bottom up instead of simply from the top down). And yes, all six volumes of Castoriadis's *Carrefours du labyrinthe* series (a large series of texts written to complement his 1975 *magnum opus*, *L'institution imaginaire de la société*) are now available together online in English translation, for the first time and free of charge, as *Crossroads in the Labyrinth*: <https://www.notbored.org/cornelius-castoriadis-crossroads-1-6.html>.

**A.R.:** *The Imaginary Institution of Society* was not translated into English until 1987. The translator was Kathleen Blamey, who specializes in translating Paul Ricoeur.

7 <https://vimeo.com/kaloskaisophos/david-ames-curtis-pregunta-2-agora-international> (in English with Spanish subtitles)

8 <https://www.agorainternational.org/cicc.pdf>

9 [https://autonomieentwurf.de/?page\\_id=23](https://autonomieentwurf.de/?page_id=23)

10 <https://www.agorainternational.org/teaching.html>.

11 <https://www.agorainternational.org/news.html>



Why was Castoriadis's magnum opus translated so late? Why didn't David Curtis do this translation? Is it difficult to translate Castoriadis in general?

**D.A.C.:** Blamey's IIS translation was already underway when I first contacted Castoriadis in 1984. And Ryle/Soper's English-language translation of the first volume in the *Carrefours* series had come out that same year from Harvester Press. On strike at Yale at that time, I wrote to Castoriadis to propose translating other writings of his and to edit for book publication existing translations done by my predecessor "Maurice Brinton," the co-founder of Socialisme ou Barbarie's sister organization, London Solidarity — his real name, Christopher Agamemnon Pallis, can now be revealed after his death. Cornelius and then Chris readily and generously accepted.<sup>12</sup> At Castoriadis's request, I later proposed extensive corrections, revisions, and bibliographical updates when Polity Press decided to reprint IIS as a paperback in 1997. Polity, however, was willing to incorporate only those changes that did not affect the existing typeset pagination, and they systematically ignored the new bibliographical information Castoriadis asked me to provide (my three volumes of Castoriadis's *Political and Social Writings* had been published in the meantime: 1988, 1988, and 1993).

As far as the level of difficulty involved in translating Castoriadis, his work is — despite a false projection spread by many who willfully or ignorantly confuse it with what he himself has called "the French Ideology" — actually much less arduous to translate than the unnecessarily arcane and convoluted constructions that characterize much of postwar French writing. It is always compelling to engage with this trenchant and plain-spoken work and a joy to render it into English, despite the minor challenge of a few ingenious Greek-based neologisms in French that are not that hard to translate into a relatively similar language (I wonder, though, how much trouble was involved in the task of, for example, the Chinese translator).

**A.R.:** Castoriadis is a special author for you. If I'm not mistaken, you were on friendly terms and have known each other since 1985. You were about 30 years old at the time. Castoriadis was 63. Did the age difference hinder your work?

**D.A.C.:** I was in my 28<sup>th</sup> year and Cornelius would soon turn 63 when we first met at his Paris apartment in early January. He was kind, generous, and certainly indulgent of my inexperience, as he had already, by letter, authorized me to approach publishers for a multivolume project. He was always willing and enthusiastic to work with younger

12 It was Brinton/Pallis who kindly told me that I was the best person in the English-speaking world to pen the Castoriadis obituary you will read now in Belarusian translation in the present issue of the journal.

people — to the point where some older Socialisme ou Barbarie members reportedly had expressed concern or disbelief that he was devoting so much time with such politically neophyte kids in the early 1960s (when, however, a major youth movement was already underway). I, therefore, feel a lifelong obligation to pass forward to others all that I learned from him.

**A.R.:** All of Castoriadis's books seem to be very expensive if you buy them on Amazon (even in paperback). This makes them unaffordable to many, thus resulting in Castoriadis's ideas becoming inaccessible. Do you, as a translator, receive royalties from these sales?

**D.A.C.:** My yearly Blackwell/Wiley royalty check, for US\$69.05, arrived a few days ago. The other contracts I've signed are "work-for-hire" — that is, I'm paid only a (small) lump sum at the start. I have no control over the current pricing policies of trade and academic publishers, nor of the various platform booksellers, whose asking prices, I see, are significantly jacked up from the original paperback list prices. I did reject one contract offer for what became *A Socialisme ou Barbarie Anthology: Autonomy, Critique, and Revolution in the Age of Bureaucratic Capitalism* when the prospective editor proposed selling a hardback copy exclusively for two years at a +\$200 price point (that would have created too perverse an irony). When one consults our English-language Castoriadis "By" Bibliography,<sup>13</sup> one can see that almost all Castoriadis volumes in English, including the electro-Samizdat ones, now have online links, making these books available to all online for free.

**A.R.:** The reader of Castoriadis's texts, compiled by you and containing your foreword, was published in 1997. As far as I know, a reader is rarely compiled while the author is still alive. Did you and Castoriadis agree on including these texts? How was the process organized? Were you shaken by the tragic coincidence of the reader's publication and Cornelius's death (that same year)? What would you change about the reader if you were compiling it today? Which texts would you add or remove?

**D.A.C.:** Blackwell's perhaps unusual *Reader* series offered readers collections for long-dead figures, like Hegel and Kierkegaard, then-recently-departed writers, like C. L. R. James, authors still alive at the time of publication, like Zygmunt Bauman and Castoriadis, and people who are still not yet deceased, like Angela Davis, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva. Feeling a responsibility to explain our joint editorial decisions to the public, my Translator's Foreword to *The Castoriadis Reader* offers an extended reflection on the reasons Castoriadis and

13 See <https://www.agorainternational.org/englishworks.html>

I made the choices we formulated while we were working closely together on the project from the start. I won't repeat here this in-depth exploration of what can, should, and did go into these determinations, except to say that they had their time and place: we combined "historic" greatest hits with several previously unpublished translations in what we concluded should be a chronological order.

Your interesting and valid question about what changes I might make today – absent now Castoriadis's living input – nevertheless remains abstract. Practically speaking, as a professional translator/editor I would ask: How many pages would this theoretical publisher allow? Would the company's editor unilaterally impose any rules of selection (prohibited or mandatory items?) or of the organization (chronologic, thematic, or otherwise?). What rights issues, if any, might be involved, including monetary considerations in relation to budget allotments? Or would I have *carte blanche* (with an adequate budget or no rights issues as well as final "passed-for-press" authorization: the publishing equivalent of Orson Welles's *Citizen Kane* contract)? If the latter, we begin to approach the realm of the *ideal*, with all its opportunities and illusions, as well as potential side effects (outside interference or outright sabotage). In his day, André Malraux's *Musée imaginaire* posited the mental comparability and availability, via memories of photographs, of all works. But the question of artworks' physical displacement, of which he was aware, and of one's own corporeal displacements (in space or at least of one's eyes) is already an old one: Does one see an African statuette or Tintoretto's series of paintings created for the Confraternity of San Rocco (so beloved by my friend and collaborator, the Icelandic artist Erró, that he paid Clara's and my flights to Venice as well as our accommodations there to see them) in the same way as when these works are removed from their original contexts in order for us, with our cultural backgrounds and interrogations, to view them elsewhere? Indeed, when one employs the term *museum* – a shrine for the Muses – should one as an ambulatory entity posit "up" and "down" (gravity), firmly fixed or infinitely flexible rooms, various openings, doors, and corridors situated in one area or another, one or several floors, and then, possible placements of staircases or elevators to allow walking or assisted passage from one set of prearranged work-presentations to another? Elevators, for example, already imply and entail, social-historically, all of electric-powered contemporary civilization – unless one has recourse, say, to mules, ropes, and pulleys (all of which, too, it is to be assumed, must already be created and reproducible). Any new Castoriadis Reader would be a "one-man show" in a space within which one could, physically or imaginarily, move about in certain restricted or relatively unobstructed ways. Should this visual-arts display perhaps combine text with sound and/or moving images (audio and audiovisual recordings of Castoriadis) and include or exclude commentaries/critiques or at least labels? (Should then *attention span* be taken into account? As of 2015, it has been widely reported, the average human

attention span has been reduced — by television and then the internet, among other factors — to 8.25 seconds, or three-quarters of a second less than that of a goldfish. In short, the *reader* — average or not — has to be taken into account when devising a Reader.) In the realm of the novel, narrations with multiple possible bifurcations and endings have been experimented with, on paper or electronically, for decades. Or one may simply mention, for example, any .html (HyperText Markup Language) file today, which allows the “reader” to navigate in any direction or sequence allowed by the programmed webpage or series of webpages, either internally or extending out to the World Wide Web (and even its “dark-web” mirror world and the “deep web”).

Thus now definitely dematerializing your question<sup>14</sup> while nevertheless remembering that *human reading* still has a physical substrate as well as an ineliminable *cocreative* element and using the hypernovel as an analogy,<sup>15</sup> a Castoriadis Reader taking advantage of current techniques and capitalist-forged technologies could involve many such hybrid options. But by the very definition of *options*, the problem of *choice* immediately arises: At what point(s) and with the aid of what cues — invented question(s), for example — might one help direct the surfer-reader to the next set of (textual/audio/visual) alternative landing sites? According to what, if any, preestablished Reader rules? And to what end(s)? (Castoriadis himself railed against the contemplative *museification* of the world.) Fixing a criterion or set of criteria at each stage immediately raises the question of the criterion/criteria for choosing particular next-steps criteria — which, in the abstract at least, creates an infinite regress. Might one virtuously stave off these inevitable questions by introducing, as operative solutions, *artificial intelligence* (a curious phrase; for, what kind of “intelligence” would be straightforwardly “natural”?) and its stepchild *machine learning* (perhaps an oxymoron, as well as a peculiar harking back to when the Machine Age, generally thought to have ended with the advent of the Atomic Age, had supplanted the more traditional labor of the dual working classes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: “Farmers and Mechanics,” to employ then-contemporary English-language parlance) in order to generate nodes/switches that will lead the

14 In speaking of *dematerializations*, I leave aside for the moment such physical-mental hybrid forms as VR goggles (with or without touch-based interactivity) and augmented-reality mobile games that combine “virtuality” and (our impure, already virtuality-soaked) “reality” via GPS-enabled smartphones, the best known of which is perhaps *Pokémon GO* (2016).

15 I am also leaving aside various dystopian science-fiction projections, such as the hypnotic “learning” of history lessons in the sixth episode (“The General”) of Patrick McGoochan’s *The Prisoner* series (1967–1968) — where the mainframe computer self-destructs when fed the question “Why?” — or David Cronenberg’s 1999 film *Existenz* — where “game pods” connecting directly into players’ nervous systems via “bio-ports” successfully erase the distinction between reality and imagination.

reader, with an impression of autonomy, to his/her adjacent reading tasks? These two phrases are quite actual, yet still under elucidated, buzzwords that are *of a piece* with other such attempts to avoid reflection, deliberation, autonomous action, and individual and collective self-responsibility today, such as “cybercurrency” or “cryptocurrency” as well as their typical means of technological implementation, now projected as a possible “libertarian” organizing principle for society overall:<sup>16</sup> the “distributed ledger” or “blockchain” technology that uses “consensus algorithms” to shortcircuit human choice-formation and social conflict as well as genuinely political oversight and intervention.<sup>17</sup>

Imagine, now, a bibliography — indeed, a series of them in as many languages as now exist where Castoriadis’s texts have been written and/or translated — and, moreover, a Webography — again, actually an extant linguistic set of them, containing references to not-physically-published yet posted-online textual and audio items — and, finally, a Videography — one combining online audiovisual records from all languages in which Castoriadis ever spoke and/or that contain foreign subtitles — that, with as many hyperlinks as exist for these text-, sound-, and image-based records, can lead one, at one’s will and according to one’s financial, mental, physical, and temporal capacities, from one place to another and to all such places, in many cases at no additional cost. We have here the virtual book-depository equivalent<sup>18</sup> of the Lewis Carroll-inspired Borgesian 1:1 map of an entire expanse. As such comprehensive mappings prove inherently unwieldy and impracticable, some sort of (self-)guidance is required. Titles/descriptions in online bibliographies and webographies, as well as a single Videography (citing sometimes multilingual — spoken-and-subtitled — entries), can be word-searched to create a first set of guideposts for further reading/listening/viewing, based on one’s existent and evolving interests. Short of creating a keyword search that would already contain

16 Of late, an ideologically individualistic “libertarianism” (not to say sociopathy) of many “tech bros” and others is being replaced in part, or supplemented, by a primarily career-based “effective altruism,” which was championed and bankrolled, for example, by FTX founder Sam Bankman-Fried until his recent arrest and disgrace. The conveniently individualistic (not to say self-serving) idea, lacking in substantive socially and politically collective thought and action, is that the “greatest good” for others might be achieved within the present system, and via its “disruption,” by amassing power and money for oneself that, it is promised, will later be distributed to those negatively affected by this very same system and by its various “disruptions.” “Disrupters” become new guardians of a *status quo* to be modified by them for the supposed benefit of absent others, not by the disenfranchised, disaffected, and disempowered people they vow to “help.”

17 Visit <https://youtu.be/Pz8G5JR3CKI> for my online conversation, recorded March 15, 2021, with Michel Bauwens (P2P Foundation) and Rok Kranjc (Futurescraft), where I gently questioned their enthusiasm for such techniques as somehow a solution to contemporary economic and ecological problems.

18 Jorge Luis Borges: “I have always imagined that Paradise will be a kind of library.”

in one place<sup>19</sup> all Castoriadis's words in all the languages in which he has written/has been translated/is heard/is seen (the last two of these would require total transcriptions or sound-image computer analyses of all nontextual entries), and even then, given the analytical limitation of such discreet searches, further (self-)guidance may be required. As the CC/AI Website English- and French-language Bibliographer-Webographer, I – and also the other bibliographers-webographers in their respective languages – communicate with the website's subscribers and with other interested people. The first two questions for any new contact – after asking, “How did you discover the CC/AI Website?” – are: “How did you discover Castoriadis?” and “What is your interest in his work?” This provides a (risky) basis for making specific additional reading suggestions tailored to each person and eventually also for putting the subscriber in contact with others who have written on and/or are exploring the same subject(s). Thus do we implement a working method of creating a Reader for every individual who might want, and could benefit from, such detailed suggestions for pursuing greater knowledge and for engaging in further inquiry, while respecting the self-guiding autonomy of each.

**A.R.:** Karl Marx, Max Weber, Sigmund Freud, ancient philosophy, etc. are often mentioned among the origins of Castoriadis's thinking. From your point of view, who and what were Castoriadis's teachers and inspirations?

**D.A.C.:** This might be formulated better as follows: “the origins of many of the questions that occurred to Castoriadis, questions he (re) formulated in novel ways.” Here I would add Martin Heidegger – not as a “teacher” or “inspiration,” but as a thinker, in this case, someone Castoriadis found profoundly wrongheaded<sup>20</sup> but whose works nonetheless led Castoriadis to raise in his mind issues he might not have addressed in the same way without them. This can be read even in the similarity of certain titles, such as Heidegger's “Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics,” “The Question Concerning Technology,” and “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” which have

19 With the kind volunteer initiative and technical assistance of “Laurent,” it is now possible to search any word or phrase appearing within the more limited scope of the forty issues of *Socialisme ou Barbarie* at our sister website: <https://soubscan.org>.

20 “Here we have the bizarre spectacle of a philosopher talking interminably about the Greeks, and whose thought draws a blank in the place of *polis*, *eros*, and *psyche*. But an ‘interpretation’ of Greek philosophy ignoring systematically the fact that philosophy was born in and through the *polis* and is a part of the same movement that brought about the first democracies, is bound to be irredeemably lame,” Castoriadis declared in his 1988 lecture, “The ‘End of Philosophy’?”, now in the third volume of the *Crossroads in the Labyrinth* series: <https://www.notbored.org/cornelius-castoriadis-crossroads-3-world-in-fragments.pdf>.

their counterparts in Castoriadis's texts "Modern Science and Philosophical Interrogation," "Technique," and "The 'End of Philosophy'?" And of course, Aristotle, to whom you allude. But also Agis Stinas (1900–1987), the leader of the most radical Greek Trotskyist group, which Castoriadis had joined well before departing from Athens for Paris in 1945; the two remained in touch until the former's death. As he was breaking from Marx and trying to widen the scope of the issues and ideas *Socialisme ou Barbarie* might address, Castoriadis wrote what for me is one of his most evocative and important, if schematic, texts: "For a New Orientation," a 1962 internal S. ou B. document arguing that the group should expand its areas of concern from traditional Marxist ones to such fields as urbanism, art history, and anthropology in order to bring out their revolutionary implications. He cites such writers as Lewis Mumford, Pierre Francastel, and Margaret Mead.<sup>21</sup> He also mentions there the Chinese-American revolutionary "Ria Stone" (Grace Lee Boggs, 1915–2015), who was active in the Detroit labor movement and the African-American community. As much as and perhaps more than Grace's and Cornelius's former collaborator, the Trinidadian revolutionary C. L. R. James, she had a profound effect on his thinking.

**A.R.:** Psychoanalysis played an important role in Castoriadis's work. Unfortunately, in the Russian-speaking world, little is written about Castoriadis as a psychoanalyst. The topic of Castoriadis's psychoanalysis is simply not developed. The only exceptions are *The Imaginary Institution of Society* and some interpretative texts.

In your opinion, what are the specifics of Castoriadis's psychoanalysis? Why does he criticize Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan?

Again, note the repetition of history similar to his transitions from different Marxist organizations. Castoriadis abandons "the Freudian school", moves to Lacanianism and then founds his own group (organization).

**D.A.C.:** Castoriadis's criticisms of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan are not fully comparable. He respected the former, despite many failings — such as Freud's reflecting the patriarchal views of his time or his neglecting, because of the prevailing scientism, to pronounce the word *imagination* in a substantive way in his work even as Freud was saying nothing but that — because in Castoriadis's view, Freud, unlike Karl Marx, continued to ask questions and fostered no definitive

21 "For a New Orientation," now translated in the third volume of his *Political and Social Writings* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). A year later, in "Recommencing the Revolution," he wrote: "It is equally important to show the similar contents that appear in the most radical currents in contemporary culture (tendencies in psychoanalysis, sociology, and ethnology, for example), to the extent that these currents both complete the demolition of what remains of oppressive ideologies and are bound to spread within society" (*ibid.*, p. 49).

closure to this thinking. Castoriadis did attend seminars of Lacan in the Sixties on account of the latter's attempt to revitalize Freud's thought at a time when "normalizing" tendencies within official Freudian circles were undermining the radical, innovative social questioning contained in Freud's writings. Yet Castoriadis had no illusions about Lacan being a positive inspiration for social thought and social change. As he wrote retrospectively, "No one in his right mind who was familiar, in the Sixties, with Jacques Lacan's writings and personality would have dreamed that he could ever have anything to do with a social and political movement."<sup>22</sup> And as early as October 1968 — in his first article devoted explicitly to psychoanalysis: "Epilegomena to a Theory of the Soul That Has Been Able to Be Presented as a Science"<sup>23</sup> — he expressed skepticism of Lacan and Lacanianism. His critique of this particular variant of "the French Ideology" then turned highly explicit and incredibly hard-hitting in "Psychoanalysis: Project and Elucidation," his devastating 1977 text written against "the Lacanian syndrome" and what it more broadly represents.<sup>24</sup> The latter article first appeared in *Topique*, the review created by Piera Aulagnier, his wife at the time. Aulagnier co-founded the Organisation psychanalytique de langue française or "Fourth Group" that had broken in 1969 from Lacan's École freudienne de Paris or "Third Group" (i.e., distinct from the two internationally-recognized Freudian organizations), to which Castoriadis never belonged. In some of the "instituting" practices of this Fourth Group — which regularly revised its statutes and collectively reviewed its activity and which was reacting against the personality-cult arbitrariness of Lacan's Freudian School of Paris — one may glimpse perhaps an influence of Castoriadis's revolutionary ideas on ongoing self-institution. Yet he described himself only as "close to" this new group and not a member, despite being himself a practising psychoanalyst for the last quarter century of his life. Castoriadis's membership in the Greek Communist Party, which he joined at age 15 and within which he quickly formed an opposition group before joining the most left-wing Trotskyist faction, or his early postwar participation in the French Trotskyist Parti Communiste

22 In "The Movements of the Sixties" (1986); see now p. 30 in the fourth volume of the *Crossroads in the Labyrinth* series: <https://www.notbored.org/cornelius-castoriadis-crossroads-4-rising-tide-of-insignificancy.pdf>

23 Castoriadis was already making reference to the importance of psychoanalysis in the first part of "On the Content of Socialism" (1955; now in the first volume of his *Political and Social Writings* [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988]) — "alienation in capitalist society is not simply economic. It not only manifests itself in connection with material life. It also affects in a fundamental way both man's sexual and his cultural functions" — while praising Wilhelm Reich's work for bringing out "the profound relation between class structures and the patriarchal regulation of sexual relations."

24 Both of these texts are now available in the first volume of the *Crossroads in the Labyrinth* series: <https://www.notbored.org/cornelius-castoriadis-crossroads-1.pdf>



Internationaliste, where he formed an official opposition faction (named the Chaulieu-Montal Tendency, after the pseudonyms of its two leaders, Castoriadis and Claude Lefort), thus are, again, not fully comparable, this time with respect to his more limited psychoanalytic engagements. What can, however, be read as a similarity between his early Marxist/Trotskyist commitments and his later, looser associations with French psychoanalysis is his ever-deeper, autonomy-focused questioning of both ideas and institutions.

It would be impossible to summarize, in a response to one part of a single interview question, Castoriadis's groundbreaking elucidation of the psychical, let alone lay out his key differences with respect to Freud, Lacan, and other psychoanalytic thinkers and practitioners. I, therefore, refer the interested reader to an excellent synthetic presentation by Castoriadis's former student Fernando Urribarri: "The Psyche: Imagination and History. A General View of Cornelius Castoriadis's Psychoanalytic Ideas."<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless, one can mention here Castoriadis's crucial insight: "The true polarity is not between individual and society, but between psyche and society."<sup>26</sup> Castoriadis posits an original "psychical monad," irreducible to society, that is expressive of the hypertrophic growth, in the human being, of a *defunctionalized* imagination. Sublimation is the psychical side of the process that, via the "breakup" — though never the total elimination — of this monad and its transformation into a "monadic pole" ever rebellious to social reality, results in the "fabrication" of social individuals that internalize the "imaginary significations" of the each-time-different society in question. Along with pedagogy and politics, psychoanalysis is a "practicopoietic activity" (i.e., not a science) that aims at the *autonomy* of the other in a way that can achieve success only by drawing upon and helping to enact in embodied consciousness the as-yet-not-fully-realized autonomy, the virtual autonomy, of the other, in this case, the analysand. "In analysis," Castoriadis asserts, "it is a matter neither of rendering the subject totally 'transparent' to himself nor of instaurating a 'mastery' of the Conscious over the Unconscious; it is a matter of instaurating another relation"<sup>27</sup> between, on the one hand, oneself as a conscious being and, on the other hand, one's own phantasies as well as the imaginary significations that have been imposed upon one via the unavoidable, and always violent, process of socialization. A homology, though by no means an identity, is thus established here with true politics, whereby one aims at establishing "another relation" between instituting and the instituted than the heteronomous one that prevails in most societies.

25 Trans. Nora Stelzer and Veronica Chehtman, with additional editing by David Ames Curtis, *Free Associations*, 7:3 (1999): 374–96.

26 "Time and Creation" (1990), now in the third volume of the *Crossroads in the Labyrinth* series: <https://www.notbored.org/cornelius-castoriadis-crossroads-3-world-in-fragments.pdf>.

27 "Psychoanalysis: Project and Elucidation," first *Crossroads* volume, p. 82, n. 28.

**A.R.:** It is often said that Castoriadis was influential during the May 1968 students-workers rebellion. It has become a matter of course. Almost a cliché. However, how exactly did Castoriadis influence the protest movement? Has anyone researched/measured this influence? If they have, how?

**D.A.C.:** The French student leader Dany Cohn-Bendit and his older brother Gaby – who had attended Socialisme ou Barbarie meetings and who supplied Dany with back issues of the group’s review of the same name – wrote explicitly in their 1969 book *Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing Alternative* that the “views we have been presenting are those of P. Chaulieu” while also directly mentioning the influence of Socialisme ou Barbarie. For his part, Castoriadis, referring to his major five-part *Socialisme ou Barbarie* text, “Marxism and Revolutionary Theory” (1964–1965), which became the first part of *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, reminds his readers that “long before May ’68, Structuralism had been criticized, notably by the author of the present article, both as to its content as such and as to its political implications. Those who lived through those times can testify that being a militant at the beginning of the Sixties in contact with certain student and university circles in Paris entailed taking a stand against Structuralism in general and Althusser in particular.” Some write histories of May ’68 that glaringly ignore Castoriadis and S. ou B. altogether, while others rightfully recognize their key, though generally subterranean, contributions.

**A.R.:** I am currently writing an article on the reception of Castoriadis’s ideas in Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of liquid modernity. Peter Beilharz wrote fragmentarily about their similarities. The Agora International website also mentions some references.

Do you know if Castoriadis knew Bauman? Did he read his books? Why did they never meet or correspond?

They were, after all, contemporaries forced to emigrate from their countries (Poland and Greece respectively). Both were fascinated by Marxism and broke with it. Both had the courage to describe autonomy, freedom and emancipation as one of the central themes of their work. They were even published in the same English-language journals (*Telos*, *Thesis Eleven*).

**D.A.C.:** Because I am relatively unfamiliar with this issue, I wrote to Peter Beilharz, *Thesis Eleven*’s book-review editor and author of *Intimacy in Postmodern Times: A Friendship with Zygmunt Bauman*,<sup>28</sup> who replied:

I do not think ZB had access to this in Poland in the Fifties or Sixties. But he becomes a great fan of CC I think after you arranged at my request to send him the *CC Reader*. The idea, or hope, was that he

28 See Beilharz, Peter (2020). *Intimacy in Postmodern Times: A Friendship with Zygmunt Bauman*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

would review it in a prominent place. . . . Then, of course, CC died. I do not know if a correspondence had opened between them in this small window. No review appeared.

Beilharz kindly referred me to Jack Palmer, who, Beilharz informs me, is familiar with the Bauman archives. Palmer helpfully writes:

There's no evidence of correspondence in the archive. I do recall coming across this amusing line in a letter Bauman sent to Claus Offe in 1998, when the latter was putting together a laudatio for the Adorno prize ceremony: "Adorno and Horkheimer I never met (and good I did not try. Later, I intended to meet Levinas, Jonas, Castoriadis – my other heroes; the moment I decided to see them, I read about their death. So being obviously a postmodern version of typhoid Mary, I stopped trying!)" The intimation seems to be that he intended to write but never got the chance.

The influence of CC was made very clear on a number of occasions. In the *Conversations with ...* book that Bauman wrote with Keith Tester, he acknowledged the similarity of their life trajectories and how it shaped their intellectual concerns ...: "he [CC] has occupied a special place among my selected kinspeople since I was struck by the parallelity (*toutes proportions gardées!*) of our life itineraries, of the similarity of that curious and difficult to disentangle mixture of continuity and discontinuity." In one of his last interviews (conducted by Simon Tabet, author of one of the very few French books on Bauman), Bauman said that "in France, Cornelius Castoriadis is my main influence: he did not know that he was my teacher, but I read his work with great interest." I do not know if Z sent books to CC. And I would say there were sympathies, rather than similarities, between their thinking.

**A.R.:** On your Facebook page, you've published the following quote from Castoriadis's text *Facing the War*: "The sole remaining 'ideology,' the only one capable of remaining alive in Russia is Great-Russian chauvinism. The sole imaginary that retains historical efficacy is the nationalist – or imperial – imaginary. This imaginary has no need of the Party – save as a mask and, especially, via propaganda and action, as a way of gaining international penetration. Its organic bearer is the army" (Cornelius Castoriadis, *Devant la guerre*, 1981).

In this text, Castoriadis's reflections have their origin in conjunction with several events, including the Russian invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Do you extrapolate this assessment onto the contemporary situation?

What is your position on the war in Ukraine, which began in February of 2022 and is still going on?

**D.A.C.:** This is what I hopefully have adequately, if briefly, addressed in my introduction, specially written for the present issue, to my Castoriadis obituary, translated here. I have tried to demonstrate the

continuing relevancy of Castoriadis's analyses of Russia's historical expansionism and of the consequences of what he called its imbalanced, two-tier (military/civilian) "stratocratic" economy and regime. These analyses, as you rightly point out, were occasioned by the Russian invasion and occupation of Afghanistan but were inspired by a longstanding conviction that Russia was, after Stalin's death and the failed Khrushchevian attempts at reform, no longer a true *totalitarian* regime, its ideology having already reached the state of "decomposition"<sup>29</sup> by the time of Khrushchev's "secret report" and even before the Russians invaded Hungary to put down a workers' revolt that had set up independent Workers' Council — just as S. ou B. had, in its very first issue (1949), predicted would happen in the Eastern-bloc countries.

I also note there a perhaps significant change, given Russia's current status as an authoritarian, extractionist petro-State unable, now in the absence of Western technology, to deploy on an actual battlefield a sufficient number of conventional weapons while becoming increasingly dependent on, for example, Iranian drones and driving abroad many who belong to what little Russia has of a modern economy.

In the Sixties, Seventies, and Eighties, some people on "the Left," disillusioned with the "Soviet Union" (in reality, *bureaucratic-capitalist* Russia) and tempted by (bureaucratic-capitalist) China's Maoist challenge to Russia's "social imperialism" as a viable "left-wing" alternative (which it was not), adopted a "Third Worldist" position that, while incoherently displacing Marxist millennialist hopes from the "proletariat" onto the peasantry and the "wretched of the earth," transferred their shameful "fellow-traveling" apologism for totalitarian States to various military and authoritarian dictatorships around the world, so long as the latter posed as "anti-Western" even as they were exploiting and oppressing their own peoples. Taking account of world realities, Castoriadis concluded his 1985 talk, "Third World, Third Worldism, Democracy," as follows:

So long as the present political resignation of the Western peoples continues, every attempt of ours at an *effective political* response to the problems of the Third World is, at best, utopian, at worst, an unconscious and involuntary cover for real policies unrelated to the interests of the Third World.

Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall and then what Castoriadis called "The Pulverization of Marxism-Leninism,"<sup>30</sup> some on "the Left" have

29 See "Khrushchev and the Decomposition of Bureaucratic Ideology," in the second volume of his *Political and Social Writings* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988); this text originally appeared in French in the July-September 1956 issue (no. 19) of *Socialisme ou Barbarie*.

30 The translation of this 1990 article now appears in the fourth volume of his *Crossroads in the Labyrinth* series: <https://www.notbored.org/cornelius-castoriadis-crossroads-4-rising-tide-of-insignificancy.pdf>

strangely returned to, or never departed from, or (because there are new generations) now adopted, under cover of a “leftist” “anti-imperialism” that targets exclusively the West, a position that reprises, for example, the “Unconditional Defense of the USSR” slogan (it is on this point that Castoriadis and S. ou B. broke from Trotskyism in 1948) – *in the absence of* Russian “Communism” (what Castoriadis more accurately had labeled “total and totalitarian bureaucratic capitalism”) and *in the face of* Russia’s current authoritarian and socially reactionary regime. Whether “tankies” – a term originally used to describe Stalinists who supported in 1956 the Russian tank invasion of Hungary (which Castoriadis and S. ou B. vehemently opposed) – or today’s descendants of various “Third Worldist” ideologies, such people continue to play out (in their heads) the “Great Game” of Anglo-Russian rivalry while, as the historian of the S. ou B. group Stephen Hastings-King has frequently stated, systematically ignoring, as a result, the actual (though fragmented) desires and interests of any mere people or region subjected to this Great Game. The sole coherent position, as our Athens-based CC/AI Website Bulgarian Bibliographer-Webographer Yavor Tarinski has argued, is to provide critical support, without falling into delusional thinking, to antiauthoritarian forces on all sides of any international, regional, or intranational conflict.

