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INSTEAD OF INTRODUCTION

What kind of journal is it?

“Crossroads Digest” is the selection of articles originally published in Russian in “Crossroads quarterly” in 2003–2006.

“Crossroads quarterly” is a transdisciplinary scientific journal devoted to political, social and cultural transformations in the Eastern European borderland (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine). The main tasks include assistance to conceptual and methodological renewal of academic research in the region, initiation of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary dialog, support of representation of regional, national and local academic schools and traditions.

Why the Border Area?

The most essential and topical field of modern research of Eastern European border area is usually recognized as the problem of transition/escape from communism and is constituted into transitology. Processes of transition are studied at and projected into the time (modernization), geopolitical and geocultural (Europeanization or Westernization) levels. Transitology today includes primarily political, economic and legal studies. However, it has a problem with the expansion of the border area studies. This means that the problems should include a wider range of social sciences and especially of new humanistic studies (research of the border area, post colonial theories, cross cultural studies, gender studies, globalization studies, etc).

In our opinion, what seems to be a problem of transition for the region (or problems) in a short-term period seems to be the problem of “the border area” in a long-term period.

Transition in the conditions of the border area continually generates hybrid models, political, economic and cultural practices which forcedly find themselves at the border of democracy and authoritarianism, liberalism and conservatism, globalism and regionalism.

Political space is broken into Western and Eastern vectors and uses them in political discourses and strategies and constantly requires “therapeutic” means to guarantee its own integrity. Economic practices turn out to be also dependant upon these strategic configurations giving rise to various and often conflict “business subcultures”.

As a consequence, political, economic and cultural space of the border area to a great extent is fragmented and these fragments are simultaneously brought into correlation with different integrities.

For instance, besides the already formed political and economic strategies of transition to “the normal West” lately there have been observed mutations of Soviet heritage that lead to the coming into being of competitive strategies of modernization that rest upon the ideas of return to the elements of socialism and ethnos of the “second world”.

All this shows that political, economic and cultural processes in the border area do not possess a linear character (progress or regress) and should be studied with the help of non-linear transdisciplinary paradigms. In this sense the studies of the border area can be identified not only as a specific academic direction and not as an interdisciplinary field of research but as a common frame in the policy context of knowledge of the whole region.

Why Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova?

“Why did you decide that Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova altogether represent a region?

Well, it is clear with Belarus and Ukraine but what does it have to do with Moldova?” Perhaps, this is the first question that comes to the mind of the people who get acquainted with the materials of our project. It is quite appropriate and can hardly be left without an answer.

It is true as differences are more than considerable. Possibly, the traditional culture of Moldavians could much more organically be blended with the Balkan context than the Eastern European one. However, this is still a question of whether this variant is more preferable for the people living in Moldova. It shall be mentioned that internal differences

in Ukraine especially with the growth of the number of Tatar population in Ukraine hardly looks less significant. In general, if one is to ask the question of what unites Belarus and Moldova the answer will be simple: it is Ukraine. This is not some geographical speculation: the traditional culture of the Karpathian region contains a lot of Balkan elements (for instance, in folklore plots) and the “ethnic linguistic continuity” of Polesje (a smooth flow from one dialect to another) actually “dissolves” the ethnic border between Belarus

and Ukraine. It shall be added that one can hardly find a single truly culturally homogeneous region in Europe. Let's consider the Baltic States as an illustration. Can the differences between the Baltic languages Catholic Lithuanians and Finnish speaking Protestant Estonians (not Indo-Europeans by language) be smaller than between Orthodox Moldavians and Belarusians? But the Baltic States are constantly identified as the region even despite the growing lack of the desire from its own inhabitants to be considered such.

Similar objections against the unification into one region can be heard from the representatives of Scandinavian peoples. It can take a long time to enumerate such examples. The process of construction of "regionalism" itself is similar to ethnic stereotypization: its essence is a clearly psychological need to bring the chaos, fatality of ethnic and linguistic differences (according to B. Anderson) to mosaicity (at least) that can be understood not only by some average not burdened by any special knowledge subject but, and this is most important, it should be accessible for making political decisions. In general, in Europe construction/deconstruction of "regionalism" is a permanent dramatic process that reflects not only the composition of cultures and languages but also the correlation of the centers of "power". For instance, the Soviet ethnographic tradition the typical feature of which in the 1970-1980s was the desire to classify actually all peoples of the planet identified two cultural "provinces" within Europe: Western-Central-European and Eastern European. The border between them coincided with the Western border of the USSR. It is typical that the Eastern European province besides the Baltic and Volga-Kama regions was also divided into the Northern (Russian-Belarusian) and South-Western regions including a part of Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. Now nobody but the specialists remember this variant of Europe division. However, while during the times of the Cold War the political discourse predominantly underlined the differences that divided Europe into Eastern and Western or Northern and Southern Europe the modern tendency in the popular representation of Europe is focused on similarities and territories of contiguity. It is obvious that the restored in the 1990s regionalism of Central and Eastern Europe including Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova is being destroyed now with us being the witnesses of this process as the European Union is expanding further East. However, it does not seem reasonable to bury it completely. Poland will ever hardly become Germany (just like Portugal did not manage to become France) as a result of this expansion. Different variants of regionalism are simply called for differently by different epochs. At the same time the construction of new regionalisms (just like in our case) is not such a useless process after all. The mosaic under the name "The Mediterranean" put together due to the efforts of European anthropologists from such fragments as Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek culture did not only encouraged the appearance of such brand as "the Mediterranean diet" but also helped to "pull out" Greece from the hopelessness with the label "The Balkans". Without any complaints against analogies it will be worth mentioning that the Mediterranean portrayed in such a way to a certain degree prompted post authoritarian Greece and Portugal to join the European Union.

Instead of Introduction

The most essential moment in the construction of the regionalism is the acquisition of a name. The name is not just the sum of the past, but it is also a project aimed at the future.

(By the way, namelessness is not so bad either especially because some names do not generate positive emotions and to change the name is sometimes more difficult than to acquire a new name). It is typical that the search for the name for us is going very actively. Besides, as a rule, it is done from the outside and it is not likely to satisfy us. It is enough to remember, for instance, “the Eastern Eurasia” or “the New Near East”. The acquisition of the name is one of the sides of the mission of our project. We want to hope that beyond it the understanding of cultural self-value and self-adequacy of our “border area” existence will begin.

By Igor Bobkov, Pavel Tereshkovich

ETHICS OF THE BORDERLAND: Transculturalism as Belarusian Experience

*At night a gloomy poet walks
On (across) the Borderland between Homeland
and the Strange Land.
Anatol Sys*

The task of this text is to interpret the five words that the title contains. Three of the words are concepts that along with the old tradition of European thinking tend to universal meaning, which does not depend on any local contexts. These words are borderline, ethic, transculturalism. The other two words form a word combination in which they jointly localize their meaning. This word combination is Belarusian experience. All of them taken together mean a certain dynamic whole, which reveals a certain intention of the thought. It is hardly possible to divulge the sense and motivation of this intention rationally. (However, it is possible to state beforehand that ethics as a temptation necessarily appears at the horizon of thinking that tries to make a culture war its subject, itself being both a means and an argument in this war. It appears as a vague imperative and as a sense-creating perspective). Because of this intention, which encounters different contents on language space, something may happen. This something is a possible event of thought. Nevertheless, it is impossible to plan or foresee the event of thought, its directions and labyrinths, deadlocks and achievements. The only thing worth mentioning beforehand is that the Archives of European thinking have two strategies. One rests on the universalization of the unique (Belarusian experience is regarded as part of wider, general experience, which is seen and thought over through the above-mentioned categories – ethics, borderland, transculturalism, and somewhere far above Plato's ideas are shining). The other, its opposite, means

making universal unique (from this perspective Belarusian experience stands out as an incomparable and disproportionate event, as a point of departure of the new genealogical project of the polycentric history of the present, – and help us Nietzsche). The thought necessarily deals with these two strategies, and it will be impossible to avoid their attraction. However, the task of our analysis is more modest and simple – to make the above-mentioned words significant in our thinking. Reasoning only weighs this significance on the scales of language.

Borderline

The term *borderline* in a certain way characterizes the topos of space: *borderland* is space adjacent to the border, connected with and designated by the border, space for which the border is in reality the organizing principle, substance, and center of attraction. *Borderland* lies on both sides of the border, and its typological status is paradoxical: *borderland* acquires wholeness through the fact of its division, i.e. through the dynamic event of delimitation, meeting and transition of We and the Other or I and Another. Exactly this dynamic event corresponds to what is called substance, center, principle, prime cause, and God in European thinking.

.....

These words (substance, center, principle) are conventional for European thinking but in a kind of geometrical projection: the projection of the circle or sphere, which has the center and periphery. In this space the movement to and from the center is the same movement; something aims at the center, reaches it and settles down in its substance, immobility and from that time on is called prime cause, God, The Universal. The question to what extent European ontology (possible European ontologies) depends on this geometric metaphor remains open. However, *borderland* seen from the perspective of the center does not exist either as ontological or typological wholeness, or, to reformulate this idea, from the perspective of the ontology of the center, *borderland* exists as the mechanical combination of two peripheries, which are separated by the border. To see *borderland* in reality we must imagine some other ontology and find another basic metaphor.

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To imagine this alternative ontology let us envision thinking that relies not on Parmenides's eternal and immovable Being but on Heraclites's "everlasting living fire" which periodically lights up and fades out or on "war which is the mother of everything". Finally, in the TAO ontology the central concept is not TAO about which we cannot say anything certain but Tao Te – the Great Border. Tao wisdom lies in the wisdom of existing in the

Borderland, the wisdom of being present in the dynamic event of delimitation, meeting and transition of Yin and Yang, I and Another. If we try to shake off European snobbishness, which devalues all non-Western claims to knowledge by boxing the corresponding texts as Orientalism or Esoteric Literature, we can understand that there is nothing Eastern or specifically Chinese in this possible ontology. The problem is not in the orientalization of European thinking but in the existence of a perspective where Borderland can be seen as a certain dynamic wholeness, in its identity.

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In order to raise the question about the identity of Borderland we have to ask about the identity of the border as such. However, the border acquires its identity only in the event of division/ joining of something that is adjacent. The border is the split of identity, the meeting and transition of I into Another. The border is an event.

In this kind of geometry borderland is not a periphery: the dynamics of space rests not on simply receiving impulses from the center but on the confrontation of identities, their disintegration and joining. On the opposite, it is in the presence of the border that identities are most exposed and aggressive. What identities are silent about in the center is exposed and pronounced at the moment of meeting Another or transition into Another.

If we pass over from ontology to the dynamics of culture or, to be more exact, to the cultural wholeness of Borderland, which reveals itself in the status of the subject of culture, existence on Borderland means not the movement from one culture to another, which could be a symptom of inculturation (if it were free) or colonization (if it were forced), but the movement across the border (along the border), melancholy progress which goes parallel to the existing cultural borders, a gesture of definitive misalignment with the existing topoi, of the strategy of non-separation of I from, and non-choice between I and Another, existence in the dark space where I is alienated and Another is still I: existence between Homeland and Strange land, which, in reality, turn out to be two faces of a single whole.

Cultural Borderland (or the culture of Borderland) is not only a geocultural (topological) but also an existential phenomenon: the process of individual self-identification with the whole cultural space is not a pure event of joining the existing identity that is equal to itself but rather the process of balancing between in the polycentric space of cultural diversity. Ultimately, any claims to pure self-identical wholeness turn into the loss of this wholeness, into one part of it, the Belarusian part.

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The Belarus of the last two centuries emerged and formed exactly in this vague space of in-between- and across-cultural dusk. At first sight, it looks paradoxical that Belarusian

thinking has not thematized and reflected upon its real (local) situation, prioritizing the ideological and textual construction of Belarus Archipelago. “The Local Ones” by Yanka Kupala is a single exception, though a great one. The Belarusian subject and Belarusian subjectivity are formed on Borderland; on the borderland between the culture of the gentry and folk culture there first appears the Belarusian cultural I, which through a series of metonymic changes presents itself either as Matsey Burachok, founder of the Belarusian national narrative, or through the expansion into the tradition as Frantsishak Skaryna, Kastus Kalinouski, Usyaslau the Enchanter and a host of other cultural masks. Borderland is the space where Adam Mickiewicz is our own Other and Alexander Lukashenka is the Other that is our own.

Transculturalism

Culture may be only a rationalized metaphor of the habitable cultured space. In this case, the futility of long and unsuccessful attempts to give this word the precision of a concept or the universality of a category can be accounted for. Culture is not cosmos, not Universe. It is only eukumene, the native nook, which is inevitably one’s own and inevitably limited.

The link of culture with the border is essential: culture emerges only in the event of delimitation and dissociation but it lives and develops only in the attempts to cross its borders and to widen its territory. In the 19th – 20th centuries, the process of geopolitical delimitation practically ended; the borders between cultures have become codified and legitimized. What is essential is that because of the deterritorialization of space the ontological status of the cultural border has changed. If before it became legitimized only in relation to the land (territory), its symbolic reading (ideology, confessions, and primitive power), now the only criterion of cultural delimitation lies in the sphere of the emergence and functioning of signs. Signs have lost their localization, attachment to the territory (their today’s topos is their systemic nature). The image of self-identified, closed, geographically localized national cultures is obviously outdated; it does not correspond to the real situation. We have entered the epoch of transculturalism.

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By the term transculturalism we shall mean – in the broadest sense – cultural transcendence, misalignment of culture (also: cultures) with its localization in time and space and textual availability, various practices of cultural transgressions – going out beyond its borders – into the space of other cultures or into the space which every epoch defines for itself as a-cultural.

The prefix trans- shows a certain dynamism, movement through or across a certain space. In relation to culture, this may mean a host of different things: the functioning of

signs, which appeared in one culture, in a different cultural space; various practices of transition across the cultural borders; multipolar identity, which appeals to different cultural traditions; the traditions themselves, which are made up of heterogeneous and even mutually exclusive elements, etc. In this sense transculturalism is not so much a defined concept as a problem field, acknowledgement of the fact that today's planetary situation in culture is not so much a mechanic sum total of different (and equal) cultures as a dynamic balance (or even a dynamic chaos?!) of different and unequal (incomparable) cultures whose signs incessantly wander about using even more efficient mediators.

From this perspective the term transculturalism leads us to the problem of today's topology (or even anthology) of cultures, to the problem of structural, dynamic and meaningful relations between cultures, cultural dialogue being only one and not the most widespread form of them. Transculturalism raises the problem of new cultural borders, their nature and location, borders that do not coincide with geographical, ethnic, or state borders and which not only draw the boundaries of but also delimit culture along and across.

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Finally, transculturalism questions the normativity of modern European utopia – national culture, a culture defined by homogeneity and self-identification whose borders coincide with political borders, a culture which is clearly dissociated from neighboring cultures. Keeping a symbolic link with the national territory, national cultures today are in reality localized in the area where there exist zones of production, use, interpretation, and symbolic appropriation of other texts. This means that the space of culture has the structure of an Archipelago and not the homogeneous location. Homogeneous national culture has never been a reality; it has rather been a cultural utopia of European modernity, which has been given a certain normative value. This utopia has never been realized even in the most highly modernized countries. With the advent of postmodernity the very normativity of this model is being questioned. Because if we look at this model as the only norm, not only the space of Belarusian tradition and modernity will be non-normal, but even the greater part of the modern world will be seen only in light of the unfinished European modernity that has not been completely built.

One cannot say that the concept of transculturalism finds itself in the intellectual vacuum: it immediately arouses associations with transtextuality of Jean Genet, transgressions of Michel Foucault as well as with a number of other terms – from multiculturalism to ply- and crossculturalism. It looks as if it organically fitted into the ideological trend of the West today that started in the 1960s and has the common slogan of “celebration of diversities”. It includes different kinds of academically well-grounded cultural relativism, the ideology of multiculturalism in America, which has actively forced out the ideology of the “melting pot”, cultural tolerance as the European variant of multiculturalism that

turned out to be the local response of the Old World to the global challenge of unassimilated immigration. On the one hand, this contextuality is completely reasonable, and we shall actively use the appropriate intellectual instruments for the analysis of the Belarusian situation. On the other hand, we shall keep a certain distance in relation to the ideological nature of the above-mentioned contexts. The thing is that among the non-conformist intellectuals, especially from the Second and the Third World, there is growing concern that the “celebration of diversities” is only a curtain that conceals new strategies of controlling these diversities, i.e. the neocolonialist practice of the West, which has to move from open to indirect domination. These warnings have been finalized in post-colonial studies that are becoming a basic critical discourse of today as they integrate the majority of methodological innovations and local critics. Post-colonial researchers sarcastically observe that all the orgies of tolerance and festivals of diversity, all the celebrations of the Other in the Old World usually conceal mature “high” cultures’ deep inner indifference to this very Other, which they require exclusively as an “exotic supplement”, decoration, ornamentation, or as a response to the market requirements of diversity of consumer proposals. By the way, it is no accident that it is exactly in the European thinking of the 20th century that there is taking place a kind of mythologization of the category of the Other, Another, that there appear various philosophies of dialogue. There is growing the utopia of the Other which is characteristic of precisely homogeneous, self-identified cultures that in reality confront the Other only at the deep periphery of their cultural field. For example, the philosophy of dialogue of Martin Buber is grounded in the Jewish tradition, perhaps the most closed and non-transparent one, while the dialogism of Mikhail Bakhtin is in a perplexing contrast with the practices of one of the world’s most narcissistic cultures – Russian, which for the last two centuries has been practicing only one form of cultural dialogue with the real Other – assimilation or exclusion.

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In contrast to the utopian dreams about the Other, transculturalism, i.e. the presence in the cultural space of numerous Others, the existence of various borders, and enforced practices of crossing these borders, are the repulsive Belarusian reality of the last two or three centuries. Repulsive because both outer and local observers treat this situation as non-normal and describe it in terms of weakness, underdevelopment and cultural absence.

Belarusian transculturalism is, therefore, a proof of cultural a-normality, which is subjectively experienced as an inferiority complex, as a certain cultural trauma – the trauma of absence of a powerful homogeneous national cultural space. Cultural absence remains a permanent metaphor of Belarusian contemporaneity and finally leads to the substitution in the system of culture of reality itself – the substitution of the ideal of a normal, happy, but so far unattainable future.

However, we are interested not in the future but in Belarusian reality as a transcultural reality, its configurations, genealogy, and practice. In this sense the motivations of our analysis coincide neither with the local narrative of just another Belarusian rebirth nor with the provincial desire to join the prestigious (and politically correct) discourse of multiculturalism, nor with the academic practices of “opening the windows” for the great Western narrative, *lumen naturale* of which will keep wandering about in the empty uninhabited rooms of Belarusian reality. Our desire is the analytics of contemporaneity or acquisition of knowledge about ourselves with all the consequences that accompany such impertinence...

Therefore, the Belarusian experience of transculturalism is not inclusion but exclusion: this is an attempt to identify and read the reality that has remained unnamed for the last three or four centuries, though it was there as a silent prerequisite of the majority of cultural practices. This is an attempt to deal with the tradition in which in different epochs six languages functioned as languages of literature: Old Slavonic, Latin, Old Belarusian, Polish, Russian, Neo-Belarusian, which the new mononational Belarusian culture is trying to succeed. Finally, this is an attempt to analyze today's Belarusian polyculturalness, which paradoxically manifests itself as the reality of a culture war, at surface looking like a multiculturalist utopia of co-existence of different cultures within the borders of one cultural field.

Belarusian Experience

When at the end of 1588 the “Deputy” Chancellor of the Grand Duchy Leu Sapiega wrote in his preface to the Statute (Appeal to all classes) that «we have laws described not in some foreign language but in our own”, he could hardly imagine that only a little less than a century later the majority of the citizens of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania would read the “laws described” in a “foreign (Polish) language”, and another three hundred years later some engaged scientists of the new, really Lithuanian Lithuania would characterize his “own language” as an artificial officialese of the Grand Duchy based on “Slavonic dialects”. When in the middle of the 19th century Mickiewicz somewhat ironically said in *EXEGI MUNIMENTUM AERE PERENNIUS...* that “young people in Novogrudok, in Minsk read me” and went on to say more heroically that “...in spite of the Tzar's warnings a Jew in Lithuania keeps volumes of my works to spite the prison wardens”, he also could hardly imagine that a century later Jews would have other things to care for, and his volumes would be read in Mensk and Novogrudok mostly in translation. When Soviet modernization was being realized and the Soviet nation was intended as the highest community possible, one could hardly imagine that at the end of the 1970s a whole generation of Belarusians brought up in Russian in Russian schools on the examples of great Russian culture would suddenly turn to Belarusian nationalism in its radical cultural variant suddenly and at once changing the language, mentality, cultural identity and geopolitical orientations – both its own and the newly acquired tradition.

.....

Let us call the tradition where such things are possible and where they can take place transcultural. This transcultural tradition is made up of heterogeneous elements; its texts are written in different languages and belong to different cultural and civilization types; they are sometimes connected with a wider macroregional context and are a part of several traditions.

At the same time, wavering, deviating, turning from one identity to another, wandering through languages, dialects, empires and cultural epochs the nation proper – for all their social and cultural-political differentiation: division into the gentry and peasants, Orthodox and Catholic believers, Belarusians and Western Russians – has remained a single and integral ethnocultural body. It assigned joining, integrity, and unity of all these mutually exclusive differences and made them aspire to the meta-position in which all these differences could be seen as part of one whole.

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For national or proto-national culture oriented towards inner homogeneity the transcultural tradition has always been a problem and challenge. Writing the tradition, creating the narrative of the tradition, aspiring to wholeness national culture stumbles on the zone of non-transparency, the territory of the Other. National identity meets texts and contexts, which cannot be assimilated and appropriated with the help of formal (or ritual) adaptation. By appropriating them, culture must establish in itself new territories and identity; including the Other, it must change itself. Consequently, meeting the challenge of the tradition and trying to be whole national culture must question itself.

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If we try to point out the sources of transculturalism in the Belarusian tradition, we shall see that in different historical epochs they are different. However, two fundamental things remain a constant: existence in the zone of civilization break-up and colonial – neo- and postcolonial practices. The phenomenon of power stands behind any fundamental changes of the cultural space, no matter how natural such changes might look.

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Belarus as a project of the end of the 19th century, a project of national culture, i.e. meta-culture, was initiated as an attempt at meta-narrative, as an attempt at cultural integrity and wholeness in which all these mutually exclusive differences could find their place. However, in spite of the efforts made, spatially and topologically Belarus remained at the level of sub-culture, one of several competitive programs of modernizing Belarus.

Today Belarusian cultural space is not a homogeneous space of national culture in which the dynamics (or dialectics) of transformation takes place as a game of the center and periphery, a succession of romantic, modern and postmodern myths. Belarusian cultural space has a complex configuration of biculturalism: a configuration of co-existence of the Belarusian and Western Russian parts in the boundaries of the half-defined whole. The main events in the boundaries of the cultural space take place between these constituents: struggle for the center, aspiration to lead in this configuration, the desire to win the greatest space pushing out and discrediting the rival making it an object. In a word, the cultural reality of the last century in Belarus is a culture war with all its empirical and metaphysical assaults.

.....

The war provokes a state of inner mobilization, a state of counter-culture, the division of territory and introduction of demarcation lines, the working out by sub-cultures of strategies of expansion and defense.

.....

In modern conditions Belarusian culture may become whole and integral only as the culture of Borderland, as the culture of inner dissociation, meeting and transition of different (interacting, conflicting) cultural parts.

Ethics of Borderland

Ethics (in its authentic old Greek meaning) arises out of space; it is a human attempt to take root in space, to take its specific fullness from it, to come under the protection of its daemons, to meet its predestination.

The ethos of Borderland as the space of dissociation, meeting and transition of identities allows several strategies of existence in the presence of borders.

Ethics of Non-inclusion or Non-choice

The ethos of non-inclusion is embodied in the idea of localness. To be local means to exist beyond and above all possible borders, i.e. beyond the reach of power or powers. It is possible not to choose between the conflicting oppositions or identities only when there is the territory on which this conflict has not yet or already taken place. For the last five or six centuries traditional culture was this terrain, and ethics of non-inclusion, or localness found its socio-cultural embodiment in it.

Ethics of War

The very combination of words ethics and war may look paradoxical. However, the thing here is not the normative morality but the archetypes of behavior, a kind of fulfillment in the situation of a “culture war”. At this, as Gazinga pointed out,

Ethics of Game

A game is always playing with something.

.....

Belarus is struggling for its fate, and that is why to this day it cannot reach its round.

CREOLITY AS OTHER MODERNITY OF EASTERN EUROPE (POSSIBLE STRATEGIES OF RESEARCH)

Concepts of “Creolity” and “Creoleness” (as well as the term “Creole” used to generate them) are not universal in culturological analyses. They are rather strictly adhered to certain scientific disciplines, types of discourses and practices of social interactions. Overcoming the established borders and wide non-critical use of these terms (as well as the term “Creolization” newly generated from them) in publicism and journalism in the modern Eastern European (including Belarusian) socio-cultural situation called upon to emphasize its post-colonial (and/or post-imperial) character, only dims the essence of the matter and habitualizes (and at the same time de-conceptualizes) real contents hidden in them. This leads to the loss of their heuristic value in the possible interdisciplinary theoretical and methodological reflection.

1

The term “Creole” (Fr. *creole* from Sp. *criollo*) arose in the practices of mutual relations of the subjects of colonial empires (initially – in Spain) for the designation of the people born outside of the mother country territory (initially – in America) providing the latter with an unequal (first of all, social-political) status and unequal opportunities in comparison with the people born in the mother country. The inequality of statuses and opportunities could be secured legally but actually was more often revealed as self-evident. Creole belonging also demanded the presence of the European origin (at least theoretically as actually a part of *metis* belonged to them as well). Thus, some special condition of “Creoleness” as ambivalence, border line and marginality in a certain space “between” or “at the edge” was constituted. In the process of formation of new

colonial countries the “racial” component in Creoleness weakened (though it never disappeared completely) and the “territorial” one strengthened emphasizing “the local nature” of its carriers¹. It made the belonging to a certain territorial context, to a local situation, to local events if not the defining then the dominating factor in self-identifications of the “non native” population of the colonies.

.....The ethnologic aspect of Creoleness that led to the specificity of the socio-political status position (to remain adherent to “Creolity”) almost at once began to be somehow supplemented and started to merge gradually with the culturological aspect. The so-called “colonial culture” and “colonial styles” were formed. They followed a certain imported example. However, they differed from it and were frequently rather independent and original in relation towards this example (the earliest and brightest example of this is the so-called Latin American “Creole baroque”)². From the point of view of the “center” (“the man of the mother country”) they were qualified more often as displays of provincial identity, stylistic diminished condition, cultural inferiority, even “barbarianization”. From the point of view of the “provinciality” (the “Creole” himself) they expressed, first of all, the peculiarity and originality of the “native”, “local”, “contextual” and, consequently, suitability for a life “here”. Thus, in the cultural field the “Creoleness” appeared. On the one hand, it was initially dual (it is possible to speak of some cases of its split) and, on the other hand, it was constituted through the fact of its belonging to some certain (the cult to the realized) space.

.....The combination of ethnologic and culturological aspects generated a specific type of national self-identifications and self-consciousness that are also initially dual by nature. This specificity was shown, firstly, through the inevitable presence of difference/distinction in identification of self-identity. The individual never equaled himself in it and if he did not notice it or did not wish to notice there were a number of situations showing this non-identity as well as a great number of ways, means, and people wanting to remind the person about it. The Creole was inevitably restored in his “non Spanish Spanishness”, in his identity towards non-identity to the inhabitants of the mother country, i.e., in Creoleness. One is also to suppose that this type of identification is universal enough and goes far beyond the traditionally understood Creolity (i.e., it can be used for the analysis of typologically close though having a different genesis situations). It is enough to refer to not so distant in time examples of reintegration of the Algerian Frenchmen and Frenchmen, reunion of Western and Eastern Germans, etc. In identification processes these examples even more precisely than the actual American-Creole situation specify the value of the “location” (“here”, “localness”) i.e., the spatial context filled with other events than “there” (including different understanding (interpretations) of the events taking place “there” which “here” are seen and perceived differently).

.....The Latin American situation is interesting, first of all, because it allows to track metamorphoses of identifications in the processual dynamics. In it the increase of difference/distinction in (self)identity got an “irreversible” character and ended with a full change of cultural-national identity on the basis of internal (arising from it) overcoming

of Creoleness instead of as a result of “liquidation” of the developing Creolity under the influence of external reasons just like in the above mentioned examples. The reflection of difference/distinction as “the other” inside the European (Spanish) concentrated integrity led to the constituting of the “other” (Latin American) in relation to this integrity. Development of this reflection was accompanied by the change of discourses of space into discourses of time, into the search of the “Latin American essence”, transition from the problems of political (“the first”) deliverance to the searches of the cultural (“the second”) liberation treated as the original self-finding of identity and authenticity. The discourse production of the Creole “local people” genealogies was replaced by the creation of the texts representing the genealogy of “localness” (“Latin American identity”) that turned out to be “interesting” for the former “center” which itself then became “the other” in relation to Latin American as the equal to itself (and/or, anyway, comparable with itself)⁴.

2

In our opinion, the above said allows to expand the traditional use of the terms “Creole”, “Creoleness”, “Creolity” and to fill them with a new conceptual content. It is possible to reconstruct at least three already undertaken attempts of such re-interpretation.

.....The best known of them was offered by B. Anderson. He proposed the thesis about the special type of Creole nationalism which is distinct from two others, the state and the language ones that dominated in the European “center”. The latter had no roots in Latin American contexts due to various reasons: the absence at that moment of the sovereign states which were only to be created and the use by Creoles of the same languages that the inhabitants of the mother country used. With rare exceptions (among them one can name H.B. Alberti’s attempt to demonstrate the special Argentina language), language problems as well as the problems of the special ethnic origin (though later appeared genealogies elevating “Latin American” to “American Indian” or “mestizo”) could not act here as the factors constituting the nation. Besides, nationalism itself could not be understood as “introduction of the national (self) consciousnesses to masses”. It did not have any substrate subbase except for a certain regional self-sufficiency that developed on the basis of administrative and economic commonness. Nationalism could be here only the business of elites, which, in turn, were still required to be before (re)-designed through the introduction of the concept about what they present to the nation. On this basis one can redefine “local people” as colleagues of the nation. Formation of Creole nationalism went, according to B. Anderson, through the “living of simultaneity” that means, as a matter of fact, transformation of space (belonging to the context) into a time simultaneity (understanding of one’s belonging to the integrity that continues itself from the past through the present into the future) i.e., through the constituting of contextual genealogy in its correlation with an opening universal design perspective. Such treatment allowed B. Anderson to expand the applicability of the studied terminology to the places outside

of Latin America, in particular, to Northern America and some other (which he, however, does not study specifically) (post) colonial situations thus opening an opportunity for further expanded re-interpretations of the problematics under analysis.Another, less known, but more developed, version of universalization of the “Creole” was conceptualized by the “philosophy of the Latin American essence” and then it was reconstructed into the “philosophy of liberation”. Figures of a Mexican L. Zea and an Argentinean E. Dussel are most representative in this respect⁶.