**A.R.:** In philosophy and social theory one often uses a link to a school, method or tradition of thought (e.g., one speaks of representatives of the Frankfurt School, Structuralism, the Habermasian, the Foucauldian, etc.). I know that you think that Castoriadisianism is impossible. Moreover, it contradicts the very idea of the infinite philosophical questioning of Castoriadis (the spirit of his philosophy). Nevertheless, I would like to ask you about it. Is it correct to use the conceptual apparatus of Castoriadis to analyze authoritarian and totalitarian societies (political regimes)? For example, authoritarian authorities (governments) would be understood as a heteronomy, while protest movements (like those in Belarus in 2020-2021) would be understood as a manifestation of creativity in pursuit of autonomy.

**D.A.C.:** Let us recall, first, that, for Castoriadis, “creativity” is not necessarily always positive: “Auschwitz and the Gulag are creations just as much as the Parthenon and the *Principia Mathematica*.”<sup>31</sup> Moreover, as I have just alluded to, in our “world in fragments” (to cite the title of his third *Crossroads* volume) – and amid the “dual institution of modernity,” wherein an ongoing conflictual struggle of mind, body, and society is engaged and enacted between two opposing “central social imaginary significations”: the capitalist project of the “unlimited

31 “Intellectuals and History” (1987), now translated in the third volume of the *Crossroads in the Labyrinth* series: <https://www.notbored.org/cornelius-castoriadis-crossroads-3-world-in-fragments.pdf>.

expansion of pseudorational pseudomastery,” on the one hand, and the project of autonomy, on the other — every gesture of every person (who is simultaneously encouraged, by various monetary-and-ideological means, to “participate” in the present system and yet must have that same participation curtailed, excluded from consequential effect; for, otherwise, full individual and collective autonomy would ensue) is expressed in, and divided between, these two competing instituted sets of practices. That does not mean that one cannot or should not make choices — which are themselves an outgrowth and manifestation of, as well as the basis for, our potential for autonomy, which has indeed partially achieved, within history, certain institutional forms and practices. Yet one cannot map, in unambiguous and univocal, one-to-one relations, “authoritarian authorities” (your interestingly redundant formulation) as heteronomy and “protest movements ... as a manifestation of creativity in the pursuit of autonomy.” As Castoriadis pointed out in the aftermath of the 1989 popular protests in Central Europe that brought down the regimes there, an ingenious outpouring of creativity on the part of protestors *at the tactical level* — whereby those governments were deposed in short order and without major violence — was *not* accompanied by a comparable creativity when it came to a *strategic vision* for establishing (instituting) a new psychological, economic, social, and political order, an autonomous (i.e., *self-limiting*) one: in most cases, the people in these countries merely (though understandably) dreamed of escaping their then-present predicament under “Communist” rule by naively adopting, wholesale, existing Western institutions, i.e., the capitalist relations and the “representative democracy” that together make up what Castoriadis labels, more accurately, “liberal oligarchy” and that have already for decades been in a state of advanced *dilapidation* in the West (without even mentioning the increasingly dire *ecological* consequences).<sup>32</sup>

Yes, for me, anyone who speaks of “Castoriadianism” or identifies as “Castoriadian” has no idea what you rightly call his “infinite philosophical questioning”<sup>33</sup> is really about. The Translator/Editor’s Forewords to the first and sixth volumes in the *Crossroads* series attempt to account for what this “infinite philosophical questioning” on his part involves and entails.

32 See “The Dilapidation of the West” (1995), now in the fourth volume of his *Crossroads in the Labyrinth* series: <https://www.notbored.org/cornelius-castoriadis-crossroads-4-rising-tide-of-insignificancy.pdf>, and “Ecology Against the Merchants” (1992), now in *A Society Adrift: More Interviews and Discussions on The Rising Tide of Insignificancy, Including Revolutionary Perspectives Today*, translated from the French and edited anonymously as a public service; electronic publication date: October 2010.

33 In a three-part 1979 interview with the French review *Esprit*, Castoriadis spoke of “Unending Interrogation”; the translation of this interview under that title now appears in the second volume of the *Crossroads in the Labyrinth* series: <https://www.notbored.org/cornelius-castoriadis-crossroads-2-human-domains.pdf>.

**A.R.:** Some of Castoriadis's texts may seem prophetic or even prescient. You've mentioned texts like "Dead End" (1987) and "Modern Science and Philosophical Interrogation" (1973). I would add "The Rationality of Capitalism" (1997), which, by the way, is also available to Russian-speaking readers.

But times are changing and so is capitalism.

Castoriadis caught just the beginning of globalization and virtualization in the contemporary world. What would his diagnosis be today? Has Western society become more autonomous and human individual lives less alienated and apathetic? Does the liberal oligopoly retain its hegemony? Does the dilapidation of the West continue? Does the unlimited expansion of rational mastery (pseudo-rational and pseudo-mastery) go on?

**D.A.C.:** Vast questions, ones that I have modestly attempted to address in a paper I have, since 2014, delivered, and/or had translated and presented/published, in English, French, German, Italian, Korean, and Spanish: "The Theme of 'The Rising Tide of Insignificance' in the Work of Cornelius Castoriadis,"<sup>34</sup> which was drafted, for a Verein für das Studium und die Förderung der Autonomie colloquium, to create a diptych with my earlier paper for a Castoriadis *Festschrift*, "Socialism or Barbarism: The Alternative Presented in the Work of Cornelius Castoriadis."<sup>35</sup> I cannot recapitulate here the entire set of analyses, arguments, and descriptions presented in these two texts.

Here are two of its key ideas: (1) Against those who claim to see a clear break between an "early," "political" Castoriadis and a "later," mainly "philosophical" one, I have tried to bring out and examine the continuities as well as continuous changes in his six decades of work, whereby the initial theme of what I call a "*present contending alternative*" between "socialism or barbarism" (i.e., different from the various future-projecting formulations of this slogan in Marx, Engels, Luxembour, and Trotsky) was transformed into, though not simply replaced by, the theme of the "rising tide of insignificance." (2) Against both Marxists and Foucauldians who speak and write as though "Neoliberalism" is unambiguously and fully our current situation, I argued in the later text:

What an understanding of capitalism as an imaginary institution of society shows – *when one takes into account the dual institution*

34 The latest version, which it was hoped would be fully translated into Korean, is now available here: [kaloskaisophos.org/f.pdf](http://kaloskaisophos.org/f.pdf).

35 This earlier text appeared in Giovanni Busino's *Autonomie et autotransformation de la société. La philosophie militante de Cornelius Castoriadis* (Geneva: Droz, 1989). It is now available here: [https://www.academia.edu/13495706/Socialism\\_or\\_Barbarism\\_The\\_Alternative\\_Presented\\_in\\_the\\_Work\\_of\\_Cornelius\\_Castoriadis](https://www.academia.edu/13495706/Socialism_or_Barbarism_The_Alternative_Presented_in_the_Work_of_Cornelius_Castoriadis)

of modernity and the hypertrophically destructive “crisis of social imaginary significations” it is now undergoing — is that there is no return to the *status quo ante*, nor is it (yet) plausible to believe that we are now living in a totally economic society, impenetrable to contestation and operating solely according to its own “logic.” The danger of taking Neoliberalism at face value is that, in gullibly accepting its premisses, we may be “taken in” by them, thereby noticing neither its incoherency nor its self-destructive tendencies (which can then be exploited for social change, but only through a renewal of the project of autonomy) nor its more mundane “real objectives” (a radical redistribution of wealth via an imposition of the money norm that is, however, self-undermining). One is even tempted to say that there is an objective concurrence among equally dogmatic and farfetched and superannuated ideologies, the “market fundamentalists” of Neoliberalism dourly telling us that “there is no alternative” coinciding with a hopeful “return to Marx” that would conjure away all that has intervened since 1848 or 1867 and deliver us an automatically guaranteed future.

However, as I also point out in the same text: “Less explored by Castoriadis than Neoliberalism’s incoherencies and its ideological screening of reality — and perhaps surprisingly so, given his longstanding interest in the relations of production — are the vast changes at the *point of production* that have been introduced in the course of the conservative counterrevolution.” Not being “Castoridian,” I readily acknowledge that there exist vast fields of inquiry for both activists and academics to explore, in order to discover realities and imaginaries Castoriadis did not elucidate, or did not elucidate fully, or did not anticipate, or did not anticipate fully, doing so while still guided — unslavishly, of course — by what Castoriadis thought and wrote.<sup>36</sup> Such endeavors, which one would undertake at one’s own new expenditure of effort and upon one’s own responsibility, can and, in my opinion, should be undertaken with a view not just toward general understanding but also toward contributing to the conditions under which the project of autonomy (simultaneously individual and collective self-questioning, self-transformation, and self-institution) may come to a more complete fruition.

36 See my discussion on pp. lii–lxiii of the Translator/Editor’s Foreword to the first volume in the *Crossroads in the Labyrinth* series <https://www.notbored.org/cornelius-castoriadis-crossroads-1.pdf>.



## КАРНЭЛІЮС КАСТАРЫЯДЗІС: ФІЛОСАФ САЦЫЯЛЬНАГА ЎЯЎЛЕННЯ<sup>1</sup>

Дэвід Эймс Кёртыс

*Abstract.* The text is based on an obituary written by the author in the year of the death of Cornelius Castoriadis. A description of the life and intellectual trajectories of this philosopher, co-founder of the legendary group and journal *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, seminal social and political thinker, is offered. In addition to the obituary itself, the text is supplemented with a new introduction written by the author especially for the Belarusian reader and bibliography and videography.

*Key words:* Cornelius Castoriadis, social imagination, psychical monad, instituting society, paideia, ethic of mortality, autonomy.

### Прадмова аўтара

Тэкст, які вы прачытаеце ніжэй, упершыню быў надрукаваны як “Карнэліюс Кастарыядзіс: Некралог” у нумары *Salmagundi* за вясну-лета 1998: (с. 52–61) і быў перадрукаваны як “Карнэліюс Кастарыядзіс: Філософ сацыяльнага ўяўлення” ў *Free Associations*, 7:3 (1999): 321–30, зараз жа размяшчаецца па адрасе <https://www.agorainternational.org/about.html> на *Cornelius Castoriadis/Agora International Website* – на міжнародным уэб-сайце, створаным з адабрэння і падтрымкай Кастарыядзіса ў 1997 годзе, у год ягонай смерці. Гэты англамоўны некралог быў таксама перакладзены для ўэб-сайту *CC/AI* на каталонскую, галандскую і іспанскую мовы. Беларускамоўны стане цяпер чацвёртым размешчаным перакладам, дзякуючы ініцыятыве Андрэя Ралёнка і перакладу Івана Новіка.

Уэб-сайт *CC/AI* змяшчае бібліяграфіі і ўэбаграфіі як твораў Кастарыядзіса, так і прысвечанай яму крытычнай літаратуры на 21 мове, у тым ліку на такіх славянскіх мовах, як балгарская, руская, сербскахарвацкая і ўкраінская. Таксама рыхтуюцца бібліяграфіі/ўэбаграфіі на беларускай, чэшскай, славенскай і польскай мовах;

1 Пераклад з англійскай мовы – Іван Новік.



мы актыўна шукаем кітайскага бібліяграфа і ўэбографа. Апроч таго, на ўэб-сайце СС/АІ можна таксама знайсці навіны і інфармацыю, уступнае відэа і відэаграфію Кастарыядзіса, у тым ліку: відэа Калёквіума Серызі Кастарыядзіса 1990 года, інтэрв’ю з філосафам 1990 года, раздзел “Вучэнне Кастарыядзіса”, поўны змест 40 нумароў “Socialisme ou Barbarie” і інш. Зацікаўлены чытач можа напісаць на [contact@agorainternational.org](mailto:contact@agorainternational.org), каб яго імя было дададзена ў спіс болей за 2650 асобаў і арганізацый, якія атрымліваюць бясплатныя, рэгулярныя электронныя паведамленні аб абнаўленнях на ўэб-сайце СС/АІ. Таксама можна пра кансультацыю з двума даччынымі ўэб-сайтамі — праектам сканавання Socialisme ou Barbarie: <https://soubscan.org> і праектам перакладу Socialisme ou Barbarie: <https://soubtrans.org>.

Хоць гэты некралог чвэрцьвекавай даўніны і не састарэў у тым, што ім паведамляецца, але, усё ж, патрабуе значнага дапаўнення, каб адпавядаць сённяшняму ўзроўню цікавасці да працаў Кастарыядзіса і шматлікім водгукам на іх. У пэўнай, на жаль далёка не поўнай, меры я зрабіў гэта прадставіўшы ў канцы гэтага перакладу бягучую бібліяграфію асноўных кніг Кастарыядзіса ў перакладзе на англійскую мову (будучая беларуская бібліяграфія і ўэбаграфія Кастарыядзіса пакажуць, што, хоць ужо існуе шэраг тэкстаў на беларускай мове, якія згадваюць Кастарыядзіса, а таксама іншамовных, напісаных беларусамі, са змястоўным разглядам філасофіі Кастарыядзіса, твораў самога Кастарыядзіса ў перакладзе на беларускую мову покуль яшчэ няма. Магчыма — спадземся на тое — менавіта дадзены пераклад стане натхненнем для будучага перакладчыка на беларускую мову, які возьмецца выправіць гэтую прыкрыю сітуацыю). Зацікаўлены чытач можа звярнуцца таксама да майго дыптыха артыкулаў на ключавыя тэмы Кастарыядзіса: “Сацыялізм або варварства: Альтэрнатыва, прадстаўленая ў працы Карнэліюса Кастарыядзіса” — унёсак у *Revue européenne des sciences sociales* 1989 года, цяпер даступны ў інтэрнэце тут: [http://www.academia.edu/13495706/Socialism\\_or\\_Barbarism\\_The\\_Alternative\\_Presented\\_in\\_the\\_Work\\_of\\_Cornelius\\_Castoriadis](http://www.academia.edu/13495706/Socialism_or_Barbarism_The_Alternative_Presented_in_the_Work_of_Cornelius_Castoriadis) — і “Тэма “прыліву нікчэмнасці” у творчасці Карнэліюса Кастарыядзіса”, выступ 2014 года, ужо перакладзены на французскую, нямецкую, грэцкую, італьянскую, карэйскую і іспанскую мовы, даступны ў інтэрнэце тут: <https://www.kaloskaisophos.org/d.pdf>.

Расійскае ўварванне ва Украіну — праблема актуальная сёння не толькі для беларусаў, але і ўсяго свету. Шэраг аўтараў звярнуўся наноў да твораў Кастарыядзіса, каб убачыць як напісанае ім колись можа дапамагчы нам у асэнсаванні гэтых сучасных падзей. Як можна даведацца з самога, пададзенага ніжэй, некралога, Кастарыядзіс заўжды быў бескампрамісным крытыкам “Расіі”, у якой ён бачыў апафеоз “бюракратычнага капіталізму” і якую ён — крытык ашуканства “камунізму”, навязанага зверху, — ніколі не пагаджаўся называць Саюзам Савецкіх Сацыялістычных Рэспублік. “Ча-

тыры словы — чатыры маны”, — сказаў ён з гэтай нагоды Мілану Кундэры (цытуючы такім чынам Барыса Суварына). Слова “савецкі” жадаў захаваць для тых адметных рабочых і салдацкіх саветаў з прамоў дэмакратыяй, якія былі пазбаўлены ўлады і сутнасці пры Леніне і Сталіне. Яшчэ ў 1956 годзе ў 19-м нумары *Socialisme ou Barbarie* Кастарыядзіс паказваў “раскладанне бюракратычнай ідэалогіі” пры Хрушчове. Пад уплывам расійскага ўварвання ў Афганістан Кастарыядзіс сцвярджаў у артыкуле 1980 года, які ў наступным годзе стаўся яго вельмі контраверсійнай кнігай *Devant la guerre* (“Насустрач вайне”): у Расіі пры Брэжневе на месца канчаткова раскладзенай таталітарна-бюракратычнай заступае нігілістычная ідэалогія “грубай сілы дзеля грубай сілы”, правадніком якой з’яўляўся ўжо не партыйны апарат, але *стратакратыя*, задзейнічаная ў сусветны экспансіянізм і ўспёртая на хісткую двухузроўневую эканоміку, дзе ваенны сектар з яго ядзернай і іншай высокатэхналагічнай зброяй кантрастуе з разбураным, другарадным прамысловым і сельскагаспадарчым грамадзянскім сектарам. Гэтая сітуацыя брыняе глабальнай небяспекай, сцвярджаў ён, у той час, калі нямецкія Зялёныя, з іх слоганам “Лепш чырвоны, чым мёртвы”, дэманстравалі недахоп палітычнага ўяўлення і волі. Тым не менш, насуперак меркаванням шматлікіх экспертаў — саветолагаў і тэарэтыкаў “канвергенцыі” дзвюх сістэм, Кастарыядзіс бачыў умовы для рэвалюцыйных сацыяльных змен у самой Расіі, дзе яе развітая ваенная эканоміка становілася ўсё большым цяжарам для адсталай грамадзянскай сферы, і дзе пустата ідэалогіі становілася ўсё болей навочнай для расчараванага і цынічнага насельніцтва, якое вызвалілася ад палону сталінскага таталітарнага шаленства.

Заходнія папутчыкі (*fellow travelers*) вінавацілі тады Кастарыядзіса ў тым, што ён паддаўся прапагандзе ЦРУ, нібыта сфабрыкаваным дадзеным аб нарошчванні расійскай арміі ў канцы 70-х — пачатку 80-х. Ва ўступе да другога выдання *Devant la guerre* ён адказаў ім: “Калі хтосьці скажа, што банда Дылінджэра ў тых ці іншых абставінах мацнейшая за банду Аль Капоне, гэта не азначае ані захаплення першай бандай, ані спачування другой”. Пазней Кастарыядзіс прызнаўся, што яму не ўдалося прадбачыць узнікнення рэфармісцкай групы знутры самой загнуваючай расійскай бюракратыі. Аднак ён прыйшоў да высновы, што гэты постгерантакратычны перыяд пасля смерці Чарненкі быў — цытуючы назвы двух ягоных тэкстаў — толькі “Гарбачоўскай інтэрмедыйяй” (1988), бо “Няма рэформаў, як і шляху назад” (1991): “Галоснасць” не прынесла трывалых зменаў, а Перабудова наогул не дала нічога сутнаснага, бо без адпаведнай сацыяльнай і эканамічнай, а не толькі палітычнай, рэвалюцыі Расію было немагчыма рэфармаваць.

Цытуючы яшчэ колькікроць назваў тэкстаў Кастарыядзіса, можна сказаць, што пасля падзення спачатку ў 1989 годзе Берлінскай сцяны, а праз два гады — і самога расійскага “камуністыч-

нага” рэжыму шматлікія ўсходнееўрапейскія народы да выяўлення трывалых палітычных волі і ўяўлення аказаліся здольнымі не болей, чым іх калегі на “напаўразбураным” Захадзе — “Дрэйфуючым грамадстве”, якое пакутвала ў сваім “Вялікім сне” ад “Прыліву нікчэмнасці”, выкліканага прыватызацыяй, апатыяй і “Абагульненым канфармізмам”. Усходнія еўрапейцы, якія толькі што так адважна, з дапамогай творчай арганізацыі, здолелі скінуць расійскае ярмо, цяпер імкнуліся цалкам увайсці ў спажывецкае грамадства і пазычыць “прадстаўнічыя” інстытуты, якія на Захадзе слугуюць ліквідацыі магчымасці прамога дэмакратычнага прыняцця рашэнняў і прыспешваюць надыход экалагічнай катастрофы. Нядзіўна, што ў такіх умовах не адбылася і рэвалюцыя працоўных месцаў, і як на Усходзе, так і на Захадзе па-ранейшаму пануюць іерархічныя, бюракратычна-капіталістычныя варункі. Болей за тое, з тых часоў шэраг гэтых краін скаціўся назад у аўтарытарызм, які цяпер трывае ў Расіі і шэрагу іншых краін у межах старой расійскай арбіты.

У *Devant la guerre* Кастарыядзіс сцвярджаў: “Расія не хоча вайны, яна хоча перамогі. Яна нястомна імкнецца да пашырэння сваёй магуты, што выражаецца ў пастаянным умацаванні яе ваеннага патэнцыялу і ў розных ускосных тэрытарыяльных заваёвах”, — гэта тая расійская стратэгія, якая нарадзілася на стагоддзі раней за сталінскія, хрушчоўскія і брэжнеўскія часы. Сёння Прыднястроўе, Абхазія, Паўднёвая Асеція, Луганск, Данецк і Крым прыходзяць на розум як назвы рэгіёнаў, якія Расія вярнула ў сферу свайго ўплыву або наўпрост анексавала. Што адзначае пэўныя змены адносна прааналізаванага ў 1980-я гады Кастарыядзісам расійскага стратакратычнага экспансіянізму, дык гэта тое, што падчас вайны ва Украіне выявілася глыбокае разлажэнне расійскага ваеннага патэнцыялу (прынамсі, яго канвенцыйнага складніку), у той час як сама Расія хапаецца за новыя ідэалагічныя асновы, якія характарызуюцца рэлігійным нацыяналізмам з ярка выяўленымі антымадэрнісцкімі, антыфемінісцкімі і гамафобскімі рысамі, што не пакідае ніякіх шанцаў на эканамічны прагрэс па-за межамі вылучна экстрактыўнай нафтадзяржаўнай структуры. Выкрыццё яе залежнасці ад заходніх тэхналогіяў у ваеннай сферы, доступ да якіх цяпер закрыты, і змушаны зварот да іранскіх тэхналогіяў беспілотнікаў з’яўляюцца двума паказальнымі прыкладамі значных зменаў, якія адбыліся ў вайскова-прамысловым комплексе Расіі, становішча якога цяпер усё болей хісткае.

У эпоху халоднай вайны Кастарыядзіс карыстаўся вялікай павагай сярод дысідэнтаў Цэнтральнай і Усходняй Еўропы і Расіі. Яны цанілі яго цвярозы погляд на “турму народаў”, адноўленую Сталіным, яго прынцыповую пазіцыю (рэвалюцыйная група, сузаснавальнікам якой ён быў, *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, у 1948 годзе парвала з трацкізмам, кінуўшы выклік “безумоўнай абароне СССР”, характэрнай для апошняга), яго празорлівую падтрымку рабочых

паўстанняў супраць “камуністычнай” бюракратыі ва Усходняй Германіі і Венгрыі і яго бескампрамісную падтрымку тых самых дысідэнтаў на працягу ўсяго перыяду існавання іх руху. Магчыма, тыя, хто сёння выступае супраць аўтарытарнага дрэйфу, відавочнага ў многіх грамадствах, як на Усходзе, так і на Захадзе, звернуцца да ягонага велізарнага і ўсё яшчэ актуальнага збору твораў, каб знайсці ў іх не ўзоры для наўпростага пераймання, але крыніцу натхнення для ўласных думак і дзеяў па стварэнні новых агульнаграмадскіх арганізацыяў прамой дэмакратыі, якія будуць садзейнічаць таму, што Кастарыядзіс у 1972 г. называў “пастаянным самаўсталяваннем грамадства... радыкальным выкарчоўваннем тысячагадовых формаў грамадскага жыцця, якое кідае выклік існаму стаўленню чалавека да прылад яго працы, да ягоных дзяцей, ягоным адносінам як да супольнасці, так і ідэяў, і, у канчатковым рахунку, да ўсіх вымярэнняў яго маёмасці [avoir], яго веды [savoir], яго сіл [pouvoir]”.

— Дэвід Эймс Кёртыс, люты 2023 г.

### Некралог

Карнэліюс Кастарыядзіс памёр ва ўзросце 75 гадоў.

Філасоф і палітычны мысляр, які натхніў май 68 г. у Францыі.

Філасоф сацыяльнага ўяўлення, сузаснавальнік легендарнай групы і часопісу *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, арыгінальны сацыяльны і палітычны мысляр, якога лічаць натхняльнікам майскіх падзей 1968 года ў Францыі, прафесійны эканаміст Арганізацыі эканамічнага супрацоўніцтва і развіцця, практыкуючы псіхааналітык, выдатны саветолаг, крытычнае сумленне міжнароднай левіцы, Карнэліюс Кастарыядзіс памёр 26 снежня 1997 г. у Парыжы ва ўзросце 75 гадоў ад ускладненняў пасля аперацыі на сэрцы. У яго засталіся жонка Зоі, іх дачка Кібела, старэйшая дачка ад іншай маці — Спарта.

Надышоў час пахвалаў. Эдгар Морэн — даўні сябра і суаўтар кнігі, прысвечанай падзеям мая 1968 года — напісаў некралог “Тытан духу” для *Le Monde*. Кент Вустэр — даследнік К. Л. Р. Джэймс — выступіў ад імя левых лібертарыянцаў, назваўшы Кастарыядзіса “нашым Ісаяй”, маючы на ўвазе яшчэ аднаго нядаўна памерлага вальнадумцу, Ісаю Берліна. Нават газета Камуністычнай партыі Францыі *L’Humanite* прызнала значнасць свайго, радыкальнага ў сваіх антыкамуністычных поглядах, апанента, назваўшы яго “незаменным дысідэнтам” (*dissident essentiel*).

І ўсё ж ідэі Кастарыядзіса даўгі час заставаліся больш вядомымі, чым ягонае імя. Каб пазбегнуць дэпартацыі з Францыі, яму даводзілася пісаць пад псеўданімамі. Пачынаючы з 1960-х гадоў сястрынская арганізацыя *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, Лонданская салідарнасць, пазней — Філадэльфійская салідарнасць, з пэўным

поспехам распаўсюджвала пераклады “Chaulieu” і “Cardan”<sup>2</sup>. Толькі ў 1970-х Кастарыядзіс атрымаў французскае грамадзянства і паचाў публікавацца пад уласным прозвішчам, а студэнты-радыкалы, захопленыя яго ідэямі, нарэшце змаглі даведацца імя свайго натхняльніка. Першы пераклад на англійскую мову з’явіўся ў 1984 годзе. 1997 год стаў пераломным: выходзіць зборнік твораў “Свет у фрагментах”, рэтраспектыва *Castoriadis Reader*, выданне ў мяккай вокладцы яго magnum opus “Уяўнае ўсталяванне грамадства”, спецыяльны выпуск *Thesis Eleven*, з’яўляецца ўэб-старонка <https://www.agorainternational.org>.

Кастарыядзіс пазбягаў інтэлектуальнай моды свайго часу. Такія характэрна французскія трэнды, як папутніцтва, экзистэнцыялізм, структуралізм, постструктуралізм, дэканструкцыя і постмадэрнізм (апошні адстойваў былы сябра *S. ou B.* Жан-Франсуа Ліятар), былі аб’ектамі ягонай жорсткай і з’едлівай — але нярэдка і гумарыстычнай — крытыкі. Гэтак жа не адпавядаў ён і таму тыпу нямецкіх крытычных тэарэтыкаў, якія ад Макса Горкгайма, Тэадора Адорна і Герберта Маркузе да Юргена Габермаса, былі сумна вядомыя сваёй слабасцю ў крытыцы “савецкага” марксізму. Ён думаў самастойна, поплеч з той невялікай групай працоўных і інтэлектуалаў, якія адмаўляліся паддавацца модзе або мірыцца з прыгнётам у любым яго выглядзе. Яго часопіс актыўна ўдзельнічаў у барацьбе супраць развязанай Францыяй Алжырскай вайны, але Кастарыядзіс ніколі не патураў рыторыцы “Трэцяга свету” і не прапаноўваў сваю “крытычную падтрымку” для “левых” дыктатараў.

Гэта непахісная і цвярозая незалежнасць зваявала захапленне Кастарыядзісам і ягонай групай і дапамагла збудаваць радыкальную некамуністычную левіцу ў паваеннай Францыі. Хоць і крытычны як у адносінах сябе, так і іншых, ён ніколі не губляў веры ў тое, што звычайныя людзі могуць уладкаваць свае жыццё і ўсталяваць самакіраванне без босаў, менеджараў, прафесійных палітыкаў, “лідуючых партый”, святароў, экспертаў, тэрапеўтаў і гуру. Няма таго “Бога, які пацярпеў няўдачу”, бо Бога — няма, як і няма “Прычынаў гісторыі”, “непазбежнага дыялектычнага працэсу”, якія гарантавалі б поспех або змаглі выратаваць людзей як ад іх самаробнага глупства, так і ад іх трагедыі.

Кастарыядзіс нарадзіўся 11 сакавіка 1922 года ў Канстанцінопалі. Сям’я, каб пазбегнуць грэка-турэцкіх усобіц, эмігравала праз некалькі месяцаў пасля яго нараджэння. Ён рос у Афінах, чыя гісторыя была адзначана дыктатурай, сусветнай вайной, акупацы-

2 Актывіст “Руху за свабоду слова” з Берклі Марыё Савіё быў падпісчыкам *Лонданскай салідарнасці*, якая кантрабандай перавозіла пераклады ў Польшчу да часоў Салідарнасці, таксама надрукавала класічныя для лібертарыянскага сацыялізму: Морыса Брынтана “Ірацыянальнае ў палітыцы” пра аўтарытарную асобу і яго ж “Бальшавікі і рабочы кантроль” пра варожасць бальшавікоў да работнікага кіравання.

яй і вызваленнем. Сябра грэцкай Камуністычнай моладзі з пятнаццаці гадоў, ён неўзабаве стварае апазіцыйную групу. У надзвычай палярызаванай атмасферы Грэцыі ваеннага часу большасць чальцоў вярнуліся ў шэрагі камуністаў. Кастарыядзіс далучыўся да самага левага крыла грэцкай трацкісцкай фракцыі, і гэта рашэнне паставіла яго пад пагрозу смерці як з боку фашыстаў, так і камуністаў.

Вызначальны палітычны момант дарослага жыцця Кастарыядзіса адбыўся ў снежні 1944 года, калі грэцкая КП паспрабавала здзейсніць дзяржаўны пераварот. Нават калегі-трацкісты спадзяваліся, што гэтага падзея падштурхне КП улева, і палічылі гэта прадвесцем рэвалюцыйных зменаў. Кастарыядзіс іх аптымізму прырэчыў. З той прарорліваасцю, якая стане характэрнай для яго ў далейшым, ён прадказаў: пучк у выпадку ягонага поспеху прывядзе не да рэвалюцыйнага стварэння бяскласавага грамадства, а да ўсталявання рэжыму, падобнага расійскаму. У канчатковым рахунку хаду падзеяў вызначылі прысутнасць брытанскіх войскаў у Афінах і папярэднія дамоўленасці Вялікіх дзяржаваў. Але далейшае ўсталяванне таталітарных рэжымаў ва ўсёй Усходняй Еўропе і на Балканскіх выспах — у тым ліку і ў Югаславіі, якую Чырвоная армія не “вызваляла” — цалкам пацвердзіла ягоныя прагнозы.

Кастарыядзіс пазбег таго, што неўзабаве ператварылася ў крываваю грамадзянскую вайну ў Грэцыі, бо атрымаў французскую стыпендыю. Пірэй пакінуў у снежні 1945 года на “Матароа”, новазеландскім транспартным ваенным караблі, які пасля стаў вядомым, дзеля таго, што прывёз у Францыю цэлае пакаленне грэцкіх інтэлектуалаў, у тым ліку Костаса Акселаса і Костаса Папаёану. У Парыжы Кастарыядзіс далучыўся да трацкістаў і пачаў развіваць высновы з свайго радыкальнага лібертарыянскага антысталінізму. Яшчэ за некалькі гадоў да таго, як зрынута лідар югаслаўскай КП Мілаван Джылас праславіўся сваёй характарыстыкай камуністычных босаў як “новага класу”, Кастарыядзіс аналізаваў “бюракратычны капіталізм” Усходу і Захаду. Ён вылучаў “фрагментаваную” форму на Захадзе — дзе пасля Вялікай дэпрэсіі, Новага курсу, Сусветнай вайны і ўзнікнення дзяржавы ўсеагульнага дабрабыту праслойка дзяржаўных і прыватных менеджараў у суправаджэнні босаў бізнес-юніёнізму, пачала замяняць прыватных уладальнікаў капіталу ў ролі галоўных кіраўнікоў вытворчасці і эканомікі і галоўных антаганістаў працоўных — ад той “татальнай і таталітарнай” формы, якая дасягнула шалёных вяршыняў тэрору падчас сталінскага рэжыму *апаратчыкаў*. У ягоным арыгінальным, хоць і даволі не артадаксальным, пашырэнні марксісцкай думкі Кастарыядзісу дапамаглі працы Макса Вэбера, прысвечаныя бюракратыі, балазе менавіта ён стаў першым перакладчыкам працаў сацыёлага на грэцкую мову.