.....L. Zea proceeded from the thesis about possible comparativeness of various semantic identification contents in Latin American contexts in which various discourse types do not replace each other as time goes by but continue to coexist with the preceding ones being kept as simultaneously significant in certain inconsistent integrity, a framework of spatial context. L. Zea finds the sources of this situation in un (almost) solved problems of cultural national identification during the times of the Creole period of Latin American history, in the duality of the nature of Creoleness itself, in the inability of Creole people to adequately reflect and conceptually form their contextuality as equal to others. It generated inescapability of the situation of cultural-intellectual (distracting from all its other kinds) dependence and lack of independence of “Latin American”. The result was a culturally substantially unfilled utopian libertarian (political-liberating) project of S. Bolivar Both the protective Creole conservative and anti-Creole oriented civilizing projects could not be realized. The most representative figure of the conservative project was a Venezuelan A. Bello who started with the thesis about an opportunity of acquiring original (authentic) identity⁷ only on the basis of re-interpretation of post-colonial (of Spanish origin) cultural-intellectual heritage (that generated the thesis about “non Spanish Spanishness” within the framework of the project). The opposite in its orientation civilizing project was most distinctly articulated by an Argentinean D.F. Sarmiento in his concept “barbarity and civilization”⁸ in which “barbarity” was identified with the Creole postcolonial heritage due to its contextual (including mestizo) inferiority. It was opposed by universal values of the “center” the mastering of which can only set an original basis of the Latin American identity (thus “Spanish” was also considered to be provincially contextual in relation to the “center” that represented “French” and-or “North American”). According to L. Zea, only the 20th century forced Latin America to address its own essence having eventually generated the project of liberation as the self-finding of its own cultural-intellectual full value but at the same time finally having got rid of Creoleness from within itself.

.....E. Dussel solves the same range of problems differently concentrating the attention, first of all, on the subjects of identity-distinction, universal-contextual. Otherwise – on the analysis of a correlation (analectics but not dialectics, i.e., grasping the correlation in terms of dialogical mutual subsidiarity instead of conflict of opposites) identity (“the same”) and totality, on the one hand, and the Other and Another, on the other hand. From its point of view, the “center” produces the “ontology of totality” (or “philosophy of identity”) which contains the intent to remove the contextual “other” and there is simply no place left for “another” (staying outside of totality) as, in fact, “outside of” there cannot

be anything but “emptiness”. Totality with inevitability (by definition) reproduces the relations of domination and submission, oppression and dependence, splitting the Creoleness existing outside of the “center” transforming itself from repression towards it into the object of its desire. Therefore, the developed state of affairs can be changed only through the consistent criticism of the desirable and this alone can be the basis for the restoration of the contextual generation – through the “otherness” of Another when constituting the infinity of the Other. However, such Other does not have a full value place in “philosophy of identity”. In E. Dussel’s opinion it was shown by dialogical philosophy of E. Levinas. The Other can appear only as a result of discourse and praxis of liberation and such an opportunity for the opposition of totality can be given only by the “barbarity of the third world” as the other of the “civilization of the center” allowing “to read Europe from Latin America”. As a result the ontology of the “center” aimed at the substantiation of the truth is forced out by the ethics focused on the moral recognition of the Other, relations “I – the world” – “I – the Other”. However, for this purpose it is necessary to destroy the ethics through the returning of the original value to the word “ethos” (ethos – “dwelling”, “location”). Thus, it is necessary to return to one’s own (“barbarous” – Creole) context and to constitute oneself “here” as being free before the totality “there” (taking into consideration the experience of understanding its experience by oneself). It, in turn, allows to leave the context “life of the given” into “possibility life”. It allows to rethink one’s “life of the given” in new prospects of a possibility of “life with others”. Thus, the hidden otherness of one’s own context is revealed and one stops to be perceived as “defective” (and, once again, acquires time measurement) in this (genealogic) retrospective and simultaneously (project) perspective.

..... At last, the third and both the most actual and popular at present version of re-interpretation of Creoleness and Creolity belongs to the circle of Ukrainian intellectuals of the 90s of the 20th century led by M.Ryabchuk⁹. The considered terminological nomenclature was offered by the latter to name and reveal the characteristics of that significant part of the Ukrainian society which being politically oriented towards the independence of the country on the whole (with certain reservations) did not accept “Ukraineness” in socio-cultural space. It allowed to move away from binary dichotomies when analyzing the Ukrainian situation (the main one is the Ukrainian speaking/Russian speaking people) having entered into “the floor of the game” the third force of Creoleness and thus constituting deeper bases (for example, the displacement of analysis onto the level of socio-cultural codes) for the analysis of modern national - cultural processes. On the whole, having kept identification specificity of the concept range and having opened its new heuristic opportunities and having universalized its applicability for the post-Soviet (post-imperial) space the given re-interpretation also opened the perspective of construction on the basis of conceptualization of Creoleness of effective analytical sociological tools. The idea to socialize the problematics was especially clearly shown by Belarusian followers of the present re-interpretation. However, the use of the Creolity concept (more exactly, the use of the term “Creole”) for the analysis, before all, of socio-political processes of Belarus led

to the sharp narrowing of its heuristic opportunities. Besides, if M. Ryabchuk emphasizes the dual and ambiguous nature of Creolity (simply speaking, “minuses” are analyzed, but “pluses” are not forgotten either) in full conformity “with the tradition” then the Belarusian context “flattened” the concepts. “Creoles” are defined in this case as “carriers of pre-national identity”, “culturally defective”, “psychologically unstable”, “the basis of stable authoritarianism”, etc. Thus, in fact, they do not only declare the anti-Creole position but another version about the people “one is not very happy with”. It is indicative that at the same time the idea of new Belarus nationalism as the project aristocratic in spirit began to be put forward¹⁰. Leaving aside the consideration of efficiency of the given theses one shall pay attention to the fact that they reproduce the old Creole dispute contextualized in the conditions of Latin America in other contexts. The dispute was reproduced as the opposition of conservative and civilizing projects though this is not noticed by Belarusian adherents of the given range of ideas. One immediately wants ask, “So who is the Creole after all?”

3

It seems that the considered above versions of universalization of concepts of “Creoleness” and “Creolity” allow to expand the framework of consideration of the problematics. In this respect the consistency with which connections of Creoleness and Creolity with different problems are observed is most essential. Here one notices the connections of Creoleness and Creolity with the following problems: 1) national identity and identification, 2) a level of national consciousness and its ways of text-discourse and praxis expression, 3) features of life “here”, with all its events and situations, 4) opposition of the “center” and “provinces”, 5) reflection of the concept of the “border” separating “here” from “there”, 6) repressions and simultaneously the desire to apply what was “there” towards to what is available “here”, 7) split, antinomy, ambiguity of all subject self-definitions, 8) spatial character of the “local” instead of time character of these self-definitions, 9) interweaving of reflective, cultural, social and personal measurements in these self-definitions. As a matter of fact, one can talk about being bound to the “location” (this was mentioned by E. Dussel). It has various measurements, ways and a degree of evidence in thinking, reflection and identifications of identities recorded in corresponding texts and discourses. Creolity turns out to be one of quite universal means of this “being” and consequently, concerns everything else that it adjoins and that finds its expression in the phenomena of Creoleness. Thus, the key to understanding Creoleness and Creolity lays outside of the “Creoles” themselves and is connected with the analysis of that was mentioned above and using E. Dussel’s idea it was named the “location”.

Here one means the analysis of what can be differently identified with the help of such terms as “context” and “contextualness” (“contextuality”). Conceptually, the term “context” is connected with the term “text” in presently dominating discourses. However,

in this case it is a question of the attempt to re-interpret its other conceptualization that was originally connected with such a direction of logic-methodological research as “history of ideas”. This direction allowed to analyze a peculiar self-generating development of various (first of all, scientific) ideas about the world in relation to which the combination of historical socio-cultural circumstances in which these ideas formed were considered “external” and insignificant. Such circumstances were treated as having only indirect value for the originated idea and only as far as they defined the context in which the author worked expressing this or that idea. Thus, they affected (through the events of the author’s biography) its appearance “here and now”. The ideas have contextuality only in this perspective¹¹. However, our case arouses more interest because of the metamorphoses of the terms “context”, “contextualness” and “contextuality” in research directions that first resisted “history of ideas” and then internalism that finally constituted that direction in modern logic and methodology of science which received the name of externalism. Externalism stated ideas that completely opposed (anyway – in limiting versions) internalism – socio-cultural historical contexts (contextualness, contextuality) play a decisive role in the emergence of this or that idea (in this respect the author’s biography only substantially pronounces them).

If one is to leave the extremes of both above mentioned directions and to try to reflect the considered problematics from the position of methodological purposes of sociology of knowledge that analyzes the internal logic of expansion of knowledge in terms of historical socio-cultural generation of this particular logic then one finds out that the universalized concept of the context can be considered the key notion for the understanding of societies and cultures of texts and discourses generated in conditions of different epochs. This, in turn, allows to understand identifications somehow connected with these texts and discourses (including the Creole one). The context in this case refers then not to the text but to the strategies of thinking that generate it. The context serves as the required “location”. However, if treated as such it acquires multidimensionality and then each time raises a question, “What, actually, is one talking about in this specific case?” The traditionally actualized relation “text – context” (in which the latter is treated as a quasi-sign phenomenon attaching additional meanings to the text) turns out to be no more than one of possible relations (let it be constituted as prepotent in structural-post-structural methodology) and this relation itself can be re-interpreted in the context of the double load which the notion of the context starts to bear within the framework of the analysis of the considered problematics.

On the one hand, the notion of the context allows to fix expressive-semantic integrity of the text. Its sense and meanings for each contextual perception turn out to be additive in relation to the sense and meanings of the sum of its constituent units. The placement of this text “inside” some text integrity and/or its consideration “against the background” of such integrity generates its additional (super) additivity. Post-structural versions of the analysis just shift the interest to the effects of super-additivity. In them the text is interfaced first of all not with the author (and contexts of generation) but with

the reader, with the reader's experience and senses referred to the contexts of perception. Within the framework of our analysis the condition of Creolity and the situation of Creoleness generated during the process of perception (more widely and in a different aspect – (post) coloniality and/or (post) imperialness) serve as a reading context. Their means are used to perceive the created text (and most importantly – the mentalities and/or cogitative strategy behind it) outside of and beside this context (in the “center”, in Europe, in the mother country). This text acts in relation to the Creole simultaneously as a means of repression as it must be acquired (for example, through the system of education) as an unsurpassable example providing “European quality” and as an object of the desire of the Creole. Only the obligatory mastering of its example that is not reflected in its bases is a necessary condition of modernity of the level of thinking. The text in this case acquires characteristics of a certain universal canon and the context is initially defined (is constructed and constituted) as the one producing “defectiveness” of thinking as something that should not be or (at least) as something that is a subject to overcoming (elimination).

Simultaneously it puts the Creole belonging to it and aspiring to pull free outside of its limits (borders) into the situation of dependence-subordination and unsolvable duality as it belongs: 1) to the context that is qualified “from the center” and in many respects it is perceived by it as nonexistent or aspiring to non-exist (and in this aspect “empty”) as authenticity and fullness of life belong (by definition) only to the “center” (“European identity”) and the Creole is a “specific European”; 2) to the context that is its core and frequently the only (due to the fact that not everyone is obliged to visit and visited the “center” and because the “center” introduces restrictions for Creoles or somebody else from their categories to enter it) “location” (being “here” means at least being in “localness”) and in this respect the context is more than real and filled with events. In the second contextual measurement the imposed and desirable text (first of all, everything that is found behind the lines) anyhow generates “Creole resistance”, turns to the reflection of the context (this produces, at least, “local people” genealogy), on the one hand, and on the other hand, it brings to life new senses found in the canon. Therefore, the same “local” genealogies even though they are built according to an external (alien, borrowed, imposed, etc.) example (which besides, by definition, cannot be surpassed) and, as a rule, are initially evaluated (if at all are noticed) from the “center” as secondary and/or presenting certain “native exotic” and nothing else, have conclusive cultural-creative value for the Creole people generating them and for making cultural (escape from fixing simple spatiality and “localness”) situations of Creoleness.

In this aspect of our problematics consideration we offer to understand the context as an organized combination of the events which generate new senses and values which are put into a certain universal (taken from the “center”, initial) text and are essentially opposed in it to those that having been brought into this text by circumstances of its generation usually remain non-reflected in this respect by the “center” but they are revealed, distinguished as such and changed (or even replaced) due to a different event

combination of the “location” of the conditionally provincial (i.e., not being in the “place and circumstances” of text production) reader (especially when occupying by the latter of a pragmatical position when mastering this text). On the other hand, re-interpretation of the traditional understanding of the context is called upon to emphasize its deconstructing (destroying) role towards universality, but, as a matter of fact, towards the center orientation (and only through it to universality) of the text. Finding out its dependence on the context the text already starts to reveal its invariant-variant (with the accent on variability) nature. It becomes obvious that it comprises senses and values introduced into it by contexts of its generation which turned out to be “drowned” and non-reflected in it but which at once are found when another cultural decentralizing context gets into the text (not connected with the “center”) (for which they are distinguished as “others” and/or “alien”). The latter aspires to replace unacceptable senses and meanings with its own and this leads to essential transformations of the initial text. It is possible to say that we start to deal with an essentially different text (a good illustration of this is a poetic translation but this statement is true to some extent for any socio-humanitarian text) in the view of a number of its measurements¹³. Creolity allows to occupy this required position of the conditionally provincial reader being in otherness (not at once reflected as such by it), allowing to find otherness in the text of the “center” initially perceiving it as other in relation to its own situation of Creoleness trying to correct or replace it (by its Another/Other) at the same time maintaining the basic invariant context of the text. It seems that in this aspect of our problematics consideration the possibility of treatment of the context given above not only remains but also strengthens.

4

Due to the analysis conducted above one can look at one more side of the considered problematics. It emphasizes the question why the European (modern) thinking did not find out its otherness for a long time and why the latter turned to be quite transparent for an “outside” look. The searches for answers to it: 1) reveal an indissoluble communication between the subjects of the context (contextualness and contextuality) and (national) self-identifications of thinking and acting subjects; 2) allow to understand Creolity as primary (other in the field of the set identity of “the European center”) but insufficient national-cultural (self) identification.

Having concentrated on the problem of the concealment of the other it becomes possible to discover that the discourse of the new European (modern) thinking was initially created as the Europe centered, universal in the “European quality”, self-identical and opaque (impenetrable) for the other (the other, another). With such characteristics it was inevitably constituted as the only possible in its self-sufficiency. Any different way of thinking and/or comprehension (reflection) was identified (“labeled”) as initially in this or that attitude “defective” and “inferior” and possibly as provincial and/or marginal

(“barbarized”) and possibly at the best, – as pre-preparing “new European” (the tradition of “Eastern philosophy” was often considered to be an example of this). New Time agreed to consider only ancient art and philosophy as its valuable sources and preconditions of its modernity. All other ways of philosophizing seemed “empty” (in later versions – as “littered”) to this or that extent. Only a European person (first of all and almost exclusively a West-European person) supposedly had some world universal mission in his possession. He was called upon to realize it (towards the Creolized Eastern European people as well). It is also quite indicative that in this respect one of the stages in the reflection of this mission was the re-interpretation of Iberian re-conquista into conquista at the end of the 15 – 16th centuries. Understanding of it went in this or that “coordination” with the discourse of colonialism (that did not prevent Spain and Portugal from “dropping out” from the framework of “the New European” for a long time subsequently). The apotheosis of completeness and representativeness of this circle of ideas was philosophy of history and history of philosophy of Hegel¹⁴. In majority of cases the new European discourse was initially developed proceeding from the idea about a transcendental universal subject opposed by a not less transcendental universal object that is, nevertheless, capable of being seized in its self-identical egoism by the subject that acts according to the rules of the only possible unique universal procedure (with all the differences in understanding the strategy of its realization). “Pure thinking” and/or “pure experience” (in their rationality as a condition of “correctness”) were opposed by “the nature as such” and/or “society as such”. The dispute concerned only the gnoseological-epistemological strategy of their rational and/or practical learning (substantiation) that do not cross the ontologically designated and universally understood border of the “European identity”. The question about contextuality as both experience and thinking let alone (“non universality”) rationality simply did not arise (or it was ignored as insignificant). If one still decided to talk about the contexts then they were comprehended in terms of the “revolting influence of the environment” the minimization of influence of which required the introduction of specific “factors of the amendment” into the conditions of the “problem” formulated ideally.

The destruction of this integrity aspiring to maintain its integrity and self-sufficient identity of the construction was extremely hard for the new European though and took quite a long time. Its final deconstruction was simultaneously the deconstruction (“death”) of the most classical new European philosophy and thus, it was consideration and reconsideration of the essence and topology of modernity. Not having an opportunity to study this process here, we shall only briefly define its milestones.

One of the first breaks that put under doubt the “out of the context universality” of the European thinking and “the European way to be” that shows the coming exhaustion of classical ways of reflection, became the project of creation of social science (initially – sociology) and emergence of positivistic methodology of learning. The latter is interesting in the considered aspect because of its reorientation from the philosophical universalism to the reality of a scientific discourse (from “metaphysics” to “factuality”), to the accentuation of reality, checkability and validity of any construct in the reality

of experience and interrelation with it. However, the experience itself was understood quite universally (though already in terms of scientific knowledge). The subject still acted as, undoubtedly, Europe centered and included into the institutionalization of universal by its character invention – European science¹⁵. Besides, in its evolution version (especially when using the terminology of “social Darwinism” and/or “racial-anthropological schools”) the positive naturalistic direction still could not get rid of ideas in the spirit of the “ladder of beings” for a long time. A “softer” version of the inevitable social progress, having inherited the ideas of French Enlightenment (that, in particular, was the author of the conceptualization of Eastern Europe) also consolidated the division of human communities into “pure” and “dirty” that corresponded to the requirements of progress and those that were outside of its and/or “dropped out” of the directed general development of mankind. Thus, even the given example shows that when sacrificing something the European thinking tried to retain its initial universally center oriented goals in inviolability. This collision kept arising, for example, in the complex of philosophical-sociological-historical ideas of Marxism that is interesting in the aspect of the considered problematics due to its concepts of the “patrimonial essence” of a person, alienation, praxis, polarity of interests of different social groups (classes) of any society, “non-capitalistic” (i.e., not universal) ways of development, etc. and also due to the pathos of the deconstruction of the developed order and criticism of ideologies¹⁶.

However, only F. Nietzsche and “philosophy of life” on the whole (in parallel S. Kierkegaard had the same ideas that were not, however, registered in due time as a fact of the European thinking) for the first time explicitly revolted against universalist claims of the European rationalism as though inside of it (not belittling thus, on the one hand, the steps made in this direction by A. Schopenhauer and, on the other hand, distracting from a centuries-old mystic irrational tradition of that “European thinking” due to its initial constituting of itself as the phenomenon opposed to “ratio”).

Uniqueness, self-identity, universality of institutional constituted was obviously doubted in the studied case. The possibility of variability of vital and cognitive strategies was also proclaimed. Besides, alongside with thinking (consciousness) there appeared a new discourse legal reality – “life” (a body, corporeality) opposed to sociality but, first of all, to culture no longer capable of authorizing the self-realization of the subject unambiguously. Dependence of the “way to think” and the “way to be” on the valuable and/or symbolical (i.e., cultural) bases was shown in various versions of neo-Kantianism (above all, the works of H. Rickert and E. Cassirer). It was written (in its design) using the example of M. Weber’s “Protestant Ethics” that gave an impulse to gradual cultural contextualization of reflective conceptualizations. In different versions when uniting with the expectation of arrival of a “superman” and/or with the thesis of “inescapable tragic element of culture” (J. Simmel), “hopelessness felt towards death” these new versions of the self-reflection of “Europeanness” were imposed on the reality of the First World War cataclysms and revolutionary shocks of the end of the 1910s – 1920s. They were substantiated by references to the realization of “Marx project” called to put “an end to the pre-history” of human-

kind. European universalism and self-identity in uniqueness became fundamentally split and had to give answers to new challenges though a significant amount of the provided answers remained marked by the discourse of crisis of consciousness and culture. Universalist claims of communistic ideology were finally opposed by an updated narrative telling about the global character of “Western values”. Concepts of the “mission of the white man” were considerably reformed and turned into various versions of the theory of modernization and decolonization. Ideals and images of discourses of globalization and post-industrialization that finally marginalized the “phantom of communism” after the loss by the countries of “socialism that really won” in a technological competition and “cold war”. They appeared on the “coming horizon” of Western socially and politically focused thinking. However, even these (to a certain extent ideologically doctrinal) constructions had the necessity to consider inside themselves the theses about multiculturalism and contextual variability of the “(post) modern” world. Various sorts of the concept “the center and provinces”, “late” and/or “catching development”, etc. appeared as well¹⁷. Thus, at the end of the 20th century when trying to defend the positions universalism was compelled to sacrifice its postulates of uniqueness and self-identity and consequently, its own self-sufficiency. This cardinal turn of the “Western thinking” marked by the fact of constituting non-classical types of philosophizing and emergence of social and humanitarian scientific disciplinary fields from the middle of the 19th century till the first decades of the 20th century was methodologically and discursively worked over in a lot of new philosophical strategies which had to stand up for themselves in their opposition to universalism to a great extent due to the mastering of categories of “distinction” – “another”, “different”, “other”, “identical”, “authentic”, “situational”, “marginal”, “pragmatical”, etc. Factually, all this categorical range was somehow, implicitly and explicitly, directly or indirectly connected with the notion of the context (contextualness and contextuality) understood very differently – as “unconscious”, “archetypical”, “daily”, “another’s”, etc. So the notion of the context appeared to be “viral” for classical ways of thinking and construction of discourses that “blow them up from within” though many of them tried (often “up to the last”) to maintain connections with the universality of “Europeanness” and its attributes. The way undergone by an intentional phenomenological tradition is very indicative in this respect. The tradition is interesting in this case because of those radical conclusions which were made outside of the frame of the initial ideas of Husserl when developing his theses about the basic correlation of the subject and the object and specificity of “natural idea” and non-reduction of contents of the “life world”. It is indicative that these concepts were most dramatically re-interpreted already behind the borders of actual philosophy – first of all, in phenomenological sociology (including sociology of knowledge) that introduced an image of the daily world as vitally contextual and different unlike the specifics with which Western philosophy and science (for example, sociology) got used to deal with. The same direction can be used to understand structuralist (K. Levi-Strauss, etc.) and functional (M. Mauss, etc.) searches of the bases of universal in the “archaic” of binary structures and/or relations of donation. As a result of long continuous redefining of their sub-

ject matter rationally scientific and analytical traditions of the European thinking came to peculiar conclusions. They gradually “de-structured” their own universalist idea through cultural contextualization (“pluralization”) of one of the basic concepts – concepts of scientific truth. Here it is possible to refer to the development and change of the arguments of Bashlyar and his followers within the framework of “neo-rationalism”, turning from internalism of A. Koyre to externalism of T. Kuhn and his followers inside the “historical school of philosophy of science” and especially to the evolution of methodological ideas of K. Popper from initial verificationist schemes through falsifactionism to radicalization of the latter in “critical rationalism” and to “falsification” of falsificationism by followers of K. Popper H. Albert and E. Topitsch including also “equalizing” mythological and scientific discourses by K. Hubner, for example.

However, European non-classical thinking implicitly remains connected with the universalist idea though following different vectors it consecutively “discredits” “the only possibility” and self-identity of traditional scientific and philosophical discourses, pluralizes the notion of rationality itself, and “fastens” it to the cultural basis. It tries to find its “other” inside itself, restoring it, first of all, from what was earlier marginalized by it and was given the status of insignificant (for universal) contextuality. It concerns such radical “turns” as philosophical anthropology with its main thesis about a human being as “an insufficient animal” that should be culturally, socially and institutionally “completed” for a normal public life or existentialism with its situation opposition of essence and existence and/or (in historical-like perspective versions of J. Ortega y Gasset) with its thesis about plurality of life and cognitive images of reality. To a smaller extent it concerns the tradition of dialogical philosophy (first of all, that of E. Levinas). It explicitly comprehended the other as another but due to this it “noticeably stands out” from “non classics” in post-non-classical philosophy. “The other”, thus, is not radicalized (in most cases) in the non-classical type of the “European thinking” as “another”. If the latter, nevertheless, gets into the focus of attention then it is taken into “brackets” as to a different degree opaque and inaccessible and thus not identical to authentic understanding or other-civilized. O. Spengler was one of the first to offer a way to such a radical decision. He did it in his opposition of civilizations and understanding of a civilization as degeneration (into other/another) of culture. “Promotion” of theses of civilization alternatives and choices received its new turn under the influence of processes of decolonization, forming of the concept of “the third world” and failures of modernization strategies (as a matter of fact, “insertion” of the European examples into a different cultural “ground”)¹⁸.

5

The understanding of such universalist centeredness of the new European thinking and its “stubbornness” in unwillingness to recognize the problematics of contextuality, other and another in many respects lies beyond its own borders, namely in the specificity

of the contexts of its generation that are defined by the strategies realized in Europe (in the “center”) of the national (self) identification, parallelly and in an indissoluble connection with which the formation of the European modern type of thinking and “the European way to be” was going. As it turned out later, these strategies were essentially different from other possible types of (self) identifications generated by other contexts. Among the last ones we are interested only in those that were in the “zone” of direct influence of the “European center” (were marginalized by it) and in this sense they can be collectively (due to the typological affinity by the given criterion) are defined as Creole (i.e., in this case we are not interested in national (self) identifications that took place outside of the “zone” of direct European influence).

To a great extent the initial non-actualization of the problematics of contextuality is connected, in our opinion, with the forming of European universalism, first of all, in the regions that directly inherited the main versions of Roman-antique, Catholic-Christian, Renaissance, (contra) reformatory, enlightening universalism. All this provided relative “naturalness” (“painlessness”, “something that goes without saying”) of ethno-cultural self-identifications in which national contexts themselves got directly in touch with the universal and due to this they were weakly reflected (when British, for example, became almost a synonym of universal and exemplary and on the contrary, universal could hardly become “non British”). There was a constant struggle for the right to represent the European “center” between the so-called “world powers”. Very indicative in this aspect of the analysis are the “examples” of Germans who for various reasons were “late” in their national self-identification and/or Italians for whom the problem of the substantiation of primary inclusion of their contexts into universality was very painful. The problematics of ethno-cultural self-determination was extremely urgent (at some stages). This served as a powerful impulse of the emergence for the first time of the reflected language (in B. Anderson’s terminology) form of nationalism that was constituted, first of all, by the efforts of German thinkers and only then (in nationalisms of the “second generation”) transferred to the countries of Central and to a smaller extent to Eastern Europe (with reference to Belarus it is possible to speak, probably, about the language nationalism of the “third generation” at the beginning of the 20th century and attempts to absolutize it at the end of the same century cannot be qualified in the “logic of generations”). Even more impressive is the example of Iberica (first of all, Spain) that “dropped out” at a certain stage from universality and lost any connection with it. That transformed all “Spanish” into a uniform context being a subject of constant reflection for several centuries and put forward into the center of attention the problematics of national cultural self-identification¹⁹.

An absolutely unique case are the intellectual traditions that were “connected” with universality but that never belonged initially to “its region”. They were initially created in essentially different (other) socio-cultural and historical contexts. However, they were always in the zone of influence of the “center”. It inevitably made their context (contextualness and contextuality) the problem of self-reflection. The getting of the problematics of the context (specifically as other, instead of simple another) into the center of attention

and its transformation into the main “place to use efforts” internally splits the national cultural tradition (and produced for it national (self) identifications). Then there appear conditional “Westerners” who, realizing all the “other quality” of their own contexts, see in them a source of periodic “provincialism” and/or “marginalism”. Here one finds the origin of the strategy of getting rid of specificity and orientation towards non-contextual images. But the same cultural tradition allows to reveal conditional “pocwenniks” (rooted in their own local culture) seeing in otherness the basis of originality of produced reflections, the creative force of one’s own culture. With all the force this dilemma reveals itself in the cases of strengthening (“reinforcement”) of “expansionism” of culture by the claim of its carriers (with a different measure of validity) for some world mission. A classical example is the Russian tradition with the mystified figure of P. Ya. Chaadaev and continuously reviving Slavophil pocwennik type of a discourse. It is indicative that in the works of Russian authors the reflection of Russian-Spanish parallels from time to time becomes aggravated. The proof of that is the number of publications of the 1990s. However, in spite of all “similarity“ of situations in many parameters one should not, nevertheless, mix their initial essential distinction, on the one hand, with a modern condition of the problem (connected with the fact that Spain “included” itself into the European universality), on the other hand²⁰.

Special and steadfast interest in the aspect of other/another context, contextualness (contextuality) is caused also by the problematics of national self-determination of the peoples who lost and/or earlier did not have the statehood, the peoples who as the fate willed identified themselves within the frameworks of multiethnic states and/or empires which “spatially get into the area of “Europeanness”. In this case an additional local “center” appears. It starts to aspire somehow to monopolize its right to (re) present the universal. This assumes the intention to “align” the space falling under its “jurisdiction” following some major parameters and to set the direction of this or that identification of cultural and/or national self-identity of the population (citizens). In this respect the main resistance to strategies of unification of identification proceeds, firstly, just from self-generating of other-contextualities, inside of which kulturtraegers constantly addressed the reconstruction-revival and/or construction-invention of new identities of various sorts (including, first of all, the (ethno) national cultural character). Hence, the fundamental notion here is the opposition “universal – contextual” though taken already in other perspectives and in all prospects considered here the “national” (in every possible version it is the varied contextual) is constituted as a special and frequently main subject of philosophical reflections and scientific efforts within the framework of social-humanitarian sciences²¹. These circumstances sharply distinguish the discourses produced here from the texts in relation to which the “center” always had some suspicion concerning the possibility of their being referred to philosophy and even science.

6

The strategy by means of which the “center” tries “to deal” with the problematics of contextuality deserves a separate analysis. Firstly, one should talk about various versions of “suppression” combining “a whip and gingerbread”, direct “repression” and provoking of “desires” (including the possibility of getting into “the present”). One of the most effective turned out to be the strategies of realization of the idea of a “united people”, first of all, in liberalist understanding of the people as the entity constituted according to the citizenship on the basis of the idea of freedom instead of “blood”. The most explicit example is the institutionalization of the French nation (with the kept contexts of “Corsicaness”, “Bretonness”, etc. and also periodic attempts of revival, for example, of “Provenceness”). Another type of strategy is the course for de-nationalization of national minorities (and not so necessarily and more likely not in the forms of direct suppression – it took place, for example, in fascist Germany, when any display of being “non Aryan” (the factor of “blood”) was considered at the minimum as a parameter of “defectiveness”). More effective in this respect appeared various versions of “...fication”, in particular “Russification” in the Russian empire which while not rejecting the possibility of direct violence (suppression of national liberation movements) was conducted, for example, through the system of school education and creation of the “center” loyal administration (it accepted its game rules). As a matter of fact, its purpose was (not reflected properly) “reverse Creolization” (when it seemed possible, for example, in relation towards Ukrainians, Belarusians, Ugro-Finnic people of the Volga region, etc.), “foreigners” (but the same Belarusians and, to a lesser degree, Ukrainians were considered more likely to be “born” Creoles than foreigners)²². Much less often local cultural (to some extent connected with the games on the political floor) elites (which will be further understood as “contextual elites” but this demands a separate substantiation)²³ managed to achieve a compromise with “the holder of universality” and, respectively, legitimize and legalize and, whenever possible, somehow enter their context into universality. The most representative in this respect is the Hungarian example in the Habsburg Empire that was even called the Austro-Hungarian Empire (not forgetting about all known problems and incompleteness of movement in this direction). A special case is the “Sovietization” in a combination with the slogan of “the right of the nations to self-determination”, still not properly analyzed in the considered aspect. It is proved by its extremely polar estimations fluctuating between the poles of the effective solution of the ethnic question and continuation of the imperial politics of “Russification” that were added recently by a discourse of “de-Russification” (“Sovietization” can also be comprehended in terms of specific Creolization and de-Creolization)²⁴. However, the given representative examples (which can be complemented by the experience of existence of Czechoslovakia) showed simultaneously “incompleteness” and, thus, critical vulnerability of similar strategies in which obvious domination appeared, as a rule, to be replaced by latent domination which caused eventually the disintegration of the given formations.

On the whole, all considered strategies somehow led (if they did not lead to the disintegration of the field of identity) to a free and/or involuntary leveling of contextuality, its peripherization and marginalization in relation to the “contemporary” (modern) which was taken mainly in the universalized examples produced by the “European thinking”. Contextuality and together with it non dominating types of nationally oriented consciousnesses, were “ethnographized” and/or “ghettotized” by different ways (and, thus, de-modernized). It was also defined (“labeled”) in dominating discourses as something exotic and noteworthy only in this quality (e.g., “We also have got Papuans, Indians, etc. and they are so strange” or “Even our Papuans, Indians, etc. have got their writers, artists, etc.”). In the end, in this case the primary goal consists in keeping “contextual elites” from moving into the “modern” (the context equalizing them with others in universality) level of thinking, their accentuation on the study of subjects of their own peculiarity and “the drawing up of the list of the former and/or thought up merits” meaning the production of discourses that constitute “local people” genealogies but that do not in any way generate texts capable of (re) presenting the genealogy of “localness” and designating another, different from the project perspective generated by the “center”. In any case, the “center” in most cases aspires to transform these contexts from other into their own and consequently, into other controlled by them. As an intention this aspiration, as it has already been said above, was initially entered into the “new European”. However, as such it was enclosed into a special construct in its own definitions. It was done within the framework of the enlightening ideology that formulated the criteria of “enlightenment”. The realization of these criteria was precisely defined in the certain (Western European) locus provided with the status of universality (representation of “Europeanness” as such). Various projects of a modernist style originate from Enlightenment (just like Enlightenment itself). In the end they are called upon to technologize “the present” and thus, move “dealings” with contextuality into the area of universal “high technologies”. The struggle against any displays of “native” and “local” (treated besides as “little local place like”) makes the essence of societies industrial (modern, contemporary) types and ways of thinking and construction of a discourse dominating in them. Contextual is “suffered” here, mainly, as an inevitable (due to impossibility of its final elimination) evil that one should take into account and that should be utilized (if it is impossible to eliminate) for one’s own purposes. Radical change of the developed state of affairs becomes possible only in the situation “post” (post-industriality, post-modernity, the post-present) that gives essentially other frameworks and parameters to thinking and discursiveness changing simultaneously the understanding of the discourse, the text and the context and, most importantly, the rationality as the basis of enlightening and modern centered universalism. Postmodernism (as an approach and as a paradigm) managed to “bury” in the row of the declared death the “transcendental signified”, “author” and “subject” and at the same time proclaimed “the end of history”. It made a-centeredness its fundamental idea and introduced “rhizome” and “simulacrum” as its most important concepts (in the context of the problematics considered in the article

two more of its concepts are also important – “trace” and “fold”) and so it opened essentially new possibilities for the discussion of the problematics we are interested in.

7

However, the discussion of the newly opened possibilities requires independent consideration which could lead us far away from the search for answers to a more specifically formulated question about the essence of Creolity and Creoleness. Here the postmodernist perspective is important not because of itself but for the understanding of the horizon towards which the “center” was moving during the epoch of the modern. It is important, first of all, for the understanding of what and why opened finally from the situation of the “location” other than the “center”. One of the models of such a situation is Creolity that exists in Creoleness defined in the fourth section of the work as primary (in the field of identity of the “European center”) but insufficient national cultural (self) identification.

Search for answers to this group of questions (and, actually, they “are declared” in the present work) demands to shift attention from the “center” to “periphery” as the main range of identification problems is connected first of all with ways, strategies, possibilities and purposes which can be formulated and realized by those “being in the context”. In this case we can also see a wider range of variants. This is connected with the characteristics of kulturtraegers and, to a greater extent, with the specificity of contexts themselves in which they have to operate. In this respect the situation of the Poles and the Czechs was different. The Poles focused on the restoration of recently lost independence and maintenance of steady functioning and development of the riches of the national cultural tradition. The Czechs were concerned with the problems of revival of the national consciousness and language, “reincarnation” of national elite and restoration of lost connections with their own cultural heritage. However, the position of the Czechs in the space of self-determination essentially differed from the opportunities of their closest neighbors Slovaks, etc. The difference of contexts of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, for example, does not require special comments (it is possible to focus attention on the differences of identification contexts of Scots, Welshmen and Irishmen inside the British Empire). It is notable that in all these cases the purposes of self-identifications were connected (with a different degree of radicalism) first of all, with the restoration of rights and/or inclusion of one’s own cultural contexts as equal into the space of universality (here one is to think about the period from the 1840s – the beginning of the 20th century which was already considered in connection with the emergence of the problem of the context in European thinking).

Thus, in all these cases we talked not about the reflection of the context (as having direct identification burden) and its discourse expression but about forming its oppositions with the universal – the “center” and canon texts generated by it. The latter in this case were also re-interpreted in the view of the identification component that they

contained through the restoration of the other (which, actually, had to be replaced by I) with the preservation of an invariant component that should “be appropriated” (through the connection with one’s other/another) as a condition of one’s inclusion into a wider than national framework (“European identity”) and/or as a condition of constituting the other/another framework (for example, “Eurasia identity”). If one is to take an advantage of the already used principle then in all these cases we talked about the perception of the “center” with one’s own eyes (“to read Europe from Latin America”), the introduction into full possession of the heritage of the “center” i.e., its inclusion into discourse strategies and production of the texts (uniting the other/another and invariant universal) which (when comprehending all their other-anotherness which starts to be regarded as a “plus” (innovation) but not a “minus” – a decrease towards the example of the “center”) begin to set an “unsurpassed example” within the framework of the universal. Latin America can serve as a classical example of the realizability of such a possibility where such identification “is stretched” for some centuries (but its relative connectedness is still not lost). This (in this case we can say that every cloud has a silver lining) allows to track systematically the dynamics of the whole process with the preservation of the relative “cleanliness of experiment”. It was done due to the minimum pressure on the considered identification problems of the burden of the lost “scandalous” historical past, constant appeal to which in various national-identification strategies of the “reviving” type in the European region seriously “dimmed” the essence of the matter. If one is to stick to the examples taken from philosophy and literature only (that in such situations always carries more than the literary burden and this was not noticed by us) then it turns out that the Latin American “final report” contains: “the philosophy of the Latin American essence” and “the philosophy of liberation”, “Latin American modernism”, “magic realism” and a “new Latin American novel” without which one cannot imagine the cultural and intellectual panorama of the whole 20th century.

However, the Belarusian situation turns out to be a model as it arouses special interest because of the processes which were revealed in the last third of the 20th century but that had a long (“stretched in time”) pre-history (the Ukrainian situation can also be taken as a model as it was made by “local” authors but it has many more additional factors complicating the analysis). Special interest in this case is aroused through the reflection and analysis of the Belarusian situation as the “place of collision” and realization of various strategies and projects both as the “center” (even “centers”) and the “context”. Both repeatedly varied in Belarus but in all their variations they did not achieve the set goals. Anyway, none of these projects can be identified as completed (and/or settled) and this led to their periodic “reincarnation”. It is indicative how easily and with the minimal efficiency “contextual” projects of the last decades of the 20th century – including the Kriv, Litvin, Yotvinigian projects, various versions of the reviving project, etc. — changed each other.

Based on this it is possible to state that the Belarusian context being the subject of reflection and analysis cannot be adequately comprehended in anyone of already known

prospects due to the multilevelness and heterogeneities clearly expressed at the end of the 20th century. The overlapping of various prospects and their ruthless critical examination at the level of (post) modern “universalist” thinking is required. However, this does not mean the rejection of what has already been done, on the one hand, and the ignoring of contextuality, on the other hand. In fact, contextuality seems to be the “place” where one should search for answers in the light of the planned analysis.

Out of all most prominent aspects that still define the essence of what is happening “here” it is necessary to analyze, first of all, the duration of constant presence and, moreover, inclusion into the context of the “lines of Russianness” and national construction (identification) strategies and projects that constituted the context (but they did not reach the ultimate goals) and, moreover, they were constantly subjected to ostracism inside their own context (!!!).

“The line of Russianness” is presented in the Belarusian context in a number of versions that replaced each other but remained representatively compared versions, each of which still has its adherents. The key to their understanding is the thesis about the initial identity and non-distinction of the actual Russian and Belarusian the contextualization of which became possible only due to the historically arisen “damage” (the Lithuanian gain, the Polish Catholic expansion or something else of the same type – the choice depends on the specifics of conceptualizations).

The second key point of practically all versions of this type is the discourse of “liberation” (that blocks possible colonialist interpretation) somehow bound with the discourse of “correction” (return to the original (authentic) identity – Slavic, orthodox, etc.). The third point is the mythologization of the supposedly common historical past, indivisibility of lives, etc., that is inevitably accompanied by the selective control of historical reconstruction. It is necessary to mention a practically indissoluble connection of these versions with the non-recognition of the status condition of the Belarusian language (and/or at least aspiration to narrow the spheres of its application by the periphery and/or borders of “cultural ghettos”). Thus, it is still the same orientation towards making another one’s own other with its subsequent ethnographization. At the same time, a sensible analysis demands to start with the recognition of partial implementation of this strategy in the Belarusian context. In many respects it explains why the “revealing” of the facts of the inclusion into the “Russian line” of the elements of direct violence, colonialism, “Russification”, etc. did not play its possible role in attempts to redefine the Belarusian situation (it is necessary to analyze the “Sovietization” separately” of this line under the mask of which it now appears in the Belarusian context even replacing it in some things). The second (according to the degree of importance – the first) “unit” of understanding of the Belarusian context is formed by the critical reflection and analysis of the strategies offered and realized here and of the projects of mastering by kulturtraegers of their own contextual space which latently contain the factor of “Creoleness”. The process of explicitness and the analysis of the latter also seem to be the elements necessary for the understanding of

miscalculations of the revival strategies and the constant of presence of the “Russian factor” in contextuality and, mainly, for the identification of a possible perspective²⁵.

8

In our context the term “Creoleness” is treated as widely as possible (naturally, in view of its versions of its Latin American culturalization) as the primary comprehension of its otherness (unlike “my other” meaning “considered besides me” and given the lowered content – “Creole” as a “barbarized form”) in the conditions of the imposed and accepted (constructed) space of identity with its mine (“accepted by me”) and alien to me (“not considering me”) modernist universality in the conditions of absence and/or loss of primary substantial criteria for constructing one’s own contextual space and introducing it into universality accompanied by the reflection of the necessity of the desire to produce such identification. Thus, in the reflection and analysis of our context the term “Creoleness” is used, first of all, for the designation of the realized otherness of contextuality given (to “its carriers”) in its initial “zero degree” (“localness”). It allows to reveal: 1) ways and strategies of formation of “local” genealogies; 2) ways and strategies of assignment and constituting of the historical-cultural heritage; 3) “measure, character and structure” of the presence and the realized inclusion into the context of the “universal”; 4) the level of the (post) present of thinking in which these strategy are offered and realized; 5) possibilities of transition from “local” genealogies to the constituting of genealogies of “localness” (otherness in “universality” shared with others); 6) ways and strategy as well as the “measure of inclusion” (legitimization) of this genealogy into “universality” and the (post) present (i.e., as a matter of fact, the construction of perspectives on the basis of the retrospective). Possibilities of the offered term in many respects are defined because it allows to combine in one analysis (following the principle of complementarity) of both interesting plans of the analysis – “thinking in the context” and “context in the thinking”.

Reflexivity of contextual otherness (in its “zero” accompanied by the absence of initial substantial criteria of (self) definition except for being bound to the “location”) at the same is not carried out in “absolute emptiness” as it corresponds to the appropriated “universal” thinking by “my other” which is used to fill the emptiness of the context through the representation of the “universal” (canon) as the object of my desires and/or through its imposing (we shall repeat again what has already been said – it does not have to be violent but this does not deny its repressiveness). That is why the primary reflection is initially twofold as it is an exarticulation of “my other” in the desirably repressive “universal” (this at least requires the knowledge of this “universal”) and this constituting of “mine another” (this, at least, requires the knowledge that can be appropriated” and/or is a subject to “assignment”). The correlation of these two plans allows to conceptualize the analysis of the defined items 1-7.

As for the Belarusian context Creolity acts as a characteristic of modernization of the nation socially formed in the post-war “wave”: 1) with poorly expressed (not emphasized) ethno-cultural (including language) parameters, 2) within the limits of in many respects declarative statehood (the republic in the structure of the Union) and 3) given the features of “Belarusian Russianness” (“Russianness in Belarusianness”) conceptually articulated in the ideology of “Western Russianism” for the first time²⁶. Respectively, Creoleness is interpreted as produced by the contextual (identifying itself with Belarusianness”) elite mechanism of culture that constructed and realized itself initially through the “expressing” of “localness” and discourse generation of the “local” genealogies and that moved along the way of generation of genealogy of “localness”. The end of this movement with the parallel institutionalization of the contextual elite as the national one would mean the exhaustion of the “Creole project” that has become obsolete from within. Now, despite numerous “outgrowings” by the contextual elite of itself and the acquisition by it of the key parameters of the national elite (at the turn of the 20th century, in the 20s, during the post-Soviet epoch, already within the limits of the proclaimed national sovereignty), despite the presence of “star” names, texts and projects which meet the requirements of the “universalist” character, the national elite remains not quite formed and not actualized in that quality (even obviously split and polarized). The latter is connected with the fact that “Belarusianness” is tried to be kept in pure contextuality/ uniqueness of “the other” and no more than that, and it itself rather precisely articulates its distinction and separation from other socio-cultural groups also following the criterion of the language difference when the genealogy of “localness” remains not completely revealed and not entirely overcome (it is possible that this is the reason why the desire to have a “Belarusian Nobel” in literature was so painfully manifested for several years). Hence, the Belarusian cultural situation can still be understood in its many displays through the mechanism of Creoleness.

If one is to address the genesis of the genealogy of Belarusian “localness” than, in our opinion, its beginning can be marked by the name of A. Mickiewicz. Probably, it is exactly he who as the central and best (subsequently) known figure among philomaths and philarets predetermined the movement of the rising new Belarusian culture following the Creoleness way. Having conceptualized the Belarusian (Lithuanian) contextualness he offered the first genealogy of “localness” though within the limits of “Poleness” having connected it with the whole historical and cultural heritage of Rzecz Pospolita. The genealogy of “localness” was also offered by Ya. Barshcheuski but for different reasons it was not accepted as the possible dominant. Ethnographic interest to revealing, describing and mapping “localness” prevailed. The leading positions in these procedures were occupied by the representatives of “external centers”, both Polish and Russian²⁷. The “local” itself as “Belarusian” (already “Belarusian” instead of “Lithuanian”) was presented only at the level of certain kulturtraegers due to the absence of the contextual elite i.e., it does not simply realize its correlation with “here and now” but also occupies an independent position (at least) towards the “center” instead of considering itself to be a provincial variant of the elite dominating in the “center”. The formation of such contextual elite followed the way

of conceptualization of the ethnographically localized “localness” and the creation of its genealogies. In different versions the course of such conceptualization is expressed in the creative work of Dunin-Martsinkevich and F. Bagushevich. Its overcoming with the necessity to finally approve the national and not simply contextual (Creolized) elite was clearly shown in the famous play “The Local Ones” by Ya. Kupala. The end of the work of the Creolization mechanisms in culture was defined by really developed national elites as the turn of the centuries and to some extent by the Sovietized elite of the 20s. Subsequent historical events again in many respects threw the national elite to the position of the contextual elite also (if not first of all) through the artificial narrowing of the application sphere of the Belarusian language, through the blocking of a possibility to establish a connection with the cultural heritage and events of history going deeper than the same “localness” of the 19th century and “ghettoizing” any displays of the “Belarusian”. Great October was proclaimed to be its beginning. Nevertheless, in our opinion, all basic preconditions for the elimination of the Creoleness from within were laid in the 90s of the 20th century. The task of the present time is to manage at last to realize them.

Notes

- ¹ The concept “localness” is a derivative of the term “a local person» used by a part of the Belarusian population during the Russian census in 1897 to identify its national (ethno-cultural) belonging. It was introduced into the Belarusian cultural tradition by Ya. Kupala. Modern Belarusian authors try to expand its application behind the frameworks of the Belarusian context as the given concept quite adequately identifies one of the phases of national identifications as such. They connect “localness” with the spatial localization of “themselves” with the simultaneous differentiation of “themselves” from “others” (not connected with the given territory and/or situation “here-and-now”). One of such main conceptualizations belongs to I. Babkou and was presented simultaneously with the concept of “Creoleness” at a joint methodological seminar of the institutes of philosophy and sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus in 2001–2002.
- ² it is necessary to note, that if with reference to the “center” it is more correct to speak about the style and/or art system of baroque evaluated on the whole as a phenomenon of a “transitive” type then in relation to the “periphery” it is possible to speak about a rather long “epoch of baroque” and specific “baroque perception”. One of the strongest conceptualizations of “baroqueness” belongs to the Cuban writer and thinker A. Carpentier. He came up with and provided ground for the thesis about “a wonderful (magic) reality” of Latin America. One of the bases was the concept offered by him of the principle “baroqueness” (as “a way of transformation of the matter and forms”, as “a way of establishing order by creating the disorder”, as “a way of re-creation») of Latin American culture. However, a similar sort of reconstruction and reflection can be applied not only to Latin America, but, for example, to Spain, the Austrian empire, the Great Duchy of Lithuania. With reference to the latter (and consequently, to modern Belarus) researchers speak about the specificity of the so-called “Vilna baroque”. Interest in the combination of the phenomena identified by this term among Belarusian researchers noticeably increased in the 90s of the 20th century. However, in the center of their attention are still the phenomena of art (one of

few exceptions is the work by B.A. Lazutka *Belaruskae baroka. Historyka-tearetychnyja prablemy stylu* (Minsk, 2001)). It is especially important to note that in a postmodernist perspective a different version of understanding baroque with reference to the “center” was also used (it is enough to refer to the work *Składka: Leibniz i barokko* (1988; Russian translation – SPb., 1998) by G. Deleuze. Parallels between ellinism, baroque and post-modernism as original cultural epochs coming instead of the “classicism” epoch were established in the same context. Thus, certain “generalization” of the contents hidden behind the term “baroque” which is more and more often understood as the notion defining the combination of common cultural processes than a certain art style and/or a certain art system.

- ³ Terms “identification” and “identity” are used in the given work as notions accenting procedurality (first) and (reflected) results fixed for a certain period of time (second). Thus, identifications can be understood as vector directed processes of acquisition, transformation and change (a special case – losing) of those or other identities – not necessarily ethno-cultural (national) though within the limits of the studied problematics the emphasis is voluntarily or involuntarily placed on them. Our understanding of identity can be seen in the same name articles in the books: *Vsemirnaja encyclopedia. Filosofija* (Moscow; Minsk, 2001. P. 382–386) and/or *Sociologia. Encyclopedija* (Minsk, 2003. P. 344–349).
- ⁴ One of the reasons to differentiate between “local” genealogies and the genealogy of “localness” is re-interpretation (“conceptualization») that has already become traditional in historic-philosophical studies (at least since E. Husserl’s times) of distinction of philosophy as a historic fact of time and philosophy as ideas. According to Husserl, the realized form of display of spirit in its ideality and universality is directed by “infinite problems” (See: Husserl, E. *Crisis evropejskogo chelovechestva i filosofija // Voprosy Filosofii*. 1986.3. P. 111). Everything that concerns “local” genealogies essentially remains a historic fact of the context which has generated them (and/or national history); behind its borders it can be of interest more likely only as (an anthropologist and/or sociologist would say “field”) some material for other (produced outside of the context) conceptualizations. The genealogy of “localness” can essentially “be pulled out” beyond the limits of the contexts of generation having become the property of a more “universal” knowledge system and/or another type of discourse. It is aimed not so much at the fixing and description of “factuality” as at the reflection of the “idea” – the expression of the essence instead of specific generations, of the “national spirit” if one was to use the terminology accepted (as correct) till the beginning of the 20th century
- ⁵ Anderson in the book *Voobrazhaemyje soobshchestva. Razmyshlenija ob istokah il rasprostranenii nacionalizma* (1983, 2 edition. – 1991; Russian translation – Moscow, 2001) specifically considers the value of the phenomena of moving in space (pilgrimage, etc.), as well as the phenomena forming the common information space (first of all, the emergence of periodic printed editions) for the creation of mass identifications synchronized in time (i.e., as a matter of fact, genealogies of “localness”).
- ⁶ Sources of the given versions should be searched for in the concept of Americanism of S. Bolivar who proved the uniqueness and commonness of the Latin American destiny. He also offered the central mythologeme of future “philosophy of Latin American”: “We all are a human race in the compressed form”. Later they are traced in the works of S. Ramos Magaña, A. Kaso, H. Vaskonselos, A. Reyes (all represent Mexico), K. Vas Ferreira and H.E. Rodo (Uruguay), F. Romero, A. Korn, H. Ingenieros (all – Argentina), H.H. Marti-

y-Peres (Cuba), P. Henriquez Ureña (Dominican Republic), M. Gonsales Prada and H.C. Mariategi (Peru).

- ⁷ It is worth mentioning that the problem of search of the Latin American authenticity preceded the understanding of the problems of identification and identity (which penetrated the Latin American discourse obviously from the outside) and in many respects arose from the reflection of contexts and not from the existence of a human being as such whereas in the “center” the given subjects were initially studied parallelly in different disciplines of knowledge.
- ⁸ D.F. Sarmiento stated his concept in 1845 in the work *Varvarstvo i civilizacija. Zhizneopisanie Huana Fakundo Kirogi. Fizicheskij oblik, obychai I navy Argentinskoj Respubliki* (1845; Russian translation – Moscow, 1988). If the discourse of “civilization” was quite implanted in the intellectual tradition of the New time (especially of Enlightenment), then the talk about “barbarity” in a culturological perspective was first started by the periphery – the new European authors opposed “the person of civilization” a differently axiologically loaded image of a “savage”, i.e., an individual principally existing outside of the frameworks of civilization. The “barbarian” (with all aversion to civilization) depends on the latter and is in the condition of periodic (parasitic) interaction with it, i.e., he stays exactly on its periphery. To understand the emergence and further use of the concept “barbarian” in the Latin American context it is important to note its connection with positivistic and (more widely) naturalistic theoretical-methodological ideas in philosophical and scientific knowledge (the same D.F. Sarmiento is considered to be one of the “fathers of the so-called “Argentina positivism”). “Humanistic” tradition in Latin American philosophy and cultural science since the essay of Rodo *Ariel* (1900) is connected with the use and inversions of images of Ariel, Prospero and Caliban from W. Shakespeare’s play *The Tempest*. In our perspective of consideration two admissible (extreme) treatments (interpretation) of the image of Caliban are important. They include a “savage” who at the best turns into a “barbarian” under the influence of civilization (Prospero) or “other cultural” Caliban resists the “civilized barbarity” of Prospero. In both versions the role of the spirit (“knowledge”), Ariel, is interesting. The developed analysis of the collisions of mutual relations of Shakespearean characters in the Latin American tradition was conducted in the collection of articles by B. Zemskov (Ob istoriko-kulturnyh otnoshenijah Latinskoj Ameriki I Zapada. Tjzhaba Kalibana i Prospero // Latin America. 1978. N 2-4). It is necessary to pay attention to the interest to the considered concept inside the Russian discourse of “civilization researches” in the 90s of the 20th century (See, for example, Pelipenko, A.A., Yakovenko, I.G. *Kultura kak Sistema*, Moscow, 1998; Yakovenko, I.G. *Varvarstvo: Sociologicheskaja Model // Obshestvennyye nauki i sovremennost*. 1995. N 4; Yakovenko, I.G. *Civilizacia i varvarstvo v istorii Rossii // Obshestvennyye nauki i sovremennost*. 1995. N 4, 6; 1996. N 3).
- ⁹ Interpretations of Creoleness and Creolity by M. Ryabchuk were formulated in his books *Vid Malorosii do Ukrainy, Dilemi ukrainskogo Fausta, Dvi Ukrainy* (all – “Kritika”. Kiev, 2000, 2003). These books led to a wide discussion in Ukrainian humanistic studies. However, here there is no possibility to concentrate on it.
- ¹⁰ The term “Creole” is actively used, for example, in the polemic newspaper publications (first of all in *Nasha Niva*) by A. Chobat. However, these publications are not so interesting due to the use of the term especially because its meaning is not clarified in any way (besides, this term flashed in the publications of other authors, for example, in V. Bulgakov’s works). Moreover, the context in which A. Chobat uses the given term is

also important. It emerged in the context of discussion of the thesis about Belarusians as a young “after war” nation, (not completely formed in the conditions of the “second” (50–70-e) industrialization/modernization (if one is to consider the 30s of the 20th century to be the “first”) and mass urbanization connected with it. At that time Belarusian speaking rural population actively moved to Russian-speaking cities and so (we shall add in many respects from themselves) was exposed to inevitable Creolization. As a result there appeared a specific new Creole – a townsperson with rural roots and mentality. The original manifest of supporters of the “aristocratic project” was published in the magazine *Arche* (2001. N 2. P. 5) in which S. Dubovets opposed “aristocratism of spirit” (with which many principles of construction of the nation as based on individual self-determination of the few) to proletarian plebeianization”.

- ¹¹ Within the limits of methodological aims of the direction of “history of ideas” one of favorite postulates was the statement in the spirit of Platonism that the idea (a scientific theory, a philosophical system) does not depend on the contextuality of its “generation”, all the same, eventually it would necessarily show itself. Later such methodological messages were used as the basis of internalist direction in modern logic and methodology of science, initially conceptualized by A. Koyre (he also considered the specificity of the cultural spirit of the epoch that imposed restrictions on the possibility of occurrence of this or that idea and the logic of its development).
- ¹² Special attention shall be paid to approaches constituted within the limits of sociology of knowledge and social epistemology lying in the metaarea of the analysis of cognitive practices that is different from actual externalism of logic and methodology of science though they still both come from similar theoretical-methodological aims. In our opinion, their development can represent a direct interest in the perspective of consideration of our problematics. However, this demands, however, a special analysis.
- ¹³ When trying to understand the essence of the mentioned problems within the framework of our analysis it will be productive to consider the mechanism of “meaning displacement” offered by M. K. Petrov who analyzed the transmutation component of communication within the limits of his concept of socio-cultural codes. The essence of this mechanism is described, in particular, in Petrov’s *Yazyk, znak, kultura* (Moscow, 1991; it was written in 1974 and was prepared for publishing under the title *Sociologicheskij analiz problem kulture*).
- ¹⁴ Following this point view in 1978 L. Zea gave a special developed analysis of Gegel conception in his work *Filosofija amerikanskoj istorii. Sudby Latinskoj Ameriki* (Russian translation – Moscow, 1984). Critical reflection of Gegel’s (West-European on the whole) scheme of development of philosophical knowledge was incorporated as one of constituting points into the program of Ibero-Americanism of H. Gaos y Gonsales Pola (the teacher of L. Zea).
- ¹⁵ Taking into account all claims to scientific universality it is indicative that in the conditions of Latin American periphery, for example, there appeared specific versions of the so-called “Argentinean” and “Mexican” positivism. In the first case in many respects it was studied as independently (with the minimal external borrowing) generated by the national context. In the second case it was recognized as the one best corresponding the context and was proclaimed almost the national doctrine. In both cases (in both re-interpretations) the positivistic aim to study the facts (and to follow the facts) which belong to contexts was essential. Both Argentina (since the presidency of Sarmiento) and Mexico (in the days of the president P. Dias) adopted the programs of radical restructuring of contexts (as “bad”)

on the basis of positivistic universalism. As a result by the 20s of the 20th century Argentina became in many respects a different country (emigration led to a sharp decrease in the number of mestizos in the population structure, urbanization was pursued, and industrialization of the country was started). By this time, Mexico had passed through long years of the revolution that began with the overthrow of Diaz's dictatorship (but this also made it a different country).

¹⁶ One should take special notice of a paradoxical (from the point of view of universalist claims of Marxism) fact of the emergence of numerous regional and/or national "socialisms" – "African", "Arabian", etc in the 60–70s of the 20th century. The fact of a possibility of different "marxisms" was registered much earlier – just look at the example of Austromarxism.

¹⁷ Concepts of the "center and periphery", "late" and/or "catching up" development, as well as a discourse of postcolonial research did not become the subject of the developed conceptual analysis in the Russian-speaking philosophical and social literature. This topic was considered, mainly, within the framework of research of ideologies of "the third world" and/or was replaced with the study of the Marxist thesis about the possibility of historical development leaving aside certain (first of all capitalist) stages (this allowed to remove the question about the "catching up" development). It was more or less extensively analyzed during the critical consideration of the projects of "philosophy and theology of liberation" but at the same time it still remained unknown outside of the circle of "problematics experts". The Russian publication of the fundamental work of an Argentinean economist R. Prebish *Peripherijnyj kapitalizm: est li emu alternativa?* (Moscow, 1992) did not become well known outside of the "circle of experts". Authors grouped around the magazine *Fragmenty* (there were 9 releases from 1996 till 2000) also periodically addressed the identified problems in the Belarus intellectual tradition. However, the center of attention of this publication was, nevertheless, "the project of Central Europe" (the first 6 releases even had a subtitle "Central European Cultural Review").

¹⁸ For the most non-classical philosophical and (to a smaller degree) scientific discourses it means that though the context (contextualness and contextuality) starts "to be noticed" it remains substantially "drowned" in kept universality, rarely becomes the main object of research and is radicalized, first of all, as a different civilizational universality.

¹⁹ Some names of the works important for the Spanish intellectual tradition speak for themselves in the perspective of their consideration: *Spanish Science and History of Spanish Heterodoxies* by M. Menendez y Pelayo, *Future of Spain* and *Spanish Outlook* by A. Ganivet y Garcia, *Nonsense of the Mean Philosopher* and *One Hour of Spain* by Azorin, *Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards* by de Madariaga, *About the Tragic Feeling of Life of People and Peoples* by M. de Unamuno y Jugo, *Toward Another Spain* and *Protection of Hispanidad* by R. de Maeztu, *the Genius of Spain* by E. Gimenez Caballero, *The Essay about Spain* and *Spain with the Broken Spine* by Ortega y Gasset, *Spain – a Historical Riddle* by C. Sanchez Albornoz, *Spain as a Problem and Generation of Ninety Eight* by P. Lain Entralgo, *Real Spain* and *Returning of Spain* by H. Marias Aliger, *Spanish Thinking. From Seneca to Subiri* and *Panorama of Spanish philosophy. Scandalous situation* by H.L. Abelian, etc.

²⁰ In many respects the self-reflection of the "Spanish" constantly passed in the atmosphere of the "loss" of communication with the universal (Spain of "the Golden Age" also dictated fashion) and the understanding of the permanence (almost mystified) of the crisis demanding the immediate revival of the "Spanish spirit" that could do it. A very indicative illustra-

tion of this is a retrospectively close example of the so-called “generations of 1898” (and personally – Unamuno y Jugo) who formed his philosophical and literary intentions after another “crash” – the defeat of the country in the Spanish-American colonial war. However, with all its “land related” turns in the discussion of the “Spanish perspective” it was always built like a European (instead of, for example, Eurasian) perspective. Nevertheless, an interdisciplinary discussion of the Spanish-Russian and Latin American-Russian parallels within the framework of the concept of “border civilizations” developed in the middle of the 90s of the 20th century seems rather fruitful: see, for example, the materials of the “round table” *Ibero-America v mirovom civilizacionnom processe* published in the magazine *Latin America* (1999. N 5-11) and the materials of the colloquiums which took place at the Institute of Russian literature published in the book *Pogranichnye kultury mezhdu Vostokom I Zapadom: Rossia i Ispania* (SPb., 2001). The retrospective analysis of the forming of the identified cognitive situation is well presented in the article by V.B. Zemskov *Ot izuchenija literaturnogo processa k osmysleniju civilizacionnoj paradigmy. Latinoamericanistika v Institute mirovij literatury* (*Latin America*. 2001. N 4. P. 118–134). As for the term “border civilization” its conceptualization took place due to the efforts of a number of authors that support the ideas stated by A.S. Akhiezer (I.G. Yakovenko, A.A. Pilipenko, E.B. Rashkovsky, Ya.G. Shemyakin, Yu.N. Girin, etc.). The problem of border civilizations, in particular, is specifically analyzed in the collection *Civilizacionnyje issledovaniya* (Moscow, 1999).