Менавіта па пытанні аб “безумоўнай абароне СССР” з боку трацкістаў Кастарыядзіс упершыню выступіў супраць Чацвёр-

тага Інтэрнацыяналу. У 1948 г. французскія трацкісты прапанавалі альянс з паліцэйскай дзяржавай Ціта, які ў той час выйшаў з сталінскага Камінфарма. Група *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, якую Кастарыядзіс стварыў разам з аднадумцамі з унутранай апазіцыі, ператварылася ў асобную арганізацыю. Прыблізна ў той час дэтройцкія радыкалы, сканцэнтраваныя вакол Раі Дунаеўскай (сакратаркі Льва Троцкага ў Мексіцы), К. Л. Р. Джэймса (народжанага ў Трынідадзе панафрыканіста, літаратурнага крытыка, эксперта ў крыкеце і суразмоўцы Троцкага па “негрыцянскім пытанні” ў Амерыцы, якая дала яму прытулак) і Грэйс Лі Богс (амерыканкі кітайскага паходжання, якая вывучала філасофію ў даваеннай Францыі), парвалі з амерыканскім трацкізмам і пачалі ў 1950-х гг. супрацоўнічаць з *Socialisme ou Barbarie*. Ад іншых рэвалюцыйных груп *S. ou B.* адрознівала ідэя — сацыялізм азначае не кіраванне “кіроўнай партыі”, дасведчанай у марксісцкай тэорыі, а кіраванне вытворчасцю і грамадствам з боку саміх працоўных.

Ва ўступным нумары *Socialisme ou Barbarie* 1949 г. Кастарыядзіс прадказаў, што адказам працоўнага класа на захоп Сталіным Усходняй Еўропы будзе паўстанне супраць новай “сваёй” бюракратыі. Саветы рабочых, створаныя падчас Венгерскай рэвалюцыі 1956 г., ашаламляльна пацвердзілі ягоны прагноз, хоць гэтае паўстанне рабочых супраць “камунізму” ў большасці левых выклікала вялікае замяшанне. Разам з сузаснавальнікам *S. ou B.* Клодам Лефорам Кастарыядзіс і напісаныя ім рэцэнзіі кідаюць выклік падтрымцы палітыкі СССР з боку вядомых французскіх інтэлектуалаў, такіх як Жан-Поль Сартр (Лефор вучыўся ў французскага філосафа Морыса Мерло-Панты, які ў выніку пакінуў пасаду палітычнага рэдактара часопісу Сартра *Les Temps Modernes*). Пазней Сартр скажа: “Кастарыядзіс меў рацыю, але няўчасна”. Кастарыядзіс адкажа жартам: Сартр меў гонар памыліцца ў патрэбны час.

Развіваючы сваю канцэпцыю “бюракратычнага капіталізму”, Кастарыядзіс сцвярджаў, што цяпер галоўны канфлікт пралягае па лініі барацьбы паміж “выканаўцамі”, або “прымальнікамі загадаў”, і “дырэктарамі”, або “аддавальнікамі загадаў”. Тое, што адрознівае капіталізм — асабліва ў яго бюракратычнай стадыі гіганцкіх фабрык, вялізных, геаграфічна рассяяных карпарацый і складаных тэхнічных апаратаў — ад ранейшых класавых грамадстваў, заснаваных на рабстве або феадалізме, заключаецца ў тым, што зараз рабочыя падтрымліваюць працу сістэмы, не падпарадкоўваючыся загадам (паўстанні рабоў або Жакерыі могуць быць контрпрыкладамі для папярэдніх грамадстваў), але праз супраціўленне і парушэнне ірацыянальных і не рэдка абсурдных загадаў, якія выдаюцца кіраўніцкімі сляямі, адарванымі ад рэальнасці паўсядзённай вытворчасці (найбольш красамоўным доказам тут з’яўляецца разбуральны эфект італьянскай забастоўкі). Гэты супраціў, першапачаткова выражаны ў супрацоўніцтве “нефармальнага груп” на



працы, таксама спрыяе тэндэнцыі да аўтаномных дзеянняў, якія маглі б служыць асновай для трансфармацыі грамадства, — сцвярджаў Кастарыядзіс. Калі цяпер кіраўніцкая эліта дзяржаўных, прыватных прадпрыемстваў і навязаных зверху саюзаў прыходзіць на месца ўласнікаў капіталу (чыя ўлада раней лічылася вызначальнай рысай самога капіталізму), то тых, хто выконвае вытворчыя задачы, трэба заахвочваць да саўдзелу і праяўлення ініцыятывы. І ў той жа самы час, аднак, кіраўніцтва лічыць, што яно павінна змагацца з самастойным прыняццем рашэнняў з боку кіраваных.

На падставе досведу Венгерскай рэвалюцыі Кастарыядзіс фармулюе свой класічны тэкст, прысвечаны таму, як можа працаваць самакіраванне грамадства. І дагэтуль “Пра змест сацыялізму” служыць арыенцірам для лібертарыйскіх сацыялістаў. Але неаспрэчана ўзыходжанне да ўлады дэ Голя ў 1958 годзе прыцягнула ўвагу Кастарыядзіса да іншай з’явы. Для S. ou B. галізм прадстаўляў мадэрнізацыю Францыі, а не зараджэнне фашызму. З крахам рэвалюцыйнага руху і прыходам “сучаснага капіталізму” бюракратыя заахвочвала і падсілкоўвала масавую прыватызацыю і дэпалітызацыю. Апатыя становіцца нормай, калі імкненне людзей да ўдзелу напатыкае сістэмныя перашкоды.

Аднак з пачатку шасцідзясятых Кастарыядзіс заўважаў і супрацьлеглыя тэндэнцыі. Раней за многіх іншых ён прызнаў, што Рух цэхавых стараст у Англіі, новыя моладзевыя, жаночыя і антываенныя рухі, барацьба расавых і культурных меншасцяў за свае правы адкрываюць перспектывы паўстання супраць сучаснага грамадства. Паўстання, якое зможа выявіць непрадказальныя і беспрэцэдэнтныя праявы аўтаноміі і альтэрнатыўных спосабаў жыцця.

Лагічным вынікам банкруцтва расійскага камунізму і ўздыму сучаснага капіталізму — з яго адначасовым і заахвочваннем, і выключэннем удзелу людзей і новымі, адсюль вынікаючымі формамі барацьбы — было тое, што сам марксізм стаў змярцвела ідэалогіяй прыгнэту, згубіў сувязь з новымі рухамі і памкненнямі да пераменаў. У апошніх нумарах S. ou B. Кастарыядзіс рэзка паставіў новую альтэрнатыву: трэба вызначацца — або заставацца марксістам, або — рэвалюцыянерам. Сам Кастарыядзіс абраў апошняе. “Марксізм і рэвалюцыйная тэорыя” (1964–1965) кідае выклік структуралісцкім і функцыяналісцкім тлумачэнням грамадства і гісторыі, у той самы час як Парыж быў яшчэ ў самым разгары структуралісцкага вар’яцтва Леві-Строса, Альцюсера і Фуко.

У 1967 годзе *Socialisme ou Barbarie* распадаецца. Але яе асноўныя ідэі працягвалі набіраць моц. У маі 1968 г. брат Даніэля Кона-Бэндыта — аднаго з лідараў студэнцкага паўстання — прысутнічаў на сустрэчах групы, а сам “Дані” з гонарам абвясціў аб сваім “плагіяце” ў Кастарыядзіса і S. ou B. Усё яшчэ быўшы замежным грамадзянінам і працуючы на Арганізацыю эканамічнага супрацоўніцтва і развіцця (АЭСР), а таму не меўшы права займацца палітыкай, Кастарыядзіс заставаўся ў цені падчас паўстання. Але ён, як і

іншыя сябры S. ou B., дапамагаў студэнтам ператварыць май 68-га ў найбуйнейшую з калі-кольвек бачаных у Францыі забастоўку. Заклікі да “autogestion” (самакіравання) ва ўніверсітэтах і на заводах утарылі ягонаму маніфесту 1949 г. “Сацыялізм або варварства”, а апеляцыя да “сілы ўяўлення” нагадвала пра ягоны апошні тэкст для *Socialisme ou Barbarie*.

Апошнія трыццаць гадоў свайго жыцця Кастарыядзіс правёў, наглядаючы за публікацыямі сваіх тэкстаў для S. ou B. (вытрымкі з якіх на англійскай мове былі надрукаваны як “*Political and Social Writings*” у трох тамах) і няспынна распрацоўваючы на падставе свайго апошняга эсэ для S. ou B. надзвычай арыгінальную канцэпцыю гісторыі як тварэння ўяўлення — тварэння, якое не зводзіцца да нейкага прадвызначанага плану: прыроднага, рацыянальнага або боскага. Ва “Уяўным усталяванні” і зборніку твораў (якія перакладзены як *Crossroads in the Labyrinth, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, i World in Fragments* (“Ростані ў лабірынце”, “Філасофія, палітыка, аўтаномія” і “Свет у фрагментах”) і аб’яднаны зараз у шасцітамовы анлайн-зборнік) ён падрабязна выклаў свае погляды, ніколі не адмаўляючыся ад першапачатковай канцэпцыі “работніцкага кіравання”, і пашырыў гэтую пачатную ідэю ў “праект аўтаноміі”, які цягнецца ад старажытнай Грэцыі да нашых дзён.

У 1970 годзе Кастарыядзіс сышоў у адстаўку са сваёй пасады дырэктара статыстыкі, нацыянальных рахункаў і даследаванняў росту ў АЭСР — працы, якая дазволіла яму паглыблена вывучаць асноўныя развітыя капіталістычныя эканомікі. У 1974 годзе ён стаў практыкуючым псіхааналітыкам, а ў 1979 годзе — быў абраны дырэктарам па даследаваннях у парызскай Вышэйшай школе сацыяльных навук (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales). У якасці практыкуючага аналітыка, у сваіх лекцыях і кнігах ён распрацаваў адметнае абнаўленне фрэйдаўскай тэорыі, пабудаванае вакол ідэі “псіхічнай манады”, якую сацыялізуюць гвалтам і якая ніколі цалкам не прымае таго сацыяльнага індывіда, у якога яе ператвараюць. Сны (адкрыта сексуальныя ці не), абмоўкі, “адгрыванне”, трансгрэсія і нават падрыў сведчаць аб захаванні гэтага невынішчальнага асацыяльнага ядра псіхікі, якое, калі часткова сацыялізаванае, можа служыць невычэрпнай крыніцай для ўяўлення сацыяльных змен.

Для Кастарыядзіса паведамленні Жака Лакана, Мішэля Фуко і іншых аб “смерці субекта” і “смерці чалавека” былі, як у свой час смерць Марка Твэна, — “крыху перабольшанымі”. Разам са сваёй тагачаснай жонкай, П’ерай Аланьё, Кастарыядзіс кінуў выклік лаканізму, які панаваў у французскіх псіхааналітычных колах, спрычыніўшыся да разрыву з “Трэціяй групай” Лакана ў 1968 годзе. Лаканаўскай рыторыцы ён супрацьпастаўляе ідэю: псіхааналіз — гэтак жа як і педагогіка і палітыка, але ў іншы спосаб — імкнецца да аўтаноміі чалавека. Мэта псіхааналізу — усталяваць з уласным несвядомым “іншыя адносіны”, якія характарызуюцца яснай са-

марэфлексій і разважлівасцю, выразным распазнаваннем і прыняццем свайго несвядомага творчага ўяўлення. Абноўленая фрэйдысцкая версія старажытнагрэцкага прадпісання “Пазнай самога сябе”, такім чынам, атрымала новую і магутную артыкуляцыю, гэтак не падобную да сённяшняй дзівачкай тэрапіі, наркатычных і антыпсіхааналітычных трэндаў.

Аднак найбольш арыгінальны і трывалы ўклад Кастарыядзіса — як філосафа сацыяльнага ўяўлення. Сапраўдная апазіцыя — гэта не “індывід супраць грамадства”, апасродкаваная “інтэрсуб’ектыўнасцю”, але псіхіка і грамадства як узаемна нерэдукцыйныя полюсы, бо першапачатковая псіхічная манада не можа сама па сабе ствараць сацыяльнае значэнне. Ствараючы “сацыяльныя ўяўныя значэнні”, якія немагчыма вывесці з рацыянальных або рэальных элементаў або сіл, кожнае грамадства ўсталёўвае сябе — хаця звычайна не ведаючы, што яно робіць гэта, і ў большасці выпадкаў не даючы сабе гетэраномнымі сродкамі распазнаць сваё ўласнае самаўсталёванне. Канцэпцыя “радыкальнага сацыяльнага ўсталявання ўяўнага” Кастарыядзіса — з характэрнай для яе ідэяй устойлівага адрознення і адначасова ўзаемазалежнасці паміж “усталёўваючым грамадствам” і “ўсталяваным грамадствам” — парывае як з функцыяналізмам, так і структуралізмам, даючы, у той жа час, ключ для разумення арыгінальнай формы быцця: “сацыяльна-гістарычнага”, самаўсталёўваючага і самазменнага адзінства, нязводнага да фізічнага, біялагічнага або псіхічнага.

Два ключавыя канцэпты распрацоўваюцца ў пазнейшых творах Кастарыядзіса. Першы датычыць пераадкрыцця ім феномена ўяўлення. Як выявіў Кастарыядзіс, уяўленне ставіць пад сумнеў увесь будынак “успадкаванай філасофіі”. У “Аб душы” Арыстотэль прапаноўвае тое, што стане стандартным меркаваннем аб уяўленні — як аб нечым пазначаным ірэальнасцю, мімікрыяй, бяссільным негатывам. Нягледзячы на тое, што Арыстотэль, здавалася б, развязаў праблему такім чынам, напрыканцы свайго трактату ён ізноў вяртаецца да *phantasia* ў спосаб, які парушае кананічны ў далейшым падзел адчуванняў і інтэлекту. І адваротна, хоць Імануіл Кант — як гэта заўважыць на ягоны рахунак нямецкі філосаф XX стагоддзя Марцін Гайдэгер — і адвёў “трансцэндэнтальнаму ўяўленню” цэнтральнае месца ў першым выданні сваёй “Крытыкі чыстага розуму” (1781), пасля выціскае яго праз некалькі гадоў у другім выданні. Гайдэгер апісвае гэты паварот як “адступленне” (Recoil) Канта перад наступствамі магутнага і нястрымнага ўяўлення. Цікава, што і сам Гайдэгер у далейшым адмовіўся ад усіх згадак пра ўяўленне. Кастарыядзіс заўважыў таксама, што нягледзячы на тое, што Фрэйд кажа аб “фантазіях” увесь час, заснавальнік сучаснага псіхааналізу ўстрымаўся ад называння, пагатоў даследавання, гэтай дзіўнай здольнасці ўводзіць уяўнае, няіснае ў быццё.

Другая галоўная тэма — гэта “сумеснае нараджэнне” філасофіі і палітыкі ў Старажытнай Грэцыі. Філасофія — як свядомае запы-

танне аб усталяваных уяўленнях грамадства — развіваецца рука аб руку з палітыкай, якую Кастарыядзіс апісаў як навочную спробу грамадства змяніць свае інстытуты. Абедзве звязаны з тым праектам аўтаноміі, чые пазнейшыя праявы Кастарыядзіс знаходзіць у ранніх бюргерскім выкліку царкве і каралю, у Амерыканскай і Французскай рэвалюцыі, у рабочых, жаночых і моладзевых рухах у заходніх грамадствах, таксама як і ў навачасных спробах працягнуць філасофію за межамі тэалогіі. Асаблівую ўвагу Кастарыядзіс аддаваў з’яўленню ў V стагоддзі да н.э. у Афінах грамадзянскай дэмакратыі. Даследаваў яе як інстытут прамой дэмакратыі, каб супрацьпаставіць той “прадстаўнічай” дэмакратыі сучаснасці, якая ўсталёўвае пастаянных носьбітаў улады, аддзеленых ад звычайных грамадзян. Пры апісанні сучасных палітычных умоў Захаду Кастарыядзіс аддаваў перавагу тэрміну “ліберальная алігархія”.

Кастарыядзіс ніколі не перапыняў сваю працу. Збіраўся прачытаць курс лекцый у Злучаных Штатах супраць сучаснай моды на дзівачкі псіхааналіз. “Мы павінны працягваць намаганні, — напісаў ён мне ў лісце, — распаўсюдзіць праз Атлантыку тую “чуму” самапазнання, якую, па словах Фрэйда, ён прывёз з сабой, калі наведаў Амерыку”. Напярэдадні Сусветнага рынкавага крызісу (1997–1998) ён скончыў артыкул на тэму “«Рацыянальнасць» капіталізму”. У ім задаўся пытаннем: наколькі далёка можа капіталізм — як згодна з уласнай логікай, так і супроць яе — зайсці ў ператварэнні свету ў “планетарнае казіно” валютных і фінансавых спекуляцыяў. Кожныя некалькі дзён, адзначыў ён, па ўсім свеце з выкарыстаннем ставак з крэдытным рычагам ідзе гульня з сумамі, якія перавышаюць увесь ВНД ЗША, без якой-кольвек прадуктыўнай карысці.

Праца Кастарыядзіса запомніцца сваёй надзвычайнай непарарыўнасцю і паслядоўнасцю, таксама як і сваёй шырынёй. Быў “энцыклапедычным” у першапачатковым — грэцкім — сэнсе гэтага тэрміна, бо прапанаваў нам “пайдэю”, адукацыю, якая завяршае круг нашых ведаў, інакш разрозненых на паасобныя галіны мастацтва і навукі. Пісаў наватарскія і першапраходніцкія эсэ па фізіцы, біялогіі, антрапалогіі, псіхааналізе, лінгвістыцы, грамадстве, эканоміцы, палітыцы, філасофіі і мастацтве, ніколі не прэ-тэндуючы на тую ілжывую “экспертызу”, якая аддадзена вузкім спецыялістам, згубіўшым далягляды агульнай карціны. Відавочна: менавіта тэма аўтаноміі з’яўляецца ключавой для яго ранніх павяненых працаў. І толькі смерць змагла спыніць ягоны імпэт да распрацоўкі яе значэнняў, дастасаванняў, разгалінаванняў і межаў.

Сама смерць, якая здараецца з намі, належала да кола тэмаў, да якіх ён увесь час вяртаўся. Нам патрэбна “этыка смяротнасці”, каб супрацьстаяць гетэраномным абяцанням вечнасці. Гэтая этыка была неад’емнай часткай грэцкага погляду на тое, што замагільнае жыццё, калі існуе наагул, будзе горшым за жыццё на Зямлі. Як дэмакратычны інстытут, трагедыя — публічнае выкананне п’есы, якая заканчваецца смерцю — нагадвала афініям пра канчатко-

вую бессэнсоўнасць думак і дзеянняў, пра неабходнасць самаабмежавання, каб трымаць гюбрыс пад кантролем.

Адзінае сапраўднае абмежаванне, якое можа трываць дэмакратыя — гэта самаабмежаванне, якое паводле канчатковага аналізу ёсць справай і працай толькі індывідаў (грамадзянаў), адукаваных праз дэмакратыю і дзеля яе. Такая адукацыя немагчыма без прыняцця факту: установы, якія ствараем сабе, у сваім змесце не з'яўляюцца ні абсалютна неабходнымі, ні суцэльна выпадковымі. Гэта азначае, што ніякі сэнс не дадзены нам у якасці дару, што не існуе ні гаранту, ні гарантыі сэнсу; гэта азначае, што, апроч створаных намі самімі ў гісторыі і праз яе, іншых сэнсаў — няма. І, нарэшце, гэта азначае, што дэмакратыя, як і філасофія, неўнікнёна адкідае ўсё святое. Іншымі словамі, дэмакратыя патрабуе, каб людзі прымалі ў сваіх рэальных паводзінах тое, што дагэтуль яны амаль ніколі па-сапраўднаму не жадалі прымаць (і што, у глыбіні душы, мы практычна ніколі не прымаем), а менавіта тое, што яны смяротныя. Толькі выходзячы з гэтага непераадольнага — і амаль немагчымага — пераканання ў смяротнасці кожнага з нас і ўсяго, што мы робім, людзі могуць жыць як аўтаномныя істоты, бачыць аўтаномных істот у іншых і зрабіць магчымым аўтаномнае грамадства<sup>3</sup>.

У сваёй творчасці і ў сваім жыцці Карнэліус Кастарыядзіс кіраваўся гэтай дэмакратычнай этыкай смяротнасці да самага канца.

### Бібліяграфія кніг Карнэліюса Кастарыядзіса на англійскай мове (перагледжана ў 2023 г.)

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3 *Crossroads in the Labyrinth*, vol. 5: *Done and To Be Done*, pp. 277–78.

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Four Portraits and Two Book Reviews. August 2017. <https://www.notbored.org/PSRTI.pdf>

Window on the Chaos, Including “How I Didn’t Become a Musician” (post-humous, 2007). Translated from the French and edited anonymously as a public service. Electronic publication date: July 21, 2015. <https://www.notbored.org/WoC.pdf>

## Два відэаінтэрв’ю Кастарыядзіса з субтытрамі на англійскай мове

Full interview with Cornelius Castoriadis by Chris Marker for *L’Héritage de la chouette* (*The Owl’s Legacy*, 1989; 1:21:09). Translated from the French and edited anonymously as a public service. <https://vimeo.com/66587994>

“Interview with Cornelius Castoriadis for the Greek television network ET1, for the show *Paraskiniom*, 1984” (56:18). English translation: Ioanna. <https://vimeo.com/85082034>

## Пра аўтара

Дэвід Эймс Кёртыс (нар. 1956) — вывучаў філасофію ў Гарвардскім універсітэце, амерыканскі перакладчык, які жыў у Парыжы, рэдактар, пісьменнік і грамадскі актывіст. Працаваў у ЗША арганізатарам шматрасавых суполак у Караліне і арганізатарам прафсаюзаў феміністак у Ельскім універсітэце. У апошнім кіраваў таксама даследаваннем у межах праекту Генры Луіса Гейтса-малодшага “Чорная перыядычная мастацкая літаратура”. Разам з Гейтсам усталяваў аўтарства “Наш Ніг” (1859) — першага рамана, апублікаванага афраамерыканкай.

Пераклады і тэксты Кёртыса друкуюцца ў амерыканскіх, еўрапейскіх і аўстралійскіх часопісах і кнігах. Сярод перакладзеных ім аўтараў: Карнэліус Кастарыядзіс, Фабія Чыарамелі, П’ер Левэк, Клод Лефор, Жан-П’ер Вернан, П’ер Відаль-Накэ і Жан-Жак Лебэль. На дадзены момант ім перакладзена і адрэдагавана болей за мільён словаў з твораў Карнэліуса Кастарыядзіса. Апроч таго ён быў запрошаным рэдактарам спецыяльнага выпуску аўстралійскага часопісу сацыяльнай тэорыі “Thesis Eleven”, прымеркаванага да 75-годдзя Карнэліуса Кастарыядзіса.

Кожную з перакладзеных ім кнігаў Кёртыс апярэджвае асобнай прадмовай перакладчыка — пішучы гэтакія штораду наноў і імпрэвізуючы як са зместам, так і ў форме, каб выказаць у філасофскіх развагах адносна свайго жыццёвага досведу культурнага работніка тое, як яго самога трансфармуе гэты адпачатна трывожны працэс трансфармацыі значэнняў адной маўленчай супольнасці ў значэнні іншай.

У 1990 г. стаў сузаснавальнікам Agora International — арганізацыі, якая імкнецца да далейшага развіцця праекту аўтаноміі ва ўсіх ягоных аспектах. Зараз Кёртыс каардынуе працу з калектывам бібліяграфіаў Кастарыядзіса ў рамках міжнароднага ўэб-сайту “Cornelius Castoriadis/Agora International”. Выступаў з дакладамі аб Кастарыядзісе

і ягонай спадчыне на розных міжнародных канферэнцыях у Канадзе, Францыі, Германіі, Грэцыі, Мексіцы, Паўднёвай Карэі і ЗША. Кёртыс з'яўляецца таксама сакратаром-скарбнікам і адміністратарам парыжскай мастацкай арганізацыі Mon Oncle D'Amérique Productions і фонду Appalachian Springs.



# THE DYNAMIC CONCEPTION OF THE SOCIAL IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORNELIUS CASTORIADIS<sup>1</sup>

Vladimir Fours (1963–2009)

Belarussian philosopher, Professor at the Department of Philosophy of the European Humanities University (2002–2009), and author of more than 100 scientific papers and 4 books on social-critical theory.

## Translator's preface

This translation aims to present English-speaking readers with the Belarussian philosopher Vladimir Fours' reception of the ideas of the twentieth-century French political philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis. As the original text was designed for the Russian-speaking public, which, until its initial publication in 2005, had only a general idea of Castoriadis's philosophy, it was primarily intended as a systematization of Castoriadis's dynamic conception of the social and included only a limited critical analysis of this conception. To strengthen the critical component and to make more explicit V. Fours' position in regard to Castoriadis's conception of the social as well as its effectiveness in the Belarussian social-political context, we decided to complement the translation with fragments of two other articles by V. Fours – “The Belarussian Project of Modernity?” and “Socio-critical Philosophy after the *Death of the Subject*”, which help to clarify the weak moments (from V. Fours' point of view) of the dynamic conception of the social by C. Castoriadis. The first fragment (see Appendix 1) shows the vulnerability of the “ontology of magma” in the context of the notion of “multiple modernities”<sup>2</sup>. The second (see Appendix 2) emphasizes two

- 1 The text was originally published here: Фурс, В. (2005). Динамическая концепция социального в философии К. Касториадиса. Докса. Збірник наукових праць з філософії та філології. Вип. 8. Грецька традиція в сучасній культурі. Одеса: ОНУ ім. І. І. Мечникова, 227–238. (Fours, V. (2005). Dinamicheskaya kontseptsiya sotsial'nogo v filosofii C. Castoriadis. Doksa. Zbirnik naukovih prac' z filosofii ta filologii. Vip. 8. Grec'ka tradiciâ v sučasnij kul'turi. Odesa: ONU im. I. I. Mechnikova, 227–238).
- 2 See the full text here: Фурс, В. (2007) Белорусский проект “современности”?



weak points in Castoriadis's conception: the metaphoric ontology of "magma" as the foundation of the social-historical world and the dualism of Castoriadis's "philosophy of autonomy"<sup>3</sup>.

Veranika Furs (translator)

*Abstract.* The article presents a reconstruction of the dynamic conception of the social in the philosophy of Cornelius Castoriadis. A meticulous study of the philosopher's most important works reveals, on the basis of various ideas about society and politics, the original version of his integral conception of the social. The reconstruction of this conception required a four-step study: (1) an analysis of his critique of "naïve realism" in the perception of social life; (2) an analysis of the method of revealing a symbolic component of social "things" in the interpretation of social institutions as functional-symbolic networks; (3) a study of the thematization of the virtual dimension of social life (Castoriadis's construction of the metaphoric ontology of the "magma" of social imaginary significations, his perception of society as a dynamic ("social-historic") formation, an elucidation of the duality of establishing and established); (4) an analysis of the way of a justification of a political project of autonomy. Our reconstruction demonstrates that the idea of autonomy is not a consequence but a cause of Castoriadis's dynamic conception of the social. Nevertheless, in the context of the notion of "multiple modernities", the idea of autonomy, being a key characteristic of "modernity", can be understood not as universal content but as a universal form. The regulatory horizon of "politics" (of the project of autonomy) is determined from the reverse — depending on what is identified as heteronomy in a given set of concrete circumstances. The interpretation we propose will allow us to proceed more consistently from the principle of the diversity of "modernities". It seems, also, that Castoriadis's position itself is characterized by two "defects": first, his conception of the social-historical world is based on the metaphoric ontology of the "magma", and, second, the "philosophy of autonomy" is dualistic.

*Key words:* Castoriadis, psychoanalysis, post-Marxism, social institutions, social imaginary significations, "magma", duality of establishing and established, political project of autonomy.

*Европейская перспектива Беларуси: Интеллектуальные модели.* Вильнюс, 43–58. (Fours, V. (2007) *Belorusskii proekt "sovremennosti"?* *Evropeiskaya perspektiva Belarusi: Intellektualnye modeli.* Vilnius, 43–58).

- 3 See the full text here: Фурс, В. (2008) Социально-критическая философия после "смерти субъекта". В: Борисов, Е., Инишев, И. и Фурс, В. *Практический поворот в постметафизической философии.* Вильнюс: ЕГУ, 173–174. (Fours, V. (2008) *Socialno-kriticheskaya filosofia posle "smerti sub'ekta"*. In: Borisov, E., Inishev, I. & Fours, V. *Prakticheskii povorot v postmetafisischeskoi filosofii.* Vilnius: EHU, 145–208.

The denaturalization of the concept of “society” is an important trend in the development of contemporary social thinking and a response to the realities of a “rapidly changing world”. This trend implies a dissociation not only from the functionalist mainstream in sociological theory, but also from the alternative “subjectivist” tradition of “interpretative sociology”, and it guides the conceptualization of a dynamic environment that generates different forms of social life (Фурц, 2004). It is important, when defining the outlines of a “dynamic conception of the social”, to go beyond a generalizing reflection on reorganizations in sociological knowledge and also to make use of recent developments in contemporary social and political philosophy. In this sense it is interesting to address the original conception developed by Cornelius Castoriadis, a prominent representative of Western (post-)Marxism.

Despite a high degree of interest in his legacy, Castoriadis is a rather “detached” thinker, and this makes it difficult to define the internal motivation and the organizing principle<sup>4</sup> of his conception. Axel Honneth, for example, sees the basic pathos of Castoriadis’s work as “rescuing the revolution with an ontology” (Honneth, 1990). However, if it were merely a matter of defending the project of social revolution, this would hardly have ensured that Castoriadis’s ideas remained relevant. In our view, his belief that any true work of philosophy must belong to the project of autonomy can be considered as a determinant. To put it more concisely, Castoriadis can be defined as *a philosopher of autonomy*: “I believe it impossible to understand what philosophy truly is, without taking into account its central place in the birth and deployment of the social-historical project of (individual and social) autonomy” (Castoriadis, 1991a, p. 20).

It was no accident that philosophy and democracy emerged in the same place and at the same time — they have something essential in common. The rejection of heteronomy is inherent to both philosophy and democracy: the denial of an external origin of truth and justice and the questioning of current institutions — whether in knowledge or in collective activity. When this internal connection with the project of autonomy is broken, philosophy degenerates into a detached, scholarly activity, into “schools”, and philosophers seek to construct a unified ontology, epistemology, etc.

Castoriadis’s own theoretical optics were adjusted in his critical references to certain “classic” concepts — primarily to those of Marx, Parsons, Freud and Levi-Strauss. The leitmotif of all these references, both where Castoriadis borrows and where he departs from his sources, can be defined as his intention to look beyond the illusory evidence of the “real-rational” in understanding history, society and the individual.

4 In the original text — “организующий стержень (the organizing pivot)” — translator’s notes (Veranika Furs).

As for Marx, two of his scientific advances retain their significance for Castoriadis. First, regarding social life, Marx proposed a continuously holistic position, breaking with both substantive and methodological individualism in the social sciences. Marx taught us to regard society as an entity in development. Second, his conception presents the internal connection between the cognition of society and the political project.

Castoriadis emphasizes that the value of this connection consists not in the construction of the next utopia, in defining social justice once and for all, but in discovering, within the social movements of a society that actually exists, something that will allow that society to change for the sake of a different future.