- ²¹ It is remarkable, that “Belarusian” and “Belarus” are pushed into the forefront of reflection in a number of contextual discourses of the 90s of the 20th century, which tried to go beyond the borders of “local” genealogies. The most representative in this perspective, in our subjective opinion, are the two texts written proceeding from essentially opposed methodological ideas. The first is the book by V. Akudovich *Mjane njama. Rozdumy na ruinah chalaveka* (Minsk, 1998 with a characteristic foreword “Archipelag Belarus”). The book fits into the postmodernist type of discourse. The second book is the book by V. Matskevich *Belorusskaja demokratija: vopreki ochevidnosti* (Minsk, 1996). The book is written within the frame of the system-thought-action approach and introduces a characteristic construct (specifically, a construct instead of a metaphor) – “to think of Belarus”.
- ²² The “experience” of France is very indicative in this respect. Antilles mulattoes and Negroes were offered identification as “Frenchmen” and/or “Negroes of the French nationality” and their countries were legally defined as “overseas departments” (this phenomenon was specially analyzed in due time by F. Fanon).
- ²³ The term “contextual elite” was offered as a technical construct for the distinction of conditions of the reflection of cultural-national contexts and, accordingly, characteristics of producers of this reflection in the range of Kulturtraeger – contextual elite – national elite at the already mentioned seminar in 2001-2002. Its further special conceptual study was not conducted due to various reasons.
- ²⁴ The topic “Sovietization” that became a certain publicist fashion at the end of the 80s – the first half of the 90s when the word “sovok” (“scoop”) received its wide circulation was not, in our opinion, completely conceptualized and critically and reflectively comprehended. Probably, its analysis from the point of view of “Creolization” can act as one of the versions of such conceptualization.
- ²⁵ Consideration of such a strategy presents an independent problem. Here it is necessary to note that so far its satisfactory complete critical reflective analysis in our philosophical and social literature has not been made.

- ²⁶ “Western Russianism” introduced a large-scale program of reconsideration of historical and cultural heritage of Belarusian lands with reference to new realities – their inclusion into the structure of the Russian empire – and possible strategy of their integration inside the new geopolitical space. Originally it contained strong motives of reunion – lands, people, culture, Orthodox confession (it is remarkable but a part of “Western Russians” was from the families of Uniat priests). Later the emphasis was placed on the research of regional specificity of Belarusian lands which were considered to be an integral (we would say – Creole) part of the Eastern Slavic world. Prominent representatives of “West-Russianism” were K.A. Govorski and O. Kojalovich (his work *Istorija ruskogo samo-soznaniya po istoricheskim pamjatnikam i nauchnym sochinenijam* was reprinted in 1997 in Minsk, *Istorija vossoedineniya zapadnorusskih uniatov staryh vremen* – in 1999). On the basis of the ideology of “West-Russianism” the study of local lore was developed and an influential school in Russian historiography led by A.P. Sapunov was established. The ideology of “Western Russianism” became one of the basic objects of criticism from representatives of the Belarusian revival. Conceptually it was summarized by A. Tsvikevich in the work (the circulation was destroyed) *Zapadnorusizm. Narysy z historyji hramadzjanskaj mysli na Belarusi u XIX i pachatku XX v.* in 1929 (reprinted in Minsk in 1993)
- ²⁷ In the 19th century the problematics of the Belarusian ethnography, folklore, and study of local lore was analyzed, for instance, in works of I.P. Barichevski, O. Bobrovski, A.E. Bogdanovich, Z. Ya. Dolengi-Hodakovski, A. Kirkor, J.F. Krachkovski, N.J. Nikiforovski, E.R. Romanov, A.M. Sementovski, E.P. Tyshkevich, K.P. Tyshkevich, M. Fedorovski, P.V. Shein, P.M. Shpilevski, etc. (the list is far from being completed).

UKRANIANS AND BELARUSIANS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NATIONS FORMATION AGAINST A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE OF THE XIX – BEGINNING OF THE XX CENTURIES

If one tries to compare modern tendencies of social transformation of peoples inhabiting Central and Eastern Europe with processes of national consolidation that took place just one century earlier then even to the first approximation it is possible to make an unambiguous conclusion: both then and now there are the same leaders and the same kind of persons lagging behind. At this one does not imply the level of economic development, as the situation has changed significantly. The essence of the matter lies in the speed of reforms now as compared to the speed of national mobilization in those times. This situation becomes especially clear on the example of the Baltic peoples. Estonians are slightly ahead of Latvians leaving Lithuanians far behind in spite of similarity of progress trends of the three nations.

If one supposes that clearly articulated national identity is one of the resources of social reformation, a peculiar form of social capital, then the roots of the current situation in the Ukraine and Belarus should be looked for in the epoch of early modernization. Along with this the question raised by M. Hroch some time ago - about why some national projects were carried out more successfully than others - has not received a definite answer yet. We can offer one of the possible variants. At that, the choice of objects for analysis – Ukrainians and Belarusians as peoples close in their ethnic and linguistic relation and, accordingly, uniformly placed with respect to imperial assimilation threats, - allows us to concentrate on the factors (first of all, social resources) guaranteed by reliable sources and are provided without any reservations as statistically comparable.

Historiography of the Problem

Researchers repeatedly conducted comparative analyses of formation of the Ukrainian and Belarusian nations. Many of them specifically stressed the similarity of these processes. Lagging of national consolidation (and the majority agree with this characteristic) is explained by peculiarities of the social structure (“peasant” nations), insufficient historicity (lack of a real state system in the pre-modern past), repressive policy of the Russian administration. In opinion of M. Hroch, it is characteristic that Ukrainians and Belarusians are stage similar in their lagging behind: from M. Hroch’s viewpoint, even at the beginning of the 1990s national movements of both nations were at the restored (earlier interrupted) phase “B” or the phase of national agitation that preceded mass national movement as such [20, p. 97].

M. Waldenberg, the author of the “National Question in Central and Eastern Europe” monograph (1992, 2000), sees the problems of lagging of the formation of the Ukrainian and Belarusian nations in one and the same thing: closeness of the language and confession to the Russian ones (that made russification easier), “plebeian” (in a social sense) character of social structure, a low level of literacy, a small number of intelligentsia. To him, differences between two national mobilizations are clearly quantitative: the Belarusian case is an even worse variant of the Ukrainian one that is irretrievably behind [27, p. 108–120].

Similar, though, naturally, not so pejorative rhetoric is typical of the “Nationalism of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Slovaks” publication (2001) [2, p. 30–41] by S. Ekelchik. The author suggests comparing nationalism of the three peoples not only from the viewpoint of their political and social history but also from the viewpoint of modern cultural studies. He emphasizes the “peasant” character of the social structure, a low level of urbanization, codification of literature languages. S. Ekelchik supports the idea of delayed nationalism in relation to national movements of Belarusians, Ukrainians and Slovaks believing that the reason for this is national oppression, active assimilation, weakness of national bourgeoisie and lack of the working class. On the whole, differences are factored out, and the similarity of historical fates is in the focus of attention.

At the same time a considerable number of researchers, noting the similarity, also tried to explain the differences. For instance, R. Radzik, the author of the “Between Ethnic Aggregate and National Commonness. Belarusians against a Background of National Changes in Central and Eastern Europe of the XIX century” monograph (2000), is inclined to explain the fact of Belarusians lagging behind Ukrainians by the content of peoples’ culture, peculiarities of the social structure and policy of the Russian administration. In his opinion, an extremely low level of historical conscience was typical of the Belarusian traditional culture (in comparison with the Ukrainian one). This statement has its ground although such a conclusion can be substantiated by the data of comparative folklore research only. Such kind of research seems to be extremely labor-intensive and methodologically problematic: for example, how can the intensity of historical conscience be

measured? The author, however, cites a number of side opinions about the level of its development among Belarusians which in itself is interesting but is not equal to peoples' ideas as such [24, p. 174–175]. It should be mentioned that the forms of traditional historical conscience of Belarusians have not been studied thoroughly. However, even the first experiments in this field show that these ideas are not as poor as it may seem at first glance. In this respect the legends about Rogvolod and Rogneda, Stefan Batory, Stanislaw Ponyatovski, Catherine II and others are quite indicative [5, p. 76–78].

R. Radzik repeatedly emphasizes extremely negative, practically fatal consequences of liquidation of the Uniat church in Belarus. As a result Belarusians, unlike the group of Western Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Slovaks and Slovenes, were deprived of a social group that could articulate national ideas in the best way.

Naturally, liquidation of the Uniat church hardly encouraged the formation of the Belarusian identity, and indeed, the Uniat confession to a great extent promoted the development of the Ukrainian movement in Western Galicia. However, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the importance of this fact. The reason is not the nature of the Uniat church as such. And not always it was an unconditional modus of the Ukrainian identity formation. A certain part of the Uniat clergy was oriented not nationally but Pro-Russian. (The fate and evolution of the views of the “Russian trinity” member of Yakov Golovatski can be quite illustrative in this respect). One should not also forget the place of the Uniat church in the system of political and social relations in Western Galicia and the Gabsburg Empire on the whole. This can be explained by the policy of Maria Theresa. The policy was aimed at equalizing the rights of Catholics and Uniats and the development of Uniat education. The results of the reforms by Joseph II, inconsistent but still able to make a peasant legally independent from the landlord, can also be added to the abovementioned. It will be appropriate to bring to attention one of M. Hroch's conclusions stating that national movements start only one generation after the liquidation of the serfdom. It should also be mentioned that the preservation of the Uniat church until 1839 in Volyn and Podolje did not leave any significant traces as it did in Eastern Galicia. Even in Belarus, with the presence of such a strong factor as the Vilno University, the religion did not lead to any evident articulation of ethnicity as the one that was presented on the pages of “*Rusalka Dnistrovaja*” (1837).

But even this is not so important. The development of national movements of a number of peoples of Central and Eastern Europe was going successfully and without tangible participation of the clergy (for instance, this applies to Latvians, Estonians, and Finns and to the part of Ukraine located to the north of the Dnieper). R. Radzik mentions the absence of the actual “Piedmont” as one of the reasons complicating the process of the formation of the national community of Belarusians. In Ukraine its role was played by Eastern Galicia and Lithuanians had Eastern Prussia as their “Piedmont”. Factually, this is quite an important factor though it did not exist in the history of many peoples of Central and Eastern Europe (Czechs, Estonians, Latvians), either.

The unpublished dissertation by the American historian S. Gutier "The Beginnings of the Ukrainian People's Nationalism: Demographic, Social, and Political Research of Ukrainian Nationality till 1917" (1990) stands out among the works of comparative research of the problem. The material that is of great interest to us is presented in detail in the monograph by Ya. Gritsak [1, p. 100-101]. In his opinion, the Ukrainian and Belarusian movements were structurally very close. This was determined by the similarity of socio-ethnic and socio-cultural characteristics of society (social identification of the Ukrainian/Belarusian with a peasant, low level of literacy). Similarity was also found in the ethnic compositions of other social groups: the landowners were Poles or Russians, small trade was dominated by Jews, and bureaucracy was Russian. The American scientist considers the relative multiplicity of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to be the reason for the wide scale of the Ukrainian movement as it was this multiplicity that allowed the intelligentsia create national communities in, at least, two big cities, namely, in Kiev and Poltava. This approach seems to be somewhat schematic. It is an obvious exaggeration to state that all the positions in the administrative body of Ukraine and Belarus were occupied by Russians. There were 46.3% of officials of the Russian nationality in Belarus (with 38.7% of Belarusians working in official positions) and 53.9% in Ukraine (with 40.8% of Ukrainians). The relatively low level of the concentration of Belarusian intelligentsia did exist, but the Lithuanians did not have a high figure, either.

Apparently, taking into consideration the sketchiness of this approach Ya. Gritsak supplemented it with a statement about the mobilizing social role of historic memory of hetmanism in the development of the Ukrainian national movement (the Belarusians did not have this phenomenon).

This point of view is supported by S. Tokht', the author of the article "The Belarusian National Movement of the 19th-20th Centuries in the Context of the National Movements of the Peoples of Central and Eastern Europe" (2001) [12]. He compares the Belarusian movement with the Ukrainian and the Lithuanian also mentioning the Slovak situation along with some others. Among the analysis criteria suggested are the stages of the development of national movements, their chronological frames and socially important results. Though the periodization of the Belarusian national movement provided by S. Tokht' seems to be excessively optimistic and the evaluation of many events in Ukraine and Lithuania seems to be rather contradictory, one can agree with the general conclusion about the national processes in Belarus lagging behind when it comes to the aspects of "time and scope". The common conclusion that "the nation-forming process on the Belarusian lands was taking place in the most unfavorable conditions in comparison with all the other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe" [12, p.75] is quite adequate. As far as the role of the memory of the hetmanization is concerned, the history of Central and Eastern Europe shows that there is no reason to absolutize such factors. For example, the Lithuanians who had much more serious ideological resources in this respect used them much less and Latvians and Estonians did without it at all.

Concluding the historiographic overview, it is necessary to underline one more, so to say, general aspect. The overwhelming majority of researchers are inclined to attach special importance to the ethnolinguistic and confessional closeness of Ukrainians and Belarusians to Russians, it being the factor that eased assimilation and, naturally, complicated the articulation of national identity (for instance, when compared to Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians). Indisputability of this situation seems obvious only at first sight. Hungarians were much more successful in their assimilation of Slovaks and Ukrainians while Germans (in Eastern Prussia) achieved more success assimilating Lithuanians in spite of much more considerable language differences.

Hypothesis

All the works presented above with the exception of the research by S.Gutier are of an evaluative and somewhat approximate nature. At the same time both similarities and, even more importantly, differences in the processes of the formation of Ukrainian and Belarusian nations can be expressed much more precisely both on the level of certain individuals' lives and on the level of sociological evaluation of mass phenomena.

I would like to present two significant examples. The fates of two historians have much in common; they are almost of the same age and practically simultaneously became pupils of V. Antonovich in Kiev University. They are M. Grushevski and M. Dovnar Zapolski. However, the latter did not become the head of the Belarusian Central Rada and did not create anything that equals in its social resonance "The History of Ukraine and Russia" by M. Grushevski. It has nothing to do with M. Dovnar Zapolski's lack of talent, diligence, and national patriotism.

Example number two. According to the data collected by Ya. Gritsak, during the elections to the Constituent Assembly Ukrainian parties collected almost 5 million votes and significantly outdistanced all the Russian parties in Ukraine [1, p.117]. During the same elections Belarusian parties and associations collected 19 thousand votes (0.59%) and only confirmed their membership list. The difference is clear. It can hardly be explained by the mobilizing role of the historical memory of the hetmanization or the Uniat movement in Eastern Prussia though M. Grushevski and other activists of the national movement in Ukraine located to the north of the Dnieper could hide there from persecution unlike Belarusian patriots who did not have such an opportunity.

Without belittling the importance of these factors I would still like to show that the main reason was the difference in the social resources of national mobilization in Ukraine and Belarus in the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries. Social resources are understood not only as the presence of social groups that can recruit national activists from their environment. This concept is much wider. It also includes modernization readiness of society both to develop national ideology on the mass level and to respond to it adequately.

The research is based on the analysis of different parameters of the population that lived on the territory that roughly coincides with the current territories of Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. As far as Ukraine is concerned, the situation is more complicated. Calculations were conducted on the basis of the data from Volyn, Podolsk, Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov and Kherson gubernias, which do not completely resemble the territory of Ukraine now. I am aware of this. However, Ukrainian scientists, for instance, Ya. Gritsak define this territory as the “ethnic core”, and, accordingly, these data can be considered to be quite a precise reflection of the dominating tendencies of social development [1, p.99]. When it comes to statistics concerning Eastern Prussia, I did not find it possible to use the materials of other researchers as I did not have a chance to work with the sources.

Sources

The article is based on the analysis of statistical sources of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries, two of which require additional comments. First of all, it is an economic statistical research of the beginning of the 20th century “Trade and Industry of European Russia by Regions” [13] which is used very little in comparative studies. The authors noted that it is the first experience of a systematic comparative collection of data in Russian history that reflects turnover of domestic and foreign trade, industry, cargo transportation by railway and waterways. The work on the collection continued for eight years under the direction of V. P. Semenov Tian Shanskii. Its basis is the information from the State Chamber of the Ministry of Finances of Russia where the cards for each commercial or industrial enterprise were kept (total of up to 600 thousand). They contained data about annual turnover, profits and the size of taxation of an enterprise. They were mapped for separate localities and districts (volosts) on the basis of which trade industrial districts were marked out. These districts represented groups of volosts that were drawn to specific localities. In their turn, they were joined into the so-called belts representing large regions with a clearly defined specialization and approximately equal level of “reviving of the trade industrial life”. This level was calculated as the absolute sum of the trade industrial turnover in rubles per one dweller. 1900 fiscal data were used as the basis. Population quantity was calculated on the basis of the 1897 population census with natality rate taken into account. The authors of the collection realized that the fiscal statistics did not include the volume of production of the farms. That is why it became necessary to use the figures of railway and waterway cargo turnover, specifically, those figures which could be used in calculations. The authors emphasized that the trade turnover is an indicator of consumer force of a certain region. In our opinion, the materials of this collection reflect the intensity of economic activity and can be regarded as one of the most important indices of the level of modernization. Secondly, there are the materials of “The First Total Population Census of the Russian Empire of 1897” [7]. In connection with this source it is

necessary to point out the following. While the Ukrainian and Belarusian historiographic traditions accept the results of this census as being a priori adequate to reality, the Polish tradition is of a steady opinion that the census of 1897 is a falsification. Taking into account the fact that the Polish schools of Ukrainian and Belarusian studies are among the strongest in the world it will be a mistake to ignore this point of view as it calls into question the very possibility of conducting research similar to the one described in this article. The main reason for Polish historians and demographers to declare that the census of 1897 is a falsification is the discrepancy between its results and the materials of other forms of population count. I would like to remind that according to the materials of "The Parish List" the amount of the Polish population within the modern borders of Belarus made up about 8% in the middle of the 1850s, according to the 1897 census the figure was 2.4%, and according to the last census in Belarus in 1999 it was 3.9%.

I would like to start with the falsification. It is necessary to point out that not only the Poles but also Lithuanians and even Belarusians accused the organizers of the 1897 census of underreporting the number of their ethnic groups. In the opinion of Polish researchers, the biggest part of Poles was added exactly to Belarusians [14, p.385, 428]. But did the Russian administration really need any falsification at all? The anti-Polish character of the regime during the carrying out of the census raises no doubt. At the same time the Polish movement in 1897 was hardly strong enough to call for significant falsifications. J. Pilsudski's Socialists and R. Dmowski's national Democrats were only making their first steps and were not mass parties while the Polish bourgeoisie was more interested in the use of the empire market opportunities (including those outside of the empire) than in the support of the national movement.

It should be mentioned that both in the past and in the present the Polish researchers do not provide any comprehensive arguments in favor of their opinion. For example, neither L. Wasilewski, nor E. Romer and J. Czekanowski left any description of the methods they used to make calculations and interpret the materials of the 1897 census. The often cited statement by L. Maliszewski that only the biggest landowners with their families and not the numerous representatives of the Polish intelligentsia in cities and small places [22, p.18] were considered to be Polish is not justified. Not less than 30.1% of Poles in Belarus, 15.6% in Lithuania and 46.5% in Ukraine (with 54.7% in the Volyn province) were peasants according to the 1897 census.

The main thesis of the Polish researchers that all Catholic Belarusians and Ukrainians should be considered to be Poles deserves some serious criticism. For example, P. Eberhardt claims that in the second part of the 19th century "on the territory of the former Rzecz Pospolita the concept of the national idea appears among peasants," "a peasant-Catholic who uses Slavic dialects becomes a complete Pole" and that "these processes at the end of the 19th century were already clearly defined" [15, p.31]. In our opinion, it is an obvious overstatement. The peasants of not only Eastern but also of Western Europe were characterized by lack of a distinct national self-consciousness. This situation was typical even of France at the end of the 19th century in spite of the more than one-

hundred-year-old existence of the national state that is “exemplary” for other peoples [28]. We shall note that in accordance with the profound monographs of H. Brodowska and J. Molenda a more or less clear articulation of ethnic identity among the peasants on the specifically Polish territory refers to the revolution period of 1905-1907 and to a greater extent to the period of the First World War [17, p.23]. As for the end of the 19th century, then, according to J. Molenda, “the typical phenomena for the rural territory of the Polish Kingdom as well as for Galitsia were civilizational underdevelopment, illiteracy, a low level of national and political consciousness and indifference towards public affairs connected with this [23, p.95]. That is why it is difficult to imagine that the forming of the Polish national self-consciousness among peasants-Catholics on the Belarusian-Lithuanian border territories was going quicker than in Poland proper. R. Radzik’s fundamental research supports our assumption. He notes that even among the Polish intelligentsia on the Lithuanian-Belarusian lands the spread of the concepts of the nation (cultural but not political) and ideological homeland was going slower than in the Congress Poland [24, p.136-137].

One more point of view should be taken into account. At the present moment it is impossible to accuse the authors of this viewpoint of bias. I mean the serious research of the 1897 census carried out by a group of scientists under the direction of A. Kappeler. This research leaves no room for doubting its relevance [16].

I shall emphasize the fact that the 1897 census occupies a special place among other statistical sources of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries. It surpasses all other statistical materials in its fullness (and not only the ones of its own time but of the whole 20th century). It contains huge factual data about the ethnic, confessional, class, professional composition of the population, level of literacy, etc. Numerous correlation tables allow to follow the development of ethnic and migration processes. However, it is well-known that the organization and methodology of carrying out the census contained a lot of drawbacks. The biggest criticism concerns the defining of one’s ethnic identity by one’s mother tongue. It should be mentioned that this approach was determined not only by the realities of the Russian Empire where the processes of forming a stable ethnic identity were far from completion but also by the requirements of international organizations, particularly, the International Statistical Congress. We would like to add that this specific means of defining one’s ethnic identity was also practiced in other European states. It is necessary to consider the mechanisms of carrying out the 1897 census to interpret its materials. Census lists were filled in beforehand and on the actual day of carrying out the census the lists only had to be checked (this is the problem of conducting the census in just one day). At the same time literate people filled in the census lists themselves and decided by themselves what language should be chosen as their mother tongue. It is necessary to keep in mind that the columns “mother tongue” and “literacy” were placed next to each other on the census list. There were cases when the respondent having some command of the Russian, Polish, German and other languages, still considered Belarusian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian to be their mother tongues. We would consider such examples of conscious

ethnic and cultural orientation to be facts of ethnic self-consciousness. As for the illiterate part of the population, the tellers were obliged to fill in the name of the language that “each person considers his/her mother tongue” in the questionnaire. Though it is difficult to say now how it happened in reality. As far as the interpretation of the 1897 census materials is concerned, it should be emphasized once again that the census provides information about the mother tongue and as for the illiterate part of the population – about the mother tongue from the point of view of the tellers. Therefore, the census reflects the linguistic and not the national situation. This is a point of principle. In this respect, the biased nature of the Russian administration lies in the interpretation of the mother tongue as an identifier of the national identity in the formula “nationality on the basis of the mother tongue”. In this respect the official position clearly reflected official expectations (in the sociological aspect) to which nationality the population should belong according to linguistic characteristics. Thus, the publication of the 1897 census materials (which means the interpretation) should be looked at as a social project, an instrument of social engineering (which, as a matter of fact, worked) and not as a reflection of mass identity the national form of which could not yet even exist on that level.

“Ethnographic Phase”: the First Half of the 19th Century

In my opinion, not only in 1917 but even at the initial stage of the national revival (“the Groh” phase “A” or the “Gellner” ethnographic phase) the Ukrainian movement was considerably ahead of the Belarusian movement. The scope of the articulation of the Ukrainian ethnicity and specifically the degree of this articulation greatly exceeds the Belarusian scope. It is exactly this feeling that one experiences after comparing publications by D. Bantysh Kamenski (“History of Little Russia”, 1822), N. Markevich (“History of Little Russia”, 1842), I. Bodyanski (“History of Russians”, 1828), A. Pavlovski (“Grammars of Little Russia Dialects”, 1818), collections of ethnographic and folk materials by N. Tsereteli (1819) and especially M. Maksimovich (1827), V. Zaleski (1833), J. Lozinski (1835) with collections of Belarusian songs by Ya. Chechot (1837-1846), a historical sketch by M. Bez-Kornilovich (1855), the dictionary by I. Nosovich (1870) or a collection of documents by I. Grigorovich (1824), which are analogous in content and meaning. This conclusion is not based on any serious analysis, and I would like the reader simply to accept this assumption, especially because there are other examples of the Ukrainian leadership. Specifically, the leadership. If one is to believe the tradition of the analysis of nationalism the foundation of which was laid by H. Kohn and continued by L. Greenfeld, then it becomes necessary to believe that practically all forms of national movements with rare exceptions are not original and that their idea “is imported” either by a bureaucratic machine or by the “old” aristocracy or by the “young” intelligentsia [21, p.19]. The history of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe almost completely supports this thesis. However, the mobilizing effect is produced not by some abstract idea but by a specific example – as a rule the

example of the neighbor. According to many Ukrainian authors including J. Gritsak, the Poles were this kind of example for the Ukrainian movement. Belarusian historiography did not study this problem in detail. However, the provocative leadership of Ukrainian literature as one of the manifestations of the national mobilization seems to be quite obvious. The publication by I. Kotlyarevski of "Aeneide" (1798, 1809), for instance, directly led to the emergence of the poem under the same title in the Belarusian language. Textual coincidences are a proof of this [6, p.325]. T. Shevchenko's creative work influenced the formation of Belarusian literature [11]. I would like to add that national ideology began to form rather early inside the Ukrainian movement unlike the Belarusian movement. The published "The History of Russians" by O. Bodyanski had an undisguised anti-Polish and anti-Russian orientation. National ideology took its clearly defined place in the program of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood founded by N. Kostomarov (1845-1847). Finally, the Ukrainian movement had the experience of participating in the political struggle during the revolution of 1848 ("The Main Russian Council" in Lvov). A distinctive feature of the Ukrainian movement was its continuity, and, first of all, ideological continuity. For example, it is well known that "The History of Russians", a tribute to the ideology of autonomists of the end of the 18th century, like no other work influenced the forming of the consciousness of young T. Shevchenko [1, p.26]. Continuity could be found on the academic (P. Kulish and N. Kostomarov were the students of I. Sreznevski and M. Maksimovich) and family levels (Vladimir, the son of Markian Shashkevich, one of the participants of the "Russian Trinity", headed the national movement in Galitsia at the beginning of the 1860s) [1, p.36, 76].

However, I am not really inclined to present an idyllic picture of the Ukrainian movement. Just like the Belarusian movement, it was not numerous and was at the periphery of social interests of the majority of the population. This can be seen, for instance, in the lack of attention to national literature even in Ukrainian Galitsia [1, p.51].

Nevertheless, in general, it is more important to pay attention to the following: if one is to be allowed to call P. Bagrim "a Belarusian Taras Shevchenko", then it is interesting for me not to compare their talents but to find out why in reality and due to what social conditions Bagrim did not become a Belarusian Taras Shevchenko at all.

The reasons for differences in social conditions of the life of these nations are manifold. One of them has roots in the critical differences of the ethno-social and confessional structure of the population, on a considerable part of the ethnic territory of Ukraine at least. It was characterized by greater homogeneity and a larger proportion of the indigenous population. According to the reconstructions conducted by V. Khabuzan and G. Makhnova, at the end of the 18th century Ukrainians made up 98.1% of the population on the Left bank of the Dnieper and 85.9% in the rural part of Ukraine (Slobozhanschina) [3, p.31, 32]. This situation could have hardly changed significantly by the middle of the 19th century. If we consider the confessional identification directly related to ethnic identity among Catholics and Jews (accordingly, Poles and Jews), then the proportion of these groups in Ukraine (accordingly, 4.24% and 6.25%) was much lower than in Belarus where

Catholics made up 17.9% (Poles up to 8%) and Jews made up 10.4% of the population. At the same time 92% of Catholics and 79.5% of Jews were concentrated on the Right-hand side of the Dnieper where their proportion roughly corresponded to the situation in Belarus with its 9.1% and 11.6%. The number of Catholics and Jews did not exceed 0.1% and 2.15% in the Chernigov gubernia, 0.06% and 1.46% in the Poltava gubernia, 0.68% and 2.22% in the Ekaterinoslav gubernia and 0.07% and 0.02% in the Kharkov gubernia.

Differences concern, in particular, the correlation of the Jewish and “Christian” population in the structure of the main city classes. For example, according to the Tax Register of 1817 Jews made up 13.9% of the merchants in Ukraine (72.8% in Belarus) and 55.1% of the petty bourgeoisie (78.9% in Belarus) [8]. The situation in the Volyn and the Podol gubernias was similar to the situation in Belarus with Jews making up 63.8% of the merchants and 87.3% of the petty bourgeoisie. Jews made up only 5.0% of merchants and 17.6% of the petty bourgeoisie in the Poltava, Chernigov and Ekaterinoslav gubernias.

Another difference that is equally important is the considerable quantity of the formally free village population officially called “the Little Russia Cossacks” (total of 13.86% of tax paying population or 496 thousand males in 1817). The Cossacks made up 42% of tax paying population in the Poltava gubernia, 30% in the Chernigov gubernia, 16.3% in the Ekaterinoslav gubernia and 8.3% in the Kherson gubernia. According to the data of the Tax Register of 1834, the quantity of “the Little Russia Cossacks” practically did not change (498 thousand people) but the proportion began to decrease and dropped to 12.35% of the tax paying population. By 1858 almost all Little Russia Cossacks were turned into state peasants and though this did not result in a serious change of their material condition it was a rather severe blow in the social context.

One more distinction is the proportion of serfs. On the whole, at the beginning of the 19th century it was 55.6% in Ukraine and 57% in Belarus. However, the figures differed greatly by regions from 86.9% in the Kiev gubernia to 61.4% in the Podolsk gubernia on the Right-bank side of the Dnieper with 47% on the Left bank area, 41% of the tax paying population in the Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav gubernias (as of 1817). Noticeable differences between Ukraine and Belarus had already appeared by 1834. The proportion of serfs in the structure of the tax paying population reached the level of 56.85% and 64.8%. Significant reduction in the percentage of serfs was registered in the Kiev and Volyn gubernias (up to 73% of the tax paying population) [8]. By 1858 the number of serfs in Ukraine decreased even more, reaching 44.24% with 58% on the Right-bank area, 37% on the Left bank area, 30% and 31% in the Kharkov and the Kherson gubernias accordingly [4, p.94]. One should take into account that serfdom on the Left bank area was established only at the end of the 18th century. At the same time in Belarus serfs made up 61.8% of the population, and this figure was the highest in the European part of the Empire with the average level of 37.5% [4]. The Mogilev gubernia with its proportion of serfs of 64.7% was second only to the Smolensk gubernia where the number was the highest with 69.0%. On the whole, the percentage of the serf population in separate Belarusian gubernias corresponded to the similar figures of the Non-Black Soil zone of Russia. However, the south

of Russia had a considerably lower number of serfs, and in the north serfdom was almost non-existent. That is why average figures were lower than in Belarus. The most "Lithuanian" Kowno gubernia had only 36.9% of serfs. Summarizing all this, it is easy to make a conclusion that by the end of the 1850s not only in comparison with Ukrainians but also in the context of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia Belarusians remained the people with the greatest number of serfs and the level of serfdom was increasing.