However, an internal as well as an external history of Marxism has demonstrated its fundamental internal ambiguity. On the one hand, there is the concept of praxis, which changes society. This concept, which is only vaguely outlined, leads us in one direction, prompting us to understand history as a creative process without end. On the other hand, there is a determinist conception of material production, which leads us to believe in the “objective logic” of the historical process. Under the influence of the positivism and the scientific-technical optimism of that epoch, on the whole, in Marx’s position, an objectivist approach to the understanding of history prevails.

Not only has this fact considerably reduced the creative potential of Marxist theory, it has also opened an opportunity of its application as an ideology of bureaucracy. Thus, the political history that culminated in Stalinism was only a practical embodiment of the “determinist” tendency originally embedded in the theory. That is why, for practical and political purposes, as well as theoretical ones, it is necessary to eliminate the component of Marx’s conception that postulates an “objective logic” to social and historical development.

The fact that Castoriadis turned to Parsons’ sociological theory became an important step in transcending the material production model. Making it an object of strong criticism, Castoriadis nevertheless, adopts the concept of the social institution, turning it into a basic element of his own social and historical theory. In Marxism the notion of the “institution” was not adequately conceptualized, as institutions in the strict sense belonged to the “superstructure”, which was determined by the “base”. This understanding of the institution postulated the material existence of a certain social substance, a substance that becomes recognizable in institutions. It is this objective determinism that Castoriadis attempts to overcome, thus accepting that any “truly social attitude” has been already institutionalized. Accordingly, it is necessary to conceptualize social life as a multitude of institutions of different kinds, including society itself as an all-encompassing institution.

In fact, the question is how to understand the nature of social institutions. The “functional-economic” point of view supposes that

the existence of any institution as well as its specifications can be explained by that institution's function in society in a given set of social circumstances and by its role in the all-encompassing economy of social life.

Whether we consider institutions as the products of conscious establishing, of accidental occurrences, or of the "logic of the historical process", in all of these cases the emphasis is on functionality, on a strict correspondence between the features inherent to the institutions and the "real" needs of the society under consideration.

Castoriadis, in his turn, perceives a need to expand this understanding of social institutions beyond the theoretical framework of functionalism, because any attempt to explain the emergence and continued existence of social institutions through their functional contribution to the maintenance of the social order ignores the fact that what constitutes this order is itself established by social interpretations.

The scale of the social process is provided by the world's interpretations and images, which give sense and order to the interconnection of social life. That is why social institutions must be regarded not so much as functional instances of the maintenance of a given status quo, but as a kind of realization of sketches created in the past. Castoriadis does not deny that institutions execute vitally important functions that are indispensable for society's continued existence, but he strongly rejects both the notion of reducing institutions to this fact alone and the possibility of fully comprehending institutions on the basis of their functionality.

Considering Freud's conception and criticizing it for a prevailing spirit of positivism, Castoriadis elaborates his own interpretation, a radically politicized one, of psychoanalysis as an integral part of the "great project of autonomy".

Castoriadis sees the main goal of psychoanalysis as the establishment of an "other relation" between psychic agencies: repression must be replaced by the recognition of and reflection on the contents of the unconscious. This replacement leads not to the elimination of psychic conflict, but to the formation of a subjectivity that is capable of self-reflection and consideration. Because subjectivity in its essence is not a state that can be achieved once and for all, but an ongoing process, and because the goal of psychoanalysis consists of the individual's transformation, it is vital that the individual in question be actively involved in the process of his own transformation.

"Thus, psychoanalysis is not a technique, nor is it correct even to speak of psychoanalytic technique. Psychoanalysis is rather a practical/poetical activity where both participants are agents and where the patient is the main agent of the development of his own self-activity. I call it poetical because it is creative: its outcome is, or ought to be, the self-alteration of the analysand – that is, strictly speaking, the appearance of another being. I call it practical, because I call praxis that lucid activity whose

object is human autonomy, an activity that can be reached only by means of this same autonomy” (Castoriadis, 1997a, p. 129).

Psychoanalysis, seeking to help the individual to become autonomous, encounters the existing institutions of society: the patient’s “ego” is to a considerable extent a social product and is usually organized as an element of the reproduction of a current social order. That is why psychoanalysis proposes a supplement in the form of the analysis of institutions. This analysis, as it goes beyond the framework of the “functional-economic point of view”, immediately leads to the notion of the symbolic.

Everything that is presented to us in the social world, as Castoriadis remarks, has a complex connection with — although it is irreducible to — the symbolic. Real actions, whether individual or collective — work, consumption, war, love, children’s education, material products — are not symbols. But they are impossible outside the symbolic network. We deal with the symbolic, first of all in language, but also in all social institutions. The symbolic is a mode of existence, in which the institution of society is given to us. Any given economic organization, legal system, established power system, or religion — all these exist in society as authorized symbolic systems.

Castoriadis’s development of the link between the “social institution” and the “symbolic”, supposedly based on Levi-Strauss’s conception, also included a radical departure from structuralism. First of all, Castoriadis did not accept the notion that semiotic systems should be considered separately, without any connection to the extra-semiotic state of affairs. He thought that social institutions could not be understood as self-sufficient symbolic networks, because symbolic networks, according to the definition of a symbol, refer to something other than the symbols themselves. That is why, in order to fully grasp the nature of social institutions, it is important to consider the correlation of symbols with representations, orders, motivations, commands to do or not to do something, the results of actions, etc. Second, it is illegitimate to consider value only as an effect of the difference between signs. Society exists only in and through symbolic systems, but it is also a history that forms and transforms them. That is why it is impossible to ignore a question of paramount importance concerning the historical production of meaning and of the emergence of new symbolic systems.

Thus social functionality acquires its meaning from outside; symbolism inevitably refers to something that is not symbolic. This element — which gives a specific orientation to every symbolic system and which is itself the creation of each historical period and its singular manner of living, of seeing, and of conducting its own existence, of having its own world, and constructing its relationship with that world — this ordinary structuring component is, according to Castoriadis, nothing less than the imaginary of society in a given historical period (Castoriadis, 1987 [1975], p. 145).

Taking into account the influence of Lacanian psychoanalysis and seeking to indicate his own understanding of the imaginary, Castoriadis emphasizes that one of the main drawbacks of Lacan's conception is its fixity on the model of vision, on the "scopic". The imaginary originates neither from the image in the mirror nor from the gaze of the Other. The imaginary is created from nothing and can be likened to the imaginary of a composer: "...we speak of the "imaginary" when we want to talk about something "invented"..." (Castoriadis, 1987 [1975], p. 127). The imaginary is not an image of something. It is the unceasing and essentially undetermined (social-historical and psychic) creation of figures/forms/images, on whose basis alone there could ever be a question of "something". The social imaginary is not the creation of images in society, but the creation of the entire world of a given society.

The imaginary and the symbolic, according to Castoriadis, pre-suppose each other: the imaginary reveals the nature of social-symbolic systems, while the symbolic provides the imaginary with the flesh of social existence. This interconnection is fixed in the basic notion of Castoriadis's social-historical conception, that of "social imaginary significations". These significations do not represent something that "really exists"; instead, they are the final articulations, the organizing patterns, and the preconditions for existing in society. The imaginary significations construct the world of the society under consideration, resting — in a new way each time — on the internal organization of a primordial natural stratum. Moreover, Castoriadis defines the term "social imaginary significations" not only in the "noematic" way: they simultaneously determine the representations, the affects, and the intentions that prevail in society (Castoriadis, 1991b, p. 42–43).

Social imaginary significations can be captured only indirectly: as a gap, clearly tangible and distinctly indeterminable, between a society's true being and its existence, when that existence is regarded in a "real-rational" way. Social imaginary significations are an "invisible cement", holding together the endless collection of the "odds" that form any society, or the "curvature" specific to every social space (Castoriadis, 1987 [1975], p. 143). For the ontological characteristics of imaginary significations, Castoriadis uses the metaphor of the "magma" — a creative, pulsating mass of energy, generating everything that exists in society.

Nevertheless, the symbolic contains not only the imaginary significations but also a "real-rational" component. Correspondingly, Castoriadis regards institutions as a socially authorized symbolic network, one in which the functional and the imaginary components are mixed in various modes and proportions.

The expansion of the notion of the institution beyond a functionalist interpretation leads Castoriadis to his conception of the "social-historical dimension".

“The social-historical is the anonymous collective whole, the impersonal-human element that fills every given social formation but which also engulfs it, setting each society in the midst of others, inscribing them all within a continuity in which those who are no longer, those who are elsewhere and even those yet to be born are in a certain sense present. It is, on the one hand, given structures, “materialized” institutions and works, whether these be material or not; and, on the other hand, that which structures, institutes, materializes. In short, it is the union and the tension of instituting society and of instituted society, of history made and of history in the making” (Castoriadis, 1987 [1975], p. 108).

The relationship between society and history cannot be understood from the outside: societies are not “located” in history; instead, history is the self-deployment of society (Castoriadis, 1991b, p. 33–34). The forms of social life are not determined by historical (and even less by natural or divine) “laws”. What creates society and history is the “magma” of social imaginary significations: “The instituting society is the social imaginary in the radical sense” (Castoriadis, 1991c, p. 84).

The social-historical transcends any “intersubjectivity” and is irreducible to it. The self-establishment of any society is the creation of its whole world: “things”, “reality”, language, norms, values, ways of living and dying, goals for which we live and die, and, of course, the human individual in which society is imprinted as an institution in its totality.

However, although Castoriadis sometimes states that the only “reality” is social reality (Castoriadis, 1997b, p. 191), he generally adheres to a position of moderate sociocentrism: although society creates its own world, the pre-social world always remains its boundary.

Society’s construction of its own world is, in essence, the creation of its social imaginary significations, which organize the natural world and establish the ways in which socialized individuals are to be fabricated (Castoriadis, 1991b, p. 41).

Thus all human groups have the capacity to give birth (with no perceptible motivation, though conditioned by their concrete circumstances) to the forms, figures, and schemas that not only organize things but also create worlds. This capacity itself is revealed in the social-historical dimension. We find a parallel to this creative dimension in the human individual, whose “radical imagination” is the analogue of the social imaginary.

According to Castoriadis, even nonhuman beings have a corporeal imagination that transforms the external shocks they receive from the outside world into “something”. What is passive here is the shock, but not the impression: not only in perception, but also in sensation, there are activity and intentionality; the body *creates* its sensations. In non-human living beings, however, this corporeal imagination is both enslaved to functionality and is given “once and for all”. In human beings,



it is defunctionalized and goes hand in hand with the new dimension of radical imagination (Castoriadis, 1997b, p. 178–179).

Castoriadis proceeds from the assumption of an initial unconscious state of the subject (monad), which is characterized by the experience of undifferentiated unity with the world. This monadic state, in which libidinal intentions are subjected to the pleasure principle, is unwillingly violated when a child becomes capable, through the process of socialization, of perceiving independent objects. The subject reacts to the loss of his world during the process of socialization, continuously struggling to reproduce that initial monadic state in his imagination and yet incapable of achieving this instinctive goal. All needs that develop in his further life can be understood, in a certain light, as the images of the substitution of the primary desire for perfect unity. This desire forms an energetic source, one that motivates all humans to unceasing imagination. Radical imagination, in which this unrealizable primary desire is unconsciously expressed, permanently draws the human beyond his present horizon of meanings.

The principal element of Castoriadis's conception of the social is his statement that the individual's nature is irreducible to the social: the core of the individual is the "psyche" (a psychic monad), which is irreducible to the social-historical, but susceptible to its formalizing effect. Society socializes the psyche of the newborn and imposes a complex of restrictions thereon: the newborn's psyche must refuse all egocentrism and the omnipotence of its imagination, recognize the existence of others and of their "realities", subject its desire to the rules of social behavior, and accept the models of the sublimated satisfaction of desire and even death in the name of social goals. Thus society succeeds (though never completely) in reorienting and channeling egocentric and asocial desires into internally coherent and socially significant activities. For its part, the psyche imposes an essential demand on social institutions: they must provide the individual with meaning. In the real world created any given society, all things possess meanings, which are, for the individual, a subjective refraction of the social imaginary significations of the society in which he lives. From the perspective of the psyche, the process whereby the psyche abandons its initial modes of fulfilling its own desires and invests in socially meaningful behaviors is sublimation. From the standpoint of society, this same process is the social fabrication of the individual (Castoriadis, 1991b, p. 41–42).

Thus the social individual is constituted through the internalization of the world and of the imaginary significations that are created by his society; he explicitly internalizes the multiple fragments of this world, and implicitly internalizes its virtual totality.

"If we define power as the capacity for a personal or impersonal instance (Instanz) to bring someone to do (or to abstain from doing) that which, left to him/herself, s/he would not necessarily have

done (or would possibly have done), it is immediately obvious that the greatest conceivable power lies in the possibility of preforming someone in such a way” (Castoriadis, 1991d, p. 149).

Before any explicit power, the institution of society as a whole performs in relation to the individual a “radical power-ground” or “non-localized primordial power”.

A society can exist only by embodying its institutions and its imaginary meanings in living, existing, and acting individuals. The individual psyche is endowed with plasticity as far as accepting a socially defined form is concerned, as well as with the capacity of retaining its monadic nuclearity and its radical imagination. That is why the individual as such is not completely dependent on society.

Explicit social power (as opposed to implicit power, i.e., the formation of the social individual by the society in which he lives) is related to the existence and acting of the forces that defend society from threatening circumstances and factors and are therefore capable of explicitly formulating commands that are reinforced by authority. Castoriadis defines a specific dimension of the institution of society in its totality, a dimension that is related to explicit power and one that is also a dimension of the “political”. This political dimension is broader than the state, but it cannot be legitimately equated with the institution of society as a whole.

As for politics, it is an explicit collective activity, tending to transparency and having as its object the institution of society in its totality. As Castoriadis believes, it is possible to speak of politics when the current institution of society is in question. The *reis* “a coming to a light” — though always partial — of social creativity. This means that politics is an explicit manifestation of the relationship between the establishing hypostasis of society with the established. The emergence of politics in ancient Greece as democracy served as the prototype for the project of autonomy. “Autonomy”, according to Castoriadis, is “a new *eidos* within the overall history of being: a type of being that reflectively gives to itself the laws of its being” (Castoriadis, 1991d, p. 164). Autonomy consists not in acting according to this law, which is opened in an unchangeable mind and given once and for all. Rather, autonomy is our endless self-questioning with regard to the consistency of any “universal” law, as well as our capacity to act in the light of this questioning.

“It is the unlimited self-questioning about the law and its foundations as well as the capacity, in light of this interrogation, to make, to do and to institute (therefore also, to say). Autonomy is the reflective activity of a reason creating itself in an endless movement, both as individual and social reason” (Castoriadis, 1991d, p. 164).

It was heteronomy, mediated by the view of an extra-social source of legality (first of all in the form of religion), that was presented as a current status quo that has historically prevailed in society. Heteronomy is a direct consequence of the establishing social imaginary's concealment behind the established form of society. For Castoriadis, heteronomy is a synonym of social alienation, which he interprets, of course, beyond Marxist orthodoxy. In the narrow sense of the word, exclusion, indeed, can refer to the historical particularities of certain institutions, as they express and authorize the antagonistic division of society and the domination of a particular social group over the social totality. But it is also possible to speak of exclusion in a more general sense: once established, institutions acquire a certain inertia from their continued existence and can practically be perceived as possessing autonomy and their own "objective" logic. Thus, exclusion is a particular modality of this attitude toward institutions and toward the social-historical in general: it takes place when a society fails to recognize these "imagined" institutions as its own products, and instead practically perceives them as a material reality. This concealment of the establishing behind the established is accompanied and strengthened by the social production of individuals, whose lives and thoughts are governed by repetition, whose radical imagination has been curbed and who are individualized to the least possible extent.

Where social heteronomy in fact predominates, autonomy is never anything more than a project, with the aim of reinstalling the political (as a dimension of explicit power) into politics: the absorption of the political by politics. If a society could not only recognize its institutions as its own work but could also liberate the social imaginary to such an extent that it might be able to change those institutions through reflexively reasoned collective activity, that society would be sufficiently autonomous.

It is important that the autonomy project, according to Castoriadis, is a two-part one: it consists of two non-identical, though analogous, projects, each with its own dynamics. In a state of heteronomy, the rigid structure of institutions and the concealment (or misconception) of the establishing social imaginary correspond to the rigidity of the socially produced individual and the suppression of the psyche's radical imagination. The project of individual autonomy, which is related to psychoanalysis, is aimed at the construction, in the individual, of the "other relation" between, on the one hand, the reflexive agency of the will and thought and, on the other hand, his Unconscious (radical imagination). By extension, the project of individual autonomy is also aimed at the liberation of the individual's ability to form and execute the continuous project of his own life. Analogously, the project of collective autonomy is aimed at the achievement of an "other relation" between the establishing and the established society and, therefore, at the liberation of collective creativity.

In Castoriadis's conception, the two projects — of individual autonomy and of collective autonomy — are interconnected. On the one hand, individual autonomy consists of the idea that the establishment of the “other relation” liberates the radical imagination and transforms it into the source of the individual's reflexive self-formation. On the other hand, individual autonomy is based on the idea that the individual cannot be free in a state of separation but rather depends on the state of society. An important object of the politics of autonomy is therefore the creation of institutions that, once internalized by individuals, will enhance their capacity to become autonomous and their effective possibility to participate in all forms of explicit power, that exists in society (Castoriadis, 1997a, p. 132-133).

The justification of the project of autonomy is combined, in Castoriadis's conception, with the recognition of the fact that human society will never be completely transparent: first, because there is an individual unconscious; second, because the social presupposes something that can never be given as such — something in which we are fully immersed, but whose “face” we shall never be able to apprehend, a formative element without a form. The social-historical dimension as a dimension of the collective and of the anonymous can never be controlled. There will always be a distance between society as the establishing and something that is established at a given moment in time. This distance is neither negative nor insufficient; it only indicates the openness of history.

Thus Castoriadis's philosophy presents a complex original version of the dynamic conception of the social. Our reconstruction has shown that its deployment postulates the subsequent fulfillment of four main steps. The first step is a critique of “naïve realism” in the perception of social life: disengagement from the “functional-economic” vision as the exemplary embodiment of “real-rational” thought. The second step consists of revealing the symbolic component of social “things” through the interpretation of institutions (including the all-encompassing institution of society as a whole) as functional-symbolic network. The third step is the thematization of the virtual dimension of social life (the elaboration of the metaphoric ontology of the “magma” of social imaginary significations), which provides a perception of society as a dynamic (“social-historic”) formation, a duality between the establishing and the established. The fourth and final step is the justification of the political project of autonomy. It is evident that the idea of autonomy in Castoriadis's conception is not a consequence but a cause of the construction of the dynamic conception of social. Specifically, an initial non-scholarly understanding of philosophy as possessing an internal affinity with the political project of autonomy stimulates a shift in the perception of social “reality” and provides a sensibility to the potential, hidden under seemingly solid social forms, for radical change. Thus Castoriadis's example confirms an observation we have made in relation to an advanced sociological theory (Фурц, 2002,

p. 99–107); the construction of a dynamic conception of the social presupposes the immanent politicization of knowledge.

## Appendix 1.

### V. Fours. The Belarusian Project of Modernity?<sup>5</sup>

No matter how we may treat Castoriadis's attempt to root the imaginary in the speculative ontology of the “magma”, it is necessary to state that the idea of the “social imaginary” (fundamental for the conception of “multiple modernities”) transcends the limits of “culture” and refers to the creative (“establishing”) component of the “social-historical”. In the context of our exploration, the fact that Castoriadis defines the idea of autonomy through the reflexive actualization of this imaginary dimension by means of politics is of paramount importance. Castoriadis believes that it is possible to speak of politics in the proper sense of the word only when (1) the present institution of society is in question; (2) as a result, the creative dimension of the “social-historical” and its interaction with present institutions explicates itself (though always partially); (3) the reestablishment of society occurs in reflexively transparent collective activity.

Having argued this point, we will take the risk of passing from the respectful reproduction of Castoriadis's thesis to a radical reinterpretation (in fact, an “inversion”) of his theoretical position. To clarify: the idea of the imaginary as the source that fills the social-symbolic networks of institutions with meanings and therefore generates the particular world of any given society, indeed, opens the new perspective of a theoretical reflection on the irreducible diversity of societies and is logically realized in the framework of the conception of “multiple modernities”. But furthermore, Castoriadis's position manifests evident dissonance between the empiric productivity of the idea of the diversity of social imaginaries and the extremely limited usage of this idea: in fact, [the purpose is — *added by translator*] only to ground the substitution of a determinist social ontology for the indeterminist — metaphorical ontology of the “magma”, which is as “transcendental” as its predecessor. The idea of multiple imaginaries remains, in Castoriadis's conception, abstract and empty, because it functions only as an axiomatic starting point for the introduction of the “ontology of creation”, but from the “ontology of creation” it is impossible to pass to the study of real social diversity in the concrete circumstances of geographic space and historical time (Gaonkar 2002: 9).

5 Translated from: Фурс, В. (2007) Белорусский проект “современности”? Европейская перспектива Беларуси: Интеллектуальные модели. Вильнюс, 46–48. (Fours, V. (2007) Belorusskii proekt “sovremennosti”? Evropeiskaya perspektiva Belarusi: Intellektualnye modeli. Vilnius, 46–48).

But if it is namely this “ontological obsession” that blocks the research and realization of this fruitful idea, then why not eliminate it, depriving Castoriadis’s conceptual model of its fundamentality and, at the same time, inverting the logical order of its deployment? Castoriadis’s order is as follows: (1) the magma; (2) the social imaginary (the creative, “establishing” element of society); (3) autonomy (the reflexive appropriation, in “politics”, of the anonymous creativity that establishes social forms); (4) heteronomy – the alienated state of society: this concealment of the creativity behind the established form of society, in which human communities do not recognize “imagined” institutions as their own products and practically perceive them as a quasi-natural reality.

If we deny the ontological “foundation” of the social imaginary in the “magma” while keeping in mind the unacceptability of its reduction to culture, we come to the conclusion that the social imaginary is grounded in “politics” – the historical and geographical reestablishment of society. This reestablishment, first is never full or universal: its scale and boundaries are defined by identifying several features and summands of the current form of life as composing the social “heteronomy”. Second, this reestablishment is reflexive in the sense of being directed by the regulative idea of autonomy. This leads to the conclusion – important for our inquiry – that the idea of autonomy, as one of the key characteristics of “modernity”, is not a universal content but a universal form (though it is possible for some of the different contents of this idea to have a “family resemblance”). The regulatory horizon of “politics” (of the project of autonomy) is determined from the inverse of autonomy – depending on what is identified as heteronomy in a given set of concrete circumstances. This proposed interpretation, in our opinion, allows us to promote more consistently the idea of the principal diversity of “modernities”.

## Appendix 2.

### V. Fours. Socio-critical Philosophy after the “Death of the Subject”<sup>6</sup>

Thus, proceeding from the idea of the “internal affinity” of true philosophy and the project of autonomy, Castoriadis discovers a theoretical position that not only allows him to construct an original version of the non-anthropomorphic understanding of the social-historical

6 Translated from: Фурс, В. (2008) Социально-критическая философия после “смерти субъекта”. В: Борисов, Е., Инишев, И. и Фурс, В. *Практический поворот в постметафизической философии*. Вильнюс: ЕГУ, 173–174. (Fours, V. (2008) *Socialno-kriticheskaya filosofia posle “smerti sub'ekta”*. In: Borisov, E., Inishev, I. & Fours, V. *Prakticheskii povorot v postmetafizicheskoi filosofii*. Vilnius: EHU, 173-174).

world (as the unity of social-symbolic institutions and the impersonal-collective imaginary), but also to inscribe it with a praxeological dimension (in the form of impersonally interpreted “politics”). But from the point of view of the overcoming of theoretical objectivism the “philosophy of autonomy” presents a subsequent step in the development of post-Marxism, Castoriadis’s position itself is characterized by two defects: first, the conception of the social-historical world is based on the metaphoric (not to say “speculative”) ontology of the “magma”<sup>7</sup>; and, second, the “philosophy of autonomy” is a dualistic one: the social-historical and the individual-personal dimensions are treated as juxtaposed, though interconnected. This fact allows us to interpret not only Althusser’s “anti-humanistic” reformatting of historical materialism, but also Castoriadis’s “philosophy of autonomy” as the “threshold” versions of post-Marxism, whose mature variants have shed this speculative “lining” and have inscribed the individual-personal dimension in the dynamics of the social-symbolic field.

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7 Let us specify: in Castoriadis’s conception, we find not a speculative ontology in the traditional sense of the word, but rather an inevitable result of the “romanticism of creativity”: the indoctrination of the perception of social reality, which is shifted toward a scanty layer of potential. But this “primary” dimension of the social self-establishment itself cannot be characterized “positively” or denotatively (literally), but only metaphorically.

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## THE IM/MEDIACY OF THE WAR

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*Abstract:* In the given article, the author addresses the issue of the perception of war in the information age through the prism of the concept of “im/mediacy”, considered in several interconnected aspects. Of special interest are the following questions: How the effect of the im/mediacy of the war is being constructed and produced in the current political, media, cultural and technological context? What factors define the distancing of and/or proximity of the war, and what role do the languages of war and resistance (as tools of communication) play in this process? The author discusses these key issues on the example of two specific cases – the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine that started in 2022, and the undeclared war of the authoritarian regime in Belarus against civil society that began in 2020. The author places this discussion in a larger context of the debates on decolonization of knowledge and culture in the ex-Soviet spaces. The conceptual framework employed combines semiotics, decolonial approach and poststructuralist philosophy.

*Keywords:* Belarus, cancel discourse, deconstruction, encratic and acratic languages, im/mediacy, Russian war in Ukraine, semicide.

### Introduction

This article is a philosophical reflection on the phenomenon of war in terms of the effects and affects that it generates in the information age. The war in a sense of warfare is not the direct subject of my reflections. However, I consider it necessary to begin this paper with some clarifying remarks concerning the definition of the very term – “war”.



These explanations will help to better understand why and based on what conceptual ground I bring together in my analysis several seemingly unrelated topics – the war in Ukraine, political repressions in Belarus, culture as a battlefield, and issues concerning the languages of war and the war of languages.

I will start with the classical definition of “war” provided by Carl von Clausewitz back in the 19th century. He defined war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (Clausewitz, 1989 [1832]: 75). This formulation seems to be applicable to any war and in any of its concrete forms. Still, in the context of the given article, the phenomenon of “war” will be considered mainly in two perspectives. Firstly, in the narrow sense, “war” means a full-scale armed conflict between different parties (states, as well as social groups within the same state territory, as in case of civil wars). Secondly, in its broader meaning, it implies the agonistic, irreconcilable struggle of two or more sides, which can manifest itself in different forms, be carried out on a different scale and with different methods, which are incongruent with the legal and moral norms of civil society. Under normal circumstances, legal instruments of mediation and conflict resolution are used to settle disputes between opposing parties. However, under the conditions of war the martial law is imposed, and thus, regular legal norms cease to function for an indefinite period of time. Disregard of moral norms that cease to operate in a state of emergency is only a consequence of already deployed hostilities. The annihilation of enemy involves and is accompanied by the seizure of someone else’s “territory” with all its natural, human, material and immaterial resources, and implies assertion of superiority over the defeated “enemy” in the form of monopoly power over both its territory and resources. To sum up, the aim of warfare, in any of its guises, is to “to render the enemy powerless” (Clausewitz, 1989 [1832]: 75).

Both of the above-mentioned perspectives of the concept of war will be discussed further in this text in connection with two ongoing conflicts, namely, the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine, started in 2022, and the undeclared war of Lukashenka’s regime against Belarusians since 2020 (however disproportionate they may seem on the scale of global politics and history).

This paper is structured according to the following logic. In the first part of the article, I elaborate on the term “im/mediacy” as a space-time concept and analyse it in three interconnected aspects, all of which are related to the perception of war. In the second part, I will consider the issue of the war of languages, drawing on the analysis of the political role and ideological (mis)uses of languages in the context of the continuing political crisis in Belarus exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. I place this discussion in a larger context of the debates on decolonization of knowledge and culture in the ex-Soviet spaces. The conceptual framework of my analysis combines the semiotic approach

(the concept of “semiocide”) and poststructuralist philosophy (Roland Barthes, Paul Virilio and Jacques Derrida).

### Immediacy: towards the definition of the concept

The historical moment in which we find ourselves at present is both unique and tragic. This “moment” has unfortunately been stretched out for an indefinite period of time (the full-scale war in Ukraine has been going on for more than a year, while the political crisis in Belarus has endured for almost three years). No one is able to forecast when this dire *now* will be over. In terms of the great historical time, this may seem to be only a brief moment, but in the context of an individual human life, it is quite long. It is not coincidental that the term “resilience” has recently become one of the most frequent words in the media and in academic discourse in connection with Ukraine. It denotes not only the resilience of the infrastructure, of the institutions of power under critical conditions, but also the endurance of ordinary people in these dramatic circumstances.

The term “immediacy (im/mediacy)” which I put into the title of this article implies several meanings and, in my view, deserves to be further elaborated as a particular space-time concept. Firstly, it defines a certain moment in time when a certain event occurs or is about to occur, and which is anticipated as forthcoming and even inevitable. In this sense, “immediacy” connotes instancy, urgency, emergency, imminence and so on.

Secondly, it denotes a situation when a certain event (or a series of successive and interrelated events) seems to be so real and so near that it urges/propels an individual to become emotionally and intellectually engaged in it. The mode of involvement, the sense of proximity, in their turn, determine the modality of interpretation, a certain way of cognition and evaluation of what is happening in the immediate present. It may be seen as a transformative moment, when distant observer turns out to be a participating observer who cannot distance her/himself from the scene of action, while being capable of establishing a reflexive attitude towards it.

Thirdly, the term also backlights the communicative aspect of the eventness that has to do with multimodal mediatization of the directly experienced reality. This process is enabled by contemporary technologies that produce an effect of utter immersion, thanks to which virtual reality is experienced as a physical one, while the distance is being constricted.

The issue of the im-mediatization of social life through visual representation and the simulative techniques had been discussed by social scholars and philosophers long before the arrival of digital technologies. As Paul Virilio noted back in the 1990s, “we are being confronted by a sort of pathology of immediate perception that owes everything, or very neatly everything, to the recent proliferation of photo-cinematographic and video-infographic seeing machines. Machines that

by mediatizing ordinary everyday representations end up by destroying their credibility” (Virilio, 1997:90). Jacques Derrida conceptualized the perception of reality that is artificially constructed with the help of contemporary media technologies in terms of “artificiality” and “actuvirtuality” (Derrida, 2002). In his words, that what seems to be “apparently immediate” and the feelings it evokes, is actually “less spontaneous than it appears”, being to a large extent “conditioned, constituted, if not actually constructed, circulated at any rate through the media by means of a prodigious techno-social-political machine” (Derrida, 2003: 86).

Media scholars, Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin, relate immediacy to a transparent interface, the one that erases itself, so that the user/viewer is no longer aware of confronting a medium, but instead “would stand in an immediate relationship with the contents of the medium”. According to them, “the logic of transparent immediacy does not necessarily commit the viewer to an utterly naive or magical conviction that the representation is the same thing as what it represents”. However, the very term “immediacy” gives a name “for a family of beliefs and practices, the common feature of which is the belief in some necessary contact point between the medium and what it represents” (Bolter, Grusin, 1999: 30). Therefore, due to contemporary media, we relate to screened reality as something that we are directly involved in, and someone else’s life as partly our own: “This is life. It’s a piece of somebody’s life. [...] You’re there. You’re doing it, seeing it, hearing it ... feeling it” (Bolter, Grusin, 1999: 3).

Since the very first days of the military invasion of Russia in Ukraine, many journalists, experts and scholars have noted that this may be the first war in the world history that can be monitored 24/7, virtually non-stop, thanks to modern communication technologies. An effect of the immediacy of the war is assured by the incessant media flow and is intensified by the diversity of media representations transmitted through different channels and platforms in a mode of (almost) real time<sup>1</sup>.