The number of peasants in the structure of the town population can be used as an indicator of social mobility. According to this criterion, by the middle of the 1850s Ukraine differed greatly from Belarus. If in the Volyn (6.23%) and the Podol (1.6%) gubernias the situation was similar to the Belarusian situation, then on the Left bank area and the rural part (Slobozhanschina) the situation was quite the opposite. Peasants made up 31.4% of the town population in the Poltava gubernia, 23.1% in the Chernigov gubernia, and 56.5% in the Kharkov gubernia and 19.2% in the Ekaterinoslav gubernia. At the same time peasants made up 0.9% of the town population in the towns of the Minsk gubernia, 1.8% in the Wilno gubernia, 2.4% in the Vitebsk gubernia, 2.6% in the Grodno gubernia and 6.9% in the Mogilev gubernia [4].

Thus, according to a number of essential indicators of ethno-social and confessional structure of the population the situation in Ukraine and specifically on the Left bank area contributed to the rise of national consolidation to a much greater extent. The social role of the memory of hetmanism should be considered from this point of view. It should be regarded not as the presence of some common myth but as the memory of the real situation the change of which had led to a significant worsening of the condition of numerous population groups, namely peasants and Cossacks

Another and, probably, more important factor at this stage was the presence of university centers (since 1805 in Kharkov and since 1845 in Kiev). Their existence created the necessary environment for the formation of national ideology. It is not less important that in combination with the peculiarities of the ethnic and social structure the presence of universities provided great possibilities for social mobility of people directly connected with native culture. In this case it is quite indicative that the social origin of P. Kulish (from the family of free peasants) and N. Kostomarov (the son of a Russian landowner and a Ukrainian woman, who was a serf) did not become an obstacle in their academic career [1, p.36]. The situation allowed not only for the talent of T. Shevchenko to reveal itself but also to become a socially important event. The lack of such conditions in Belarus was clearly seen on the example of P. Bagrim's life.

On the whole, the main reason that hampered the development of the Ukrainian and the Belarusian movements was the modernization backwardness, mainly the exceptionally low level of the spread of education among the population. According to the data for 1856 the share of pupils in the structure of the population of the Volyn gubernia was 0.23%, the other gubernias had the following figures: Podol – 0.25%, Poltava – 0.44%, Kiev – 0.5%, Chernigov – 0.54%, Ekaterinoslav – 0.92%, Wilno – 0.52%, Vitebsk – 0.34%, Grodno – 0.37%, Minsk – 0.33%, Mogilev – 0.50% with 4.62% in the Lifland gubernia.

At the Turn of the Centuries

I would not like to spend too much time concentrating on facts that demonstrate the advance development of the Ukrainian movement in comparison with the Belarusian movement in the second half of the 19th century. This fact is proved by the more intensive suppression of the Ukrainian movement by the Russian administration. This force always equaled the potential danger. This was shown in the monograph by V. Rodkiewicz who analyzed the empirical national policy towards Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians [25]. Factually, from 1859 till 1895 not less than seven different decrees and resolutions were published that to this or that extent limited the possibility of publishing literature in the Ukrainian language including the notorious Valuev Decree of 1863 and the Decree of 1876 aimed at preventing the spread of national ideology among the masses. At the same time there was only one Decree of 1859 that had a limiting character for Belarus. Just like in Ukraine, it prohibited the publication of literature in the Latin alphabet. Even in spite of the unprecedented measures to suppress the Ukrainian movement. Because of this Eastern Galitsia became the center of the national movement. Its scope in the North-of-the Dnieper part of Ukraine greatly surpassed the scope in Belarus. As before, the reason for this was a considerably higher level of modernization.

The analysis of the materials of "Trade and Industry in Russia" clearly shows that in the economic aspect Ukraine was far ahead of Belarus (all the economic data given below were calculated by the author according to [13]). If in Belarus the annual turnover made up 25.79 rubles per capita, in Ukraine this figure was 70.26. At the same time though the Ukrainian figures were much lower than the Latvian (204.87) they were similar to the Estonian indices (85.54) and were far ahead of the Lithuanian figures (39.07). However, the intensity of the economic development was extremely uneven. On the one hand, a great part of developed regions was located in the south of Ukraine (for example, the Uzovka district with 448 rubles per person per year) and on the other hand, in the north, less developed districts of the European part of the empire were located, specifically, in the Volyn gubernia (Kamen Kashir and Kovel districts with 4 and 5 rubles per person per year accordingly). Even in the developed southern districts there were purely agricultural zones where the level of trade and industrial turnover did not exceed 14-15 rubles per person per year. The average level of development of the northern Volyn and Chernigov gubernias (accordingly 26.3 and 28.1 rubles) did not differ significantly from the average figures in Belarus. It was relatively low in one of the most nationally and culturally active Poltava gubernia (30.4 rubles). However, the average level of economic activity in Ukraine was on the whole higher than in Belarus. Naturally, there were relatively developed districts in Belarus as well, for instance, Grodno (62 rubles) and Brest (88 rubles) districts which the compilers of "Trade and Industry ..." considered to be parts of the "Near-Vistula" economic zone. Another district worth mentioning is the agricultural Oshmyany district which almost equaled the Baltic states in its indices (40 rubles). However, these were rare exceptions against the background of patriarchal Polesye and, surprisingly, such districts

as Volozhin, Glubokoye, Druya and Disna (only 8 rubles per person!), Cherei (5 rubles), Chechersk (6 rubles), Senno (8 rubles), and Klimovichy (9 rubles).

We will not go deeply into the reasons of the economic backwardness of Belarus which can and should become the subject matter of a separate research. We would like only to mention that according to the data of "Trade and Industry..." Belarus figures were similar to the figures in Lithuania and a number of Ukrainian gubernias (26.37 rubles per capita in the Volyn gubernia, 38.12 rubles per capita in the Podol gubernia), eastern part of the "Near-Vistula" line inhabited predominantly not by Poles (14 rubles in Wlodawa, 17 rubles in Biala, 19 rubles in Sokolka, etc.). We would allow ourselves to make a preliminary conclusion: the zone of economic underdevelopment coincided with the territory of the spread of large Polish landownership on the ethnically non-Polish lands. Obviously, the levels of economic and national activity are not directly related. However, as M. Hroch says, there is some minimum of the development of market relations and the national movement hardly has any chances to develop before reaching it [20, p.86]. The figures for the Poltava gubernia show that it does not have to be very high. At the same time a number of districts in Belarus and to a lesser extent districts in Ukraine had not reached it at all at the beginning of the 20th century.

Social resources and, first of all, those which can provide the intellectual base of the national movement are of great importance for the development of the national movement along with the intensity of market activity. Materials of the 1897 census allow to draw a very detailed picture of a representative of the educated population with the "level of education higher than the primary school level" according to the definition of the census (the data given below were calculated by the author on the basis of [7]). The Ukrainian group made up 44,721 people, the Belarusian group had 8,320 people. It should be kept in mind that there were 27.2 people with the above primary school level of education per every 10,000 Ukrainians and there were only 17.8 such people in Belarus. It is worth mentioning that this figure reached 85 people in the Poltava gubernia. There were more educated Ukrainians in the Poltava gubernia alone (11,386 people) than the total number of educated Belarusians. Educated people in the Poltava gubernia made up 25.4% of all educated Ukrainians overall. Probably, this is the explanation for the unique "Poltava" phenomenon. It should be mentioned that the lack of university centers in Belarus not only prevented the forming of the nationally oriented faculty but also noticeably limited the opportunities for social mobility of the indigenous population: the number of peasants with the university education in Ukraine (total of 348 people, including 120 people in the Kiev gubernia) was 20 times higher than in Belarus (17 people). It is necessary to remember that the success of the national movement cannot be explained only by the numbers or by the critical mass of intelligentsia. For example, Latvians had 6,148 of such people (46.6 per 10 thousand Latvians), Estonians had 3,442 people (38.6 per 10 thousand Estonians) and Lithuanians had only 2,726 people (17.3 per 10 thousand Lithuanians). Though Lithuanians had the smallest number, the development rate of their national movement was ahead not only of Belarusians but also ahead of Ukrainians.

Many researchers such as G. Breuille, Ya. Gritsak, T. Raun, M. Hroch emphasize the special role of representatives of such professions as lawyers, journalists, writers, scientists and instructors at higher educational establishments in the process of nation formation. It is this category that generates national programs and political activists. One should remember that the absolute number of this social group does not have significant importance. Materials of the 1897 census allow to analyze these aspects in detail. For example, the category “engaged in private legal activity” was given as a separate line. Those “engaged in science, literature, and art” also formed another separate category. However, in the latter case the criteria are not exactly clear, especially when one tries to find out whether these occupations were the only source of income. The 1897 census registered 442 Ukrainians engaged in private legal activity and 467 engaged in science, literature, and art. There were 60 and 89 Belarusians respectively. There were 2.7 lawyers per every 100 thousand of Ukrainians (1.2 per Belarusians) and 2.8 people engaged in science, literature and art (1.9 per Belarusians).

The teacher’s environment played a special role in the development of the national movements in Central and Eastern Europe. This particular environment represented a mass social resource, a social group from which regular activists of national movements were recruited. Besides, it is well-known that many future lawyers, journalists, scientists, and professors were brought up in the families of school teachers. Later they became the leaders of these movements. It should be pointed out that not only teachers composed the group “occupied with teaching and educational activity”. The group also included private mentors, tutors, and others. The census registered 9,459 Ukrainians-teachers and 3,207 Belarusians-teachers (accordingly, 57.6 per 100 thousand Ukrainians and 67.4 per 100 thousand Belarusians). It should be emphasized that these figures were much higher for Estonians and Latvians (195.6 per 100 thousand Estonians and 147.2 per 100 thousand Latvians) though Lithuanians had lower figures (only 43.6 per 100 thousand Lithuanians).

As far as the role of the clergy is concerned, it was specifically this group that compensated Lithuanians for the drawbacks of all other social resources. Of special attention is the great number of Lithuanians among the clergy of the non-Orthodox Christian confessions with the total of 958 people. They dominated in their own group (55%) while the Poles made up only 37.5% of it. To a great extent this circumstance explains the exceptional significance of the Catholic clergy in the development of the Lithuanian national movement. However, its multiplicity was not the only determining factor. Ukrainians and Belarusians had a considerable amount of the Orthodox clergy when speaking about absolute figures with 18,144 and 2,363 respectively. The analysis of the structure of the professionally confessional groups shows that Ukrainians and Belarusians were represented by almost the same numbers with Lithuanians with 53 and 47% though the role of Orthodox Ukrainian and Belarusian clergy cannot be compared with that of the Lithuanian one.

As a rule, the officialdom as a social resource of the national movement was not especially significant because of the peculiarities of its position. The officialdom completely

depended on the authorities and its majority was interested in the preservation of the existing order. Officials join the national movement only when its perspectives are quite clear. The rising social mobility is reflected in the figures of the representation of the indigenous population groups in the “administration, court and police”. According to the 1897 census, 12,728 Ukrainians worked in this sphere (77.5 per 100 thousand) and 3,486 Belarusians (73.2 per 100 thousand). So their situation was about the same.

One of the most problematic forms of the rising mobility for the indigenous population was getting the merchants into the group. However, in this respect the Ukrainian and the Belarusian situations differed greatly. There was a noticeable difference in the number of merchants: Ukrainians had 4,434 people (Belarusians had only 225), the share of merchants in the population structure of Ukrainians was 27 people per 100 thousand and in the population structure of Belarusians was 4.7 (which means 5.7 times less). At the same time Ukrainian indicators not only exceeded the Lithuanian figures (4.2 per 100 thousand Lithuanians) but also Estonians (17.5 per 100 thousand Estonians) and yielded only to Latvians (65.6 per 100 thousand Latvians). This situation can be explained, first of all, by the poor development of market relations and, secondly, by the traditional domineering of Jews in the entrepreneurial sphere. Jews made up only 58.3% of merchants in Ukraine but 91.5% in Belarus and 83.1% in Lithuania. The question whether the merchant class belongs to bourgeoisie deserves special discussion. If one is to assume that it fully does, then the role of bourgeoisie as G. Broili emphasizes should not be exaggerated. Its interests may and may not coincide with the interests of the national movement [18, p.30]. In any case, the bourgeoisie played a significant role in the history of Ukrainians and especially Latvians. However, its role was tiny in the history of Lithuanians. The materials of the 1897 census allow to make a comparative analysis of the class structure of the population on the whole. Naturally, the class division by the end of the 19th century did not fully reflect the real social structure, especially in those cases where the intensity of the development of market capitalist relations was high and, consequently, the social mobility was developed as well. At the same time, in spite of a certain degree of formality the class structure left a significant mark on the character of the development of national processes. It is interesting to mention that though from the formal point of view Belarusians were, if one is allowed to say so, the less “peasant” nation: 92.14% were peasants whereas Estonians had 96.3% of peasants. This once again proves the formal character of class division at the end of the 19th century. The high proportion and quantity of nobility among Lithuanians (2.56%), Belarusians (1.77%) and Ukrainians (0.54%) also attract attention. The importance of this group for the development of national consolidation does not have a single meaning. As it has already been mentioned, the victory of the national movement with its egalitarian slogans means a very tangible loss of social status and identity in a “pre-mordial” understanding for the nobility. If the development of modernization has already undermined its importance this situation is not taken so hard, and it is quite the opposite in a contrary case (as, for example, in Belarus). In such conditions not only the participation of the nobility is limited. Its position in the system of the formed social rela-

tions noticeably cuts down the opportunities of rising social mobility for representatives of the petty bourgeoisie and peasants and, consequently, seriously limits the forming of potential social resources of national consolidation.

The success of the national movement is to a great degree determined by its support by the layers of the city population. Potential resources of Ukraine and Belarus greatly differed. According to the data of the 1897 census, the urban Ukrainian community had 904,000 people (32.2% of the city population) and the Belarusian community had only 107,000 people (16.5%). The proportion of city dwellers was 5.5% of Ukrainians and only 2.2% of Belarusians. The share of Ukrainians in the structure of city dwellers was close to that of Latvians (38.1%) though was considerably behind the share of Estonians (67.4%). The share of Ukrainians in the cities made up 32.2%. It reached the level of 48.8% in the cities of the Chernigov gubernia, 54.1% in the Kharkov and 57.1% in the Poltava gubernias. The Poltava gubernia and the city of Poltava are of special interest. Poltava became one of the centers of the Ukrainian national movement. We should emphasize that both the gubernia and the city had a rather average level of economic activity for Ukraine (respectively, 30 and 64 rubles per person per year). Poltava was a relatively small town with the population of 53 thousand people. However, Ukrainians made up 56% of the population. On a gubernia scale Ukrainians made up 71.5% of officials, 46.1% of lawyers, 83% of Orthodox clergy, 49.5% of teachers, 61.4% of doctors, 46% of people with education above the primary level. But one should not overestimate the importance of this fact. Lithuanians, for example, were the least urbanized nation of Central and Eastern Europe if one is to use these parameters. They had only 1.7% living in the cities making up only 7.7% of city dwellers.

Still, the decisive factor of the support of the national movement was mass literacy. The data given below provide the information about the absolute indicators of literacy which means the rate of the number of the literate towards the population on the whole. This approach somewhat differs from the one traditionally accepted in demography that considers the relation of the literate towards the population older than a certain age (usually 9 or 10 years old when a person can potentially be literate). In connection with this the data given in this publication as well as the data in other earlier publications look underestimated in comparison with the works by other authors. However, this reliance on absolute figures has a number of advantages. It corresponds to the methodology adopted in the publication of materials of the 1897 census. This, in its turn, greatly simplifies the procedure of processing and comparing the data. Calculated in absolute figures, the data prove that the lowest indicators of literacy were among Ukrainians (12.93%) and Belarusians (13.5%) while they were three times higher among Lithuanians (36.8%) and the level of literacy among Latvians (70.93%), especially Protestants, and Estonians (80.0%) practically reached the theoretically possible. This figure, as can be seen, did not depend directly on the level of economic development. For examples, Latvians had a figure lower than that of Estonians and the Ukrainian indicators were lower than the Belarusian ones. Though the levels of the economic development of Belarus and Lithuania were similar,

the indices of the literacy differed noticeably. The reasons for the differences had roots in the regional and confessional traditions. It is clear that one's belonging to Protestantism to the greatest extent supported the spread of literacy unlike one's belonging to the Orthodox Church, which influenced the spread of literacy to the lowest extent. It is quite indicative that there were 79.86% literate people among Protestant Latvians and only 44.38% of the literate among the Catholics.

As for the Catholic and Orthodox traditions, the approach towards women's education could be used as a distinctive marker. It is especially clearly seen on the example of the literacy level of Belarusians. For example, the data for four gubernias (Minsk, Mogilev, Vitebsk and Grodno) prove that the level of literacy among the Catholics (29.9%) is 2.6 times higher than the level of literacy among Orthodox believers (11.1%). It should be pointed out that if the level of literacy of Catholic male believers in Minsk was 33.5% exceeding the level of literacy of Orthodox male believers in Minsk (19.5%) by 1.7 times, the level of literacy of Catholic female believers in Minsk with its 24.9% exceeded the level of literacy of Orthodox female believers in Minsk (3.0%) by eight times! One can assume that the situation with male and female literacy among Ukrainians was similar to the situation with Belarusian Orthodox believers. Besides, it was exactly the higher proportion of Catholics among Belarusians (13.4%) in comparison with Ukrainians (2.0%) that ensured a higher average level of literacy.

In the Baltic States the level of literacy among women was higher than among men. The level of literacy among Lithuanian women in the Kowno gubernia was 44.08% while the level of literacy of Lithuanian men was 37.79%. There were 81.57% of literate women and 79.89% of literate men among Estonians in the Estland gubernia and 81.24% of literate women and 78.88% of literate men in the Kurland gubernia. The level of literacy of women and men among Latvians in the Kurland gubernia reached 79.29% and 79.02% respectively. We would like to underline that not only one's belonging to a certain confession but also a stable regional confessional tradition played its role in this case. That is why the literacy of Orthodox Estonian females (75.04%) and Orthodox Latvian females (74.11%) was rather high and exceeded similar figures among Orthodox males (70.78 and 72.84% accordingly).

In our opinion, female literacy became one of the most important factors that determined the rate of the development of national processes. Gender aspects of the development of nationalism have not been yet theoretically analyzed. Following N. Yuval Davis and F. Antias, S. Walby emphasizes that a woman not only reproduces members of ethnic communities biologically but also plays a central role in the ideological reproduction of collective identity and transmission of culture [26, p.236]. Certainly, this statement seems to be too broad; however, one cannot but agree with it. Consequently, one can make a logical conclusion that women's literacy and, correspondingly, the ability to comprehend and the readiness to retransmit national identity is a key moment in its spread in the conditions of Central and Eastern Europe. On the whole, a relatively wide scope of national consolidation among Ukrainians in comparison with Belarusians was determined

by the objective factors of the level of modernization. Equally, in my opinion, the lack of success (again, to a different extent) in the implementation of national projects can, first of all, be explained by the peculiar features of modernization. Success greatly depends on the balance between those who can form the national program and the critical mass of those who can adequately react to it. Ukrainians had significant social resources at their disposal. These resources provided for the development of the national doctrine but the lack of the prepared public made the movement extremely vulnerable in relation to the Empire's repression policy. The Belarusian movement also had to face the problem of the lack of the public; it had considerably smaller intellectual resources that did not have the appropriate centers of institutionalization. However, the Lithuanian movement that experienced the same pressure as the Ukrainian movement and that was in much more difficult modernization conditions managed to become a mass movement and at the end to achieve success exactly thanks to social resources.

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Andrei Kazakevich

THE BELARUSIAN SYSTEM: MORPHOLOGY, PHYSIOLOGY, GENEALOGY

In the Kingdom of Arles, the diocese of Valance, there is a tall tower called the Tower of Bishop Valantain; at night the tower allows no guards. If a guard is assigned to watch over the tower at night, in the morning he will be found in the valley at the foot of the tower. The guards are carried to the valley with no injuries; none of them is afraid to fall down; none is afraid to be taken away no one knows where; none feels he is being carried away; none feels he has been struck to the ground.

Gervasius von Tilbury.
Wonders of Dauphine. XIII century

Instead of the Introduction

When I was a student, I, like my many colleagues, found that the question why Belarus was unpopular as a field of research and why the regime feels no need to conceptualize itself in spite of its opponents' severe criticism was methodologically unsolvable. For some strange reason Belarus (the Belarusian situation) practically never became an object of reflection in the academic community. However, the will for self-reflection seems never to have been a distinguishing feature of the Belarusian society, and interest in Belarus had almost always been interpreted as a manifestation of "nationalistic" attitudes. This began to change cardinally only at the turn of

the millennia, and now we can really speak of the emergence of the new intellectual and political situation. The number of domestic reflections and analytical platforms has considerably grown. The number of research projects abroad has also increased. Then there started stimulation of Belarus studies, and there appeared appropriate dissertations as if Belarus had become independent only in 2000. The awareness that Belarus has got a contemporary history and genealogy seems to have emerged only quite recently. It, therefore, means that it is something more than just an everyday reality and administrative territory. Elucidation of reasons and prerequisites for the above-mentioned processes requires a separate discussion; that is why here we shall only point out this important fact. By the way, it is exactly at this time that the regime begins to conceptualize and describe itself which is revealed in the attempts of creating the “ideology of the Belarusian state” starting in 2003.

The description of Belarus from the outside is usually reduced to rather strange and very naive schemes. For Western analytical studies Belarus is practically always a “black hole”, epithets “underdeveloped”, “agricultural”, etc. being added. Not so long ago reading recommendations for foreigners who were about to visit Belarus within the framework of a “near”-political project, I came across the phrase “Belarus is a country that is not civilized enough; Internet and mobile communication appeared there only two years ago.” Regrettably, such concepts are typical not only of people “near” politics but also of real politicians (how can one forget L. Wolff with his “Inventing Eastern Europe”¹). Even for our close neighbors we are either “metastases of Stalinism” or the “lost Soviet paradise” while the Ukrainian M. Ryabchuk linked the Belarusian regime with funny Soviet-Creole nationalism, though Belarusian Soviet nationalism is not any funnier than Ukrainian “little Russianism”. In a word, the description of Belarus from the outside seems to be rather strange, but even much more strange was the low level of self-description (until quite recently) which was generally reduced to the interpretation of Belarus as anomaly or to the justification (normalization) of its “specific” way of development.

To a great extent self-description of the regime in 2002-2003 (most obviously revealed in the corpus of texts of “the ideology of the Belarusian state” – course books, university course programs, and articles) presents a response to the evaluation of Belarus from the outside. The dependence of the corpus of self-description on the outside “critical” discourses is quite significant. To my mind, this proves that self-description is a procedure which is to some extent involuntary. The “Belarusian model” of the search for self-centeredness constructs its ideology on the basis of oppositions (we – they), and this leads to its permanent “borderline” state.

The description of the regime by oppositional political science in 2001-2003 has also gone through changes. The number of books that deal with the regime and A. Lukashenko personally has grown; among them we can mention the PR-like “Invasion” and “Accidental President”. More attention is being paid to the analysis of the power structures; the “revolutionary paradigm” is losing its importance. It has got stuck at the analysis of the phenomenon of the current regime as a priori pathological and short-lived and is accom-

panied by a taboo on a number of topics (like financing the opponents of the authorities) and the uncritical attitude to their own position.

Today we can ascertain the beginning of a new intellectual situation – a gradual transition from “struggle” to “critique” (“apologetics”), and this is symptomatic, especially because the political situation itself has changed insignificantly. One can observe the tendency to normalize research and ideological discourses, which means that the social changes brought to life by the current regime are of a rather deep cultural nature.

I. Lukashenko and Revolution

The consciousness of 1994 is the awareness of the crisis, which permeates all the spheres of society. Even the Constitutional Court’s Message of 1994, a document that by definition cannot have political and even more so economic assessments, reveals the feeling of depression:

“Today the Republic of Belarus ...is at one of the most difficult stages in its development. In spite of the measures taken by the administration to get out of the crisis, the economic situation remains difficult. The standards of living of the majority of the population are falling down. Crime rate has been growing at a high speed.”

This fragment reveals the general mood that was systemically affecting the newspapers, television, political parties and even organs of power reflecting a kind of “Zeitgeist”.

Today it has become fashionable to remember with nostalgia the early 1990s as the “golden age” of economic freedom, national revival and democracy, but in reality it was first and foremost the time of crisis that required a revolution, resolute and radical transformations. Revolution is primarily a political action (and only then economic and cultural); that is why practically all the political forces of that time had their own “revolutionary project”. Each of these projects: “national revival”, “restoration of the U.S.S.R.”, “radical liberal reforms” – regarded the “existing reality” as its enemy: it was filled with crisis, social diseases, inflation, and unemployment. It was all linked with “bureaucracy”, “nomenclature”, the “state machine” as a whole, which personified corruption and injustice.

The popular masses are the main reserve of the revolution. Appeals to “the people” / the “nation” and sincere belief that the masses would support the changes were equally characteristic of the Belarusian Popular Front, the communists and the alternative political projects, one of which became A. Lukashenko.

Bureaucracy. The logic of the revolution requires a special attitude to “bureaucracy”. The state apparatus – a means of exploitation, space for corruption and inefficiency – deserves only hatred. The symbolic distance between the “nomenclature” and A. Lukashenko is emphasized to this day; the latter tries to get a position above power which he largely manages to do in both the information sphere through the media and the legal field: in accordance with the 1996 changes in the Constitution the president stopped heading the executive power and acquired the status of “head of state”.

After the victory the apparatus of the state becomes the only means of maintaining the situation, but the symbolic distance between the first person and the “vertical line of the administration» is being kept; the border between “I” and “they” does not disappear, which to a great extent allows the president to shake off the responsibility for the actions of the government and other “performers of errands”.

Enemies. The revolutionary mood of the new power of 1994-96 was also directed against the project of “national revival” and oriented towards the political and cultural “restoration” of the Soviet past. The project of “revival” was rooted out as harshly as possible (it was practically completely ousted from the political field and to a great extent from the cultural field). The project was regarded as the main source of instability in 1996 and later; in addition, the suppression of “street confrontation” helped to accumulate political capital for expansion into Russia. Only around the year 2000 the project of “liberal reforms”⁴ begins to occupy the first place of the “ideological” and political enemy.

Expansion. «There comes a moment when the territory occupied by the guerilla detachments becomes small, they penetrate into the areas where they come into collision with large enemy forces. Then the detachments get united making a monolith front and turn to the position warfare which is usually waged by a regular army” (Che Guevara). The vector of the “monolith front” for the new regime, which was striving for expansion, was connected with the East. “Revolutionary spirit” beguiles the ideological infrastructure of the regime where Pan-Slavism, different variants of Pan-Russism, neo-Slavophilism (with elements of communist rhetoric), etc. begin to dominate. The President’s Administration patronizes various Russian nationalistic groups (in particular, the radical SU “Belaya Rus (White Russia)” while Russian National Unity (RNU) nearly takes care of the president’s personal security (or even does it).

In the second half of the 1990s the radical Russian communists/nationalists (as, for example, Anpilov) were really ready to “die a soldier’s death” for Lukashenko’s regime, which embodied the possibility to crush the global logic of the developments created by “Western imperialists”. The revolutionary project of A. Lukashenko was regarded exactly as a symbol of this crush and he himself as the person who displayed a will not to play according to the usual political rules, which was earlier typical only of the leaders of unrecognized states like Transnistria.

II. After the Revolution

The revolutionary mood cannot be maintained for long if it is not supported by real political achievements – the crush took place some time at the end of the 1990s. The strategy of expansion, which was led by its own political mission (and which was only partially successful in signing a few treaties, memoranda and protocols with Russia), was replaced by the strategy of self-preservation and adaptation to the unfavorable and hostile environment. Imperial consciousness permeated with political non-conformity, anticipa-

tion of the apocalypse and the collapse of the global (or, at any rate, regional) order is replaced by the tactics of contextualization and localization of the regime. The search for one's own place is changed by its enclosure. The discourse of expansion is replaced by the discourse of contextualization and the rhetoric of the "revolution by the phraseology of "tradition". The inner enemy gives way to the outer enemy, and even the opposition is no longer regarded as a group of "destructive elements" and turns into a "bunch of puppets manipulated by the West", which is not the same thing.

The new situation contributed to the systemic colonization by the regime of the political, informational, social and even cultural space, which is beginning to correspond more and more to the structures of the Belarusian authorities. During the first half of the 1990s political and cultural "partisan" spirit could still retain its independence and social significance. Countless intellectual, literary, political and social initiatives emerged, lived and died in the "independent Belarusian society", "opposition", etc., which was parallel to the "official" one. It is enough to remember that after the 1996 referendum there existed parallel legislative and executive organs of power: the Supreme Soviet of the 13th convocation, the National Executive Committee, various magazines, newspapers, and informal communities.

However, gradually the "independent space" is colonized by the social practices of the new regime and reduced to the minimum. After 2001 "institutionalization" (inclusion in the existing structures) generally becomes the strategic goal of practically all the political and cultural projects, which meant not only the renewal of attempts to cooperate with state institutions but also the return into them (if it was possible) in order to get a greater space for activities including a career mobility.

"Independent Belarusian society" got dissolved; the "oppositional" political scientists, philosophers, writers, lawyers, and economists chose to be simply qualified political scientists, philosophers, writers, lawyers, and economists without having a rigid political orientation. Once again it became important to speak in the name of "structures" and obey the rules of corporate ethics.

Correspondingly, the means of political struggle have changed, too: mass protest actions ("resistance") of 1996-1999 have given way to the systemic practice of participation in election campaigns⁵. There has happened what may be called the "death of ideas". Ideas have finally surrendered to techniques / technologies. Political subjects begin to pay ever more attention to technologies while discussion of ideas, even in the "ideological" parties is becoming a second-rate thing. Now the victory itself over the regime is regarded exclusively as a technological / technocratic takeover with the active participation of the outer factor. Does it not mean that the idea of the contemporary Belarusian regime (as an amalgam of social practices) was generally accepted by the participants of the political game?

Moreover, in the second half of the 1990s the radical nationalist organizations demonstrated their frank hatred to representatives of the authorities and especially of the law-

enforcement bodies (symbolizing the “enemy/occupant”) while today service in the army or the Internal Ministry is considered useful for members of these organizations.

The system of power created in 1994-97 managed to ingrate a considerable part of the “disloyal” political and cultural space. The president’s rating can vary, but there are a great number of people who support the regime as an amalgam of clear and customary social practices.

III. “The Eastern European Alternative” and the “Global World”

As far back as the 1960s Europe was a conglomerate combination of diverse political projects. Spain was under Franco who did not entirely accept the rules of the European political game. Within the borders of its empire Portugal was building up a multi-racial “luso-tropical civilization” and the social political system based on the principles of corporatism. Eastern and Central Europe were united in the “Soviet bloc”, the “second world” which was opposed to the “first world” as a system. For a period of time Greece and Yugoslavia had been trying to proclaim their specific way, and, finally, communist Albania had been pursuing the policy of isolation from Europe paying great attention to cooperation with China. France, Italy, West Germany, and Great Britain were only beginning to form the integrational center of the would-be EU.

The European space (or, to be more exact, the space of what is now generally called “Great Europe”) was the location where a great number of diverse and dissimilar political projects were being developed.

However, since the early 1970s these autonomous political projects begin to give way to the “central” project of European integration, and 20 years later, at the end of the 1980s – the beginning of the 1990s, this project wins a total victory. The political landscape becomes uniform as never before. All the “alternative” regimes have failed.

With the “collapse of socialism” in 1989-91 Europe became a single political project which captivated the minds of the majority of the population and elites, considerably expanding its influence over the East and becoming the political and cultural goal of the new European policy, the object of desires and expectations.

The emergence of the monolith European landscape put all the possible “alternatives” (both right and left) in the position of enclaves, oppositional (sometimes marginal) political parties, intellectual groups, institutions, and sometimes countries. These variants of resistance had an absolutely different nature and foundation but used a similar strategy of working out their own rules of the game through breaking the principles of political correctness. These Soviet- or nationalist-based enclaves stood and continue to stand as the opposition to the political liberal project of globalization though usually they do not place themselves outside the European context.

That is why the triumph of “Great Europe” turned out to be incomplete because there have remained enclaves of instability, the steadiest of them having been Serbia and Be-

larus (though one can add here Croatia, Bosnia and Transnistria). The Belarusian regime felt solidarity with Serbia (until 2000) not so much because of its belonging to the Slavic world as because of its “non-standard regime. In 2000 Milosevic’s regime in Serbia fell and Belarus seems to be the only country left in Europe that not only kept its previous political strategy but also strengthened “alternative” elements in ideology “built not on foreign single-type projects but using the historical experience of our people”⁶.

Belarus allows itself to break a lot of rules of economy and politics which were acknowledged as axioms for this region. Belarus’ own experience proves one of the slogans of antiglobalists, namely, “the world can be different” (which, though, does not mean better). In this respect the Belarusian regime if it had good PR and did not position itself as not quite European could become an attractive symbol for both European political alternatives, the right and the left ones⁷. Belarusian authorities permit themselves to talk about the issues that other countries of the region prefer to keep silence. They openly speak against the idea of “the gold billion” and one-polar world. They talk about Americanization as a threat for all countries and, more over, they seriously discuss the topic of “liberal terror” and call the USA or Germany “modern empires”. Not without reason certain European officials declared that there is a necessity to cooperate with Belarus after the radical condemnation of the USA operation in Iraq voiced by Belarusian authorities. Other countries of Europe could not allow themselves to do just that⁸. However, the given example is more of an exception. As for its foreign political representation Belarus still remains “a grey zone” or “a black hole”, the territory that is not interesting for anybody and that can be given completely under the protectorate of Russia⁹.

The peculiar ideological frame of the Belarusian regime was formed exactly within this context. Pan-Russism and Pan-Slavism of the second half of the 1990s as the project of radical denial of the European civilization gradually moves into the past securing itself a place in a historical discourse. Appeal to the Belarusian people (academician Babosov even offered to consider “Belarusianness” to be the basis of ideology which, however, was not accepted), its traditions and state system. The Eastern Slavic civilization is changed into Eastern European. Belarus must fulfill its cultural and value mission for it¹⁰.

How long the isolated Belarusian enclave will be able to survive is difficult to say. Many countries (Portugal, Spain and others) retained their particular political systems with the practices of corporatism till the death of their symbolic centers such as Franco and Salazar. It seems that such systems (while the symbolic center remains) can exist for quite a long time if foreign intervention is excluded.

IV. Belarusian Model of Development

“Belarusian model”, “Belarusian way”, “choice” are the linguistic means of self-description of the Belarusian system which are called upon to display autonomy, self-centrality and alternativeness of economic and political reality. This work is built around a

big number of oppositions based on the contraposition of “one’s own model” and “the external standard”, “the way” and “the order”, “the choice” and “the duress”. The former is something natural, organic, worthy, and free while the latter is mechanic, forced, and conformist. However, the process of such conceptualization cannot be considered complete.

Unfortunately, the “contextualization” phenomenon of the thinking of power (anchored in the problems of “the present existence”, description of its own originality, search for its own center “here” and formulating mental borders not only in the West but also in the East) was almost unnoticed and was not reflected by the political community. At the same time, the raising of the question about “the Belarusian model of development” means something bigger than the change of rhetoric and, specifically, that the regime acquires history, and to be more exact, genealogy, including the intellectual one¹¹.

The description of “the Belarusian model of development” demands delegitimization of economic theory that is why critical attitude to liberal “theoretical schemes” (which are defined as “profanation” and “primitive propaganda”) looks quite organic against the background of discussions about anomaly, incorrectness and impossibility of existence of Belarusian economy from the point of view of liberal economic ideology¹². It is combined with a symbolical discussion with the International Monetary Fund personifying in the best case thoughtless and in the worst case deliberately destructive economic policy. This does not allow to “break away” from our “sinful earth” and forget about those initial conditions which “limit our opportunities”.

The context, national and economic features, specific conditions of development of “the Belarusian model” are all an argument in favor of the fact that is incorrect to compare us with the West and other “empires” - as we only start to develop as a state, especially because we did not have very favorable starting conditions of development. The local cancels the universal and puts its experience above the universal schemes that gives an opportunity for an economic alternative. It is natural, that it is easy to find a political basis in such rhetoric (the justification status quo), but the comprehension of it does not make the theoretical schemes offered from abroad exclusively “scientific”.

The collision of the existence of the Belarusian regime with the “logic” of economic theory in that sense as it was visioned by local “economic science”, deserves special consideration, therefore we shall not study it in detail. I shall note only, that the first apocalypse was first expected in 1995, and then - both economists-experts and liberal theorists - infinitely transferred it into the near future while the belief in some possible “crisis” (which, despite of “scientific” rhetoric, was completely irrational) has not died away.

V. Self-understanding and Evolution of the System

*Believe, we have a unique country, before the presidency
I knew not everything about its uniqueness*

A. Lukashenko

One more opposition which should reveal its expressive difference from all countries of Central and Eastern Europe is put into the base of “the Belarusian model”. “Stability”, “perfection”, “care and accuracy” are opposed to “crisis”, “radical transformation”, “shock therapy”, “collapse-like privatization” as integral forms of a political and economic landscape of the region”. Instead of the word “reform” - the central concept of the liberal economic project for Eastern Europe which “compromised itself at the beginning of the 90s”; one is offered to use “perfection”. “Perfection” presents a modernization project opposite to the project of “reforms” (to “a catastrophic way of collapse-like reforms”) under the plan of the IMF, the European Reconstruction and Development Bank, recommendations of “Western” experts and analysts, “unacceptable for the Belarusian people”.

Development should be successive, without “the cardinal breaking” of the existing system and “revolutionary experiments”. It is necessary to consider “the mentality of the Belarusian people, the people’s history and traditions”. Development should not be based on something “alien”, not implanted in an economic and social reality even if it is “scientifically proved and legitimized by “world experience”. It is natural, that Belarusian authorities do not think that “the world experience” means “universal” and that it is suitable for our reality. By the way, such position is somewhat true.

It is necessary “to stand on the shoulders” of the generation which created the existing society. “We went and we go from what we have got... we did not break anything, did not scatter and did not destroy”. “We have chosen an evolutionary way of development”.

The tendency towards adaptation by “the system” of lexicon of conservatism is obvious. During one of the seminars for top executives in April, 2003 elements of ideology of conservatism were defined as “traditionally characteristic for Belarusians”, and “today they do not lose their urgency”. This can be considered as one more means of conceptualization of political and economic status quo.

The system created as a result of “conservative” policy, should possess not only peculiar features in strategy of its development, but should also possess a corresponding structure. The distinctive feature of the Belarusian model (according to the self-description) is the absence of oligarchic clans that is provided for by the creation of strongly centralized power. But at the same time we shall recollect, that before the formation of a modern regime there was no place for oligarchic systems in Belarus. One should also take into account the processes of shadow privatization taking place today.

Absence of criminality in authorities and a low level of corruption. In the conditions of concentration of power political projects of both traditional and new criminality are

impossible. Power monopoly belongs to civil servants, directors of enterprises and only occasionally to “business” if it has a reliable bureaucratic “roof”.

“Our model has not led to mass unemployment and an impoverishment of people”. Really, the rate of unemployment in Belarus is less than 2-3% being a low parameter for Europe and a certain social achievement. Though how much it is economically effective is an open question.

Among other attributes of the Belarusian model one usually names the prevention of de-industrialization, a low level of external debts and a rather high level of social protection¹³.

VI. Rules of Power

*Even having the master, **i** and **di** cannot be compared with **sya**, deprived of the master¹⁴.*

Confucius

Political analysts like not only to copy European theories and concepts, but also to give to a political field the type of rationality that is habitual for them and that seldom is conterminous with the logic of thinking of the Belarusian regime.

The majority of analysts steadily move to fast-thinking, that is simply stating what is expected from them by newspapers or “readers” thus, responding to beliefs and expectations. Accordingly, it means the dictatorship of fashion and hackneyed phrases when defining a political situation. It is combined with the non critical attitude to one’s own position and obligatory (self) censorship. Indeed, the analyst practically cannot discuss a number of taboo topics, for example, the financing of political structures though such analysis can predetermine the development of a political situation. Bypassing taboo topics, the analyst can long argue about mentality, values, economic laws and “activity of masses”, but at the same time s/he does not mention the essence of the political process.

Therefore, many essential moments remain in a shadow, and especially - imperious relations (the rules of power) in Belarus¹⁵ which are rather far from the rationality attributed to them “from the outside”, and from images typified in mass-media and consciousness.

Power is a phenomenon of the social root taking which simultaneously stimulates both the simplification of power (oppositional analytics) and its sacralization (official propaganda). Simplification is too simple, and sacralization is too complex to be a reality. Power is the relation between the ones who have it and its subordinates. At the same time the subordinate actively influences the behavior of the master.

What Is President

“Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world”¹⁶. Unlike the majority of analysts, political scientists and journalists, I am not inclined to exaggerate a role of the president in political-bureaucratic system of a new regime. He forms the center, but it is not so much the center of “real politics”, as a symbolical/organizational basis of its legitimacy with which the forming of the structure of imperious relations begins. The question about to what extent the president defines the policy of the state, remains open and is far from rhetorical. There are no doubts that the president makes decisions and influences their execution, but does he define the policy? Decisions are accepted on the basis of information and analytics, and their only source for the president is “the system” which constructs an information reality and makes this analytics (it is often declared, that first of all, KGB and security service are engaged in this, but the list does not come to an end with them). The break to reality is practically impossible, and not necessary. Practice of “the system” is self-sufficient. It may seem to the president that he is engaged in everything, but, probably, there is only phantom of some kind of “psychological inflation” (K. Jung)¹⁷ – the expansion of individual consciousness and identity into social institutes and functions. “My money”, “my state”, “I my country” ... - the domination of similar rhetoric in speeches of the president, possibly, is the illustration of such a phenomenon. Psychological inflation is not at all pathology, but a special style of thinking which, among other things, reveals a certain loss of feeling of reality. Opinions of the system become one’s own opinions, and there are more than enough such examples in history of modern Belarus.

The practice of delegating functions, specialization, general “weariness” of the center and decrease in attention to details gradually increases in administrative relations. Attention concentrates on contacts with a small circle of information sources more and more. The main thing that distinguishes the president from other structures of the regime is the absence of fear of political or any other responsibility (threat of “dismissal”, “resignation”, etc.). It allows to ignore the habitual for the bureaucratic system aspiration to evade from personification of its functions and decentralization of responsibility and to take a symbolical “central” position in the political system.

The fact that “the center” of a mode is mainly symbolical, does not at all mean, that it has no real value for the regime. The place of the president very important because as it has been mentioned before the system of complex relations of imperious elite begins from it. For many he is the guarantor of preferences and political positions. With the big degree of probability one can say that the regime will break down together with A.Lukashenko’s leaving the political stage, at least, significant transformations await it. Thus, it is “the center”, but the center which influence on the logic and strategy of development of “the system” is rather limited, and hypertrophied ideas about his functions (widespread in mass consciousness) look quite naive.

Rules of the System - the Belarusian Corporation

There is an opinion that in the modern world there is a gradual transformation of small states into greater “McDonalds”. In order to provide for its future, a small state becomes a corporation with corporate ethics (ideology), a recognized and politically legitimate “brand” (image), a rational hierarchical structure, a corporate strategy (the program of development), management (instead of the group of proprietors), etc. One can argue about how the offered model suites all states, but the organization of the Belarusian power is very similar to a corporation. It became especially obvious after the failure of the integration project with Russia.

The corporation is subordinated to the principle of efficiency (it not necessarily economic efficiency), adaptability to manufacture, fast reaction, and survival in “the ocean of external risk”. “Political” relations in it are very far from the classical vertical scheme which is becoming more and more horizontal. The power becomes more and more interested in “the function” instead of “the consciousness”. Now it is already difficult to find people who seriously think, for example, about the ideology of the regime that does not prevent them from executing loyally their duties in the ministries, departments and committees and from serving the system.

Usually the Belarusian state and political machine is described as a centralized system with a certain hierarchy of places of localization of power. It is, however, only partially true. The present centralization is possible only under the condition of rigid specialization of functions of the subordinated subjects and only then the role of the center as a coordinator increases to the maximum. The processes of concentration of power by state machinery are more likely to be observed in Belarus, but within the limits of the system the power is rather disperse. If the performance of a certain function (for example, the sale of the state property for a certain sum) demands the coordination with the president, it means not only that the Council of Ministers cannot solve this question without “the center”, but also that the Administration of the President joins the process of decision-making and, probably, some more state bodies. In reality the procedure turns out considerably less centralized than it is represented, and the decision appears unstable and not-personified. Such decentralization also gives greater opportunities for “the revision” of the situation already after the decision has been made. It allows new lobbyist groups to enter the game. As a result it becomes difficult to find the valid center due to a plenty of procedures of coordination, consultations, duplications of functions, etc. There is only a dim field where the functions are concentrated and the decisions are made, but within the limits of its field any center has a relative character. Each official reduces his own risk introducing the procedures of infinite quantity of visas, slows down the acceptance and execution of decisions even if it corresponds to his competence. There are even fewer reasons to speak about the steady hierarchy of the imperious centers for there is no stability here too.

Concentration. The difference of the processes of centralization and concentration has been noted above. Now we shall try to look at the phenomenon of concentration in more detail.

The balance of control and efficiency is constructed on the concentration of various kinds of the capital – political, economic, cultural, etc. – within the limits of one “state” field. The logic of concentration is present practically in all administrative decisions – from turning the enterprises into joint-stock companies and reduction of public service by 10 % (the end of 2001) before the creation of the system of “ideological work”. Each social institute should carry out the maximum quantity of additional, “facultative” functions – ideological, social. The research institute, keeping the image of “a scientific institute”, should be an economically profitable enterprise, conduct ideological work and carry out a number of other social functions. The large-scale industry, concentrating in itself the function of social, political and economic control, now should be engaged also in some ideological activity. Many state institutions are simultaneously concerned about the production, control and management. The quantity of such functions continues to grow.

Concentration is up to a certain degree a process opposite to centralization which is based on the principle of specialization (the narrower the specialization, the bigger is the value of the center). Concentration leads to the creation of such a non-personified and unspecialized “system”, as is implanted in the Belarusian practice of management. Even such a delicate political project as “the ideology of the Belarusian state” is from the very beginning carried out through the giving of new ideological functions to state institutions, and the uniform methodological and “scientific” center of the project and has not been yet created (at least, so far).

Concentration of resources within the limits of the state field and their simultaneous decentralization are high enough. For this reason there was no oligarchic system in Belarus. In Belarus there is no “economic elite” for the elite is simultaneously both political, and economic, both ideological, and social, and the resources are decentralized by different parts of the social field to the maximum. In such circumstances the process of centralization of an economic resource (moving of an economic resource to one center) contradicts the logic of the system and, consequently, it is forced outside of it or is suppressed.

De-concentration is possible through privatization that is through the introduction into “the system” of some different logic, some different type of rationality. It naturally causes the resistance of the regime. For example, if it is the question of a profitable enterprise, then the privatization is unprofitable because the state system will lose profit, and together with it will lose an opportunity for the search of an extreme resource in a crisis situation. The result is the decrease in economic efficiency, but the choice of “the system” is completely rational if one is to start with its logic and interests. “... have taken away the enterprise, have fired people, have made a product, have sold, and have taken away the money”. The control over the present and over the future becomes lost: opportunities of forecasting and planning decrease promptly. Investments for “the corporation” are a

one-time inflow of the finance. One will have to pay by the loss of economic and, what is more important, social control. Besides, the change in the structure of shareholders will inevitably cause the requirement of change of management, and this is already a political question.

Power and Symbolical Game

The public side of power is based on a symbolical game. On the one hand, the president separates from “the system” and can always allow to confirm his legitimacy with charges against the bureaucracy (“I carry out my duties, but YOU [ministers, chairmen, directors] fail to fulfill your duties”) and, certainly, regular symbolical (selector meetings) and real (dismissals and arrests) reprisals. On the other hand, the system is so de-personified, that it cannot be responsible for anything, and furthermore, be guilty of all the decisions of the president. Such a game reflects the logic of the regime and a peculiar feature of its social representation.

No matter how effective selector meetings can be, it is only a symbolical display of hatred towards bureaucracy. Actually, “the people of the system” are not especially afraid of A. Lukashenko, understanding well that the main thing for their career is the relation not with “the center” but with the colleagues of their own level and their direct management. Personal relations with the president that had their importance in the first years of the president’s rule are gradually losing their value. Only “the unofficial” struggle (the struggle in the corridors) its importance. One should be afraid of friends, colleagues and enemies as only their intrigues can lead to really negative consequences. During a normal development of the situation any failure to perform the task assigned by the president (such as the type of parameters of growth by 6 %) can always be justified both theoretically, and actually. But the group of “clans” can destroy anybody no matter how close he is to the president (“good relations” can always be destroyed by “the right information”)¹⁸. The logic of system development makes functionaries more and more dependent upon each other rather than upon the “abstract” first person.

VII. Management and Structures of Domination

Within the limits of the Belarusian field “the system” owns three structures of domination. Direct domination (the metaphor for which is the word “property”) is most important and occupies “the system forming” positions (“possession” of concerns, enterprises, collective farms, etc.). It allows to have not only economic, but also administrative control (as an employer) over certain segments of society.

It is the private (internal) ownership of the system of the means of economic, cultural and political control. The property right on system forming institutions has economic, social, and administrative value. All directors of large factories, educational structures, mass-

media, etc. are appointed by the president, and the appointment goes through the circle of “coordination” in presidential administration, the Council of Ministers, etc. Who shall occupy the post of the chairman of a collective farm is not so much an economic decision. It is more of a political decision. The right to management can proceed only from the system itself.

Indirect Domination – Rent Relations

While the state is capable of keeping control over an enterprise or a branch of economy, it keeps it. But not everywhere direct domination yields desired results. The system needs “lacunas”, as in the shadow of itself. The relation of “the lacuna” to the system has rather the character of vassalage than the character of direct submission: here loyalty has a greater value than economic efficiency; the essence of activity is to serve “the system” (its specific parts) instead of a structural submission. The business having an administrative roof, does not obey ministries and concerns. It serves ministers and directors of factories. Loyal mass media can independently form the information policy, but at the same time they should always promote political stability, advertise only the coordinated candidates at local and national elections and to provide for their “independent” political career. Similar functions are carried out by loyal political parties and public associations built into the system as personified projects which work not so much for the regime but for its certain centers.

Vassal structures receive a part of social and economic space of “the system” for rent. They pay, accordingly, a rent which is combined with informal payments and corruption. Inclusion into bureaucracy is very often an only opportunity to retain one’s own business.

For the functionaries the system declares greater risks (a disciplinary punishment, dismissal, etc.) and puts them into a complete state of dependence. Vassal structures have the main task of decreasing this risk, i.e., the provision of additional profits, work for relatives and friends, etc.

On the other hand, such business should maintain its complete loyalty and, the main thing is to know its place as an additional element of the state system placed on the lowest step of political hierarchy. Until now a significant part of the bureaucracy has retained an organic feeling of contempt towards “nasty businessmen” and symbolically separates itself from them in social practice¹⁹.

The indirect sector of domination is formed at different levels, including the lowest ones. It is poorly connected with “the center”, at least until the emergence of conflicts with the regional “roof”. But when “the system” reveals even minor signs of weakness, “tenants” of political legitimacy start to demonstrate their rights and even try to impose conditions on officials to whom they pay. Such attempts to intercept the initiative are rigidly suppressed. It is the logic of the system. It means that the people who “keep” a certain

amount of parts of “the system” have lost the feeling of reality. They start to think that they have mastered the situation and that now they should not pay for legitimacy, it should be vice versa. There are attempts to change the system of domination, to make it one’s own property and such actions can bring success at certain local levels. However, usually such efforts draw attention of the center and different clan groups and are quickly suppressed. The control of the one, who gives the bribe over the one who receives it, cannot be long.

Belarusian authority usually deals very cautiously with such a business and never recognizes the business as a part of itself. Therefore, even though it stimulates its development at the same time it limits and supervises. “Repressions” in this sphere are usual politics tricks, the result of exclusively some clan struggle or “success dizziness” which is combined with the loss of feeling of one’s own place. But, as Nietzsche would say, repressions are just some dust rising above the battle field, and the dust should not cover what happens in reality. Attempts to consider each such case a victim of “political” repressions are symptomatic but they do not have any relation to the essence of the occurring processes.

By the way, we shall mention that the number of those who wish to receive the vassal status both from business and from the political sector is much higher than from the social and economic space which is leased by the system. Therefore, the inclusion into the relations of vassalage (indirect domination) collides with the competition and many subjects of this field are compelled to be loyal to authorities receiving practically no dividends for it.

Secondary Structures

However, not all structures of the economic and public sphere receive legitimation from the system. Entrepreneurs²⁰, different public initiatives without a certain political orientation are forced to be in “free” condition that does not present much interest to the system.

Secondary structures interest the system only as an additional (but it is far from being the main one) source of profit coming in the form of taxes and a “tribute”. Small business is outside of the system, social and economic space of the system is not leased to it, but this business fills lacunas and emptiness, in the majority not interesting corporations. Its social base is “temporarily unemployed” (politically and socially insignificant agents), its economic base includes the spheres where “the system” structures are not capable of effective supervising of the situation. If the state structures have shown their interest in the busy economic sphere, then to take it away from small business is not a problem.

Small business is not especially interesting for the regime from the point of view of the social control: the strike of merchants will never lead even to a part of the political resonance which such an action a large factory could cause.

Secondary structures are not given additional social functions which state factories or businesses having “the roof” have got. They play only one role: a fiscal role. The system of statutory acts and control bodies is constructed according to this logic.

Usually the state is interested not so much in how effective the work of such an organization is effective economically, but how this work can be supervised. Local authorities bear the responsibility for “the disorder and larceny” of the business. Business can be given freedom, but the amount of this freedom depends on how much it gives in to the control and discipline - fiscal, social, political. If there is no discipline, there will be no limit and if there is no limit then there will be “complete lawlessness” which means the instability that “the system” cannot allow in general.

VIII. Degrees of Power (Some Words about Political System)

The Belarusian authority is “rigid”²¹, concentrated and weighed as “it is necessary to consider what happens in our country and what happens around it”. “Without strong power that organizes all processes, we shall simply collapse, like others, there will be complete criminality in the country”. Such power is self-described as a unique opportunity to stay away from disintegration, fragmentation, crisis and decline. “Today one can say what one wants to say about authorities, but it is not drunk authority. It is the authority that answers, protects interests, solves problems ... “The President (as a symbolical and organizational center of this authority) is ready to recognize “the presence of elements of authoritarianism” during the practice of his administration. Authoritative authority is a necessary thing but it is also situational, “each society during such a complex period solved the problems by means of strong authority”.

The Belarusian authority agrees that its properties include totality, weight and a high level of concentration. But in discussions it is compelled to prove its natural, nonviolent and legitimate character. Definitions “dictatorship”, “usurpation” are rejected, and it means, that the political and administrative position of authority demands some justification and proof, that “dictatorship is an ideological attack, mere words” and nothing else. In definition of its essence the authority takes the position of justification, it means that communication with “critics” is not torn.

Principles

The Belarusian regime emphasizes its normativity, internal integrity and subordination to certain steady principles which should demonstrate stability. Among these principles politicians more often name fairness (which is combined with the rigid control and insistence), sincerity (“it is necessary to speak about the facts”) and dislike for “violence” in the streets more often. (Probably, by inertia) special attention is paid to the latter: it is repeatedly emphasized, that “the street is not politics » and all should be “civilized”, within

the limits of the dialogue. Mentions of street opposition play the role of some negative background when it is a question about opposition, “destructive forces” and attempts to destabilize a political situation. It once again confirms a greater role of street resistance of 1996-1999 in the forming of the regime (no matter how fatal and ineffectual that resistance could seem)²².

Infrastructure of the Regime

When defining its infrastructure - institutions and organizations which formally are not a part of the state machinery but carry out various auxiliary functions within the limits of “a civil society”, - the authority usually names trade unions, local councils and youth organizations (BRUY). We shall not study in details each of these structures, we shall only note that such configuration developed only in 2002 when the rigid control over trade unions was established. Local councils were always loyally passive in a political life. But after the elections in 2003 there was a desire to make a more active structure from them. The reform of local self-management is not being discussed. Reception by local councils of financial autonomy has no basic value - all of them equally administratively depend on “the center”, and the structure of local controls and self-management is substantially defined by the Administration of the president. The main argument against the reform of local self-management is the decentralization that in presence of disproportions in regional development and consequences of catastrophe at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant will result in the decay of whole areas (“will put them on the edge of destruction”). As for the BRUY then the artificial creation of the general (total) youth structure began in 1997 with the founding of the BRUY. This structure received its modern registration in 2002 by the merger of the BRUY and BUY into a uniform organization.

The regime specifically in comparison with other countries of the region, deals with parties. No loyal political project became influential. It is a unique situation demanding special consideration outside this text.

Political discipline

*Once, I remember, when there was still an old mayor of Minsk,
I started to bring the city into order. I say:
It should be made so. “This, Alexander Grigorievich,
is impossible! » I say: «If you do not do it - I shall expel you!!! »*
A.Lukashenko

If one understands politics as an open political game then the Belarusian “system” since the crisis of 1994-1996 is apolitical and monolithic. Therefore, in it different forms of directive planning and disciplining of a political life look absolutely natural and logical.

Before the elections there is a stage for planning the structure of future elective bodies and the plan of representation is openly declared. This plan is similar to a directive task according to which there should be of about 40% presence in the local council and parliament of women and youth or the preservation of a sufficient amount of “skilled staff” in elective bodies should be assured (not less than 50 %). Thus, the personnel work in elective bodies does not really differ from purposes in the bureaucratic machine. Phrases about planning the results of elections (predetermined results) are conveyed by authorities quite often though usually they are supplemented with democratic rhetoric and appeals to “law”. There is no doubt that the personal structure of elective bodies with minor exceptions is already defined by authorities prior to elections.

The political discipline means not only the planning of the structure of elective and non-elective bodies, but also the disciplining of the agents of the regime. Woven into the net of facts and hidden practices, work in “the system” defines a number of requirements, most significant of which are not “moral substance” and “belief” (though they are sometimes declared by authorities), but different degrees of loyalty and functional utility (“loyal professionalism”²³). The basis of personnel selection is “the loyalty to Belarus, to the state and patriotism”, “loyalty to the carried policy”. Accordingly, the heaviest political sin is the treason. Treason is the most dangerous display of non loyalty that the president regularly emphasizes. Certainly, competence and professionalism have a great importance but “for our society it is important that they [people of “the system”] were fair. Were not traitors. And we have got such. If one does not agree with the policy, go openly to the opposition. There is no place for traitors in the team”. Proceeding from this logic, the greatest threat for local authorities is represented by “a swindler” who combines elements of political disloyalty and criminality. Normative parameters, checks, instructions, reorganizations and dismissals are intended to solve the problems with discipline.

Binary Opposition of Authority/Opposition

For authorities the political field of Belarus is expressively divided into sectors depending on the level of loyalty. Despite of a number of nuances, this division basically comes down to the binary opposition of authority/opposition. This opposition penetrates the political rhetoric of authority and considerably influences its structure into which the opposition is entered as the mass which uses the scheme “the president is bad, the people is “the cattle”, the country is “the boondocks of Europe” when thinking.

The opposition condition acquires ontologic features of disloyalty, instability, destructiveness and orientations to the West. The perception of the opposition as the other is emphasized even by the use of the other language. In particular, the majority of cases of the use of the Belarusian words and phrases in the speeches of the president is connected with the definition of opposition (“national conscious”, “democrats”) and political plans of the opposition (“to Europe”, “to the West”). The use of the Belarusian language be-

comes a political marker defining the context of the opposition condition despite of the underlined loyal attitude to the Belarusian language in general.

The reason for the existence of the opposition is known: it is either lack of the information (and, as a result, the misunderstanding of the state policy)²⁴, or “dishonesty”, “self-interest” and “indecent behavior” of some politicians. Any opposition can be removed either through the explanation of “the facts of the true state of affairs” or through the exposure of its self-interested political essence. The branched out ideological infrastructure with ideology courses in high schools, ideological work “in working collectives”, propaganda brigades and state mass-media is created to conduct work in the first direction. There is a concentrated and rigid state machinery to work with the second category of “the opposition”.

Enclaves of Opposition

Opposition as the factor of instability is distributed in social space non-uniformly and, except for political parties together with the structures close to them, concentrates in a number of spheres and social groups: formation, culture, “youth”, etc. Among such enclaves, in particular, higher education establishments and students (generators and carriers of the most radical ideas of transformation of society), whose “unclear” opposition mood cannot but disturb the authority. One of the books that has become the empirical basis of this text (“the Historical Choice of Belarus”) consists of the president’s speeches to students. Higher education establishments come across as a special object of imperious domination in these speeches. The control of students’ loyalty is very different, but it seems that the main means is the “work” with rectors who should carry out state policy in state high schools and ensure results at the elections (the former rector of BSU was blamed for the latter). Other important means include the development of loyal youth organizations and ideological work. Rectors themselves, certainly, come out with more effective means of loyalty provision. In particular, the conclusion of contracts about nonparticipation in opposition actions in exchange for the right not to attend official actions.

Any allocation of means to disloyal groups and structures is inefficient. The authority openly declares, that financing, for example, cultural projects is possible under the condition of their implementators’ loyalty. Disloyal cultural practices cannot be stimulated; they should be subjected to repression in every possible way. Opposition attitude breaks the internal logic of the “system” control, raises its instability, therefore, a negative attitude to such an activity is absolutely logical, as well as the strategy for social isolation of such practices. It is necessary, at least, to change the structures of power distribution if one is to legitimize “the opposition” but this cannot be allowed.

IX. Identity – State and National

... There are often such annoying cases, when in one village there are Belarusians and “local people”. “Local people” consider Belarusians to be a party, as, for example, PPI, communists, etc. ... “local people” do not want to join this Belarusian “party”!
N. Shkyljonok

The Belarusian identity has recently become an attractive object of research given enough scientific and non scientific attention. This research consists of reflective texts where the structure of the Belarusian consciousness is only vaguely designated by the opposition of “Western” and “Eastern” principles, empirical sociological research of “the system of values”, national, cultural and religious belonging, various variants of the analysis of a political (and historical) choice, etc.

Practically all the studies the goal of which is to define the structure of the Belarusian consciousness²⁵, come across its non-integrity. Usually the analysis leads to the formulation of binary opposition of two²⁶ non-identical and unlike Belarusian mentalities which resist each other both politically and culturally²⁷. Division criteria are very different: the attitude to reforms (“progressive” and “conservative” consciousness), to national values (“conscious” and “irresponsible”), to subethnic division (“Litvins” and “Ruthenians”), to political orientation (“nationalists-Belarusians” and “Russophiles-West Russians”). The same strategy of binary opposition is supported also by those who divide identity into “weak” and “strong” (I. Bobkov), “national” and “pre-national”²⁸, and it is better to say “national” and “local”. Deep analysis of two types of the Belarusian identity and how much the designated oppositions are adequate to the Belarusian demands a special research. Here we shall only note the fact of its division and we would like to draw attention to the fact that the existing authority spreads the second opposition member mentioned type of identity: “weak”, “pre-national”, “local”, “conservative”, “Russophile”, etc.