This certainly does not mean that top-level political decisions or the exact geographical locations of the battlefield become *immediately* known to all those following media news practically around the clock. The information about the ongoing hostilities allowed for publicizing on either side remains partial, superficial and inaccurate. This implies that, on the one hand, we are dealing with the instantaneous delivery of news and media publications of many testimonies and facts almost in real time. On the other hand, all this takes place in the conditions of secretiveness about the actual situation on the fronts, arrangements on the supply and delivery of weapons, military

1 In this text I do not analyse the role of media representations and/or the formats of mediatization of the war; however, I am certain that media aspects of this war will become a subject for many research works in the future.

intelligence data, actual targets of missile strikes, the state of the armies' fighting ability, the actions of the guerrilla warfare, etc. In other words, the effect of the immediacy of the war is being produced by the informational simulacra that create an illusion of transparency and accessibility of the data, while concealing the actual state of affairs.

The categories of urgency, duration and speed (when discussed in relation to the temporal regimes of military actions, news delivery, evacuation, mobilization, aid and so on) are highly relevant for comprehending the effects of immediacy. Yet the issue of the im/mediated perception of the war relates not only to *time*, but to *distance* as well.

To begin with, "distance", while being a spatial and geographic notion, is also a speculative and subjective one<sup>2</sup>. It is well known that "distance" can be experienced and felt in a myriad of ways. Moreover, under certain circumstances, its physical parameters may not matter at all. The perception and commensurability of distance are determined by many social factors, such as family bonds, professional ties, cultural context, biographical circumstances and media consumption, with the latter often being decisive in our time. Media audiences consist of millions of people who follow the news on different media sources and, thus, perceive and interpret the information obtained from those sources in very different ways. In democratic societies, the decision-making of politicians on the aspects of warfare, the forms and strategies of support of either side of the conflict cannot be made without the electorate. The political views of ordinary people and their ethical attitudes to what is happening at the frontline and around the war are determined largely by the sense of proximity to or remoteness from the war. However, while the views of audiences (and, hence, of various electoral groups) are shaped by media representations, the perception of the war as an immediate or remote event is also constructed by media.

Nowadays, visual media play the most important role in producing the effect of presence and immersion in the events. The affective power of images demonstrates that they may serve "as catalysts to set off a chain reaction of mass emotion", functioning as "multipliers of meaning, power and emotion" (Mitchell, 2012: 95–96). Since the beginning of this war, due to the massive flow of visual images of violence and destruction, "the pain of others" (Sontag, 2003) has become part of everyday life for many. Seeing videos and photos of mutilated bodies, corpses of civilians, city bombings, ruined buildings and so on has become almost routine. One still has difficulty in accepting their realism: some of these pictures produce an effect of watching the cinematic scenes from the war movies, and at times even slashers. Unfortunately, this is not a cinematic staging, but the medialized reality of the war.

2 There is an extensive conceptual toolkit for the analysis of this phenomenon developed by philosophers, in particular, in the framework of the phenomenological tradition and of social epistemology.

Reflecting on the power of images (of war) to invade consciousness against our will, Judith Butler notes, “that images and accounts of war suffering are a particular form of ethical solicitation, one that compels us to negotiate questions of proximity and distance. They implicitly formulate ethical quandaries: Is what is happening so far away from me that I can bear no responsibility for it? Is what is happening so close to me that I cannot bear having to take responsibility for it? If I myself did not make this suffering, am I still in some other sense responsible for it?” (Butler, 2015: 101).

I find these questions highly relevant for the next chapter of my paper in which I reflect on the distance from the war that Belarusians find themselves at, and on the degree of distancing or direct involvement determined by the immediacy of the events that took place in Belarus and preceded the outbreak of the war.

### On the proximity of the war: a view from/outside of Belarus

As I noted earlier, the immediacy of the war can be experienced in a particular context as its anticipation: as something that may be delayed for some reasons, but most likely is imminent and might occur at any moment<sup>3</sup>. The fact that the war against Ukraine began from the Belarusian territory and continues with the support of Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime is shocking, yet not surprising. In 2020, Vladimir Putin helped Lukashenka to remain in power. Over the last two years the regime’s dependence on Russia’s economic, media and political support has only increased. The military training in Belarus in January–February 2022 ended with an attack on Ukraine from its territory. Belarus as a state has lost sovereignty and turned out to be a *de facto* occupied country, with all the ensuing consequences.

It would not be a stretch to claim that for many Belarusians the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the logical and in a certain sense anticipated continuation of the war that Lukashenka’s political regime had been waging against Belarusians since, at least, August of 2020. For almost three years, Belarusians have been living in a traumatic, never-ending, gloomy *present* caused by the political crisis in Belarus, mass migration abroad and

3 Many European intellectuals who faced the brutal reality of the Nazi regime (first in Germany and later in other countries) – as political migrants, as concentration camp prisoners, as people without citizenship, as war refugees or members of the resistance movement, reflected this anticipation of the impending tragedy and the approaching war in their letters, diaries and literary works written in the 1930s, even before the outbreak of World War II. The texts written by Adorno, Benjamin, Zweig, Sartre and other intellectuals in that decade seem to be so close to us today in terms of their perception of the *Zeitgeist* and their premonition of the imminent disaster.

the unprecedented level of violence and political repressions inside the country itself. Both the supporters of change who opposed the authoritarian regime in 2020 and the current authorities seem to be stuck in the eternal August<sup>4</sup>. Belarusians are facing legalized lawlessness on a daily basis. Since 2020, there have been registered thousands of cases of human rights violations, and already more than 1,500 individuals have been recognized as political prisoners<sup>5</sup> (their number is growing with every day). The machinery of repressions does not stop. More than 11,000 criminal proceedings related to political protests and media activity have been initiated by Belarusian authorities over the course of two and a half years. The recently adopted new Criminal Code allows for the deprivation of citizenship and the remote trials against those political activists who fled abroad. The inclusion of the article on death penalty for “attempted terrorism” and other new “norms” in the legislation are sheer evidence of the catastrophic situation with the constitutional and human rights of Belarusians these days. According to rough estimates, several hundred thousand Belarusians have emigrated since 2020, including many journalists, political activists, independent trade unions’ leaders, academics, cultural figures, athletes, IT professionals and so on.

Upon the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, political repressions took a new impetus. Within just one day, February 27<sup>th</sup>, 2022, more than 800 Belarusians who took part in the rallies against the war in Ukraine were arrested and later sentenced to jail (in 2022–2023 some of them were sentenced to 6 and more years of imprisonment)<sup>6</sup>. Detentions related to the support of Ukraine continue, embracing various cases — be it a singer who performed a popular Ukrainian song in a night club in the centre of Minsk, anti-war comments in social media, a wish to serve as a volunteer in the Ukrainian army, posting a sticker of the Ukrainian flag on the windshield of a personal car and other absurd cases — persecuted by the regime that claims to be a peacemaker in this conflict.

The political crisis in Belarus continues, while the political divide in the society is only deepening. Attitude to the war in Ukraine and the extent of emotional involvement among Belarusians (belonging to different social strata and representing various social groups) remains a complex issue in terms of sociological analysis<sup>7</sup>. However, if in Russia

4 It is not by accident that in each of his public speeches Lukashenka repeatedly refers to the events of 2020, trying thus to suture his personal traumatic wound and to exorcise the ghosts of revolution.

5 According to the data provided by the human rights centre *Viasna* 1996, as of the end of April 2023 [<https://prisoners.spring96.org/en>].

6 For more details on the protests in Belarus against the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine in February, 2022, see here: <https://www.voiceofbelarus.org/belarus-news/large-anti-war-protests-took-place-in-belarus/>.

7 Without going into details, I would only note that in the conditions of war and

the so-called “special military operation” against Ukraine is endorsed (or at least, not contested in public) by the large part of population, the situation in Belarus differs significantly. The adherents of Lukashenka inside the country may support Russia’s invasion in their public utterances and employ highly militant rhetoric, but they hardly want Belarus to enter the war on a full scale. Numerous opponents of the regime, including those who have remained in Belarus but switched to the mute mode or gone underground, and those who were forced to emigrate, unanimously condemn the war against Ukraine and tend to help Ukrainians in various ways. There are volunteers working with refugees or providing humanitarian assistance both in Ukraine and abroad; as well as volunteers who joined the Ukrainian military forces and even formed special military units (such as *Kastuś Kalinoŭski* regiment). Independent Belarusian media provide information support to Ukraine and work both for the Belarusian and Russophone audiences. Besides, there are many ordinary people who donate to the needs of the Ukrainian armed forces or Belarusian regiments in Ukraine.

“We stand with Ukraine” in both the ethical and political sense. The prospective victory of Ukraine in the war against Russian imperialism gives grounds for hope that the defeat of Putin’s Russia will foster the dismantling of the authoritarian regime in Belarus. It is on this background that Belarusians regard the struggle of Ukrainians against Russian invaders as the war that affects us in the most immediate way. This, however, might not at all be evident for the distant observers who until recently have not been familiar with the political situation in Belarus and may not have been aware of the dramatic developments within the country.

### On the linguistic trauma and cancel discourse

The word “im/mediacy” that I put in the title of this text (split and yet conjoined by a slash) is certainly meant to be read as a deconstructivist gesture.

In view of the issues that I discuss in this paper (the war in Ukraine, the political conflict in Belarus, the problem of delinking from Russian imperialism and overcoming the path of dependency on the totalitarian

mass political repressions, the problem of the validity of sociological polls conducted from abroad, but aimed at studying public opinion within Belarus, is a very controversial issue regarding both the methodology and analytics based on the obtained data. However, surveys conducted by some research centres (such as Chatham House) provide certain insight into the general trends and dynamics of Belarusian attitudes towards the war in Ukraine and the change of attitude towards Russia since the beginning of this war (Chatham House, 2022; Ленкевич, 2023; Фридман, 2023].



regimes of the 20<sup>th</sup>–21<sup>st</sup> centuries), the slanting mark transforms into the self-sufficing sign, in all its polysemy. On the denotative level, the word “slash” means a cut made with a wide, sweeping stroke, typically by a knife or sword. The graphic signifier “/” retains this connection with an act of physical violence (Roland Barthes conceptualized this relation in his book *S/Z* (1970)).

However, the slash in “im/mediacy” reveals a cut and marks an open wound also in a metaphoric sense. This punctuation mark becomes a signifier of the traumatic division between *here* and *there*, *now* and *then*, *before* and *after* the series of the catastrophic events. Furthermore, the slash also implies a linguistic trauma caused by the war. “/” may be considered as a marker of a language disorder in a particular historical context. This issue will be analysed below in relation to the question of languages of war and resistance.

The question of the linguistic trauma will be considered here in three interconnected aspects. Firstly, it relates to the option (voluntary, forced or compulsory) between speaking out or keeping silent. The extreme case of silence is muteness, caused by the traumatic event(s) and the shock it produces. Secondly, it concerns the position of the Russian language in the context of the decolonizing process set off by the outbreak of the war. I imply here the revision of the attitude to the Russian language in the countries neighbouring Russia in the context of “cancel culture” (in Ukraine and in Belarus where a fairly large part of the population use Russian in everyday communication). Thirdly, I consider this question in the aspect of the *war of languages*, that is, of the clash between the language(s) of war and the language(s) of resistance, and reflect on the relationship between language and power, as well as language and violence.

There are, perhaps, three most recurrent questions that we hear and ask each other from the very beginning of this war. Where were you on February 24 (2022)<sup>8</sup>? Under what circumstances did you find out that the war had begun? What was your first re/action? Quite obviously, the first thoughts that came to my mind did not concern the language issue at all. But as the war continued, the question of language began to bother me more and more.

Any war is certainly a manifestation of the fiasco of the language of diplomacy (since politicians, unlike ordinary people, have the ability to act with words). In the conditions of war, vis-a-vis with brutal violence executed on a daily basis, the diplomatic speech acts such as “we are deeply concerned” seem to be completely out of place. In addition, there still remains an ethical dilemma related to the problem of not

8 February 24th, 2022, will certainly be remembered as such a dramatic date, the very impact of which was felt “in an apparently immediate way”. Rephrasing Jacques Derrida’s words, one can say that it was marked by the “ineffaceable event in the shared archive of a universal calendar” and will stay in history as the day “that truly makes its mark” (Derrida, 2003: 86).

only the uselessness, but also a certain tactlessness of speaking, as well as the inappropriateness of certain words in a particular situation. After all, in such circumstances it is necessary not just to speak, but act.

Then what instruments of resistance to the war, against violence and destruction are available to the “silent majorities” (to use the concept of Jean Baudrillard’s), and which ones can be efficient under such circumstances? For instance, may cancel culture be considered as an efficient way of struggling and how does it relate to the question of language?

For a large number of people, the beginning of the war became such a profound shock that they could only respond to it with muteness. However, to remain muted and to keep silent is not the same thing<sup>9</sup>. After the beginning of the war, it turned out that for media persons, in particular those with high symbolic capital, even if they did not openly support Putin’s military aggression, keeping up to the mode of muteness in media was fraught with immediate consequences. Those public figures (athletes, musicians, actors, writers, from Russia and elsewhere) who did not condemn the war and did not articulate clearly their anti-war position during the first weeks were faced with these consequences very soon. “Cancel culture” had become a means to remind them of the price of their silence in public.

The concept of “cancel culture” entered our lexicon only a few years ago, mostly in connection with the #MeToo (2017) and Black Lives Matter (2019) movements. In a digital, globalized society, “cancel culture” is primarily a network phenomenon that expands through various media platforms. Grassroots initiatives launched through social networks are a condition for both the possibility and the realization of an organized and consolidated cultural protest. At first, the boycott was aimed at concrete individuals (public figures, celebrities) who were publicly rebuked for inappropriate behaviour related to either sexual harassment or racism (offensive remarks or unacceptable actions, up to and including physical violence). But very soon the practices of cancel culture spread to various cultural institutions, brands, artworks and other social and cultural phenomena. Public debates around this phenomenon (regardless of the country or context) brought to the forefront a dilemma: is cancel culture only an instrument of social justice and expression of solidarity, or is it also a mechanism of political censorship from below, and therefore, possibly, it may represent a challenge to democracy, freedom of opinion and cultural diversity?

9 Under certain historical and political circumstances, performative silence in public may become a form of protest against power regimes, state oppression, violence, censorship, etc. To mention but a few examples, such as silent protests in Minsk in 2011–2012 or art performances with stitching up the mouth.

In the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, this form of ostracism in public discourse, even after 2017 (#MeToo movement), has rarely targeted issues of gender, sexuality, and racial discrimination (for a variety of reasons, stemming both from the patriarchy in the public sphere and from the rise of neoconservative populist governments). However, public censorship has become a very important element of civic resistance in the context of military conflicts and political tensions. In Georgia (since 2008) and Ukraine (since 2014), it was directly linked to acts of Russian military aggression in the 2000s and 2010s.

Belarusians started to utilize the political potential of cancel culture in 2020. On the eve and after the rigged elections, many began to “cancel” supporters of Alexander Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime in social networks, shun certain spaces of consumption and brands run by businessmen loyal to the regime, and to boycott the events organized by the state (concerts, sports events, festivals, music concerts, etc.). This form of civil disobedience has become especially important in the context of the increasing political repressions in 2020–2022. If one cannot voice her/his dissent in public, then silent contempt may become a personal strategy of resistance.

After February 24 of 2022, the phenomenon of “cancel culture” gained a new impetus and new forms. In some countries the condemnation of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine manifested itself in cancelling of Russian culture and/or putting it on the pause (be it the cancelling of art exhibitions, musical concerts, theatrical performances or dismantling of monuments, renaming of streets, and so on). “Great Russian literature” (which was long appraised as a unique contribution to the world culture and an etalon of morality) has also become the target of harsh criticism because of its implicit relation to the imperial narratives, ethnocentrism, xenophobia and patriarchy. These forms of protest against Russian aggression in Ukraine are among the few means available to ordinary people to make their outrage heard and supported through social media campaigning. It is both an expression of solidarity with the Ukrainian people and, at the same time, a means of distancing from Putin’s imperial politics. Russian propaganda hastened to declare that the boycotting of Russian culture implies a revocation of culture as such. However, those Russian intellectuals who condemn the war note that Russian culture has for too long served as a protective screen for imperial ambitions of the regime, and that between “abolishing conscience” and cancelling of culture, they choose the latter.

“Cancel culture” has much in common with the mechanisms of economic sanctions, but the difference is that the political reasons for economic sanctions are directly related to the achievement of goals. Their abolishment depends on the fulfilment of conditions – be it the ending of the war, releasing political prisoners or other. However, cultural sanctions differ in that they have neither a strictly defined

requirement nor a foreseeable duration. When the war in Ukraine is over (hopefully, on Ukraine's terms), the boycotting of Russian culture will not stop overnight, but most likely it will take new forms, because in this case we are talking not about merely neglecting a remote culture whose dissemination is put on a temporary hold (as in some European countries where the Russian language is not used in the public sphere), but about much more complex issues. By starting the war against Ukraine Putin's regime aimed to restore the frontiers of the Russian Empire, as well as its cultural and linguistic domination in the region, but this has resulted in the irreversible consequences. The process of decolonizing rapidly accelerated, and has become a pressing issue in the political and cultural agenda of ex-Soviet countries and beyond.

The growing negative attitude towards Russian culture in the conditions of the war has also affected the language issue. Many foreign writers and publishers who have been earlier making good profits on the Russian-language publishing market (given its capacity), have terminated their contracts for the provision of copyright for the translation and publication of books. However, for Russophone writers and scholars residing in different countries the situation appears more complicated. Publishing in Russian started to be seen as politically and ethically inappropriate: how can one write in the language of the aggressor country, publish in journals or take part in the conferences that are somehow connected with the country that unleashed the war? But ultimately, it is also a question of whether it is possible to distance oneself from the mother tongue and start to consider it merely a "first language"?

For writers and humanities scholars, the impeccable command of language(s) is a key prerequisite for intellectual work. Literary style, semantic nuances, word play, the use of puns, idiomatic ambivalences, intended ambiguity, intonation and rhyme, mastery of idiolects, ironic subtlety, the invention of neologisms — all of these features of the linguistic perfectionism (refined in one's own native language) certainly matter. However, under certain historical or biographical circumstances, the native/first language may become the most vulnerable spot, and in a certain sense a locus of pain. Giving it up can result in the temporary loss of the "gift of speech", as it takes time to start thinking and writing in (an)other language and to adjust the conceptual apparatus to it<sup>10</sup>.

10 Those Russian intellectuals who are in opposition to Putin's regime seem to be likewise uncertain about which audience they address now (from exile), and in what language it would be appropriate to do, lest they be accused of the imperial view point. This situation is not unique and there are many historical correlations. A relatively recent example of the linguistic anxiety of intellectuals whose home country was in the position of a war aggressor and who were political migrants can be found in the correspondence between Walter Benjamin

For those Ukrainian intellectuals who until the beginning of the full-scale war had been writing mostly in Russian the question of the “first language” unequivocally ceased to be a neutral issue (for some, the turning point occurred back in 2014). A Ukrainian writer Vladimir Rafeenko (Volodymyr Rafeyenko) noted: “After February 24, I made a firm decision never again to publish a single text in Russian. [...] And I have no desire to contribute any longer, even if indirectly, to Ukrainian literature in the Russian language. [...] I’m simply unable to write in Russian any longer. The very thought that someone would consider me a Russian writer because I write in Russian is intolerable” (Rafeenko, Shore, 2022).

For a significant number of Russophone Belarusians, the Russian language lost its seeming neutrality back in 2020. In an effort to keep power in their hands, Lukashenka’s regime headed for total Russification. Persecution of the Belarusian language and culture became one of the key strategies of the politically motivated trials (the examples are so numerous, that it is hardly possible to list them all). Russian invasion of Ukraine made the political-linguistic divide inside the country even more acute. The fact that many Belarusians, including some opinion leaders, in the context of these events switched to the Belarusian language is explained by both the desire to separate themselves from the system of power built by Lukashenka’s regime, and to strengthen the ground for political independence of the new Belarus. In a decolonial perspective, it is important to underline, that the Belarusian language has not sullied itself either in the past or in the present by its proximity neither to dictatorial regimes, nor to the imperial/colonial regimes of power.

In order to explain why the cancelling of Russian culture after the beginning of the war against Ukraine could not abide the language issue, it would be useful to recall the relation between cultural representations and linguistic categories. The notion of “culture” implies a certain set of values and meanings, codes of communications, historical narratives, behavioural conventions, rituals, ethical norms, religious beliefs, and sexual norms. According to Stuart Hall, “meaning depends on the relationship between things in the world – people, objects and events, real or fictional – and the conceptual system, which can operate as mental representations of them”. Hence, individuals

and Theodor Adorno after having left Germany. Benjamin started to write in French, Adorno switched to English, and both of them discussed the condition of the German language in their emigrant milieu. Thus, in May 1937, Benjamin writes to Adorno: “I dislike the frequent offences against German itself. [...] I have the rather evil suspicion that the resentment of the emigré [...] is simply finding an opportunity to express itself at the expense of the German language, and that is no longer an amusing matter” (Benjamin, 1994: 186). In response, Adorno notes: “It is interesting that you too suspected a certain revenge against the language here. I have often had the same feeling myself” (Wiesengrund-Adorno, 1994: 190–191).

who speak the same language share a basic set of meanings. At the same time, “the conceptual map which I carry around in my head is totally different from yours, in which case you and I would interpret or make sense of the world in totally different ways” (Hall, 1997: 17–18).

That is why decolonial thinkers question the presumable innocence of language, considering the latter rather as a system of concepts and as a way of seeing of the world through the prism of linguistic categories than as a neutral tool of communication. Hence, in the given context, it would be more correct, instead of “cancel culture”, to use the term *abrogation*, which implies a “refusal of the categories of the imperial culture, its aesthetic, its illusory standard of normative or “correct” usage, and its assumption of a traditional and fixed meaning “inscribed” in the words” (Ashcroft, Griffiths. Tiffin, 1989: 38)..

### Deconstructing the semicide

The opinion that the Russian language is not Putin’s or Lukashenko’s regimes’ “private property” and should not be blamed for violence is rather wide spread these days. However, the political status of Russian as a language of those who unleashed and support wars (Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and Lukashenka’s warfare against Belarusians and against the Belarusian language) induces the reconsideration of the relationship between the language(s) of power and the language(s) of resistance.

Teresa de Lauretis, in her article “The Violence of Rhetoric: Considerations on Representation and Gender” (the title of which reverberates with Michel Foucault’s term “rhetoric of violence”) argues that “the (semiotic) relation of the social to the discursive is posed from the start”, as there is a close connection between “the order of language, some kind of discursive representation and the social practices of violence” (Lauretis, 1989: 32). In other words, language was and remains the main instrument of ideological indoctrination, which may be exploited according to the needs of power regime(s).

The prominent German philologist Victor Klemperer, soon after the end of WWII, published a book named *LTI. The Language of the Third Reich* (1946). It was written on the basis of his wartime notes and observations that he kept writing down throughout the years of the Nazi regime. Describing the linguistic catastrophe that had overtaken the German language under the Nazi regime, Klemperer noted that words can be like tiny doses of arsenicals: they are swallowed unnoticed, they do not seem to have any effect, but after a while the poisoning is evident. Noticing everywhere the same clichés, the same intonation, the spread of the style of “bazaar agitator-shouting”, he concludes: “Nazism permeated the flesh and blood of the German people through single words, idioms, and sentence structures which were imposed upon them in a million repetitions and taken on board

mechanically and unconsciously” (Klemperer, 2000). Not realizing this danger, the Germans soon found themselves in another reality: books and newspapers, official correspondence and bureaucratic forms were all swimming in the same brown sauce. But the worst thing was that the symbolic violence was total – so much so that even the Jews spoke the language of the Nazi (Klemperer, 2000).

These days, in both Putin’s Russia and Lukashenka’s “Belorussia”, the language of hatred plays a key role in the implementation of violence. Its offensive and obscene rhetoric permeates all levels of the power vertical and is transmitted through the state media channels. Moreover, its efficiency as a tool of symbolic violence significantly increases when the state repressive apparatuses are also involved, as in the case of Belarus. During all the years of Lukashenka’s rule, Belarusians have also witnessed how the meanings of even the most familiar, everyday words (both colloquial and official language) have been gradually destroyed or inverted. This has affected the judicial and political vocabulary in the first place. Through diverse media channels of propaganda, the “newspeak” intruded and took over the public sphere. It is not accidental that the same language (i.e. Russian) is used for the propagation of war, hatred and genocide, and for the imperial expansion and occupation.

For more nuanced conceptualization of the destructive actions of power regimes with respect to language, the concept of “semicide” may be relevant here. This term, coined by the Estonian scholar Ivar Puura (Puura, 2013), describes a “situation where signs and stories that are significant for someone are destroyed because of someone else’s malevolence or carelessness, thereby stealing a part of the former’s identity” (Puura 2013: 152). In a broad sense it signifies “the destruction of signs and stories”, it implies “the erasure, total or partial, sudden or gradual, of meaning making processes pertaining to individuals as well as communities”, but what is equally deleterious, is the damage to or even “destruction of sign relation, not only of the sign bearers themselves” (Usluu, 2020: 224, 234). In this context, my own semiotic anxiety stems from what I would call the contamination of “letter”, or to put it differently, the defilement of language with all the ideological impurities that have saturated the official rhetoric in both Russia and Belarus.

However incredible it may sound for the adherents of the “Russo-phone world”, but Lukashenka and Putin, aiming to disrupt Ukrainian and Belarusian cultures, languages and national identities, harmed Russian language the most. Conducting semicide via annihilation of language as both the system of signs and the picture of the world is certainly quite symptomatic. On the one hand, it represents an attempt to evocate the ghosts of the “radiant” past (be it the Russian empire or the USSR) and the desire to bring the dead back onto the political scene and into the discourse. And on the other, it is also an intended revenge on the immediate present in which there is no place

for dictatorships in any impersonation, likewise there is no room for the language of violence, hatred and destruction.

According to Roland Barthes, the domain of language(s) under certain conditions may become a true “battlefield” (Barthes, 1989: 106)<sup>11</sup>. The war of languages is not “natural”: “it occurs when society transforms difference into conflict” (Barthes, 1989: 107). The dividing line runs in the relation of languages to Power. It is on this ground that he proposed to distinguish between the *encratic* and *acratice* languages:

“There are languages which are articulated, which develop, and which are marked in the light (or the shadow) of Power, of its many state, institutional, ideological machineries; I shall call these encratic languages or discourses. And facing them, there are languages which are elaborated, which feel their way, and which are themselves outside of Power and/or against Power; I shall call these acratice languages or discourses” (Barthes, 1989: 107).

In my view, the notion of the *encratic* language is applicable to the analysis of the discursive regimes of imperialism, colonialism, totalitarianism, but also may be instrumental for the analysis of more specific languages of propaganda, oppression and violence (characteristic for racism, misogyny, homophobia, prison, gang and military subcultures and so on). The particular cases of the *acratice* languages, as well as the strategies of resistance to the discourses of power are likewise diverse and multiple, and are being shaped by the concrete political circumstances<sup>12</sup>.

The events of 2020 in Belarus that made a clear-cut the divide between the adherents of the current power regime and its opponents revealed the yawning discursive gap between the *encratic and acratice languages* in the divided Belarus. In the current circumstances, it is necessary to *keep up a correct distance* from the language that has been poisoned by propaganda clichés of “denazification” and “demilitarization”, i.e. from the discourse that serves as an ideological curtain of the war against Ukraine. In the analysis of what happened, how the war became possible at all, what role hate speech and propaganda messages play in this conflict, we certainly will need a different conceptual vocabulary. The emancipation of language, the discursive *delinking*

11 It is worth mentioning that this wording from Barthes’s text has been translated into Russian as “поле брани”, but in Russian “брань” also means obscene, rude, inappropriate language.

12 In this paper I choose English as both a metalanguage in relation to Russian as a language-object and as an *acratice* language in the given political and cultural circumstances. English is certainly not a neutral or innocent language either, especially in light of the history of colonization, yet I recourse to English in order to create a critical, reflective distance towards the war and the discourses that are servicing it (be it in Russia or Belarus).



from the current power regimes and the deconstruction of meanings that the authoritarian regimes of Lukashenka and Putin have assigned even to common language phraseology will require time and effort.

Will we be able to restore the meanings of the terms that were appropriated, abused and corrupted by the languages of hatred and violence? How will we deal with the etymology of devalued words? Will we be able to get rid of some words and phraseological constructions that have established themselves in this “newspeak”, so that they do not continue to poison our languages after the collapse of these regimes? These are all open questions, but one has to be reminded of the work on deconstruction of the language(s) of war and violence that awaits us ahead.

### Concluding remarks

As Jacques Derrida once noted, “being ‘in touch with actuality’ and ‘thinking one’s time’ are not the same thing. Both of them imply doing something, over and above establishing facts or offering descriptions: taking part, participating, taking sides. That is when you ‘make contact’, and perhaps change things, if only slightly. But one ‘intervenes, as they say, in a time which is not present to one, or given in advance” (Derrida, 1994: 28). In continuation of Derrida’s thought, I would note that in terms of individual agency, none of us has the power to stop, cancel or “cross out” the war, and yet we have no choice but to critically revise our own distance and proximity from/to the war. I mean not only the empathy and solidarity with those who are struggling against war, violence, destruction and dehumanization, but also the political distancing from those who started the war, moral distancing from those who support it, and building a critical, epistemological distance towards the very situation of the war.

I would like to conclude my reflections on the im/mediacy of the war with two relevant quotes. Both of them sound if not optimistic, then at least encouraging. The first quote, which invites us to think of the present dialectically, in all its complexity, is from the text by the decolonial thinker Achille Mbembe: “we have now fully entered what looks like a negative moment. [...] It is a moment when contradictory forces – inchoate, fractured, fragmented – are at work but what might come out of their interaction is anything but certain. It is also a moment when multiple old and recent unresolved crises seem to be on the path towards a collision. Such a collision might happen – or may-be not. It might take the form of outbursts that end up petering out. Whether the collision actually happens or not, the age of innocence and complacency is over” (Mbembe, 2015).

The second quote is taken from the above-mentioned book by Viktor Klemperer. He advises us, instead of getting desperate, to do what we can do as scholars even in the conditions which may not at all be

favourable for the intellectual work. He suggests noting every detail of the immediate present, in order to make it comprehensible later, and to value the experience of living in the troubled times: “observe, study and memorize what is going on – by tomorrow everything will already look different, by tomorrow everything will already feel different; keep hold of how things reveal themselves at this very moment and what the effects are” (Klemperer, 2000: 10).

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# ROUSSEAU'S AMBIVALENT PERSPECTIVE ON POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

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*Abstract:* *The Social Contract* by Jean-Jacques Rousseau is frequently identified as a pivotal work on the concept of popular sovereignty. This paper explores the nuanced nature of Rousseau's perspectives on popular sovereignty, arguing that his views are multifaceted and, at times, conflicting. We delve into two primary perspectives on the power of the people found within Rousseau's work. According to the first, often dominant interpretation of Rousseau's *Social Contract*, the people is presented as a sovereign power, bound only by their decisions and actions. The second perspective, however, presents the people as significantly less empowered, subject to numerous substantial restrictions. This article systematically reconstructs these two viewpoints, compares them, and scrutinizes the tensions and contradictions they generate. Our analysis proposes an interpretive framework for the coexistence of these divergent perspectives, advancing our understanding of Rousseau's complex political thought. Moreover, we highlight how these insights into Rousseau's concept of popular sovereignty shed light on contemporary political phenomena and contribute to ongoing debates in political philosophy.

Keywords: Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Sovereignty, State, People.

## Introduction

This paper aims to critically re-evaluate Jean-Jacques Rousseau's complex and ambivalent notion of popular sovereignty. It not only situates this notion within the broader context of Rousseau's



contemporaneous contractual theories but also extrapolates its implications to the current political discourse. By exploring the enduring significance of Rousseau's thoughts on popular sovereignty, this paper seeks to contribute to the discourses on democratic theory, political power limitations and evolving sovereignty conceptions.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *The Social Contract* (1762), the cornerstone of political philosophy, is an authoritative text about popular sovereignty and a foundational reference book for modern democratic thought. Ch. Bertram, in his extensive analysis of *The Social Contract*, argues that Rousseau's work significantly deviated from the prevailing sovereignty discourses of the time, laying the groundwork for future democratic theories (Bertram, 2012). However, this paper suggests that Rousseau's advocacy of popular sovereignty and related democratic principles and values may not appear as absolute or unreserved as commonly perceived.