Domination of such identity made a part of the revolutionary project of 1994, despite the fact that the political rhetoric of the new authority at the beginning felt a very powerful influence of Pan-Slavism (in its Russian, Pan-Russian form) and the idea of the restoration of the USSR. The Russian (Soviet) orientation was situational and was connected with the necessity to keep the traditional cultural and political donor.

Genetically imperious consciousness is connected not with “West Russianness” which at first, resisted the Polish cultural context and then to the Belarusian national movement but with the self-consciousness of the locals the most significant feature of which is an exclusively practical instead of ideological attitude to what forms the so-called system of national values (the language, traditions, the state, identity, etc.), the desire to avoid identification, the aspiration to preserve an uncertain cultural and national condition and, accordingly, the necessity of a cultural donor (the external manufacturer of “a high culture”)

for others. It is natural, that the XIXth century “localness” has gone through some important transformations, the major one of which is the industrialization and the formation in the structure of the BSSR of the Belarusian Soviet identity, the “local” elements of which stimulated political loyalty and were cultivated by the Soviet authority. But with certain assumptions such strategy of behavior in a political and cultural field remains actual today.

Nevertheless, the description and the self-description of this “silent”, “dim” and “uncertain” identity that considered it to be best to remain in the shadow of others, began not so long ago. The formation of “the ideology of the Belarusian state” is one of the attributes of this process.

Imperious identity in Belarus today is various but we are greatly interested in the practice of evasion from identification by the washing out and decentralizing (this concept will take the main place in our analysis) of identity. Power²⁹ has no firm national identification. It is expressed in the form of a regular reminder about the similarity between Belarusians and neighboring peoples. In particular, the essence of the Belarusian language according to the approach of “the locals” is defined by the formula “a Polish word, a Russian word, a Ukrainian word”, which means something that is not self-sufficient, that does not possess the center and ethnic/national root.

Genealogically, the consciousness of power is closely connected with the Belarusian Soviet identity. It was constructed according to the political practices of industrialization, mass migration and formation of “a single Soviet people”. The basis of all this was the principle of Russo-centeredness. Certainly, a considerable part of features of the “normal” Soviet identity disappeared together with the formation of a new Belarusian state. An intrinsic transformation of “the Russian center” is also going on. Transformation of the Soviet identity has many reasons, but the most important one was the change of power systems and moving of the political center from Moscow to Minsk.

The Soviet consciousness had two levels, namely, the Soviet Union consciousness and the national consciousness. The Russian language and culture were universal for “the whole union level” with national cultures occupying local niches at the second level accordingly. With the disintegration of the USSR, the formation of an independent state and concentration of political power in Minsk the national-state identity inevitably loses its hierarchy and becomes single-level. It has raised a very important practical question, “What is the content of the national?” (As the national was no longer local). The Russian language lost the legitimation of the center and this caused two inconsistent tendencies: a turn to “Belarusianness” and preference of its gradual expansion not only in the project of “revival” but also in the project of “the creation of the state” which was formed by a part of the post-Soviet elite. Belarus was to become a normal state and it means the state with its own language, tradition, mythology and by that to generate a single-level identity, similar to the Lithuanian or Polish identities.

The opposite strategy demanded the inclusion of the Russian language and culture into the limits of the single-level identity or, in other words, their inclusion into the local context. The logic of such a process demanded the deprivation of the Russian center of

monopoly for cultural products and actual destruction of Russo-centeredness. The only barrier here were the attempts to revive the hierarchical consciousness due to the creation of a new “union”, “an allied state”, but from the beginning of this century the question of “independence” and value of the Belarusian center, apparently, has been solved.

The regime attaches a lot of importance to the legitimization of the Russian language for Belarusians. The legitimization formula seems to be simple: “Russian is not only Russian”. In his lectures for students A.Lukashenko³⁰ repeatedly uses the fable about how B.Yeltsin wished to thank A.Lukashenko for the referendum in 1995 (more precisely, for giving the Russian language the status of the second state language). There is nothing to thank for as “Russian is our language too”, answered the president then.

“We cannot give back our Russian language to Russia”. “The language we speak, is not only Russian, it is also our language”. “We enclosed just as much of our soul, feelings, emotions and other things into as Russians did”. It is being proved that the Russian language should be considered native for Belarusians and be a real value.

Such rhetoric is combined with the attempts of decolonization of the Russian language – “We have got a special kind of the Russian language, a unique Belarusian accent and we shall not abandon this language”. The Russian language in Belarus acquires national Belarusian features³⁰. “Pure Russian differs from the one used to receive education and the one we use speak”. It is the language of our people who for a long time lived not “between Moscow and Warsaw” but “in the Russian empire and the Soviet state” and, respectively, gives us the right for its cultural heritage. Features of the Russian language in Belarus, thus, are used as a means to prove its “closeness” for people, “deep roots” in the Belarusian cultural landscape and to show its national (not Russian) character. Such attempts can be perceived with some irony but it is an important tendency of modern development of Belarus which will become only stronger as time goes by.

“Privatization” of the Russian language looks strange (and even naive) when the attempts of its historical legitimization are being made. It is stated that F. Skorina wrote “in Russian” though it is well-known that he did not include the “Russian” (“Moscow”) content into the term “Russian”.

The Belarusian language is identified by authorities as something “native” and “natural” – “the mother’s language”. It is not a subject for reasoning and, naturally, is not a tool for a wide use. One does not need to speak it or use it when writing, one is just to know it³¹. Naturalness and likeness should be quiet and express no claims for social expansion, it should be “a tamed other”³² hidden in the body of its own identity.

There are no problems in the similar status with the Belarusian language in a sense that the language is not a problem. Nobody forbids to use it, it is permitted even to support various cultural and social enclaves where it can be completely legitimate (Belarusian literature, history, study of local lore, etc.) but if a question of the increase of the social status (expansion of space) is raised, the attitude to it changes dramatically.

The political argument “against the language” was generated at the beginning of the 1990s and since those times it has not really changed: “forced introduction of the lan-

guage leads to social unrest". The latter became one of the reasons of defeat "of those people who had power at the beginning of the 1990s".

The policy of power aimed at constraining the spread of the Belarusian language, has mainly sociopolitical argumentation and is formulated in the context of justification. It is possible to speak about the presence of a certain political "complex of the Belarusian language" when its displacement from the daily use makes political subjects use rather cautious arguments as well as "the justification" and demonstration of symbolical attachment to it. It proves that that the power identity is not deprived of the influences of the "revival" discourse which allocated the central place to the language. However, it is probably a single example of such influence.

Localization of the Russian language and existence of the Belarusian language in the limited social frameworks make the linguistic element of identity broadcast by the authorities, decentralized and not completely defined. The desire to avoid definiteness demands, however, the de-legitimation of not only "the national language" as an attribute of the Belarusian ethnos, but also the deconstruction of judgments « about "the uniform origin of modern Belarusians".

Indicative here is the regular use (particularly, in the president's lectures to students) of the metaphors of scale "incest" and the description of Belarus as "a melting pot". Naturally, the image of Belarus as "a melting pot" has little in common with processes of real ethnogeny but it is an important element of political rhetoric of the regime. Political goals of the metaphor "the melting pot" are obvious as they reflect fundamental structures of national identification of power. "We have such mixed ... ", "we, Belarusians, are, consequently, so sly and clever because a Belarusian is a bouquet of bloods". It is mentioned that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rzecz Pospolita and the Soviet Union developed as multinational states. Such understanding of the Belarusian nature contradicts even the concept of the Soviet nation which recognized a separate ethnic origin of Belarusians.

"Internationalism but not nationalism comes out among features of the Belarusian character... ". "When we were creating our hymn ... I said: make our hymn sound like a hymn of the people-internationalist"³³. To understand the identity of power the word "internationalism" here needs to be understood not within the framework of the Soviet tradition (equality/solidarity of peoples) but as a practice of the nation-between (the infer-nation), as a condition of legitimate uncertainty and a desire to avoid deep and obligatory national identification. Traditional for Eastern and Central Europe centers of national identity, namely, the language and the general origin are sublimated by the political experts of the regime. Upon the disintegration of the Soviet consciousness the first place, just like before in history is occupied by practices of "localness", up to the national and inter-national which are combined with the traditional aspiration to avoid definition of the content of its own identity, articulation of "the non-peculiarity" and "similarity" of the national Belarusian and the other. For the inter-nation the situation of two languages or, more exactly, of no language (meaning the existence without a national language) is

more natural as well as a nihilistic attitude to each of the national languages which by definition cannot be self-valuable for the “local” self-consciousness.

The inter-national metaphor is also created to provide the answer to a more important from the political point of view question, “How do we, Russians and Belarusians, differ?” The concentrated answer of the authorities will be that there is practically no difference at all. As a result of “the objective reasons, first of all, economic ones, and traditions we are practically one people”. The word “practically” is central here: practically no difference means that there are no differences that would have practical importance (economic, political etc.). The word practically bears special semantic value for identity referring to infinite nuances of useless and uninteresting diversity³⁴. “Normal Russianness» of the Belarusian regime collides with abnormal political, economic and cultural Russianness of Russia more and more often. This sometimes causes sincere misunderstanding and even greater alienation. The distance between the Russian “Russians” and Belarusian “Russians” inevitably increases, more and more calling into question the metaphorical “commonness”.

The State

The state is a unique “center” the existence of which is admitted and spread by the regime. Other possible points of concentration of consciousness and authority – the nation, language, cultures, etc. – are consecutively de-legitimated by political and cultural practices of the regime. Unlike “the Belarusian state”, its independence and sovereignty, the Belarusian nation represents a rather vague value for the ideology of the Belarusian regime.

If the national (in the sense of being national-cultural) identity of “the Belarusian model” is aimed at the maximum uncertainty then the state consciousness is revealed openly. Though the uniform understanding of the state tradition is absent, the value of “sovereignty and independence”, “our common house of Belarus” is emphasized in every possible way and is not called into question. We “should have an independent state”, “we should develop independently”. Independence is usually broadcast by the authority as an indisputable value, the main means to ensure state, national and people’s interests.

Such “state oriented” rhetoric is a rather new phenomenon, most openly formulated after 2000 when the project of integration with Russia began to lose the political capital. Earlier, in the middle of the 1990s the word “independence” (which, apparently, sounded too “nationalist”) was sublimated and was replaced by a more politically correct “sovereignty”. Belarus is “a sovereign republic”. It caused steady associations with the Soviet state tradition and the BSSR³⁵. Now the word “independence” moves to the foreground and obtains an increasing importance, even for the discourse of “the ideology of the Belarusian state”.

The project of integration with Russia retains its urgency, but starts to acquire some different sounding. It is necessarily an equal in rights Union of two independent and sovereign states. “We, Belarusians, have a different mentality: Russians are not afraid if they are ruled by a foreigner (that happened many times in the history of the country)” (p. 78). “They are not afraid and we should keep our ground”, “we are ready to share the sovereignty but equally and Russia should do the same”. “Only equal rights for all – no “incorporation of Belarus”.

More indicative statements are also allowed. If equality does not take place “having squeezed our teeth we shall have to suffer, we shall work as it is”. In this case even the existence without the Union does not look like a catastrophe though 3–4 years ago it meant deviating from the state policy. Probably, it is only rhetoric, but the fact that such an idea was made public says a lot. Thus, “the weak” identity of authority has one “strong” exception - the Belarusian state. If at the earliest stages of evolution of the regime the statehood was considered only to be a means to achieve the goals set by the revolution of 1994 (including the penetration into the Russian political market) then later the statehood turned into the unique space of the existence of the regime. Now the Belarusian state has acquired great political importance and sometime after 2001 an expressive identification of authority began together with it. Gradual myth making and introduction of it into the system of “stable values” also began if one can talk about such things in our context at all.

The aspiration to avoid national and cultural identification is one of attributes of the modern world when the choice of self-consciousness becomes a problem and the limits of habitual identity become washed away. Nevertheless, for Belarus this phenomenon is not so new, it has more of the traditional character well described already in the XIXth century. Cultural practices are aimed at the maximum dispersion of identity and deprivation of its expressive center the place of which can be claimed by the state only.

Sometimes those who sincerely love the Belarusian culture and language, have a cold attitude towards the Belarusian state. On the other hand, people devoted to the idea of the independence of Belarus very often do not understand why “one clings to the collective farm, half dead language”. It would be possible to name this identity “hybrid” or, following the term used by V. Abushenko, “Creole” if it were not for an inexcusable uncertainty of these concepts for the Belarusian context. Hybridity assumes the presence of two “pure” initial types which then will form certain “mix”, “synthesis”, etc. “Creole identity” requires the search of the center, periphery and migratory movement. The revelation of both the first and the second upon close research collides with significant conceptual difficulties.

National/State Symbolics

In 1995 when the white-red-white flag on the building of the Administration of the president was being torn into pieces the rest of the political project of “revival” which it

seemed embodied the main threat of destabilization for the new regime was being destroyed. When the youth in 1995-1996 burned down red-green flags, tore them off from the columns during demonstrations and removed them from official buildings, it was also a political action of the opposition to the regime and “occupation”. Gradually, however, the new symbolics started to be perceived not as a symbol of occupation but as a wrong Belarusian symbol that stopped having its specific political value especially because the whole generation has already grown knowing only it.

The new symbolics becomes a part of identification, a means of representation of not only and not so much of the regime but of Belarus. This attitude can be compared to the attitude to the symbolics of the BSSR which could be perceived as “wrong”, but simultaneously it was an important element of national self-difference.

The red-green flag now is a “wrong” Belarusian symbol. It is wrong but it is Belarusian and less Soviet.

Authority legitimizes the new (“some people name it the Soviet symbolics”) symbolics through “the people” and “the law”. “If we want to change the symbolics that our predecessors lived, worked and fought in the war with then we should consult the people. I gave people an opportunity to decide” – I organized a referendum. Now everyone should respect this symbolics because it is the law the way it was done by the president himself in 1994 kissing the white-red- white flag during the inauguration. Transfer of argumentation into the “legal” sphere is an additional proof of the decrease in the political and emotional saturation “of the dispute about symbols”.

X. Genealogy of the Regime

In 1995 everything laid in ruins.

A.Lukashenko

Despite such rhetoric, we cannot speak about the direct continuity of the Soviet regime in modern Belarus. I think this is obvious to everyone except for external/foreign analysts who prefer to apply their own schemes to everything. The revolution of the middle of the 1990s did not become either “the returning of the names” or “the returning to the mother”³⁶. In order to create its own genealogy the regime more frequently uses the opposition to “the chaos of the beginning of the 1990s” from which it arose.

The image “of the beginning of the 1990s” is a system forming image which gives a start to the “normal” forming of the Belarusian state. The regime really deduces its genealogy from 1994-1996 and, naturally, has no desire to identify itself somehow with the first years of independence. The president precisely defines the age of “our state” - 1995 (the year of the first referendum and formation of the “verticals of authority”). Following the logic of ideological schemes, 1990-1994 are the years that represent the elements of destruction, ethnic animosity, an economic collapse, political anarchy and treachery. The

epoch of “democracy”, “independence” (only in quotation marks for here one cannot talk about true democracies and independence which personify the regime) is a treacherous plan which has become a nightmare. The usual position of the system representatives: that is exactly what happened in those days but I (we) have no relation to it, “the opposition” (that is “those-who-are-now-in-the-opposition”) - they are guilty, we were the last bastion of “common sense” against “the reformatory”, “the nationalist”, “the liberal” etc. madness. Thought many from the regime machinery occupied high positions then and still recollect those times as “the Golden Age”, “when much was possible”.

“I think, many remember the ruin in the middle of the 1990s, unfortunately, the ruin was found not only in material resources, but first of all in the heads, the way of life” (!? – A.K.). “Therefore, I am allowed a lot and you have no right to take offence”. Such a syntactic construction starts to build a specific logic of thinking which goes far behind the frameworks of disputes about what actually took place and that makes the basis for the strategy of management. It is surprising how strong is still the appeal to the democratic authority of the period of 1991-1994. The term of existence of the present regime increases the time of “democracy” by three times but the appeal to this rather remote period has still great importance in the discourse of power.

Here are some most important binary oppositions used by the modern regime to build its genealogy:

- to sell, to stop large enterprises, to give power to criminality and corruption or to put things in order in all structures of the government;
- to leave education, science, health care without state support or to maintain a strong state policy;
- to retain parliamentary anarchy or to build an effective vertical of authority with personal responsibility;
- to move in the nationalist direction or to ensure sociopolitical stability.

Such oppositions can be found in all speeches of the president and mean a lot.

The act of forming the regime is legitimized not only by the condition of “chaos” but also by “the people’s support”. Supposedly, the people itself independently revealed its adherence to the new regime and the new Constitution at the referendum. Moreover, the solving of the constitutional crisis in favor of the president was “the only way to avoid violence” because “some people already “rattled the saber” and provoked “the use of force”.

The new regime did not possess corporate unity and did not have its own team because the president lacked the experience of bureaucratic and state machinery work. There was enough authority for the arrival of “new”, ambitious bureaucracy, but “something held it back from mistakes”. Now the regime considers it to be its merit that it did not begin “to take drastic measures and to change all authority”, “there were a lot of talented people there, and the experience was polished for many years. This kernel remained and, first of all, in economy”. A part of “the new people” ran away from the government while others started to work with ideology, personnel and law. Those who should not “have power”

in view of their “treachery and dishonesty” (it concerned both the old and the new elite) became “the destructive opposition”.

“ ... Then there was a referendum. Then we floundered, somehow getting out, using the experienced staff ... then there was a problem and we solved it”. This is a brief self-description of the Belarusian regime’s own genealogy given by the regime itself.

Thus, the regime starts its genealogy approximately in 1994-1995. The rhetoric of authority regularly emphasizes, that Belarus has only started to develop as a state. “We, like other CIS countries, had no traditions of the statehood. In the Soviet times we were “the suburbs”, “a province” and, naturally, did not have what the state should have”.

Unlike the majority of the countries of the region which use various ways try to deepen their history, the Belarusian authorities do not need to this (all the rhetoric about “the tradition of the Belarusian people”, “roots”, etc. has some abstract instead of particular historical content or, to be more precise, this content is deliberate ahistorical). Even more important is the following: (especially for an outside observer): the regime does not deduce the genealogy from the Soviet system though it emphasizes its symbolical loyalty to its experience. The new regime is the suppression of the post-Soviet chaos instead of the life *mos maiprum*³⁷ of the Soviet political and economic system as it is frequently described (and, in my opinion, it is absolutely groundless) by domestic mass-media and also by the Russian and western analysts.

XI. History and its Future

*If someone wished to prove, that history-
is only a toy in the hands of those who play with it he could
take Belarus and Ukraine as an example*

Daniel Bovua

History is an important element of national identity: “The historical experience collected by the people should be used creatively to strengthen our young statehood, to solve the problems of the past and the present”. “According to the historical scale Belarus is a young country but our people has a centuries-old history”. Fight for history and more precisely, for historical memory in Belarus has been going on for several centuries; even in modern Belarus such struggle has its own plot full of events, it is enough to recollect how many times history textbooks were rewritten in the last 13-14 years.

Political forces treated and still treat history very seriously, searching in history not only for means to form mass consciousness, but also for the source “sacral” for society. Interpretation of history in the discourse of power has been changed recently but the changes mainly concern a different arrangement of accents instead of some radical revision.

Prevalent till now still remains the concept of a triune Russian people and common Russian origins of our statehood³⁸. Concepts of the common Russian nationality, language,

consciousness, state (“based on a strong princely authority”) are perceived as an axiom. This even serves as a naive argument in favor of historical sources of bilingualism in Belarus.

Integration of the historical and cultural heritage of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into a historical canon of authority occurs slowly though a certain progress in this process can already be seen. Russian lands showed “persistent resistance” to the expansion of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Polotsk and Vitebsk principalities repeatedly revolted against the authorities of the Grand Duchy. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania is an alien state and it cannot be considered actually Belarusian though it is possible to consider it to be Belarusian up to a certain degree. Similar formulas define the status of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the historical canon of official authority. Special attention is given the statement of orthodox identity, some kind of a myth about “special fidelity of Belarusians to Orthodoxy” which “was kept and became stronger during the centuries” and that cannot be considered to be true historically (it is enough just to recollect the reformation, two centuries of domination of the Union and modern religious indifference).

It is natural that annexation to Russia was a positive fact (the Belarusian people was rescued from the gentry anarchy), and revolts against Russia represented the movement of the gentry which “spirit was alien” to the Belarusian people.

The BPR is not a state while the BSSR is the cradle of Belarusian independence. Repressions of the 1930s almost did not concern Belarusians “as Belarus had good leaders who ... always protected the people”.

A number of other historical myths are being cultivated: Belarusians never were conquerors; they always were guided by social justice rules. Besides, the whole historical way of our people is marked by creative activity. All this is combined with the ritual exposure of “historical falsifications” of ideological enemies, their secret sympathies to “Poles” and Russophobia.

Thus, the Soviet historical case with some “additives” of rhetoric of independence and sovereignty has been adopted. Though at times all this receives an unexpected “patriotic” turn such as, “I am deeply revolted both as a historian and as a head of the state when Belarus is identified with the Great Principality of Lithuania or with Poland or with Russia. We should be proud of what the Belarusian people has created and is famous for instead of its historical neighbors”. Here becomes obvious an aspiration to clear Belarusian achievements from external layers.

In general, the Belarusian regime searches for its legitimation in the historical tradition but in the present and, first of all, in political and social experts of the last 8–10 years. It positions itself as a system with short genealogy that can be considered politically completely justified.

No matter what the future of Belarus will be like it is not a fact that it will become history.

2004

Notes

- ¹ “Izobretaja Vostochnuju Evropu” (“Inventing Eastern Europe”) is the book devoted to the emergence of the image of “Eastern Europe” in the European culture during the Renaissance epoch.
- ² The discourse of the Constitutional court is now absolutely different and touches exclusively upon legal issues.
- ³ It is enough to recollect periodic selector meetings where a symbolic fight with bureaucracy and different public services takes place.
- ⁴ Concepts “liberal terror”, “globalization” and others come into use.
- ⁵ Political events of 2005-2006 start to somewhat break this logic as the text analyzes the atmosphere of an earlier period.
- ⁶ The main elements of ideology include: the Constitution, the Belarusian political model, the Belarusian economic model, the ideological doctrine/national idea.
- ⁷ To a certain degree such an image was created in the post-Soviet space where Belarus (especially among different sorts of neo-communist movements) is perceived as the country of the saved socialism. As for the rest of the world – fortunately or unfortunately – Belarus was not and practically is not renowned behind the western border.
- ⁸ Belarus can speak about things that others can only be silent about.
- ⁹ In order to understand this it is enough to read Bzhezinsky or to observe the work of structures like the local IRI.
- ¹⁰ As Belarus is not so corrupted as its neighbors and managed to maintain its essence.
- ¹¹ It is difficult to imagine the publication of the book like “The Belarusian Model of Development” in 1994 or even in 1998 as now it has become practically topic number one for the discourse of authority.
- ¹² It is enough to recollect how many times the collapse and total crisis of the Belarusian economy were predicted. Such predictions appeared already in 1995
- ¹³ Priorities defined for the state are certainly populist as they include export, accommodation and food products. They may include industry, social protection and agriculture according to a different interpretation.
- ¹⁴ I, di are uncivilized tribes to the north and east from China, sya is the civilized population of China.
- ¹⁵ We still do not have any more or less systematic research of the bureaucratic system of Belarus.
- ¹⁶ “Business is going badly, the center cannot be kept, the sea of anarchy is spreading around the world” (William Butler Yates).
- ¹⁷ Inflation in its initial sense is expansion, swelling.
- ¹⁸ The example of Zhuravkova shows that full loyalty and trust of the president do not guarantee safety.
- ¹⁹ For example, the materials of Lukashenko’s meetings with the regional activists 2001 allow to draw a conclusion that “there is some use” from businessmen but this use is not axiomatic.
- ²⁰ Those who did not get into the first, “exclusive” category.
- ²¹ The president from time to time says that “it is very rigid”. “But our authority is really very rigid. There are even elements of authoritarianism, I agree”.
- ²² In due time it really was perceived as the main political threat.

- ²³ Loyalty is, first of all, loyalty of behavior, instead of consciousness. Nobody requires devotion to “the idea of the regime”, the primary thing is loyalty as a function.
- ²⁴ The logic of ideological work is usually constructed on the basis of this.
- ²⁵ When analyzing “the mass” sociologists usually speak about “the schizophrenia” of public consciousness. Ideologized analytics from the Institute of Social and Political Studies under the Administration of the President tries to marginalize and sublimate internal dissimilarities, “oppositional analytics” aspires to expose such dissimilarities.
- ²⁶ Though one can identify three and four of such mentalities.
- ²⁷ Such a situation is also characteristic also for a number of some other countries of the region including Ukraine (Little Russians vs. Ukrainians) and Moldova (Moldavians vs. Romanians).
- ²⁸ See, in particular: Radzik R. Prychyny slabasti natsyjatvorchaga pracesu belarusau u XIX–XX st. // *Belaruski gistarichny ahlyad*. T. 2. Ssh. 2.1995.
- ²⁹ National identity of authority is the identity which is based on the certain understanding of “national” and is broadcast, according to Altusser into the ideological machinery of the state: an education system, political structures, mass-media, etc.
- ³⁰ Such an aspiration “to Belarusize” the Russian language is similar to the procedures of “decolonization” of the English language in former British colonies.
- ³¹ The language, thus, is not so a much means of the communications as a national symbol.
- ³² For more details see.: Kazakevich A. *Pra kaloniju // Palitychnaja sfera*. #1.2001.
- ³³ That is how this hymn turned out to be – as amorphous and inexpressive as possible. At least, out of all offered versions the one that was chosen was the one that least suited its status.
- ³⁴ In this context the Russian language can be named “the tool of our knowledge”. Whatever the tool is like, so is the knowledge.
- ³⁵ There was even a certain opposition of words “independence” and “sovereignty”. “Independence” corresponded with the national tradition of understanding the beginning of the statehood starting with the BPR, “sovereignty” – with the BSSR.
- ³⁶ Conservative versions of revolutions. “Returning of names” is a social project of Confucius; “returning to the mother” was the name of the reforms in Shumer civilization.
- ³⁷ Latin “according to the custom of ancestors”.
- ³⁸ One of the textbooks on ideology talks even about “the common Russian (!?) roots” of the Belarusian statehood and this is full idiocy.

THE PROBLEM OF MEMORY AND IDENTITY IN POST-TOTALITARIAN STATES. THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Over the past decades societies in post-totalitarian states have been going through a multitude of complex and ambiguous transformations. In this context the problems of *Collective Memory* and *Identity* stand out as the key ones and put more new questions to us such as: *what are the mechanisms of interaction between the images of the past and national identity, how and why the collective memory changes in transitory epochs, how the experience acquired in the second half of the 20th century is transferred, and what encourages the emergence of “the alternative interpretations of memory” called upon to become the basis of new identities?*

Historical science no longer has the monopoly on memory; it no longer controls the need of memories and the process of their interpretation proving the thesis of the French researcher Pierre Nora about confrontation between history and memory as the fundamental feature of modern society¹. It is not accidental that such conceptions as “historical culture” or “culture of memory” occupied one of the central places in works on cultural studies and history in the last few years, being the phenomena closely connected with the process of formation of *identity of any community*.

The first researcher of “the social borders of memory” was the French sociologist and anthropologist Maurice Halbwachs who claimed that “memories” are constructed by social groups. Halbwachs clearly differentiated *between collective memory* which he considered to be a *social construct* dependent upon the system of values, and “*written*” history, which seemed more objective to him due to the use of scientific methods and freedom of personal interpretations. Collective memory of any “we – the group” is not a phenomenon but an object of the historical process as, it is the fundamental core of the nation².

Public consciousness of the Republic of Moldova is the zone where the import and adaptation of Western institutional models initiates the processes of formation of new identities. At the same time the processes of mutation of identities on the basis of “alternative images of the past” also take place here. “Invention of new traditions”, revival of historical images, rebirth of the historical past, destruction of old and construction of new monuments, myths and identities are the most obvious and striking examples of this process.

After the collapse of the USSR and the achievement of independence the Republic of Moldova inherited a deeply traumatized historical memory. The situation was worsened by the fact that at the same time the country had to face the problem of legitimacy of its new political status. Unlike many other post-socialist countries which quite soon had not only their state structures and national economies formed but also the readiness to determine the political and cultural choice the citizens of the Republic of Moldova did not find any agreement between themselves. That is why the problem of restoring historical memory and forming sincere relations with their own historical past as an indispensable condition for the formation of a new state moved to the forefront. However, instead of becoming a consolidating factor for the Moldovan society history turned into a battlefield involving into the joint fight both ordinary citizens and representatives of the highest echelons of power.

A widely recognized statement in the research devoted to collective memory is the thesis that manipulation of remembrances and memory is a powerful means of managing individual and collective consciousness³. Rivalry of different versions of collective memory and its symbols often becomes an important component of the struggle for political leadership, an argument about the dominating system of values and a choice of episodes of dignity and pride of the nation.

The idea of the common heroic past is in principal essential for self-consciousness of identity, forming of “places of memory” in the process of the development of “We – Others” and creation of national ideology.

New political power in the Republic of Moldova persistently tried to create the official ideology that could support the joining of the nation. The communist elite’s “conception” was based on the idea of existence of the so-called “Moldavian ethnos” *between* the rivers Prut and Dniester. The “ethnos” owed its advent to the descendants of Stephen the Great⁴.

Lack of any scientific arguments proving the existence of the “Moldavian nation” was compensated by the composing of new political myths about the people of “The Moldavian Land” and Ștefan cel Mare (Stephen the Great, also known as “Stephen the Great and Holy”), the Prince of Moldova between 1457-1504. President V.Voronin declared the year of 2004 the year of Stephen the Great by a special decree. At the same time other great personalities from the history of the Romanians (Mihai Viteazul, Nicolae Milescu Spătarul, Alexandru cel Bun etc.) were neglected.

Appealing to the past the political elite of the Post-soviet states which came to power from the second and third echelons of the former political structures factually began to build an extra historical scheme that presented the people as an eternal and invariable integrity which always relied on the ideal features of “national character” and high “national spirit”. As the contemporary epoch was seen as the time of decay and moral corruption and heroic spirit and great deeds were associated with the remote past then such an approach encouraged the flourishing of the irrational mythical comprehension of history according to which the heroic past should automatically ensure the glorious future of the people.

It shall be pointed out that the irrational motives of people’s behavior (especially of mass behavior) predominate greatly over the rational ones exactly during the crucial moments in history. However, even during the “normal” periods of society development the irrational component plays a considerable role.⁵

In these conditions mythology is an indispensable attribute of the political system of not only a totalitarian state but also of a democratic state as any power needs symbols that embody it. Yet the “production” of myths in democratic and totalitarian states is organized differently: in the former case myths are created in the conditions of excess of information and pluralism of opinions and in the latter they are singled out through the artificial limitation of the information field.

Specifically those ideologies which exploit the irrational mechanisms, deep-laid symbols and schemes of collective unconsciousness become the most effective in the field of public administration. It is the content of ideology itself that can be just a nomad plot borrowed from an absolutely different historical epoch and cultural environment. However, if this plot has a deep-laid archetype basis it will turn out to be the most efficacious.