A close reading of *The Social Contract* uncovers a complex view that contradicts the mainstream interpretation. This paper seeks to illuminate the nuances and potential contradictions inherent in this seminal work. Our goal is not to overturn the prevailing interpretation, but to reveal its one-sided nature. By faithfully adhering to the spirit of the thinker and the text, we aspire to provide an enriched, more productive and accurate perspective.

Full appreciation of Rousseau's political philosophy requires its contextualisation within the Enlightenment, a period marked by the upheaval of traditional authority and the emergence of innovative ideas about democracy, individual rights and political power. This paper explores Rousseau's position regarding contractual theories and political processes of his time while concurrently examining the historical ambivalence towards popular sovereignty. It positions Rousseau's ideas alongside those of notable thinkers such as Hobbes and de Tocqueville, thereby establishing dialogue between their respective thoughts.

## 1. The Evolution of Sovereignty: Contextualising Rousseau and his Legacy

Understanding Jean-Jacques Rousseau's notion of sovereignty requires an exploration of the concept's historical evolution. This approach frames Rousseau's ideas within their broader intellectual context and highlights their ongoing influence.

During the Middle Ages, the concept of sovereignty was predominantly interpreted within theocratic and monarchical contexts. Thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas in *Summa Theologica* (1485) and John of Salisbury in *Policraticus* (1159) articulated the concept of sovereignty as the divine right of a monarch. These foundational perspectives on sovereignty gradually eroded during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment brought about a significant shift in sovereignty discourse, pivoting towards the “social contract” theory, which grounded political authority on the consent of the governed. Theorists such as Thomas Hobbes in his seminal work *Leviathan* (1651) and Jean Bodin in *Six Books of the Republic* (1576) were instrumental in this shift. While Hobbes postulated the “sovereign” as a mutually agreed entity ensuring social peace, Bodin delineated sovereignty as the absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth, an idea that further problematized the “divine right” theory. M. L. Frazer (2018) provides an illuminating extension to this discussion, deeply contextualizing Rousseau’s thought within the Enlightenment moral and political philosophy where reason and sentiment were seen as the key drivers of justice.

Rousseau’s works emerged in the midst of this vibrant intellectual evolution. His unique concept of popular sovereignty, which suggests that sovereignty inherently resides within the people, introduced a radical reconfiguration of political power and authority. To fully appreciate Rousseau’s ideas, it is crucial to consider their interpretations by modern scholars. Quentin Skinner in *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, elucidates how Rousseau both extended and challenged prevailing theories of sovereignty (Skinner, 1978). Separate from Skinner, Carl Schmitt, in his “Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty”, spotlights the radical departure of Rousseau’s ideas from mainstream discourses, thereby offering a different perspective on Rousseau’s notion of sovereignty (Schmitt, 2005).

Rousseau’s writings have left an indelible imprint on the democratic theory. *The Social Contract* postulates that “sovereignty, being nothing less than the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated” (Rousseau, 2002: 170). This concept became instrumental in shaping theories of direct democracy and significantly influenced political philosophers such as John Rawls and his work *A Theory of Justice* (1971) and Jürgen Habermas and *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962). Rousseau’s emphasis on the collective will as the bedrock of democratic governance is echoed in their work. Indeed, J. Cohen and J. Rogers point out that Rousseau’s theories of direct democracy, epitomized by his focus on the “general will” as the cornerstone of democratic governance, have substantially influenced subsequent democratic theories (Cohen, J. & Rogers, J., 1983).

Moreover, the influence of Rousseau’s ideas can be compared and contrasted with other seminal thinkers, such as Alexis de Tocqueville. Tocqueville in *Democracy in America* (1835), offered a critical examination of the strengths and weaknesses of democracy, including the concept of popular sovereignty. He recognized the potential pitfalls of what he termed the “tyranny of the majority”, a concept that served as a counterpoint to Rousseau’s radical democracy. Tocqueville’s views help illuminate the complexity of the discourse around popular sovereignty and its potential implications. Drawing parallels and contrasts

between these two thinkers can further enrich our understanding of Rousseau's unique contribution to the concept of popular sovereignty.

The impact of Rousseau's ideas also permeated the realm of critical theory, particularly influencing Karl Marx's development of historical materialism. While Rousseau and Marx differed in their approach to class and economic relations, they both advocated self-determination of the masses. Rousseau's concept of the "general will" echoes Marx's idea of "class consciousness" – both hinting at collective empowerment as a path to societal transformation.

In addition to critical theory, Rousseau's concept of popular sovereignty significantly influenced political activism and constitutional law. His ideas echo in democratic constitutions and declarations, from the French Revolution's Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) to the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). D. L. Williams underscores that Rousseau's *The Social Contract* has been a fundamental text for democratic constitutions and declarations (Williams, 2014). His in-depth exploration of Rousseau's work allows us to draw clear connections between Rousseau's theories and the evolution of political activism and constitutional law. By mapping Rousseau's concept of sovereignty onto this larger intellectual and historical landscape, we can better appreciate its transformative potential and enduring relevance, setting the stage for a deeper exploration of Rousseau's unique conceptualization of popular sovereignty and its resonance in contemporary political discourse.

## 2. The Omnipotent People

We could commence by highlighting some innovative elements in Rousseau's thought that contribute to the enduring relevance of *The Social Contract*: "Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains" (Rousseau, 2002: 156). Rousseau's famous statement expresses an experiential judgement that encapsulates a political demand. Read in context, it implies that until now, political relations have been structured as nothing but a relationship of people's subservience to arbitrary powers. This must change and change radically: political relations must be re-constituted on the basis of freedom so as to appeal to human nature or human condition.

Rousseau's political philosophy stands in contrast to the Natural Law tradition. While he agrees with thinkers like Grotius that society is based on a contract, he diverges from them in his understanding of what underpins this foundation. For Rousseau, it is not an agreement between rulers and the ruled, but rather the act of the people constituting themselves as a political entity (Rousseau, 2002: 158). Key to Rousseau's stance is his belief in the inherent freedom of the people. He asserts this freedom as a *conditio sine qua non* for their existence as a political body. More importantly and radically, he posits the people

as the sole source of sovereignty. Unlike other political thinkers of his time, including the absolutist Pufendorf, Rousseau argues that sovereignty is inalienable, meaning it cannot be transferred or delegated under any circumstances (Derathé, 1950: 49).<sup>1</sup> Thus, in Rousseau's view, any contract transferring sovereignty to a ruler or governmental body is invalid. He contends that the people cannot surrender their sovereignty, as doing so would be equivalent to relinquishing their freedom, an intrinsic part of their humanity.

*The Social Contract* intends to set the principles for building and maintaining a state that aims to balance justice and efficacy. The concept of freedom is supplemented and bolstered by the notion of equality. Without it, if unequal relationships exist, freedom would be compromised: initially for those subordinate to others, but ultimately for the more powerful as well, as they too would inevitably become part of a dependency relationship, reverting to a state of nature. Therefore, the State in *The Social Contract* is composed of equal and free human beings – more specifically, citizens – since each participant relinquishes their “natural rights” to the community that transforms them into political rights, granting the same status and the same rights and obligations to all. As a member of the state, everyone is considered primarily as a citizen, since it is the political relationship that establishes his/her existence and relationships with others. Rousseau postulates that individuals voluntarily enter into the contract. Any form of coercion would result in undesired subjugation, a situation Rousseau consistently repudiates.<sup>2</sup>

To summarize, the State in *The Social Contract* is a community of free and equal citizens who are not subject to any higher or external authority, but practice self-government. This is realised through the collective and equal participation of citizens in the general assembly, which, as the sole authority, makes political decisions. When the people, as a united and indivisible political body, convene in the general assembly, they operate and act as the Sovereign and as a result, the general assembly is the place of sovereignty. Sovereignty manifests itself in the passage of laws that are generally characterized by their abstract nature vis-à-vis their object, the common good, and universality in terms of implementation, that is, the laws do not discriminate or exclude certain citizens or groups of citizens. One distinguishing factor between Rousseau and Bodin, and an inspiration for Kant, is Rousseau's concept of autonomy. This involves citizens' independent drafting of laws and wilful adherence to them.

1 For an overview of the notion of sovereignty and the impact of Rousseau on its development, see also Lloyd (1991).

2 Rosenfeld (1987) raises concerns about the political status of those who decide not to participate in the social contract but remain under the rule of the established state.



The concept of freedom is thus inseparable from the concept of will. In the absence of any external authority, whether excessive or not, the subject is free only if he/she expresses him/herself and acts according to his/her will. In particular, the famous “general will”<sup>3</sup> through which the Sovereign presents itself has as its exclusive principle the common good, which, by definition, can only be desired by every citizen precisely because he/she considers him/herself an indivisible part of the whole, that is, of the state. Thus, Sovereignty is separated from the government. The latter is a separate body that does not have any sovereignty at all, as it is entirely subjected to the Sovereign. It is the executive body that is committed to implementing and specializing laws, as well as managing administrative tasks.

### 3. The Incapacitated People

This paper has so far outlined the key arguments of *The Social Contract* emphasizing pertinent passages while highlighting the work’s radical and progressive nature. Although the above interpretation is valid, this paper also considers it to be somewhat limited and one-sided. We now delve into the reservations rooted in Rousseau’s own text that challenge this interpretation’s validity.

#### a. Prohibitions

Rousseau suggests that since the establishment of the social contract, every citizen should equate their personal interests with public interests, and their individual will with the general will. However, he does not assume that this will always happen in practice. He states:

“It does not mean that the decisions of the people are always correct [...] The people are never corrupted, though often deceived, and it is only then that they seem to will what is evil” (Rousseau, 2002: 172).

To address the issue of political deception, Rousseau puts forth certain restrictions, notably barring the formation of separate citizen associations and prohibiting communication between citizens before the general assembly. He justifies these restrictions as protective measures for the state. His primary concern is the fragmentation of the people into factions which would then compete for their individual interests at the expense of the common good. If this were to happen, the general will would be corrupted, reduced to the “will of all” – an

3 For a discussion of the theological origin of the idea of the general will, the sources from which Rousseau drew it and the particular importance he attributed to it, thus connecting it primarily with his own work, see a detailed presentation in Shklar (1973).

aggregate of individualistic, self-serving interests. The prevention of organized groups and pre-assembly communication, in Rousseau's view, safeguards against such a scenario.

However, we cannot help but observe that this introduces a fundamental doubt vis-à-vis the ability of the people for political action. The magnitude of the doubt is as great as the severity of the measures taken for its "protection". It appears that Rousseau's restrictions might limit people's independent thinking and curtail their power to enforce or remove measures according to their own will and judgment. Even though popular sovereignty is not formally suspended, as it is by definition exercised only during the general assembly meetings, could we argue that this is actually a limitation of popular freedom undermining the people's autonomy? It seems that Rousseau believes that, as long as such prohibitive measures are mutual and equally applicable to all, and thus all enjoy the same level of freedom, there could be no problem.

Concurrently, there is the concern of "adequate information" of citizens before the general assembly. However, this remains somewhat ambiguous as to who and how citizens are informed. The only answer that can be given from the text itself is that this role is taken on by the authority of the magistracy, that is, an institution that regulates public debate and common opinion (Rousseau, 2002: 240). Rousseau deliberately takes inspiration and refers positively to the Roman institution of the censor, especially in relation to those duties that refer to the care of morals. If the information is provided by a public institution that operates as a censor, it raises questions about the authenticity and impartiality of citizens' formed opinions.

#### b. The Absence of Deliberation in Rousseau's *The Social Contract*

After discussing the formation of public opinion, the paper will proceed to the activities of the general assembly. There, finally, we expect the existence of a deliberation procedure which will conclude with the decisions that will take the form of laws. However, Rousseau, having the idealised Swiss cities of his time as a benchmark, states the following:

"As long as a certain number of men consider themselves to be a single body, they have but one will, which relates to the common security and to the general welfare. In such a case all the forces of the State are vigorous and simple, and its principles are clear and luminous; it has no confused and conflicting interests; the common good is everywhere plainly clear and only good sense is required to perceive it" (Rousseau, 2002: 227).

"A State thus governed needs very few laws; and in so far as it becomes necessary to promulgate new ones, this necessity is universally recognized" (Rousseau, 2002: 227).

These quotes underscore several of Rousseau's crucial propositions. Firstly, the presence of few simple and stable laws is applauded as a guarantee of the power of the State, the alignment of interests and the harmony of its citizens. *En contraire*, the presence of many laws or frequent changes in them is considered a sign of decadence. This indirectly infers that legislating should ideally be minimized, for it is perceived as potentially unnecessary and even harmful. Could this not be perceived as a caution to the Sovereign — the people — who is the Sovereign solely during the act of legislating, to limit their overall activity?

Along the same lines, Rousseau argues in favour of a monological model<sup>4</sup> with regard to the functioning of the general assembly, instead of a more inclusive model of dialogue and collective deliberation. Indeed, he suggests that:

“the first man to propose them only gives expression to what all have previously felt, and neither factions nor eloquence will be needed to pass into law what everyone has already resolved to do, so soon as he is sure that the rest will act as he does” (Rousseau, 2002: 227).

In order to be able to fully comprehend the nature of the previous quotes, we must highlight the way which Rousseau believes to be the most suitable for establishing the common will: every citizen approaches the general assembly after previously having reflected on it individually. There, someone — we will examine later who this can be — presents a proposal for a law. The rest of the citizens, providing all goes well, will identify with them, confirming the validity of the proposal, having individually perceived its necessity prior to the general assembly, mirroring the proponent's thought process. Therefore, this would involve one or more proposals for laws that, according to Rousseau, are so apparent that each citizen, applying their inherent good sense (*bon sens*), has already accepted them. Indeed, as he notes, “the common good is everywhere plainly clear and only good sense is required to perceive it” (Rousseau, 2002: 227).

In Rousseau's view, good sense as the logical ability, inherent and common to all people, is opposed to the sophisticated, philosophical reasoning (*raison*) of men of letters, which is not considered superior. Indeed, *raison* is discredited as a reasoning that, due to the lack of simplicity and its innate tendency towards the production of endless thoughts and arguments, often leads to confusion and uncertainty. Moreover, Rousseau considers *raison* to be susceptible to what we would today call instrumentalization. Contrary to *raison*, good sense is considered safer, as it is seamlessly connected internally with the

4 See Manin (1985: 80–83) for a concise discussion of where the monological view of Rousseau is contrasted with the equally monological model of individuals behind the veil of ignorance in Rawls's Theory of Justice.

innate source of justice that, according to Rousseau, all people possess and that can indicate what is correct and just<sup>5</sup>. Simultaneously, it guarantees the authenticity of the subject's will, as it originates from its own inner being. This notion strengthens Rousseau's preference for simplicity in both institutions and laws. The simpler they are, the more effectively good sense can be applied, and vice versa, the better good sense is applied, the more efficiently the simplicity of laws and institutions is maintained.<sup>6</sup> Here, it would be appropriate to note Hannah Arendt's objections concerning the inherent uncertainty and unpredictability of guided human thought, rather than focusing solely on "good sense". She did not consider it absolutely certain that people, even if they had identical interests, would arrive at the same conclusion on the same issue, without this meaning that they would act irrationally. Neither did she consider it possible to predict what results would ultimately be produced by the adoption of a certain action. Arendt believed that human plurality should not be eliminated – nor, accordingly, the need for deliberation through which individual opinion is formed – via the substitution of a collective, indivisible body.

This is why Rousseau also dismisses the use of *eloquence* and rhetoric. Because the use of rhetoric implies that things are not obvious and clear – or even if they are, a clever orator may attempt to present them otherwise – resulting in the activation of a process of argumentation that will include persuasion techniques. Consequently, Rousseau finds that if such processes were initiated, they would inevitably lead to orators attempting to mislead the people and to the formation of opposing factions fighting over their egoistical interests.

“The more that harmony reigns in the assemblies, that is, the more the voting approaches unanimity, the more also is the general will predominant; but long debates, dissensions, and tumult announce the ascendancy of private interests and the decline of the State” (Rousseau, 2002: 228–229).

“But when the social bond begins to fail and the State is weakened, when private interests begin to make themselves felt and small factions to exercise influence on the State, the common interest is harmed and finds opponents; unanimity no longer reigns in the voting; the general will is no longer the will of all; opposition and debates arise, and the best advice is not accepted without disputes” (Rousseau, 2002: 227–228).

The intent here is not to trace a direct causality between the evolution of individual interests and the surfacing of disagreements

5 The notion of the innate sense of justice is found elsewhere in Rousseau's *oeuvre*, but is more systematically discussed in the fourth book, *Emile* (1762).

6 See an analytical discussion in Canovan (1983).

within the general assembly. Instead, the relationship is more about mutual dependence and complementarity. It is crucial to note that any emerging differences and animosity cannot be effectively addressed within the general assembly. Once doubt, disagreement and differentiation emerge, they invariably escalate into a state of irreconcilable conflict. In essence, Rousseau reignites the traditional philosophical bias against the Athenian-style democracy. Succinctly put, his apprehension lies in the potential disintegration of the people's unity into competing factions susceptible to manipulation by demagogues.

Hence, within the general assembly, the unrestricted and free presentation of varying opinions and arguments is neither welcomed nor anticipated to function in a synthetic, corrective capacity for the shaping of the general will. Furthermore, the attainment of consensus is not deemed essential if it implies partial compromises or concessions (Ogrodnick, 1999: 120). For Rousseau, the scenario is thus deemed irreversible. The division is considered an established fact and the general will is seen as in a state of decay, descending into the "will of all".

### c. Voting and the Elevation of the Government

This aversion to consultation, dialogue and argumentation culminates in a rigorous measure within the general assembly, echoing the earlier prohibition against pre-assembly communication. It relates to the reduction of the citizens' participation into the simple right to vote (Rousseau, 2002: 229–230). The power to take the legislative initiative belongs exclusively to the government.

"I might at this point make many reflections on the simple right of voting in every act of sovereignty — a right which nothing can take away from the citizens — and on the right of speaking, proposing, dividing, and discussing, which the government is always very careful to leave to its members only" (Rousseau, 2002: 228).

Here, Rousseau maintains the stance he established in his *Discourse on Inequality* (1755). He reiterates his argument for the right of all citizens to legislate but narrows down this right to the simple approval of laws.

"Above all, I would have fled from a republic, as one necessarily ill governed, where the people, believing themselves able either to do without magistrates altogether or to allow their magistrates only a very precarious authority, foolishly kept in their own hands the administration of civil affairs and the execution of their own laws. Such must have been the primitive constitution of the first governments which emerged immediately after the state of nature; it was also one of the vices which ruined the city-state of Athens. I would have chosen a republic where the individuals, being content with sanctioning

the laws and making decisions in assemblies on proposals from the leaders on the most important public business, had established courts, distinguishing carefully between the several parts of the constitution and elected year by year the most capable and the most upright of their fellow citizens to administer justice and govern the state” (Rousseau, 1984: 52–53).

Here we observe a seemingly contradictory series of limitations imposed on the power of the people, starting from prohibiting their actions outside the general assembly to later extending them even within the assembly itself. What makes this scenario particularly distinct is the challenge to the fundamental idea that the people alone hold sovereignty. The government, which was initially just a tool for execution without any sovereignty, suddenly assumes a role of managing the legislative process. It oversees the initiation of laws and their public discussion, thereby gaining a significant role in the exercise of sovereignty which is only expressed through legislation.

#### d. The Question of Voting

A further decrease in the citizens’ power is worth noting — a point often overlooked in the relevant literature. The citizens approach the general assembly without prior communication, see their legislative rights reduced to merely approving or rejecting proposals without public debate, and are not directly asked “what they want”:

“When a law is proposed in the assembly of the people, what is asked of them is not exactly whether they approve the proposition or reject it, but whether it conforms or not to the general will, which is their own; each one in casting his vote expresses his opinion thereupon; and from the counting of the votes is obtained the declaration of the general will” (Rousseau, 2002: 230).

Although it may appear as nit-picking or pedantry, we are dealing with an unconscious yet fundamentally important shift here, because the question confronting the citizen transforms from “what do I want?” into a cognitive question: “Do I believe that the proposal to be approved aligns with the general will or is compatible with the common good?”. W.T. Jones argues that Rousseau was possibly the first to grasp the importance and extent to which the formulation of the question determines the answer, something arguably obvious today (Jones, 1987). Further indication of this interpretation is found when Rousseau concludes the following:

“When, therefore, an opinion opposed to my own prevails, that simply shows that I was mistaken, and that what I considered to be the general will was not so. Had my private opinion prevailed, I would have done

something other than I wished; and in that case I would not have been free” (Rousseau, 2002: 230).

In conclusion, we can argue that Rousseau's concept of the general will bears a significant drawback. The tautological nature of its construction renders it unattainable, and the requirement for individuals to accept the outcome of a vote as reflecting their true desires, regardless of their actual beliefs or preferences, raises concerns about the limitations imposed on freedom and autonomy.

#### e. Silent Sovereignty

The passages mentioned above present a contradictory image. On the one hand, we see citizens gathered in the public space of the general assembly, anticipating to make autonomous political decisions. This gathering, on the other hand, although it carries symbolic and perhaps even festive elements and strengthens political bonds and the sense of belonging to a political community, is hindered by the procedural provisions we have previously examined. These provisions resist unrestricted, active and full participation of the people in the legislative process. It is essential, therefore, to reconsider the ban on public debate at this point. Rousseau distinctly expresses his opposition to representation, especially in relation to the general will:

“I say, then, that sovereignty, being nothing but the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated, and that the sovereign power, which is in fact a collective being, can be represented only by itself; power indeed can be transmitted, but not will” (Rousseau, 2002: 170).

Rousseau's viewpoint becomes even more pronounced when he remarks that the English people lost their freedom the moment they elected members of parliament (Rousseau, 2002: 221). For Rousseau, direct political action is the true guarantee of freedom and authenticity, serving as an indispensable condition for the formation of a legitimate political entity.

Nevertheless, the question that arises is the following: how is this direct political action expressed? Through speech, i.e., the use of voice, precisely because Rousseau adopts the traditional philosophical idea that the voice is an instrument that is closer to the soul and therefore comes in an authentic and unmediated way from the inner world of the subject. As Rousseau noted in his *Essay on the Origin of Languages*:

“Now, I say that every language with which one cannot make oneself understood by the assembled people is a servile language; it is impossible for a people to remain free and speak that language” (Rousseau, 1998: 332).

In this context, the voice is a symbol of an individual's active conscience. However, during the general assembly, only the voices of the government representatives proposing the laws are heard, effectively silencing the citizens. Ideally, these voices should represent common sentiment and strive for universality and authenticity. However, they inevitably end up replacing the diverse voices of the citizens (Abizadeh, 2001). Even more so, the opposite of voice – silence – is taken as evidence of consent to the government's initiatives:

“This does not imply that the orders of the leaders cannot pass for decisions of the general will, so long as the sovereign, free to oppose them, refrains from doing so. In such a case the consent of the people should be inferred from the universal silence” (Rousseau, 2002: 170–171).

However, the people do not have legal avenues to voice their views – and consequently their potential objections to the government – outside the general assembly. Paradoxically, even within the assembly, their silence is expected to remain unbroken, as the right to speak is reserved solely for government members. The only outlet for their dissent is by voting against the government's proposals, but the legal process for reacting to actions already implemented by the government remains ambiguous.

Rousseau invokes voice and speech as valuable authentic sources of will, but hesitates to incorporate them into a framework of dialogue and deliberation, fearing that the sound that would arise is the “noise” of demagoguery and conflict. Consequently, he replaces the voice with silence. However, silence is ambiguous, because it also implies absence, in fact, it mainly relates to absence. Since the citizen does not speak, their will must be inferred. And that is not clear at all. Therefore, Morgenstern (1996: 34) rightly wonders: how can we distinguish silence, where citizens do not need to speak because they have already reached the general will, from the silence of a tyrannical regime where people are forced to remain silent? Rousseau himself has considered it when describing the hypothetical scenario of an attempt to subvert power by the government:

“[...] the Prince derives a great advantage in preserving his power in spite of the people, without their being able to say that he has usurped the power; for while appearing to exercise nothing but his rights, he may very easily increase them, and, under the pretext of maintaining public order, obstruct the assemblies designed to reestablish good order; so that he takes advantage of a silence that he prevents from being broken, or of irregularities that he instigates, so as to interpret in his own favor the approbation of those silenced by fear and punish those who dare to speak” (Rousseau, 2002: 226).



Similarly, we read that when the State is close to dissolution, then (among other things) the general will remains without a voice (Rousseau, 2002: 242).

#### f. Morals Dictate the Will

Concerning the foundation of the State, Rousseau, like most political theorists, turns to the semi-godly figure of the Legislator. The role of the Legislator is often compared, as Rousseau does, to the work of an architect (Rousseau, 2002: 183). The legislator, thus, is the one who creates the edifice — that is, the State — but has no role or involvement in it once it is built. In summary, their work is to establish, using their superior intellect, the first laws and simultaneously transform the existing blind masses into a people (Rousseau, 2002: 184–185). Rousseau acknowledges the paradox: for individuals to initiate the formation of the social contract, they must already exhibit the qualities these laws will subsequently instil in them. In other words, the members of the State that this contract forms could only form it because they have become what they need to be because of the contract. They can embrace the general will as their own will and endorse the common interest only at a later stage, as a result of their transformation into good citizens (Riley, 1982: 99). It is this need that makes the intervention of the Legislator a necessary condition for the formation of the polity.

The contradiction between the self-legislation act described in the social contract and the founding act by an external person (i.e., to the self-legislating collective subject) is made clear in the previous passages. However, let us leave this problem aside and let us ask: besides the construction of the primary state structure and the composition of the political subject of the people as such, can the actions of the Legislator have lasting consequences after the completion of their tasks? Can they potentially limit or even bind popular will? Indeed, this seems to be the case. We are addressing the subject of morals [*mœurs*] described as unwritten laws — beyond the political, civil, and criminal realm.

“To these three kinds of laws is added a fourth, the most important of all, which is engraved neither on marble nor on bronze, but in the hearts of the citizens; a law which creates the real constitution of the State, which acquires new strength daily, which, when other laws grow obsolete or pass away, revives them or reinforces them, preserves a people in the spirit of their institutions, and imperceptibly substitutes the force of habit for that of authority. I speak of manners, customs, and above all of opinion — a province unknown to our politicians, but one on which the success of all the rest depends; a province with which the great legislator is occupied in private, while he appears to confine himself to particular regulations, that are merely the sides of the arch, of which customs and morals, slower to develop, ultimately form the immovable keystone” (Rousseau, 2002: 191–192).

These morals make up a shared way of life as summarized by practices, customs, attitudes, perceptions, codes of conduct, etc. They significantly contribute to forming the State's collective identity and transforming it into a cultural community. They instil harmony and coherence, acting as a preventive measure against potential contradictions and conflicts. Indeed, Rousseau argues that the “[...] great simplicity of customs and morals, which prevents a multiplicity of issues and thorny debates” (Rousseau, 2002: 201), which means that they function as a deterrent to the appearance of dissent and contradictions. Rousseau asserts that when citizens accept the morals and customs and find them within themselves, within their hearts, their simplicity means that good sense is sufficient and there is no need for uncertain and ambiguous debates. In the light of customs and morals, the proposals of the law will be evaluated “correctly”, there will be, thus, no doubts, and the exchange of views will be unnecessary.

Nevertheless, we confront a two-pronged problem: firstly, these morals and customs are imposed by the legislator and, more disconcertingly, the citizens do not accept them, as the legislator has stealthily embedded these norms within them; secondly, and of greater importance, they do not accommodate review and critical engagement, because, according to Rousseau, they must be considered as self-evident and given in their established, fixed form. Any change in them constitutes only a corruption and alteration, and therefore must be rejected:

“When once customs are established and prejudices have taken root, it is a perilous and futile enterprise to try and reform them; for the people cannot even endure that their ills be touched with a view to their removal, like those stupid and cowardly patients who shudder at the sight of a physician” (Rousseau, 2002: 184).

Therefore, morals are intensely binding for citizens, as their relationship to them is tautological, preventing people from establishing a critical distance or initiating a process of possible revision. It is the morals acting as practices and values of the shared homogeneous life that offer “content” to the will, subsequently making the margins of expression of the latter extremely limited.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, Rousseau presents a paradoxical understanding of the people that encapsulates the intricacies and challenges of democratic governance. On the one hand, he pictures the people as a self-governing political entity that bears the autonomous values of freedom, equality and justice. They emerge as the ultimate sovereign whose authority can neither be diminished nor alienated. Yet, juxtaposed

against this optimistic portrayal is an image of the people as uneducated and easily manipulated, incapable of independently conceptualizing, organizing and implementing their own will.

This dichotomy prompts the question: is this a theoretical flaw or a nuanced understanding of the practical complexities of democracy? We contend it is neither. Rousseau's critique of societal inequalities and his vision of a more egalitarian society are both clear and powerful. Yet, his transition from advocating for the people to entrusting them with sovereign power exposes the inherent challenges of actualizing a truly democratic society.

In his role as the Legislator, Rousseau regards democracy as a daunting task, fraught with potential antagonisms, clashes of interests, and the emergence of new forms of inequality and exploitation. In response, he proposes a redemptive strategy of fostering a spirit of community and a homogenous collective life. However, if the people wield the extensive power suggested in *The Social Contract*, the intellectual susceptibility of the masses might lead to disruptive trends for the State itself due to hasty and impactful decisions.

Rousseau's apprehensions about the democratic capacities of the masses remain relevant in our contemporary political landscape, especially with the rise of exclusionary populism. Today's exclusionary populists often champion increased public voting and referenda. However, these calls for direct democracy often revolve around predetermined agendas that can operate against the interests of marginalized and minority groups, reflecting Rousseau's fears about the democratic abilities of the masses.

Navigating the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century requires us to draw on the wisdom of political thinkers like Rousseau. From the rise of exclusionary populism to the erosion of democratic norms, and the shifting boundaries between public and private power, Rousseau's insights into the feasibility of democratic governance remain illuminating. His concerns about the potential manipulation of the populace will serve as a crucial reminder of the need for vigilance and critical reflection in our contemporary political institutions and processes.

Beyond this, Rousseau's complex approach to popular sovereignty provides a valuable guide for examining the democratic process. His writings prompt us to recognize the signs of potential democratic erosion and provide us with the intellectual tools to challenge contemporary political dilemmas. Far from being a relic of the past, Rousseau's political philosophy serves as a valuable resource for democratic theory and practice in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It invites us to persistently question, critique, and, if necessary, reformulate the political norms and institutions that govern our societies.

In the face of recurring issues such as income inequality, political disenfranchisement, and the resurgence of autocratic leadership styles, Rousseau's emphasis on the inalienable sovereignty of the people serves as a touchstone for democratic resilience. It encourages us

to scrutinize the mechanics of power distribution and the principles that underpin our social contracts. Finally, Rousseau's exploration of popular sovereignty offers an enduring lesson: we need vigilant safeguarding of the principles of freedom, equality and justice that form the bedrock of any liberal democracy.

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# ТРАНСФОРМАЦИЯ СТАТУСА ДИЗАЙНА В КУЛЬТУРЕ: КОНТЕКСТ ВЗАИМООТНОШЕНИЯ С ИСКУССТВОМ

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DESIGN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL  
SITUATION: STATUS TRANSFORMATION

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*Abstract:* This study examines the changing status of design in the context of its relation with art. Currently, design has overcome its peripheral position and transformed into a special creative project activity aimed at harmonization of modern human life, solving the problems of artistic and imaginative structuring, transformation and communication of objective-spatial, procedural and sign-informative human environment.

The factors determining the actual position of design in culture are the totality and globalism of design, institutionalization of collective design, collecting and market structure of design products, high cost of collective design objects, growth and consolidation of the influence of museums of design in the world.

The paper is concluded that at the present stage there has been a transformation in the status of design and it is trying to reclaim more space in the culture. Design aims to give the consumer new impressions and emotions and this proves that it is not only an activity to transform the object-spatial world of man, but also a new form of human interaction with the design product.

*Keywords:* design, transformation of the status of design, design and art, impression, communication, collective design.



## Введение

Актуальным направлением современных культурологических исследований является изучение не только традиционных форм культуры, но и новых. Несмотря на то, что дизайн существует около ста лет, культурологический подход к проблеме исследования дизайна как феномена культуры не был реализован в должной мере. Вопрос о его положении в культуре остается не определенным, и это объективно связано с его пограничным положением, поскольку он находится на стыке материального и духовного, функционального и художественного, символического и утилитарного, проектного и объектного.

Отправной точкой данного исследования является гипотеза о том, что, несмотря на не четкую позицию в пространстве культуры, дизайн существенно видоизменился, и эти изменения связаны в первую очередь с усилением его влияния на другие феномены культуры, в первую очередь на искусство. С момента своего возникновения дизайн был призван придавать художественно-образный вид предметно-пространственному окружению человека. Главной задачей дизайнера являлось художественное проектирование промышленных продуктов.

В настоящее время дизайн является проектной деятельностью, направленной на гармонизацию жизни современного человека, решающей проблемы художественно-образного упорядочивания, преобразования и коммуницирования предметно-пространственной, процессуальной и знаково-информативной среды человека, а также продуктом этой деятельности (предмет, процесс, знак). Воображаемый уровень коммуникации дизайнера позволяет человеку продуцировать индивидуальный мир значения предметов, процессов и знаковых систем, который также участвует в процессе взаимодействия. «Смещение акцента с производства предметов на производство смыслов в дизайнерской практике потребовало и нового осмысления цели этой деятельности. Допущение, что таковой является впечатление, во многом меняет понимание миссии дизайнера в культуре» (Г. Н. Лола 2010, с. 16). В процессе взаимодействия с продуктом дизайнера происходит общение потребителя и предмета на физическом, психологическом и семантическом уровнях. В процессе такого взаимодействия происходит считывание смыслов, заложенных автором или заказчиком, а коммуникация перерастает в диалог между автором и потребителем, приобретая индивидуальные черты при каждом взаимодействии.

Однако наиболее интересным и показательным примером трансформации статуса дизайна в культуре является тенденция «захода на территорию», традиционно занимаемую искусством. Дизайн выходит как бы из «тени» искусства и претендует на роль организатора и транслятора ценностных установок и кодов культуры. В. В. Чижиков пишет: «Тотальный характер современного

дизайна выражается в бесконечно многообразной системе предметов и их комплексов, в преодолении традиционной оппозиции: духовно предметного — технологичного; традиционного — инновационного; высокого искусства — “тотального зрелища”; картины — поп-арта, и выступает одним из универсальных механизмов общечеловеческой репрезентации дизайнерского опыта и деятельности — как радикально новая (в историческом процессе) форма эстетического и философского самовыражения определенных символических конструкций и явлений, фиксирующих и транслирующих социально значимую информацию, способствующая взаимодействию материального и духовного развития современной цивилизации» (Чижиков, 2011, с. 35).

Можно отметить, что в эпоху постиндустриального общества происходят трансформации дизайна как культурной формы не только на уровне материально-вещественного, но и на уровне изменений мировоззренческих взглядов и концептуальных подходов. И здесь можно согласиться с В. В. Чижиковым, что «дизайн представляет собой новый в социокультурной практике, возможно, более высокий уровень стандартизации системы образов социальной адекватности и престижности, определено новую форму организации “культурной компетентности” современного человека, его социализации и инкультурации, новую систему управления и манипуляции сознанием, интересами и потребностями, потребительским спросом, ценностными ориентирами, поведенческими стереотипами» (Чижиков, 2006, с. 238).

Такая ситуация тотальности дизайна происходит на фоне трансформационных процессов в культуре — «культура утрачивает жесткую дифференциацию своих феноменов на ортодоксальные и ценностно периферийные, — культурная среда обретает характеристики аксиологической децентрированности и аструктурности» (Можейко, 2007, с. 47). И если мы отмечаем, что современная культурная среда находится в состоянии неуравновешенности вследствие «флуктуационных изменений параметров ее развития» (Можейко, 2005, с. 11), то дизайн, находясь в таком пространстве децентрированности, может стать местом формирования нового этапа культурных изменений.

Нельзя сказать, что дизайн — это единственный феномен, который подвержен таким качественным трансформациям. В настоящее время мы наблюдаем, что многие формы культуры изменяются, и это связано с процессами, происходящими в мире. Однако мы можем обратить внимание на то, что дизайн в ситуации изменчивости мира показывает скорость процессов таких изменений.

Эти изменения обладают количественными и качественными характеристиками. Количественные изменения демонстрируют массовость и всепроникающий характер дизайна. Важной особенностью качественных изменений может являться появление дизайна интеллектуальных артефактов, когда потребитель взаи-



действует не с физическими и функциональными качествами продукта, а с виртуальным пространством. Если в XX в. человеко-ориентированный дизайн подразумевал обращение к психофизиологическим качествам человека, то в настоящее время дизайн нацелен на создание удобных и информативных интерфейсов, создающих новые впечатления и новые виды и способы коммуникации.

### Дефиниция «дизайна»

Все многообразие мнений и суждений о феномене дизайна делает возможность определения еще более сложной, хотя для многих современных исследователей задача дефиниции уже не стоит, а гораздо важнее является задача определения границ и изучения его влияния на процессы, происходящие в культуре. Сложность дефиниции заключается в том, что исследования дизайна осуществляются, как правило, в рамках междисциплинарного подхода, а это существенно расширяет терминологическое, методологическое и теоретическое поле, добавляя еще больше сложности в объяснении. Несмотря на это, каждый ученый, занимающийся исследованием феномена дизайна, пытается дать свое определение.

Существует несколько подходов к определению термина «дизайн». Первый подход основан в той или иной мере на предложенной в 1969 г. ICSID<sup>1</sup> формулировке дизайна как творческой деятельности, цель которой — определение формальных качеств предметов, производимых промышленностью. Представители данного подхода («деятельностного») рассматривают дизайн как деятельность по созданию предметно-пространственного окружения человека промышленным способом.

В новой формулировке ICSID, которая была дана в конце прошлого века, немного сменилась парадигма дизайна. Теперь дизайн является творческой деятельностью, которая направлена на создание многогранных качеств объектов, процессов и услуг, а также сложных систем в течение всего их жизненного цикла. В таком контексте дизайн становится важным фактором гуманизации технологий и решающим условием культурного и экономического обмена. Такое определение показывает, что дизайн не только создает продукты, но и формирует особое представление о продуктах, процессах и знаковых системах, то есть формирует специфическое видение предметов, то есть создает образное представление о сущности предмета.

Второй подход к определению дизайна связан с рефлексией на меняющийся статус дизайна в культуре второй половины XX в.

1 ICSID (International Council of Societies of Industrial Design) — Международный совет организаций по дизайну. Основан в 1957 г. в Лондоне.

Этот подход обозначим как «семантический», и его особенностью является отказ от строгой функциональности и рациональности дизайна. В рамках такого подхода дизайн понимается как границы, как опредмечивание духовных и материальных ценностей человека. Особенностью такой дефиниции является поворот к анализу семантики дизайн-продукта.

Этот подход к дефиниции локализирует дизайн в рамках парадигмы постмодернизма, когда «Дизайн — это наделение (вещей) смыслом» (Krippendorff, 2006, p. xv).

Третий подход («коммуникативный») основывается на работах современных исследователей, которые рассматривают коммуникативную функцию дизайна как наиболее существенную и отмечают формирование взаимодействия человека с человеком посредством дизайн-продукта. Коммуникативная способность дизайна связана с бытием человека, а сам процесс общения знаменует обретение человеком нового опыта и нового впечатления. В процессе взаимодействия дизайн провоцирует событие, в котором участвуют и дизайнер, и потребитель. «Такое участие может спровоцировать загадка, интрига, заключенная в дизайне, поэтому дизайн с необходимостью предполагает наличие как послания, так и кода-ключа к его разгадке. С пониманием особой миссии дизайна должны выстраиваться и его коммуникативные стратегии» (Г. Н. Лола, 2010, с. 19).

С точки зрения данного подхода дизайн определяется как особый способ видения мира и его устройства и характеризуется индивидуализацией решения функциональных задач.

Этот подход рассматривает дизайн как культурную стратегию, призванную не только заниматься проблемами преобразования предметно-пространственного окружения человека, но и реализовывать сущностное содержание времени в продуктах дизайна. Как пишет известный исследователь дизайна Найджел Кросс, «дизайн предоставляет возможности развития широкого спектра способностей в невербальном мышлении и коммуникации» (Cross, 2006, с. 12).

В этом подходе определяется новое понимание целей дизайн-деятельности. Сегодня он не столько занимается проектированием вещей и систем, сколько создает новые формы взаимодействия и провоцирует новые впечатления. А для современного пользователя такое получение новых эмоций становится более важным, чем функциональность.

Поменялась и стратегия потребления продуктов дизайна. Сегодня потребитель обращает внимание не столько на функциональность, эргономичность или эстетичность продукта, сколько на имидж марки или бренда, социальную и политическую значимость товара или услуги. Все это меняет привычное представление о феномене дизайна и отмечает его растущее влияние на ценностные ориентиры современного человека.

Продукты современного дизайна приобретают особый семантический смысл, который выражает уже не просто предмет, процесс, знак, а экзистенцию предмета, процесса, знака. Смысловые категории в форме визуального выражения (образы, знаки, символы) наделяют продукты деятельности дизайна особым значением, новыми смыслами и коннотациями, такими как статус, имидж, социальный образ и т. д.

## Дизайн и искусство

Наиболее интересным для рассмотрения примером трансформации статуса дизайна в культуре является изменение его взаимоотношения с искусством. Еще в 1970 г. В. Л. Глазычев писал: «Через сложное соотношение дизайна и искусства мы можем существенно уточнить представление о современном дизайне за счет большего проникновения в глубь дизайнерской деятельности...» (Глазычев, 1970, с. 134). Такая сравнительная процедура может быть актуальной, поскольку не только дизайн подвержен трансформационным изменениям, но и искусство.

С начала своего возникновения дизайн находился в дистанционном положении по отношению к искусству и воспринимался как периферийная практика, с ориентацией на ценностные установки высокого искусства. Искусство же воспринималось как центр, где вырабатываются культурные коды, идеалы, каноны. Такая ситуация продлилась вплоть до конца прошлого века, а сегодня мы констатируем, что «не только не правильно, но и саморазрушительно описывать дизайн словами, которые предполагают «подчиненность» искусству или вторичность по отношению к нему» (Росторн, 2021, с. 43).

С начала нового столетия ситуация еще более обострилась, и это связано со многими процессами, происходящими в мире, в первую очередь процессы глобализации экономики и цифровой революции (digital revolution).

Сегодня наблюдается изменение субординации в отношении дизайна и искусства, поскольку искусство в каком-то смысле потеряло роль центра формирования культурно-ценностных установок и эталонов. Многие исследователи говорят, что искусство теряет свое исключительное положение, хотя нельзя сказать, что ситуация трагична и искусство теряет свой сакраментальный смысл и значение. Оно находится в стадии трансформации (перманентно) и выходит на совершенно новые качественные и концептуальные положения. Б. Гройс пишет, что произведение искусства теряет свою ауру и «окончательно лишается ценного референта, будучи изъято из своего изначального контекста, и, по существу, становится вещью среди других вещей, или знаком в знаковой системе, полностью получая свое значение извне» (Гройс, 1993,

с. 343–344). Такие процессы стирают оригинальность искусства и приводят к «аурагизации симулякра» (Гройс, 1993, с. 344), что в свою очередь приводит к выдвиганию дизайнера на качественно новый уровень в культуре, несмотря на то, что пространство искусства обладает особой объективацией. Вот как об этом говорит Г. Н. Лола: «...искусство обладает автономным бытием и объективируется в собственных формах, но эти формы не могли бы случиться, не будь они дизайнерскими» (Лола, 1998, с. 107).

Искусство начала XXI в. находится в состоянии «абсолютной негативности в поле морфина потенциальной бесконечности. Сегодняшней художественной современности не хватает воли к производству бытия, которая теперь реализует себя в решении практических дизайнерских задач или в кинематографе, но не в изобразительном искусстве», — пишет Е. Ю. Андреева (Андреева, 2007, с. 391). У современного искусства нет возможности опереться на что-либо основательно, поэтому оно «вынуждено либо “гнать воздух”, либо “опираться на воздух”» (Андреева, 2007, с. 391), в отличие от дизайна, который всегда подразумевает предметность. В этом предметном содержании дизайна находится ядро успеха стратегии своего выживания.

Дизайн можно представить как границу места, в котором является бытие, и, собственно, место появления (перехода) бытия из небытия. Искусство являет собой приращение бытия, а дизайн предстает явлением бытия и его ограничением (формированием). Как писал Ю. М. Лотман, функция границы сводится «к ограничению проникновения, фильтрации и адаптирующей переработке внешнего во внутреннее» (Лотман, 2000, с. 265).

В этом контексте процессы, происходящие в современной культуре, выглядят не как разрушение устоев и потеря культуры как таковой, а представляются вполне обоснованными и естественными. Бытие не теряется, оно приобретает новое звучание, новое опредмечивание. Не случайно самым востребованным и динамично развивающимся направлением в дизайне является цифровой дизайн, когда создается новое пространство человеческого бытия. Меняется уклад городской жизни, и меняются требования к организации и коммуникации городской жизни. Современный дизайнер сегодня выступает как главный оформитель цифрового пространства, ведь его миссия состоит в воплощении мечты о комфортной жизни человека. И речь здесь не идет о новой форме или новом материале, речь идет о создании нового типа пространства, в котором у человека будут и новые возможности, и новые потребности, и совершенно новые впечатления и переживания.

Искусство же, наоборот, становится все более дистанцированным от человека, более непонятным и неоднозначным. Оно представляется совершенно оторванным пространством, между ним и человеком находится огромное количество препятствий и усло-

вий для его понимания. Понимание и принятие произведения искусства не может происходить сразу и до конца.

Для восприятия современного искусства необходимы интерпретаторы, в качестве которых выступают кураторы, арт-критики и особые методы «вхождения» в смысл художественного произведения. Путем манипуляций с языком и текстом интерпретаторы доносят идеи современного искусства зрителю. Или же сам автор выступает в роли проводника и при помощи дополнительных средств разъясняет зрителю, что он действительно должен увидеть, осознать, почувствовать. При этом в своем изолированном пространстве, где нет быстрой и естественной рефлексии от зрителя к автору, искусство начинает выхолащиваться, беднеть и профанировать.

Кроме того, актуальное искусство теряет свою материальную, предметную ценность. Со времен дадаизма произведения искусства все чаще становятся «реди-мэйдами», что ставит под сомнение их профессиональную «искусность» и мастерство. В таком контексте искусство, оторванное от прямой рефлексии и рассказывающее о себе только через интерпретаторов, теряет для человека доступность понимания и как следствие не способно вызвать переживание зрителя.

Дизайн же становится более доступным и необходимым, и его принятие потребителем становится неоспоримым. Он находится в авангарде инноваций, коммуникационных технологий, быстро реагирует на запросы общества, в то время как его эстетические и образные возможности дают человеку утраченную искусством потребность в прекрасном, как писал В. Беньямин, «искусство рассталось с царством “прекрасной видимости”, которое до сих пор считалось единственным местом процветания искусства» (Беньямин, 1996, с. 41).

Для современного потребителя уже не стоит проблема, как украсить пространство: на смену картинам и скульптурам в жилище современного человека приходят вещи. Еще Ж. Бодрийяр писал: «Искусство уже становится или уже стало тотальным дизайном, метадизайном» (Бодрийяр, 2007, с. 278). И речь здесь идет не только о возникновении симулякров, но и о том, что дизайн, обладая собственной методикой проектирования и продвижения продукта, становится более успешной стратегией придания образности и эстетичности материально-вещественным, знаково-информационным и процессуальным системам.

Стремление человека следовать модным тенденциям приводит к быстрой смене приоритетов. Наряду с производством промышленных объектов, рассчитанных на долговременную работу (машины, тракторы, станки, оборудование и т. д.), авангардные дизайнеры стремятся создавать так называемые сезонные коллекции. Ш. и П. Филл пишут: «Соответствие моде стало мейнстримом дизайна, особенно в области бытовой электроники, где мобиль-

ные телефоны постоянно представлялись функционально устаревшими благодаря скорости появления технических инноваций. То же самое было с товарами массового производства — от чайников и стиральных машин до ноутбуков и диванов» (Филл, 2014, с. 489). Все это требует от продуктов дизайна предоставления большего удовольствия и новых впечатлений.

Так дизайн-продукт становится не просто функциональным объектом, сколько объектом наслаждения и поводом для новых эмоций. То есть дизайн не просто меняет свое положение в пространстве культуры, он меняет свою внутреннюю цель. От предметности и проектности дизайн переходит в стадию «впечатления».

Представление о переходе дизайна в новую стадию развития Г. Н. Лола раскрывает следующим образом: «Если цель дизайна — впечатление, внимание тут же смещается с “тела” дизайн-продукта (некоторого материального или идеального объекта) на его “душу” — образ. М. К. Мамардашвили назвал образ “материей впечатления”, поскольку только в образе что-то может действительно задеть человека, запустить механизм производства впечатления. То, что дизайн создает образ и “искусственную форму” как единое целое, является первым следствием основного методологического принципа “дизайн-продукт должен иметь структуру впечатления и конструироваться как событие”» (Лола, 2016, с. 17).

Особенностью функции создания впечатления является экспрессивный характер современного дизайна. Современные дизайнеры часто называют себя художниками, и в этом кроется творческий потенциал дизайн-практики. Несмотря на то, что дизайнеры имеют в своем арсенале систему разнообразных научно-технических средств, функционирующих на эмпирическом уровне (наблюдение, экспериментирование, измерение, анализ) и теоретическом уровне (анализ, обобщение, формализация), основным отличием от других практик является наличие художественной составляющей. Именно способность мыслить образами делает дизайн отличным от других проектных практик. Эмоциональность дизайна заполняет пробелы неэмоциональности современного искусства и наполняет предметно-пространственный мир человека организованностью. Дизайнеры ищут в практике особую форму самовыражения и утверждения своего опыта переживания.

Можно сделать предположение, что если сравнивать дизайн и искусство, то дизайн — это граница, а искусство — то, что находится внутри границы. Если это положение верно, то можно выдвинуть и следующее предположение: если искусство призвано открывать смысл явлений и вещей, понятий и представлений, то дизайн делает эти явления, вещи, понятия и представления осязаемыми, вещественными. Здесь можно привести мнение Г. Н. Лола, что «дизайн не только не выводим из других практик, но, более

того, в определенном смысле является более фундаментальным по отношению к ним и причастен не только к быстротекущей повседневности, но к бытию» (Лола, 1998, с. 109).

Происходящие процессы существенно меняют и структуру дизайнерской семантики, и роль автора в процессе производства и проектирования. Дизайн, так же как и актуальное искусство, активно использует цитирование и коллажирование, что существенно сближает искусство и дизайн, несмотря на разницу целей и задач. Б. Гройс пишет: «Эта зависимость от цитирования, которую только усиливают современные средства массовой информации, делает неизбежным понимание современным художником своей практики как прежде всего работы с цитатами» (Гройс, 1989, с. 10). Такая ситуация характерна не только для искусства, но и для практики дизайна, так как современный дизайн вынужден отказываться от оригинальности и стремиться к «дистанцированной и объективной работе с цитатами с целью выявления их знаковой природы и их объективного социального статуса» (Гросс, 1989, с. 1-2).

Для дизайна считается уместным использовать цитату, и на этом принципе работает большинство приемов в графическом дизайне. Для современного дизайна характерны черты сарказма, инверсии, подмены, ремикса, «видоизменения клише» (Брэдли, 2016, с. 170), рефреминга (переосмысления смысла предмета или явления) (Брэдли, 2016, с. 40), оксюморона (парадокса, бунта против стереотипа и здравого смысла) (Брэдли, 2016, с. 128) и пр. Все это принимается как нечто оригинальное, хотя зачастую использует, деформирует и комбинирует образы и формы прошлого. Потребитель получает уникальный продукт и новое впечатление.

Кроме того, практика дизайна получает большую свободу и возможности благодаря новым технологиям, дизайн стремится к избавлению от зависимости функциональности и конструкции: «новая свобода от конструкции и функции уже ведет к новым свободам постфункционального и постиндустриального дизайна с его барочными формами и не-только-полезностью» (Козловски, 1997, с. 165). В современном дизайне появляются предметы, не имеющие функционального предназначения. Одни из них претендуют на положение арт-объекта, что ставит под вопрос их функциональное предназначение. Другие созданы таким образом, что их использование невозможно по прямому назначению.

Многие века оно было главным ориентиром в области художественно-образного представления человека о стиле. Что же демонстрирует современное искусство сегодня? Как пишет Е. Ю. Андреева, «искусство уже давно существует вне стиля, постмедийно отказавшись от специфически художественных материалов, делается из всего, и тому, что оно монотонно и самоограниченно» (Андреева, 2011, с. 4). А дизайн, наоборот, демонстрирует многообразие, структурность и последовательность смены сти-

лей, четкость границ и переходов между ними, что создает впечатление о цельности феномена. В нем видится упорядоченность и логичность, в отличие от разрозненности и хаотичности искусства.

Если сравнивать дизайн и искусство, то искусство становится ризомой из бесконечных интерпретаций зрителя и многозначности высказывания автора, а дизайн превращается в практику собирания и созидания образности, наряду с тем, что эта образность выражается в форме предмета, системы или процесса. Дизайн способен сконструировать образ, то есть «эстетизировать нечто» (Лола, 2010, с. 18). Что в свою очередь значит — «вынести его за границы обыденного, непосредственно данного, само собой разумеющегося и сделать объектом созерцания» (Лола, 2010, с. 18), то есть сделать его нечто большим, чем функциональный объект.

### Коллекционный дизайн

Если мы говорим о меняющемся статусе дизайнера, в особенности по отношению к искусству, то надо сказать, что за последние двадцать лет произошел еще важный момент, указывающий на смену субординации между искусством и дизайном. И речь идет о феномене институализации коллекционного дизайна.

Дизайн арт-объектов, или коллекционный дизайн — новое направление в проектировании 2000-х гг., ориентированное на создание ограниченного тиража (а иногда и единичного образца) дизайн-продукта. Надо сказать, что в пространстве культуры еще нет четкого разделения между терминами «арт-дизайн» и «коллекционный дизайн». Момент перехода происходит постепенно, и в разных источниках можно увидеть употребление одного или другого термина при обозначении одного и того же явления.

Появление термина «арт-дизайн» приписывают А. Пейну, руководителю отдела дизайна аукционного дома Phillips, который вывел предметы современного дизайна на рынок коллекционирования. Постепенно рынок арт-дизайна трансформировался в рынок коллекционного дизайна, который занимается продажами дизайн-объектов.

Надо сказать, что коллекционирование предметов дизайна началось уже во второй половине XX в., но это касалось редких серий предметов массового производства или произведений известных дизайнеров 1920–1930 гг. В научно-популярной литературе предметы дизайна всего XX в. принято называть «историческим» коллекционным направлением. Ш. и П. Филл пишут: «Как коллекционные вещи они, подобно произведениям живописи и в отличие от большинства продукции массового производства, обладали внутренней присущей долговечностью» (Филл, 2014, с. 491). Ключевой момент укрепления значимости «историческо-



го» коллекционного дизайна произошел в феврале 2009 г., когда кресло дизайнера Эйлин Грей (Eileen Gray) было продано на аукционе за 21,9 млн евро, что является рекордом продажи предметов дизайна за всю историю продаж (Прил. А, рис. 1).

С конца прошлого века произошел качественный поворот. Постепенно на аукционах стали продаваться дизайн-объекты современных дизайнеров, и стоимость их объектов сравнивается со стоимостью произведений искусства. Примером этого поворота может быть успех и популярность современного дизайнера Марка Ньюсона (Marc Newson), который проектирует для крупных корпораций и торговых марок, таких как Alessi, Ford Motor Co., Hennessy, Hermès, Nike и пр. Наряду с этим, он занимается созданием коллекционных дизайн-объектов, или, как их часто называют сегодня — уникатов (unique). Эти уникаты проектируются в малых сериях или в единичном экземпляре и представляют собой вполне функциональную вещь (стул, стол, лампа), но с уникальными эстетическими (по мнению экспертов) качествами. Такие предметы сразу становятся предметами коллекционирования, и надо отметить, что М. Ньюсон является рекордсменом по продажам среди современных дизайнеров. В 2015 г. его металлическая кушетка была продана за 2,4 млн фунтов на аукционе Phillips в Лондоне (Прил. А, рис. 2).

К настоящему времени все крупные аукционные дома имеют так называемые отделы по дизайну (Design Department), и выручка от продажи предметов дизайна растет с каждым годом. Например, аукционный дом Кристи (Christie's) 13 декабря 2018 г. закрыл торги по предметам дизайна на сумму свыше 8 млн долларов. И если еще несколько лет назад основными лотами на дизайн-аукционах были предметы XX в., то в настоящее время на аукционах произведения современных дизайнеров продаются наравне с произведениями современных художников.

В отличие от коллекционирования искусства, коллекционирование предметов дизайна все еще остается доступным для потребителя. То есть каждый человек может начать коллекционирование, создавая свой мир. «Для коллекционера в каждой его вещи содержится — а на самом деле упорядочивается — целый мир» (Суджич, 2017, с. 93). Сегодня мы наблюдаем за процессом институализации и коммерциализации коллекционного дизайна.

Формирующийся высокодоходный сектор коллекционного дизайна становится чрезвычайно элитарным явлением и возможностью для дизайнеров использовать свободу творчества, не ограничиваясь финансовыми и творческими соображениями. В настоящее время в разных странах работают дизайнеры, которые позиционируют себя как дизайнеры-художники. Они работают для крупных галерей или выставок, представляя свои объекты в виде инсталляций и перформансов.

## Экспонирование дизайна

Изменяющийся статус дизайна подтверждается и возникновением ярмарок современного дизайна, на которых демонстрируются новые тенденции и предметы коллекционного дизайна. Сегодня параллельно со знаменитыми ярмарками современного искусства «Арт Базель», «Венецианская биеннале» идут ярмарки дизайна, на которых выставляются молодые и прославленные дизайнеры со всего мира. Особенностью таких ярмарок является то, что многие дизайнеры делают предметы и коллекции специально для этих мероприятий. Участие в такой ярмарке показывает статус дизайнера и не только демонстрирует новые приемы и технологии производства, но и задает новые тенденции в стилеобразовании.

Выставки дизайна проходили в мире уже со второй половины прошлого века, но это была демонстрация предметов крупных производителей. С 2000-х параллельно с биеннале современного искусства стали проходить биеннале дизайна. Так, при ярмарке Art Basel с 2006 г. стала проводиться ярмарка Design Miami/Basel, при Art Paris — PAD, а при арт-ярмарке Frize — PAD London. Постепенно эти ярмарки превратились в самостоятельные явления: уже сегодня проходят дизайн-ярмарки в Монако, Брюсселе, Нью-Йорке и т. д.

Важным моментом стала выставка «Дисфункциональное» (Dysfunctional) на 58-й Венецианской биеннале в 2019 г. Это стало событием, изменившим взаимоотношение дизайна и искусства. В рамках биеннале известная галерея Carpenters Workshop Gallery предложила нескольким дизайнерам и студиям сделать проекты в интерьерах палаццо Ка-д'Оро. Каждый из представленных проектов представлял собой инсталляцию, спроектированную для старинных интерьеров. Главная идея заключалась в противопоставлении современных дизайн-объектов произведениям Мантеньи, Тициана, Ван Дейка. Суть проекта заключалась в том, чтобы современные дизайн-объекты «растворились» в пространстве старинного здания и придали новое звучание произведениям искусства, которые находятся в нем. Главной идеей выставки было переосмысление границ искусства и дизайна. В итоге дизайн-проекты превратились в нечто единое вместе с работами старых мастеров и интерьером палаццо, создавая впечатление единства и гармонии, как в случае с проектом студии Drift и ее проектом Fragile future. Студия сделала световую инсталляцию из одуванчиков в зале с работой А. Мантеньи «Святой Себастьян» (Прил. А, рис. 3).

Другой проект выставки — проект датского дизайнера Мартина Хааса (Maarten Baas), представляющий собой часы с цифровым дисплеем, на котором дизайнер в режиме реального времени рисует стрелки часов. С точки зрения функциональности — это настоящие часы, точно определяющие время. С точки зрения сути

проекта — это, конечно же, арт-объект, инсталляция, демонстрирующая постоянное присутствие художника (Прил. А, рис. 4). В итоге многие зрители, переходящие от одной выставочной площадки к другой, не всегда ощущали разницу в переходе от выставки современного искусства к выставке современного дизайна.

Таким образом, экспонирование объектов коллекционного дизайна вышло на качественно новый уровень, демонстрирующий, что функциональные вещи могут создавать такое же впечатление, как и современное искусство.

Изменяющееся положение дизайна доказывают и организация, и функционирование самостоятельных музеев дизайна по всему миру. Эти музеи не просто занимаются сбором коллекций, но и ведут активную выставочную, исследовательскую и просветительскую деятельность.

Деятельность музеев дизайна происходит параллельно с функционированием отделов дизайна в крупных художественных музеях и галереях мира. Интересным остается факт, что такие отделы существуют наряду с отделами так называемого декоративно-прикладного искусства, и разделение временных и предметных границ дизайна и декоративно-прикладного искусства выглядит довольно условным.

Кроме того, многие известные музеи современного искусства проводят выставки дизайна, а некоторые из них, например, знаменитый МоМа, выставляет объекты дизайна в качестве средства организации пространства музея наряду с произведениями искусства и создает выставки дизайна наравне с выставками современного искусства.

## Заключение

Трансформация статуса дизайна в культуре неоспорима, и мы можем наблюдать, как вырастает его влияние на другие формы культуры, в первую очередь — искусство. «Это свидетельствует о глубине и масштабах конфигураций сознания и представлений, вызванных эпистемологической картиной мира дизайнера, его философского мышления. Конфигурации дизайна обретают свой формационный статус на уровне явления, когда проявляют устойчивые в своей повторяемости функциональные свойства, когда находят распространение в качестве культурной формы и артефактов, поддаются типологизации в своих общих свойствах» (Чижиков, 2011, с. 37–38).

Изменяющийся статус дизайна в культуре подтверждают количественные и качественные изменения дизайна. Количественные изменения демонстрируют массовость и всепроникающий характер дизайна. Характерной особенностью качественных изменений может считаться появление дизайна интеллектуальных

артефактов, когда потребитель взаимодействует не с физическими и функциональными качествами продукта, а с виртуальным пространством. Расширилось поле проектной деятельности дизайнера: от постмодернистской парадигмы проектирования предметно-пространственной среды человека до постиндустриальной парадигмы специфического контекста, который определяется особенностями знакообмена и дискурсивными практиками.

Результатом трансформации статуса дизайна в культуре становится изменение взаимоотношения искусства и дизайна и субординации между ними. Это происходит вследствие того, что искусство утрачивает главенствующее положение в процессе формирования культурно-ценностных установок культуры. Дизайнер же укрепляет свою ценностную позицию, а организованные дизайном системы образуют полифигуративные симбиозы перманентной конструкции, реконструкции и деструкции, коллажи и элиминации эстетических смыслов и кодов в пространстве реального и виртуального.

Одной из характерных черт меняющегося статуса дизайнера является возникновение коллекционного дизайна, нового направления в проектировании 2000-х г. Изменяющийся статус подтверждают институционализация музеев дизайна и формирование новой парадигмы в коллекционировании и репрезентации объектов дизайна. Теперь они коллекционируются и экспонируются как арт-объекты, а их ценностными характеристиками являются художественная выразительность и знаковость.

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## ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ А



Рис. 1. Э. Грей. Кресло «Драконы», 1917–1919 гг., дерево, кожа, продано в 2009 г. за 21,9 млн евро, установив рекорд на предмет дизайна XX в.



Рис. 2. М. Ньюсон. Кушетка «Lockheed Lounge», 1988 г., алюминий, GRP, тираж: 10 + 4 корректуры художника + 1 прототип



Рис. 3. Студия Drift. Инсталляция «Fragile future», 2019 г., семена одуванчика, фосфорная бронза, лампочки



Рис. 4. М. Баас. Проект «Реальное время XL», 2019 г., латунь, бетон, бронза, цифровое оборудование. ЖК-экран, проигрыватель Blu-Ray DVD, Blu-Ray DVD



## COLOUR IN ADVERTISING POSTER: STEREOTYPE VS. CREATIVITY (ON EXAMPLE OF RED)

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**Abstract:** The visual language of colour in Advertising is represented by the logical reflection of the sociocultural state of society during definite periods. *The aim* is to characterize problems of Media, such as the means of visualization, the visual stamps, and the stylistics of its contemporary development. The comparative study defined the following *scientific methods*: structural, semantic, sociocultural, art historical, and method of theoretical generalization. Colour is a component of global info space, therefore content-analysis of visual images in the Ad posters (commercial, political and public) was carried out. *The scientific novelty* of this article is the consideration of visual stereotypes in colour advertising posters. *The result* of our study is the assertion that advertising images in red colour as products of creativity have social meaning only in the systemic understanding of political and cultural processes. Communicative aspects of pictorial are presented in the sociocultural dynamics in accordance with certain stages of society's development. *Conclusions.* The Poster actively forms the mass consciousness, is included in the social sign system, has a powerful influence on public opinion, and represents past and present creative experiences. It is proved that the semantic space of the Poster is a visualization of a significant idea, a generalized reproduction of an object or phenomenon in form and colour.

**Keywords:** ads visualization, visual content, stereotype, colour, media representations.



## Introduction

Visualization and strategic communication in design are increasingly relevant in European countries. Studies on the interaction of cultures show the multi-vector nature of this process, in particular, the exchange can take place not only in material, scientific or technological ideas but also cultural values, social norms and traditions, and art practices also. The language of colour is perceived by all segments of the population of different countries, so it becomes a metalanguage and improves cross-cultural communication. Advertising messages are a social matter. As images in vivid colours, they dominate the public space and influence us with their inevitable suggestions. This connection will be the focus of our article.

Sandra Moriarty and Ken Smith define particular aspects of Visual communications. Aesthetics of perception, media representation, visual literacy, cognition, semiotics, assimilation, narrative (historically and culturally based interpretation), ethics and cultural studies are on this list. Perception of visual messages transmitted through sign systems arises from a person's understanding of their codes. Semiotics became especially useful for researchers of Visual communications. Though, deterministic philosophy represents coding as the process of reading and censoring data and a set of features that represent certain objects. In different languages, signs are often clearly defined, and witness simply responds to them. But the process of decrypting meanings is more complex, especially for colour graphic signs with a wide range of visual perception and interpretation. The audience expands and fills the meaning with their own connotations (associations, views, emotions) in the integrated process, where information is actively decoded and synthesized (2005, pp. 228–234).

Almira Ousmanova distinguishes two paradigms: the first is based on the ability of visual images to construct social reality; the other interprets everyday life and appears as a sociocultural representation that reveals the ideology of the authors and involves some manipulations with viewers. She identifies three subject areas for visual appeals research (Ousmanova, 2006, p. 11):

- 1) Who created or implemented the image and why?
- 2) image meaning and what channels was it presented through;
- 3) image perception by the audience and further interpretations.

Advertising as Visual communications is a broad field, the study of which involves acquaintance with the laws of visual perception, including Gestalt psychology, colour theory, semiotics and aesthetics. In his book "Advertising. Scientific Approach", American advertising scientist and practitioner Claude Hopkins substantiated psychological aspects of advertising influence on different consumers and strategic approaches to planning advertising campaigns. He established a scientific system of argumentation, proved the importance of high-quality visualization of advertising proposals and emphasized the necessity

for creative approaches to success. Hopkins argued that in the early 1920s, advertising was not only a means of attracting attention, but also a form of communication between manufacturers and consumers, as well as a semantic space and a driving force that created new industries, changed traditions and fashion and influenced millions (Hopkins, 2000).

The visual language of colour in Art was studied by Albers (2006), Alberti and Mori (2007), Almalech (2011), Biggam (2012), Heller (1995), Jones and Amaral (2018); in Design – Barnard (2005), Cross (2011), Heller (2000); in Advertising – Binder (1934), Biggs (1956). Joseph Binder wrote “Colour follows function”, and his book begins with the words: colour is the poster painter’s chief means of creating effect. It is his vital factor, but for that very reason, it is necessary in the first place to understand clearly what the laws of colour are. The little book is dedicated to clarifying the significance of colours in the area of applied graphics for ads (1934). Moni Almalech thinks that we are faced with colour dialects, with national and regional languages of colour. Its semiotics includes both visual and verbal colouristic aspects. Thus, we enter by the physical properties of colour, once – in the territory of natural language, and secondly – into the social and individual culture and tastes. This means that we can hardly find any specific colour grammar for the whole society (2011).

Major attention is focused on the activity and associativity of the red colour in advertising graphics, imagery and ambivalence of its perception, depending on the ideological guidelines of relevant political and sociocultural formations in different countries. The structure of the article reflects conducted retrospective analysis of ads consistently considering creative and semantic aspects of colour harmonization.

## Methodology and theoretical framework

Malcolm Barnard proposed the interdisciplinary approach to understanding of visual culture. Style is explained as a form of communication, as homology and as signifying practice. Style is used by subcultures to create and communicate identity and a sense of difference from “mainstream” cultures and styles (Barnard, 2001, p. 187). Based on his research and on the research of other well-known authors, for comparative study of visuality defined the following methods: *structural* (Barthes, 2003; Barnard, 2005) to the consideration of many functional, technological, marketing, and cultural factors for their synthesis; *semantic* (Biggam, 2012; Krauss, 2013) to the analysis of art-aesthetic features the advertising products; *sociocultural* (Moles, 1973; Bralczyk, 2008; Sarna, 2021) to the definition of advertising as part of Mass Culture; *art historical* (Heller, 2000; Dydo, 2008; Preziosi, 2009) to understand the influence of art styles on advertising and

identify contemporary stylistic trends. The *method of theoretical generalization* was used to summarize the research and determine the further study of colours in digital media. The structure of this research reflects the conducted retrospective analysis of ads practice, considering all of the above aspects taken together. So, the object of our research is the visual language of colour in Advertising, the subject of research is the red colouristic in ads.

Since the 1960s, the study of Media has developed its own set of theories, facts, and analytical methodologies. The appeal of such a study is that it leaves the interpretation of the modes and forms of social interaction used in a certain era flexible and open. Media analysts today use a combination of ideas and techniques for diverse purposes. Research of M has thus, logically, developed into a highly interdisciplinary mode of inquiry, drawing from disciplines such as anthropology, semiotics, linguistics, psychology, sociology, and aesthetics also (Encyclopedia of Media and Communication, 2013, p. 9). But this Encyclopedia is missing an article about colour.

Richard Klyushchinsky expressed the opinion that the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century marked a fundamental and unambiguously directed transformation of Culture. Contemporary Art finally abandons the trend towards structural and material homogeneity that dominated it until recently, which of course affects Media (Kluszczyński, 2005).

Rodney Jones in frame visualizing digital discourse says that Media invite users to constantly produce themselves and their experiences visually and construe meaning from the visual representations of other people's experiences, however, presents significant challenges to the "semiotics" and "grammars" of Visual communication developed at the turn of the century, forcing analysts to engage more fully with the ways multimodal meaning emerges not from "signs" per se, but from techno-somatic entanglements in which the most important communicative resource is not what is visible but communicators' embodied experience of seeing it (Jones, 2020, pp. 19–20).

Still, the term "visual communication design" has been subject to a series of interpretations. In the process of design development, various names restricted the precise definition of the designer's work. Design is usually understood as a physical product, and its interpretations in everyday use, such as "beautiful creation", "ornament", "pattern", "decoration" or even its application to the beauty of nature, certainly cause confusion. While society accepts design only as a reference to certain objects, designers focus on it as a conscious activity. Moreover, they see the product as the last step on a long path of production. The professionals do not associate Design either with reproduction of natural forms or with the recurrence of traditional ornament. Design is understood as a process with a sequence of idea, planning, drafting and coordination to the selection and organization of a number of visual and textual elements. The phrase "visual communication" deepens the essence of design and refers it to the design of visual objects

aimed at transmitting information by specific messages on the principles of relevance, arrangement, aesthetics and further evaluation of the effectiveness of these objects (Frascara, 2004).

Robin Cohen believes that posters, placards, advertising appeals are examples of creolization, as they combine the verbal part with the visual, which belongs to a different sign system than language. According to him, creolization occurs when designers choose certain elements of cultures, give them new meanings and creatively combine them to create new images that become products of Mass Culture (Cohen, 2007). The new book by Thomas Kacerauskas and Algis Mickunas helped us understand some aspects of communication, for example, Internet offers unlimited possibilities for communication, yet as a portal to the Internet the computer screen limits our view (Kacerauskas & Mickunas, 2020, p. 73). A team of authors is studying the relationship between the verbal component and their visual characteristics in Social Media, and note that in order to decode the full amount of information, knowledge of both the cultural background and the current social and national situation is required (Smirnova & all, 2021).

The state of scientific development of the problem indicates an insufficient level of research on the art-aesthetic aspects of Advertising. Scholars in Economics, Marketing, Humanities and Art studies don't reveal the determinants of colour form as a style element or its evolution. Their works are descriptive and don't give any idea of the patterns of the visual language of colour in Advertising.

Hess (1915), Beasley (2002), Earle (2011), Flath and Klein (2014), Kaf-tangiev (2012), Landa (2016), and Morra (2006) have criticized stereotypes in Advertising. Content analyses of general advertising stereotypes, conducted from 1978 through 2004 have been subject to a meta-analysis, providing a good overview of the use of such portrayals across several markets, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, New Zealand, South Africa, Japan, Zimbabwe, Mexico, Denmark, Singapore, and Serbia (Akestam, 2017). We have not found any analytical publications on the topic of visual stereotypes in colour ads, so, the scientific novelty of the proposed article is obvious.

## 1. Results of the colour research in Advertising

Colour encompasses areas of branding, promotion, product development, retail design, and online engagement with consumers. We argue for a way of creative thinking about colour in ads visualization – designers should choose colours based on a given context rather than in isolation. Hierarchy of colour functions in Advertising we present as:

- *expressive function* – at the first stage of attracting attention;
- *psycho-physiological* – at the stage of perception of objects and generalization of forms to simple geometric figures;

- *emotional* – at the stage of perception of straight and curvilinear silhouettes in colour and tone;
- *informative* – at the stage of forming the interests of consumers;
- *positive-aesthetic* – at the stage of getting ready to purchase (Pryshchenko, 2019, p. 313).

Colour cannot be perceived in “pure form”, colour is always and everywhere a manifestation, an expression of a certain idea, however, not a measure of quantity or form, but the quality of the property without which it is impossible to imagine creative human manifestations. Brayn Holme, on the basis of historical and cultural contexts, emphasized the conformity of colour-graphic means to the advertising idea and the integrity of its implementation (Holme, 1982). To understand colour as a multifaceted phenomenon, it is necessary to turn to cultural heritage. Colour organizes space and creates identity, that to promote a deeper understanding of its relevance in the overall design process and to establish a theoretical and practical basis for a transnational discussion concerning a cross-cultural appreciation of colour designing.

Chromatic graphic objects as components of Visual communication that comes from petroglyphs of primitive peoples to modern icons. It is a means of coding information into images and symbols. Symbolism differs from illustrativeness by the presence of additional meanings that can be perceived by a mass audience. Moreover, it is art-project activities to create a balanced and effective visual-informative environment that conveys innovations to the development of economic and sociocultural spheres of life. Throughout its existence, graphics has influenced consumers and persuaded them by using advertisers’ ingenuity and their personal tastes. Advertising often had unexpected, but sometimes highly artistic forms. In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century a new scientific method based on associative psychology was formed generating significant effectiveness of advertising. It was a transition from raising awareness to creating symbolic meaning for consumer goods. The symbolic meaning of the product for consumers, obtaining imaginary satisfaction of their own needs, is formed by values artificially combined into a holistic image. However, semiotic analysis of Advertising helps understand its language “aposteriori”. Sometimes, in the process of practical experience, the authors themselves are surprised by how many hidden meanings and allusions can be found in their messages (Dayan, 1993). Therefore, it should be noted that Semiotics is the basis of Advertising, and Semiotics of Advertising studies the semantic and symbolic influence of colours on consumers. Roland Barthes defines Advertising as an applied Semiotics. One of the examples is Branding as a unique communicative element that allows one to “tie” the product to a particular object of the symbolic world as in the case of Marlboro cigarettes that are associated to the cowboy. It is an interesting fact that the Marlboro Man is recognized as the most popular advertising image in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Understanding of poster images is closely intertwined with social, political, cultural and technological processes. The dialogue between cultures is an exchange of meanings within a single semiosphere. It is a complex process of understanding the meaning of one's own culture, conveying it to other cultures and simultaneously searching for ethnic differences and specific mentalities (Lotman, 1992). But even Bense was looking for a semantic-mathematical model for describing the creative process and aesthetic properties of digital artworks (Bense, 1971).

Media has become a place where serious strategies are played out. In the current technological period, communication goes beyond traditional media, including posters. DiMarco (2011) considers the creative process, from project management to working with graphics to designing for Print and Web in frame New Media, and presents a wide variety of inspirational images from well-known designers. Among the visual elements, the author lists line, shape, font, and colour as an important factor in digital design, in particular contrast, and gives examples of colour schemes (types of colour combinations), in fact, without revealing the principles of application.

Let's examine the meaning of a poster in an artistic context. Poster does not lose its position as the main advertising medium in outdoor (especially city lights), interiors for various purposes, even as an element of decor (instead of paintings), virtual contests of various themes, and can be transformed into online ads banners. The poster is the most common type of graphics with artistic features that are determined by propaganda function. A poster is an artwork performed on a large piece of paper with or without a concise text carrying out social, commercial, cultural, political, educational or other purposes. An informative message should be perceived by a person in motion, defining the visual shape of the poster, its size, laconic image, clarity of the idea, easy-to-read font and vivid colours. The most spread one is a commercial poster, which often uses photography, symbolic elements, and associative-emotional methods of persuading potential consumers. An outstanding feature of the designer is the ability to see and reflect any idea in a poster and a poster wise way of thinking. The last one includes some excitement and passion in trying to convey a certain idea to the target audience. A poster artist must filter the idea through internal analysis in order to convey the image to the viewer simply and clearly.

A poster is the most effective means of Visual communication, it should stimulate, explain, provoke and persuade. It should be easy and coherent in its form, however, to achieve this is much more difficult than to express oneself as an artist in painting. Though, a significant disadvantage of advertising is the imbalance between its aesthetics and commercial effectiveness. There are a lot of examples, where an advertising message is built on the laws of composition, but a visual advertising idea is not solved, not positioned and motivational moments of persuading certain audiences are not found. As a result, it does not work and the product is not bought.

On the basis of conducted classification of advertising images, we defined regularity of a choice of pictorial means in disclosure of advertising ideas at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The art imagery, emotionalism and originality of pictorial means take first place. Special computer effects are added. In the period of hyper-consumption, designers are trying to find new means of organizing visual information. Nowadays, visual streams prevail over verbal ones. Though, a new, fragmentary “clip thinking”, based on emotional platform, visuality, big variability and perception of a large number of different visual elements enters the market. Advertising creates a different, aesthetically appealing mythical reality and becomes a sign system, and consumption becomes a sign. Thus, contemporary advertising has acquired the status of a fashion leader.

Advertising has a regional specific also: oriental motifs, colouristics and ornaments. Orientation of production to regional groups, a significant change of market policy presupposes a cardinal change in tasks and character of advertising: socio-psychological, cultural, and aesthetical indices become very actual. The definition of imagery as specific means of creating image from the point of view of definite aesthetic ideal is a key to understanding the process of projecting images in ads. Ethno is becoming increasingly popular, which brings to the urbanized standardized life a sense of artistic expression. Most often there are ads, furniture, accessories, stylized decor elements of East. It remains relevant and justified to use the ethno-art tradition to identify countries, goods, and services in the world, preserve national cultures. If in the printing and packaging of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century numerous designs in the “folk style” were built on the active use of ornamental motifs, today the innovative design ideas must be combined with the traditional features of mentality and folk art images.

## 2. Semiotic transformations of red colour

We follow transformations of red colour in advertising messages, which are most frequently found. Red is a paint, an emotion, a symbol. Currently, advertising is divided into commercial (profit), political (creating a positive image of management ideologies) and social (emphasis on social issues) by its main functions. Additionally, commercial advertising was the first to be founded and developed with the main purpose to promote goods and services on the market. The most active was the use of the red colour, because of the peculiarity of our visual perception – the retina is the fastest to perceive this wavelength. Knowing this, the designer *must think in colour*, that is, not to paint the image at the last stage, but consider the colour image of a given object at the stage of the idea. In other words, colour in Advertising should always contribute to the fulfillment of its communicative function. Together with trademark and font, brand colour is extremely important for the



identification of the company. It encourages the establishment of the contact between the company and the consumer.

It is a known fact that colour is perceived and remembered much faster than other pictorial and written means (Bovee & Arens, 1989). Modern practice proves that corporate colour is increasingly used as a factor of styling. Colour graphics is one of the main psychological factors of influence on consumer, as visual form of advertising is addressed primarily to human emotions. Contemporary advertising does not offer goods, but mental states.

*Commercial advertising is a tool of competition.* Commercial ads (commercial graphics/ commercial poster) are ranked first among other types of advertising. However, social areas of advertising cover not only economic relations (production, finance, trade, various services), but cultural events and even self-promotion. The art historical method is aimed at understanding the essence of psychological and cultural-aesthetic concepts of advertising and its long-term impact on different social strata, especially since the advertising process has national-specific features in the culture of different regions.

The development of graphic and poster design in Tsarist Russia is especially interesting and little documented (Aulich, 2014). The visual language of colour ads in Ukraine was based on stylistic tendencies of Art Nouveau (Secession/ Jugendstil/ Liberty), forming its own graphic interpretations in combination with traditional artistic motifs associated with national, historical and mythological figures. In this example (Fig. 1), we see the characteristic Art Nouveau restrained red, green and blue colours, the combination of plant and geometric elements, and also the interpretation of motifs of Ukrainian folk art. The red always had a positive connotation, but in ads, before the October Revolution of 1917, it was used very limitedly.



Figure 1. Wine list from Kyiv, Ukraine, 1930s. Photo from author` archive (S. Pryshchenko)

It is a very important point to underline the irrelevant role of advertising messages in the period of planned economy. In socialist countries,

advertising was an ideological enemy, and in the 1920s, commercial advertising actually ceased to exist. It was replaced by political propaganda and images of socialist realism. Small number of advertising products of the Soviet period promoted mainly goods for export or now and then reminded the population: “Drink tomato juice!” and “Have a rest in the Crimea!”. However, it is necessary to pay attention to high skills and ingenuity of Soviet artists. For more than 20 years transition to the market relations and advertising culture were formed in the post-Soviet area.

In the 1960s a Ukrainian advertising poster was very striking with its ethno-art traditions mainly in Ukrainian-speaking posters of movies, performances, concerts, exhibitions and cultural events. The artist Denysenko created poster “Exhibition of Ukrainian books” as advertisement of “EXPO-1968” for the Days of the USSR Culture, where the main element was an ornamentally stylized flower. During the 1960s and 1980s, a large number of interesting posters were created. Particularly, the poster for the film “Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors” with graphic drawings of rural life scenes on the black background developed by Yakutovych in 1964. In 1968 Ponomarenko created the poster “Exhibition Ukrainian graphics” with an ornamental letter, where red and black combination in the title of the exhibition on a white background was really significant. Chernyuk revealed the poster “Love, protect the fabulous native land!” with ornamental tree-bird in the same 1968.

Volodymyr Lesnyak designed the poster for the “Week of Ukrainian folklore” (1982), which became already the educational example. Red is kept in a contrasting combination with a black background. The poster “See, people, the Day has come!” with an extremely stylized image of a flower, linear space solution, and plane colours was composed by Vitaliy Shostya in 1986. The red flower is metaphorically opposed to the gray thistles of Totalitarianism, symbolizing the revival of Ukrainian art.

Colour semantics effectively contributes to the understanding of the product essence. Big companies have always paid great attention to the creation of a visual image of the product and the formation of certain psychological stereotypes — the most important means of sales promotion. Visual advertising aims at identifying the characteristics of a particular product, creating, as a rule, a very attractive image. The use of visual metaphors in advertising indicates that they have significant potential and persuasiveness on a subconscious level, and, as a result, have good financial effects (Semiotics of the Media, 1997, pp. 162-163).

On the one hand, due to the colour orientation increases the speed of recognition of the presented objects, on the other, it increases the demonstrativeness of their attractive qualities. Image-based advertising deals with pictures, where images closely related to the concept of brand should be obvious and clear with the aim to create a positive regular image of goods/services/companies in the minds of consumers. However, we see a lot of red colour in current advertising: it instantly attracts our attention, but is excessively present not only in

logos, signs and visual elements of images — now it often serves as a background in print, outdoor and online advertising (Fig. 2). The main aesthetic problem of Outdoor in Eastern European cities consist in extreme pollution of ads information. In contrast, in the central areas of many large cities of Western Europe, there are almost no large billboards and no “colour advertising noise”.



Figure 2. a) red advertising the Coca-Cola brand. The series “Plants make us happy”, 2014; b) red in Munich, 2015; c) New York, 2015.

Available at free recourse [www.pinterest.com](http://www.pinterest.com)

The change in a sense of the red colour is especially visible in political and public advertising — from the clear sign of socialism and communism to the accentuated red colour in the most important elements of advertisements. The same can be said about the cultural-imaging poster.

*Political advertising is an instrument of ideological struggle.* Propaganda posters are political advertising that emerged as a means of propaganda during the First World War. Today it determines the level of the political culture of society and is one of the important factors in communication. If we consider political advertising in the mirror of culture, we can note several formative trends, determined by ideological platforms — the main thing should be the meaning and ideology, in order to properly translate them into the relevant poster images.

Events during the October Revolution of 1917 became the cradle of Soviet political posters, especially Ukrainian ones. It is difficult to imagine the walls and windows of houses in those years without propaganda posters. Extremely diverse, sometimes brilliant, and genuinely carried out, they were always imbued with the pathos of struggle. Created for people, especially for the illiterate masses of workers, posters of the 1920s were simple and intelligible in the form and content. Many of them looked like woodcut popular print pictures with folklore images, a live spoken text, folk humour. The significance of images, their solemn heroic character enhanced the emotional state of the works and their impact on the viewers. Ukrainian posters of the 1930s were laconic and characterized by the clear rhythm, solid line, symbolism and conventional colour. During this period, posters-splinters designed for the peasants gradually disappeared. The culture of spectators

raised, the professional skills of artists also increased, and the quality of printing was markedly improved. “Here, and there, and everywhere we are building Socialism!” – this is how the main slogan of the time was formulated. The black colour was used to depict everything old, and red meant to illustrate the new that will come (Fig. 3, b). The use of colour contrasting contours was widespread back then.

However, the method of “socialist realism” prevailed in all kinds of Art: there was an artificial introduction of Soviet attributes and plots of Soviet reality, strengthening posters, operating with available ideological constructions, and banning ethno-art traditions, which generally led to the disappearance of Ukrainian ornaments, the semantic significance of colours and forms.

The posters of the Second World War can be divided into two main groups: the first were heroic, which glorified feats of arms at the front and labor exploits in the rear, and second were satirical, which exposed fascism. A stable satirical image of Hitlerism was formed as an ugly swastika spider. Vasyl Kasiyan came up with the idea of using Taras Shevchenko’s poems in posters. Despite respect for this Ukrainian graphic artist works, we can give examples of tedious visual solutions. His poster “To the battle, Slavs!” (by the way, slogan was in Russian) revealed an uninteresting image of the defender, drawn with pencil-like in academic drawing. Additionally, it was too pathetic as the soldier appeared in Cossack clothes, a fur vest, with a machine gun, a grenade and a Soviet flag.

Internationalism prevailed not only in the USSR but in socialist countries. Illustration is in posters of the Museum of Modern History in Leipzig, where images of German Democratic Republic period are strikingly similar to images of socialist realism with happy children, hardworking women, communism heroic men-builders. Posters, as inexpensive and effective media were widely used for state influence and control of East German citizens, as well as praise of the communist allies, reproducing historical and cultural images of that period.



Figure 3. a) Soviet Ukraine, 1930s; b) Soviet Ukraine, 1946; c) borrowed visual stylistics from Germany of the 1930s and in USSR poster of the 1980s.

Available at free recourse [www.pinterest.com](http://www.pinterest.com)

Prominent Ukrainian philosopher Myroslav Popovych claimed to write a book about the red 20<sup>th</sup> century, as by his words, “it was mostly like that for us” (Popovych, 2005). Even after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, Ukrainian posters retained of “Soviet style” until the end of the 1990s with the red colour, communist symbols, epic images and patriotic slogans. Today, declaring decommunization and forming the national ideas, the former Soviet generation has not completely lost Soviet visual stamps. We know a few examples of exhibition posters showing artists and designers appealing to the Ukrainian ethnocultural heritage.

*Public advertising is a tool for promoting socially significant ideas.* Public posters, or public service advertising (PSA – advertising of public values) should become the amplifiers of state ideology as they are designed to create a state image by the perception of its residents and citizens of other countries. The purpose of this type of advertising is to change the attitude of the audience to any problem (lifestyle, standards of behaviour, abuse, environmental protection), and to create new social values in perspectives. Currently, boundaries between social and some examples of commercial advertising are blurred. Negative emotional means also attract attention, but the use of shocking techniques, inherent in social ads is almost never used in other types of advertising. It is very important for communicators to use coding systems for the main ideas in advertising appeals, available for understanding by a specific target audience. Critical analysis of the aesthetic level of public advertising in post-Soviet countries reveals the use of outdated stylistic devices, visual stamps (red flag, red star, red rocket, white dove), practically borrowed from political posters of the USSR, deficiency of original ideas, and more (Fig. 4, a-b). But with a red accent, just one letter changes the sense to the opposite (Fig. 4, c). One red letter completely changes the content (Fig. 4, d).



Figure 4. a-b) Soviet posters, II half of the XX cent.; c) Polish poster by Richard Kaya, II half of the XX cent. Available at free recourse [www.pinterest.com](http://www.pinterest.com); d) creative ads by Armando Milani, Italy. To the 60th anniversary of the United Nations, 2005. Available at free resource [www.graphis.com](http://www.graphis.com)

In the cultural-imaging posters, colour often acts as a visual identifier of the countries, on this examples there is red creativity presented in the national colours: France – blue, white, and red in three flowers (Fig. 5, a); Switzerland – red and white (Fig. 5, b); Lithuania – red and green with white outline because the flag of Lithuanian SSR was red-white-green (Fig. 5, c); Poland – red and white; red here is dominant, festive and emphasizes the importance of a cultural event (Fig. 5, d).



Figure 5. Red as a visual identifier of the countries: a-c) photo from Wikimedia Commons. Available at free multimedia repository [www.commonswikimedia.org](http://www.commonswikimedia.org); d) Etno Krakow Fest 2020, Poland. Available at free resource [www.etnokrakow.pl](http://www.etnokrakow.pl)

Synergetics is a phenomenon in which the complex influence of the factors involved gives a total effect much greater than the sum of the effects of each of them separately (Smiraglia, 2014). For example, the concept of colour theory contains a new understanding of the interdependent processes of colour formation in Nature, the psychophysiological perception of colour by people, and its associative reproduction in Art, Design and Advertising. The synergy of intercultural and inter-stylistic dimensions of advertising requires rethinking and applying a contemporary integrative approach. Matthew Soar analyzes coding in Advertising and notes that scholars classify ads either on a historical basis or consider them in commodity, gender, ideological, or fetishistic categories, without delving into an important aspect – cultural coding or decoding of appeals. However, the production of Advertising is not so much an accumulation of values as a “creative eruption”, because the advertisement invents for the consumer a visualization of certain ideas (Soar, 2006, p. 210). George Panigyrakis offers a conceptual framework that integrates variables that historically have been considered independently in the use of colour in advertising literature. His study examines this question in relation to particular product categories and across cultures. The findings suggest that British and French advertising creative executives attach similar importance to different effects of colour use in print advertising per product category, apart from the case of speciality goods (Panigyrakis, 2015).

We use synergetics in the design of ads as a visual-verbal model, where the idea, forms, colours, materials and techniques of execution

are inextricably linked into an imagery. The synergistic possibilities of colour in ads designing are to find the original solutions to the visualization of advertising ideas. Colour combinations in Advertising must be focused on the target audience and adjusted to regional ethnic and cultural traditions. Advertising products for the mass market must have an aesthetic level and perform a cultural education function. New understanding of colour and the use of the term “colour synergetics” are well reasonable which we discussed in the previous article (Pryshchenko, 2014). As an alternative to Globalization processes with their aspiration to standardization and assimilation of cultural peculiarities, processes of self-identification of nations are actualized in Design and Advertising. One of the directions of design research is examining the influence of colouristic traditions in art-project culture.

The comparative method of studying the visual tension of red colour in Advertising allows us to notice significant dynamics in the use of its quantitative and qualitative characteristics. The 20<sup>th</sup> century turned out to be very rich in semiotic approaches, colour means in Art, Design and Advertising, technological innovations in Media, etc. In the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there was a rapid increase in the red colour in Advertising communication, especially in posters. Online advertising also significantly reflects this trend. Red coding is becoming more active even in those advertising messages that are not directly related to social appeals. The red colour in Advertising is a logical consequence of certain ideological and stylistic constructions inherent in the periods of cultural development of Modernism and Postmodernism with their pluralism in ideological doctrines and concepts, multi-vector of directions, absence of system, continuous movement between aesthetic categories and styles, colour harmony and disharmony, construction and deconstruction, reality and virtuality, axiological meanings of previous epochs disappearance, new meanings appearance and new means of organizing visual information search. The scientific novelty lies in comparing the use of the red colour in commercial, political and public advertising, as well as emphasizing the need for and understanding of the colour synergetics in Advertising. We didn't find any new similar publications.

## Conclusion

The study analyses colour in Advertising from the point of view of its art-aesthetic level and focuses on the creative aspects of colour as a means of Visual communication. An interdisciplinary approach to colour designing is proposed. The variability of red colour and its semiotic transformations in different sociocultural spaces are discussed: from positive to negative (and vice versa), from corporate colour to public appeal. Media and Communication reflect the influence of Art and Technologies on Advertising, on Poster, which remains relevant

despite rapid digitalization. The comparative analysis of cultural aspects of ads and, especially, visual stereotypes and functions of colour in Advertising are provided. It is obvious that colour images as products of creativity in Advertising have social meaning only in the systemic understanding of cultural and political processes. The advertising image differs from the artistic one by the emphasized non-standardish colour contrast, according to the status of the goods or service, intelligibility for groups of consumers of different cultures, and variability of visual language. Since advertising often borrows images from art forms, their creative interpretation and preservation of symbolic meanings are necessary.

These materials are included in the content of the integrated author's course "Design of Advertising", and can be useful for master studies, certificate programs, training of designers, and doctoral studies. Also, we are planning to include them as a chapter of the monograph "Poster and New Media" in 2023. The development of professional competencies should be aimed at analyzing and understanding the stylistic tendencies in Advertising, and the search for national identity, for example, designing advertising concepts and design elements that are relevant for the regional characteristics of Eastern European countries.

So, we tend to argue that the study of colour is complex and must be comprehensive. The interrelation between colour and society, traditions, culture, art, innovations and environment affects human perception and perception of the advertisements. Nowadays visualization of advertising ideas is represented as a synergy of colour, art imagery, and digital technologies. Creativity is the success factor for Advertising in the future, and we have a plan to study the visual aesthetics of colour in Media representations extensively.

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