Political symbolism tightly borders on the religious one; political ideals and symbols are often changed into the religious ones and *vice versa*. To a great extent, political mythology copies religious systems and, accordingly, it bears the main features of religious doctrines: utopism and dogmatism. This is some kind of a secular religion called upon to answer the same expectations and hopes that the religion “created by God” does. “Embodied art of achieving political goals,” affirms S. Moscovici, “touches, first of all, sensitive strings of heart, then belief and, finally, appeals to expectations. Abilities of mind play only an assisting role in this. And, if one is to look deeply into mass societies ... politics is nothing else but religion that has again acquired soil under its feet.”⁶

Construction and restoration of religious temples and churches began after the declaration of sovereignty and independence in the Republic of Moldova. All this seemed natural in the context of aspirations towards restoration of historical memory by new representatives of political elites. But in reality communists searched for ways of cooperation with the church only to influence the collective memory in order to strengthen their coming to power. For instance, one can remember the publication of the Bible in “the Moldavian language” initiated by Premier V. Tarlev (though in reality it was a re-publication of one of the Romanian variants of the Bible), the trip to the Sacred Mount Athos of

President Voronin who supposedly strove to follow the traces of Stephen the Great, the creation of new historical monuments together with the representatives of the church.

Deep identity crises in the Republic of Moldova coincided with social conflicts that in most cases were produced by economic difficulties. Social stratification of the population (along with the deformations of the Soviet period) led to the “dislocation of historical memory” when different social groups depending on the ethnic origin owned only certain fragments of total historical knowledge⁷. Very often ethnic aspects of economic and social traumas were speculatively exaggerated and “easy” political decisions of “autonomy” concerning different ethnic minorities were used as the means of minimization of conflicts. Later it had “the effect of a boomerang” for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova.

The problem of historical memory is differently revealed in the contexts of civil and political society. A considerable part of the statemen of the Republic of Moldova has an opinion that “the Moldavian people have already been formed and consolidated”. On the basis of this the former president P. Lucinschi “advised” to evaluate the historical traditions of our people according to the relevant situation. That meant free interpretation of historical past and even the creation of new national holidays and traditions. For example, a special decree joined the 31st of August – the Day of the Romanian Language, with the 27th of August – the Day of the Declaration of Independence; The Festival of Wine (the beginning of October) which in the collective memory of the people is associated with the deep historical past was tried to be combined with the Day of the Capital-city. In this way new political elites speculated on the historical memory (not connected with its first-hand experience) and thus strengthened their own power.

Undoubtedly, national self-consciousness is a very complicated phenomenon. Ideal visions about common national features, both positive and negative, is an equal part of self-consciousness just like conceptions about common cultural practices. The nation’s idea about its geographical space is included into the national self-consciousness as well as the interpretation of social and economic order, the evaluation of political regime and juridical norms. However, the special role for collective identity is played by the notion about the common past. It is specifically this part of national self-consciousness that researchers dealing with the national “realms of memory” of the nation are interested in.

Historical monuments are of special interest in the context of this research. They do not include architectural monuments and historical monuments in general but only those monuments that assist in the process of recollecting the historical past. Following the theory of Pierre Nora one can study the change of the historical self-consciousness and collective identity using the example of the change of “places of memory”. E. Fostachuk chooses three kinds of changes in the ensemble of national *lieux de memoire*⁸. First of all, they are those “spaces of memory” (historical figures, events, memorial monuments) that are gradually being forgotten or forced out. Secondly, they are those “places of memory” that are being returned from the oblivion and are again becoming topical. Thirdly, they include those *lieux de memoire* that have a constant place in the collective memory of

the nation, though this place does not remain permanent. Such an event as, for instance, the October revolution is now remembered differently in the Republic of Moldova than, let's say, ten or fifteen years ago. The October revolution remains in consciousness as "the space of memory" but now it carries an absolutely different meaning. The same can be said about the events of 1812, 1940, 1944.

Conscious and active influence of political parties, power structures and different public organizations also play an important role in the processes of change of collective memory but large-scale changes reveal the result of the evolution of cultural or social basis of social environment.

The production of collective memories is one of the most important elements for creation of identity of certain society. Though sometimes this "production" serves as a means for unleashing national hostility when monuments to some political figures are restored and to some others are destroyed. Memories can be taught.

Every society chooses those historical events and persons with which it wants to identify itself, thus constructing its social memory. Two tendencies have been competing with each other in the struggle for forming collective memory and national identity in the Republic of Moldova in the past decades. It is most obviously seen in the attitude of society towards monuments to Vladimir Lenin and Stephen the Great. Acuteness of confrontation is proved by the fact that in 2002 the attempt to restore the monument to Lenin in the town of Beltsy was cancelled due to "the danger of ethnic conflicts".

In the process of remembering a significant role is played by political rituals the goal of which is the actualization and "deployment" of certain historical events in a desirable direction. Political power does not stop manipulating the public opinion trying to achieve its recognition through the renewal of certain historical images in collective memory. First of all, intensification of influence happens through rituals of returning the monuments of the communist epoch to their original places (primarily, it concerns Northern districts which the communists still consider to be "red"). In this case the ritual does not follow its social or cognitive function but only the political one.

It is evident that the memory of the nation is the battlefield not only during the revolutions or radical transformations of the state system. But during such epochs this condition becomes most obvious. The destruction of old and creation of new monuments in the Republic of Moldova today are the only most evident and striking examples of this process. To us the possession of political power still means having control over the collective memory of the nation.

Naturally, there is not one and only collective memory in Moldova. Sociologist M. Hallbwachs once noticed that "there exist as many memories as there exist groups of people." As each human being is simultaneously a member of very different communities (a family, a religious group, a certain town, a region, a party, a class, a nation, etc.) s/he is simultaneously under the influence of different concepts of collective identity.

The process of restoration of historical memory in post-soviet Moldova is far from being completed. Historical memory there is still in a segmented condition and that is

why cannot serve as a consolidating force of society the way it was in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Along with this one cannot omit the theory of F. Bartlett according to which the lack of information happens not so much due to the neglect of history but through the reconstruction of senses. After each radical change new political power strives to reorganize social memory removing old reference points from it and fixing new ones in their places so as to reconstruct the historical senses according to its own ideas about the past.

Notes

- ¹ See: Nora P. Frantsia – pamyat'. SPb., 1999.
- ² See: Halbwachs M. On collective memory. Chicago, 1992.
- ³ See: Repina L. Kollektivnaya pamyat' i mify istoricheskogo soznaniya, ili Sotvorenije Istorii. Chelovek, pamyat', tekst. Course of lectures edited by E. Vishlenkova. Kazan, 2001.
- ⁴ Cojocaru G. Mitul politic părtaș la guvernare // Arena Politicii. Nr. 5. 1996. P.14-15.
- ⁵ Kassirer E. Tekhnika sovremennyh politicheskikh mifov. M., 1990.; Moskovitchi S. Vek tolp. M., 1996.
- ⁶ Moskovitchi S. Vek tolp. M., 1996.
- ⁷ Enciu N. Memorie istorică în tranziție // Anatomia societății posttotalitare. Chișinău, 2002. P.95.
- ⁸ Fostachuk E. Kontseptsija „*lieux de memoire*“ // <http://www.main.vsu.ru/-cdh/Articles>.

HISTORY AND HISTORIANS AT THE BORDER (Lviv as the Center of Formation of Ukrainian National Historiography)

The phenomenon of Eastern Galicia as a multinational border zone has long been a favorite topic of a number of European historiographies, first of all, Polish and Ukrainian. Scientists studied the specificity of formation of the ethnic structure of the region, cultural interaction of nationalities occupying it, features of social and political development. They also tracked the genesis of numerous conflict situations and attempts to settle them. The center of attention is traditionally dominated by Polish-Ukrainian opposition in the region. This opposition covered all spheres of life during the 19th – first half of the 20th centuries. But recently the problem of the “third” ethnic component of the region has become more and more popular. It actually is the Jewish community which became an active player on the social-political field of Eastern Galicia during the period identified by us. These problems practically marginalized other research plots. We would like to pay attention to one of these plots in the present publication. In our opinion it is quite interesting to look at such phenomenon of Galicia from the point of view of functioning professional intellectual communities, in particular, the historical one. It is obviously important for us to study how factors of the border zone as the space of special civilization, political, economic and cultural interaction influenced the directions and intensity of modernization changes in the Ukrainian historical ideology and science at the end of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries. In fact, at that time the grounds of Eastern Galicia became the center of development of the Ukrainian humanities. For a greater correctness of our historiographic analysis we shall constantly keep in the focus of attention the condition of a historical science in the Trans-Dnieper Ukraine which representatives laid the foundation for institutional and conceptual formation of the Ukrainian history during the whole

19th century (first of all, it is M. Maksimovich, M. Kostomarov, V. Antonovich). The offered aspect of the scientific search will allow to essentially supplement the problems of studying traditional for modern researchers Eastern Galicia problematics. For example, popular studies of the Polish and Ukrainian national movements in Galicia in the second half of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries usually emphasize the ideology and politology components. The foreshortening selected by us allows not only to reconstruct the historical-conceptual bases of ideological models of the Ukrainian and Polish national movement, but also, and this is just as interesting, to identify the role of historians in the processes of active nation formation. Therefore, having paid attention to the received formation and professional interest of Galicia politicians of the second half of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries, both Polish and Ukrainian, we managed to reveal that the majority of them were professional historians. We have selected the processes of structurization of the Ukrainian scientific community in Eastern Galicia at the end of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries as a starting point of our historiographic analysis.

First of all, we shall outline the event context of our problem. Eastern Galicia in the second half of the 19th century represented an economically backward independent province of Austro-Hungarian empire in which small representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia (mainly greco-catholic clergy) constantly fought against the Polish domination supported from Vienna. Constant enmity of Poles and Ukrainians in the region harmed the normal development of both peoples hindering the implementation of actual national tasks. It made the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation urgent. Several attempts to reconcile were made during the second half of the 19th century but they were unsuccessful. The critical moment for the development of the Galicia ukrainstvo and the Ukrainian-Polish attitudes in Galicia at the end of the 19th century came with the events of “a new era”. In the conditions of aggravation of international relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the 80s of the 19th century Vienna in every possible way promoted the strengthening of the narodnik (populist) movement wing of the Ukrainian politicians in Galicia, which had anti-Russian positions. Under the initiative of the Kiev public figures in 1885-1890 the agreement was reached with the Polish conservatives about the beginning of “the new era” in the Ukrainian-Polish relations according to which Poles agreed to provide certain space for cultural development of Ukrainians in Galicia, expand their participation in the political life (with the purpose of opposing Russian sympathizing Moscow-philes)¹.

The consequence of the agreement which plans were developed in Kiev, instead of in Lviv was prompt activization of the Ukrainian cultural and political life which entailed the formation of modern Ukrainian intelligentsia which raised the question of equality of Ukrainians and Poles in Galicia. The consequences of “the new era” were extremely important for the development of the Ukrainian historical science as well. The faculty of Ukrainian history in the Lviv university (officially it was called the faculty of world history with the review of history of East Slavic peoples) with the teaching in the Ukrainian language moved Ukrainian history from the amateur sphere into the academic one. It gave Ukrainian studies the disciplinary status. The organizational and scientific talent of

M. Grushevsky who was the head of this department promoted the transformation of Lviv into the Ukrainian Piedmont. We shall mention that the role of M. Grushevsky in intellectual history of Galicia Ukraine of the studied period was significant. M. Grushevsky known first of all for his scientific achievements (and keeping away from Galicia political conflicts) turned to be that figure around which all Ukrainian intellectuals could be united in the realization of the national project. Researchers are unanimous in their recognizing of the Ukrainian national life in Galicia at the end of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries as the “Grushevsky’s epoch”. At the beginning of the 90s of the 19th century the image of Galicia as a national leader popular in the Russian Ukraine was greatly exaggerated. Ukrainians occupying the Galicia lands appeared to be split politically. They divided into the camp of pro-Russia focused Moscow-philés and populists to whom the slogans of the Ukrainian national revival were close. The most noticeable Galicia scientific institution – the Scientific society named after Shevchenko (further – the SSNSh) turned to be extremely weak organizationally and scientifically; besides, because of the domination of populists the access to it of adherents of other political orientations was closed. Ukrainian intellectuals paid their prime attention to the reorganization of this “stronghold of populism” in the second half of the 90s of the 19th century. We shall say that when discussing the model of reorganization of the SSNSh the majority of the Ukrainian figures appealed to similar Polish experience which was realized in another cultural center of Galicia – Krakow where through the reorganization of organizational structures of the Krakow scientific organization the Academy of knowledge (in the language of the original – Akademia Umiejętności) was founded. Adaptation of this ready example was facilitated due to many Ukrainian scientists being the members or member-correspondents of the Polish Academy and actively participated in its work – we shall mention the names of Antonij Petrushevich, Isidor Sharanevich and Mikhailo Grushevskiy. Like their Polish colleagues, the Ukrainian scientists began their reorganization activity with the change of the charter of the SSNSh approximating it to the academic examples. According to the new charter, the activity of the SSNSh was concentrated on three areas: philological, historical-philosophical and mathematical-natural-science-medical. Then followed the problem of de-ideologization. It became the reason for the discussions among the Ukrainian intellectuals of Galicia and led to a serious crisis inside the SSNSh. As a result in 1897 M. Grushevsky became the head of the institution. It was he who proclaimed the carrying out of fruitful and qualitative scientific research the main criterion of the SSNSh. Most brightly these ideas were revealed when Ivan Franko was invited to work for this institution. The latter, undoubtedly, the most outstanding Ukrainian humanist at that time, remained outside of the field of activity of this institution for a long time only because he belonged to a different political wing of Galicia political circles. Time proved that the choice of M. Grushevsky as the chairman of the SSNSh justified itself. In spite of the pressure from various political forces for the following seventeen years of his presidency the scientist carried out the course of the priority of science.

As the head of the SSNSh M. Grushevsky first of all began to organize the scientific work “in the scientific society named after Shevchenko that was reformed but that was not on the scientific road yet”¹. His vision of ideas and purposes of activity can be found in articles and speeches at the SSNSh assemblies. Primarily, it was the idea of the Ukrainian national-cultural independence that was reflected in science and literature in the Ukrainian language. The second idea was the idea of sobornost (synaxis) of Ukrainian lands and the acknowledgement of the fact that Ukraine divided between two empires is, in essence, uniform just like the uniform Ukrainian people and there is only a territorial-geographic border between Kiev and Lviv rather than the national-ethnic one. One of the forms of unification of Ukrainians had to become the national history which M. Grushevsky himself aspired to conceive and re-conceive. He employed this as the basis in his attempts to establish “the closest connections between Austrian Ukraine and Russian Ukraine in the interests of successful development of the Ukrainian cultural life using the forces of all parts of Ukraine...”⁵. Finally, the third idea of the scientist which became the basis of the SSNSh was the idea of the Ukrainian democratic enlightenment by means of revival and development of science and culture as the main precondition of national liberation. According to the scientist’s deep conviction the primary goal was to perceive that “scientific work lies in the foundation of cultural development and that without a strong cultural basis any strong political or national achievements, any thorough and forward movement of people forward are impossible”.

Relying on the support of wide public circles of Galicia and the Trans-Dnieper Ukraine M. Grushevsky set a goal to gradually transform the SSNSh into the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences that, in turn, would prove cultural equality of Ukrainians with other European peoples. Since the 60s of the 19th century various Slavic peoples which had no statehood began to create their national academies. For instance, the Yugoslavian Academy of Sciences and Arts was established in 1866. In 1871 the Krakow scientific society was transformed into the Academy of Sciences. In 1886 the Serbian Academy of Sciences was set up on the basis of the Serbian scientific society and in 1889 the Czech scientific society was reorganized into the Czech Academy of Sciences and Arts. These examples of Slavic peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire inspired M. Grushevsky and other representatives of the Ukrainian national movement. M. Grushevsky believed that the fact of the existence of such an Academy itself “would give the final right to the Ukrainian language to be recognized as a cultural language suitable for scientific use”⁶. The problem of transformation of the SSNSh into the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences became the unifying idea for the uncoordinated Ukrainian scientific forces, a symbol of struggle for the liberation of Ukrainians from a century long enslavement. Many years later, being the academician of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, M. Grushevsky recollected that “the plan of the Society reorganization was created with the use of the example of the academy and the initiators of the reform believed that after several years of scientific research and scientific publishing activities of that reformed Society the Austrian government would give it the title of the Academy of Sciences. These hopes soon vanished but the idea of the Ukrainian

Academy of Sciences took its roots in the national-cultural scientific circles and found a great number of adherents, free from any cheap politics. Instead it became the real national postulate⁷.

In 1898 the scientist wrote a note addressed to the general meeting of this institution. In it he described the goals of the SSNSh concerning the reorientation of its work towards academic canons. It was written, in particular, that the SSNSh had to become “the center of scientific work conducted in the native language... To collect around itself a broad circle of scientists who adhere to national interests, to organize scientific work and use it to bring up new employees, new scientific staff⁸. The new Charter necessary to reach these goals was adopted at the general meeting in February 1899. It was approved by Galicia governor in April of the same year. When evaluating the reform in his report about the activities of the SSNSh M. Grushevsky emphasized that “the main feature of the SSNSh was the deepening of the scientific character of its activities... through the change of the whole organization of society⁹. In 1899 M. Grushevsky initiated the introduction of the institute of elective full members as an elite scientific structure. Participation of its members in various international forums and exchange of editions with numerous scientific institutions and publishing houses of the world testify to a great international prestige of the SSNSh. Wide connections of the SSNSh with an international scientific community were supported by the structure of its foreign members among whom we can name A. Einstein, M. Planck, D. Hilbert, A. Ioffe, T. Masarik, A. Shakhmatov and many other well-known scientists. Upon his arrival to Lviv M. Grushevsky turned especial attention to scientific publications and, first of all, to “Notes of the SSNSh” the editing of which became his solid responsibility in 1895. It will be interesting to mention here the influence of the Polish scientific periodical press of Lviv on the formation of the structure of the Ukrainian historical editions. For example, in one of his letters to I. Kripjakevich M. Grushevsky wrote that “besides the department of criticism and annual reports the editors decided to publish a bibliographic register – similarly to “The Kwartalnik Historyczny” meaning books, articles and reviews from the branches such as archeology, history of material culture, art¹⁰. It took M. Grushevsky a little time to reform the magazine from a year-book into a quarter-book and subsequently into a two-month edition. The volume and circulation of the edition were also increased. In 1897 “Notes” stopped being the publication of all three sections of the SSNSh and started to represent only the historical-philosophical and philological sections. M. Grushevsky also changed (following the classical European examples) the structure of “Notes” that included scientific articles, miscellanea (small source study publications), documentary materials and a review department. Soon “Notes” turned into the most authoritative Ukrainian studies body where M. Grushevsky was the most active author and simultaneously a talented editor. Other authors of the reformed edition included Ivan Franko, Vladimir Gnatyuk, Alexander Konisky, Cyril Studinsky, Vasily Shchurat, Alexander Kolessa, Vyacheslav Lipinsky, Vladimir Shuhevich, Feodor Vovk and other outstanding Ukrainian humanists. More than 100 volumes of “Notes” were published by the middle of 1913 under the edition of M. Grushevsky.

The important problem faced by the Ukrainian historical science at the end of the 19th century was the creation of a viable national historical grandee-narrative that could be used to oppose the historical concepts of Polish and Russian scientists. The latter in their works developed the models of “big Russian” or “big Polish” nations “dissolving” the history of Ukrainians in their own syntheses. This task could only be carried out under the condition of turning scientific activities into professional ones and transforming Ukrainian studies from amateur research into an organized collective process. Therefore, the problem of formation of the national historical school became extremely acute. M. Grushevsky also took upon himself the responsibility of solving this urgent problem. His hopes to rely on the Lviv university in this respect turned to be vain as the chauvinistic part of the Polish professorate constantly interfered. The university authority that belonged to Poles supervised the lectures of M. Grushevsky to prevent him from carrying out political campaigns among youth. For example, already in 1895 K. Vojtsehovski, the dean of history department, visited M. Grushevsky’s seminars and named Grushevsky’s scientific arguments about the key moments of the Ukrainian history “political”¹¹. M. Grushevsky who, following his own principles, always spoke the Ukrainian language during department sessions (the university formally recognized two, the so-called regional languages – Ukrainian and Polish – as equal), was sometimes even forbidden to speak “like a peasant”. In such cases he left sessions with a scandal like, for example, in 1901.¹² Considering these circumstances, the main work on education of the new staff was transferred to the sessions of the historical-philosophical section of the SSNSh¹³.

Before M. Grushevsky nobody in Galicia was specifically engaged in the preparation of the scientific staff among national historians. He was the first to pay attention to this important problem having created his own scientific school the activity of which covered the following directions: educational (preparation of historians-professionals), research (development of a wide circle of problems of the history of Ukraine), archeographic (carrying out expeditions, search of new sources) and publishing (spread of scientific achievements through periodic and special printed editions). The professorial post allowed M. Grushevsky to select pupils from the students most capable to do scientific work as this was one of the necessary conditions for the creation of the historical school. They (Em. Terletsky, D. Korenets, M. Kordub, S. Tomashevsky, S. Rudnitsky, O. Tselevich, V. Gerasimchuk, I. Dzhidzhora, I. Krevetsky, I. Kripjakevich, etc.) were the center of his school¹⁴. The total number of representatives of the Lviv historical school of M. Grushevsky, according to the estimation of I. Kripjakevicha, reached one hundred people¹⁵. The selection of creative and talented youth and the creation of necessary conditions for a quick scientific formation of the school showed that M. Grushevsky was an outstanding organizer of science¹⁶. On the whole, it is possible to make a conclusion that at the end of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries the voice of Ukrainians was clearly heard due to various directions of activities of the historical school of M. Grushevsky in the national-cultural polyphony of Lviv.

Quick scientific coming into being of representatives of the Lviv school of M. Grushevsky and a high professional level of their works created a complete synthesis of the Ukrainian past which now could be used to oppose the historical expansionism of Polish and Russian scientists. When directing the scientific search of his pupils in such a way so that their research represented also the monographic processing of insufficiently studied key moments of the Ukrainian past, M. Grushevsky concentrated all efforts to create the national grandee-narrative. The scientist wrote in his "Curriculum Vitae", "Writing a complete history of Ukraine already in Kiev times became my heartfelt dream, to a certain extent the point of my honor and the honor of the generation, despite the fact that as the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian historiography of the older generation then still considered it to be the idea for which the time had not come yet – there was not enough material, there were huge blanks, etc."¹⁷. The important preparatory stage was a course of lectures read by M. Grushevsky in the 1890s in Lviv. Initially, he intended to publish some rather small three-volume research. But in the process of studying of the material his work expanded and the result was an unfinished ten-volume publication (in his work the author wanted to cover the events till the end of the 18th century but had time to prepare materials only up to the year of 1658).

The work on the first volume continued for two years and the volume was published at the end of 1898. Its publication coincided with a grandiose celebration of the century of the Ukrainian national revival. "Oneida" by Ivan Kotlyarevsky was considered to be its beginning. M. Grushevsky described it as a peculiar personal "hello" in the foreword to the book¹⁸. Successive volumes of this edition were published at the end of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries. Some delay of certain books was caused by a different sort of circumstances including political events, lecturing, traveling abroad, etc. However, M. Grushevsky continued to work on "History" after returning from emigration to Ukraine. Two parts of the ninth volume of the book were published in Kiev in 1928 and 1931. The tenth volume was printed in 1936 already after the death of the scientist. Separate volumes of "History of Ukraine-Rus" were repeatedly republished during the lifetime of the author (the first volume was republished three times, the second, the third, the fourth and the eighth – twice). With the purpose of popularization of the basic ideas of the historiographic concept in the European scientific circles, M. Grushevsky published the German-speaking edition of the first volume in 1906 and since 1911 some volumes of "History" have appeared in Russian translation as well.

The most important point of M. Grushevsky's concept was the idea about the continuous formation of the Ukrainian nation. Many Russian historians of that time traditionally believed that the Tatar invasion had led to the devastation of the Trans-Dnieper area and emigration of its indigenous population to the north-east. M. Grushevsky's predecessors (Kiev historians M. Maksimovich, V. Antonovich and M. Vladimirsky-Budanov) used their research to prove that the desolation was not total as the biggest part of the population stayed continuing to develop old Russian cultural and political traditions. Supporting this point of view M. Grushevsky emphasized that the leading role in the settling of the Trans-

Dnieper region and renewal of political traditions belonged “not to alien but to local population which never disappeared”¹⁹.

Another important point of M. Grushevsky's historical model was sobornost (synaxis) or the consolidation of the integrity of the Ukrainian ethnos residing geographical area. In connection with this the scientist paid a lot of attention to the description of history of those Ukrainian territories which were located far away from the main lands in the historical and ethnic understanding.

The necessity to oppose the Polish and Russian vision of the Ukrainian past made M. Grushevsky thoroughly analyzed the Polish-Ukrainian and Russian-Ukrainian relations, researched the interethnic opposition on the Ukrainian lands, reflected on the genesis of ethnic conflicts and ways of their overcoming in “History of Ukraine-Rus”. He polemized very sharply with the Polish colleagues. Involving a significant amount of a new documentary material, M. Grushevsky showed a wide picture of a gradual economic enslavement of the indigenous population of the Ukrainian lands by the Polish gentry, the destruction of traditional cultural and religious bases of a national life under the press of the assimilation policies from the middle of the 13th century and till the beginning of the “Khmelnysky rule”. The author's vision of the problem of the Polish-Ukrainian relations led to sharp polemic remarks from the Polish researchers, especially concerning those historiographic concepts which were formulated from the position of the Ukrainian national ideology. However, M. Grushevsky's critics considered the attempt to emphasize the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in all spheres of public life the greatest shortcoming of “History of Ukraine-Rus”. They believed that there were no strong reasons for a deep national conflict. Therefore, the conclusions of the Ukrainian scientist were not only groundless, but also unduly politized, caused by the tension in relations between the two peoples at the beginning of the 20th century. L. Kolyankovsky believed that those particular circumstances led to the fact that “an extremely hardworking, simply tireless researcher in his work which had all the features of a scientific project digresses and includes sections which can only be written by a publicist. We may include into this category the strings of the Polish-Ukrainian hatred that the author constantly touches upon and so from time to time there is an impression that this is his purpose”²⁰. However, the general impression from the work of M. Grushevsky and the evaluation of his professional skills were extremely high. “The work of Mr. Grushevsky,” wrote O. Brikner, “is a nice proof of erudition and universality of the author. He mastered the huge volume of literature on the subject – archeological, historical, philological, and, primarily, Russian, which was tightly closed for Europe before; he simply surprises us with his wide reading, knowledge of the most special, fine, quite often forgotten works of Russian and German scientists. This fantastic erudition goes hand in hand with the speed of thought, originality of judgments, and perfect methodology, all this being quite unusual”²¹. Therefore, from that moment principal discussions of all national schools of Ukraine occurred around those problem lines, which M. Grushevsky used to separate Ukrainian history from “the usual schemes” of neighbors creating a national grandee-narrative.

In its most concentrated form the concept of M. Grushevsky was stated in the widely known article "The usual scheme of "Russian" history and the task of the rational account of history of Eastern Slavic peoples" (1904) which he prepared in connection with the intentions of the Academy of Sciences in Petersburg to publish the encyclopedia of Slavic studies²². The main idea of the article is formulated in the thesis that Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian peoples have their separate history which was developed on their own territories. He opposed the widespread in science "Moscow-centered" scheme to the "Ukrainian-Belarusian-Russian" scheme. "There is no common Russian history," claimed M. Grushevsky, "and cannot be just like there is no "common Russian" nationality. There can be only the history of "Russian nationalities" if someone wants to name it as such or the history of Eastern Slavic peoples. It should take the place of "Russian history".

The historiographic value of M. Grushevsky's concept is closely connected with its political importance as the historian considered as his main vital task not only to write the history of Ukraine but also to prove historically the right of the Ukrainian people to independent cultural and political development. The work of M. Grushevsky provided serious theoretical substantiations for the Ukrainian national movement and legitimization of its requirements²³.

Activization of the cultural and public life naturally led to the modernization of ideological bases of the Ukrainian political movement. It is remarkable, that scientists-humanists, first of all, historians were in the avant garde of the political life. But now the traditional division into Moscow-philes and populists was opposed by the political project which called to separate from the Polish political circles and drift in the waterway of the Polish policy. The Ukrainian prominent leaders realized that the policy of "a new era" was defective as it demanded the giving in of the basic national positions in exchange for fine concessions of the Polish side in an economic or a cultural sphere. This understanding entailed the criticism of the Polish-Ukrainian agreement and led to the reformatting of the Ukrainian political landscape in Galicia. Having realized the defects of populist political Galicia public figures – M. Grushevsky, I. Franko, J. Romanchuk, E. Levitsky, V. Ohrimovich – started to reform populism, the consequence of which was the creation of the National-democratic party (NDP) in 1899²⁴. It is worth mentioning that the program of the new party displayed a qualitatively different level of historical ideology and national expectations which were formulated in numerous scientific and publicist speeches of M. Grushevsky and I. Franko. It, in particular, proclaimed that "We, Galicia Rusyns, a part the Ukrainian-Russian people that once had the statehood and fought for state-political rights for centuries ... declare that our final goal is the cultural, economic and political independence of the national organism incorporated into one single unit..."²⁵. The NDP program identified its nearest strategic task in the national sphere planning to acquire the status of autonomy for the territories of Bukovina and Galicia occupied by Ukrainians. The party also declared that it had the support of Ukrainians of the Trans-Dnieper area in their struggle for the constitutional and federal reorganization of the Russian empire. The program also contained democratic requirements, such as the introduction of the direct

universal and secret vote at the elections, the establishment of the proportional system of representation of national minorities in government bodies, the abolition of constituencies. The program proclaimed that "Our nationalism should be completely democratic" with the ideal represented by Ukraine-Rus "without the muzhik (peasant) and master"²⁶. We shall emphasize that the NDP, professing the ideological principles named above, maintained its leadership in the Ukrainian political life of Galicia till the declaration of the Western-Ukrainian National Republic.

Realization of the NDP program required strenuous national efforts and considerably aggravated complicated Polish-Ukrainian mutual relations. For example, M. Grushevsky stated that in the conditions of the constitutional state which Austria-Hungary was, "Galicia became a touchstone for the Polish-Ukrainian relations". The Galicia administration system developed in the 19th century completely contradicted national interests of the Ukrainian population. Having gained the trust of the Austrian government, the Polish ruling circles received these lands into their full and uncontrolled management. The Ukrainian policy at the end of the 19th century was directed at the change of this particular situation.

We would like to illustrate the acuteness of this opposition using the example of the struggle for the Ukrainian university in Galicia headed by the SSNSh and its chairman. It is remarkable that Galicia Ukrainians at first again put forward only the requirement to increase the quantity of the Ukrainian departments and expansion of the rights of the Ukrainian language in the Lviv university. However, obstinate resistance of Poles, their desire to see the Lviv university as an exclusively Polish institution caused active counteraction of Ukrainians that eventually turned into the movements to create a separate Ukrainian university in Lviv. One of the main ideologists of this movement M. Grushevsky wrote, "The need of the Ukrainian-Russian people, first of all, should be satisfied in Lviv, the Galicia capital of Russia, the center of the national cultural life of not only Austrian but of the whole Ukraine-Russia ... The Lviv university belongs to Rusyns!"²⁷. In a different extract M. Grushevsky also wrote that "while there is no such separate university it is necessary for us to increase the number of Russian departments in the Lviv university"²⁸.

M. Grushevsky acquainted the Ukrainian society with the arguments of Poles concerning the impossibility and uselessness of opening of the Ukrainian university and publicly expressed his opinion regarding this question. Using the actual material he proved groundlessness of Polish arguments bringing into the focus two main moments. Firstly, Lviv was "the center of the national life of the Ukrainian people of Galicia", secondly, "the number of students-Rusyns of the Lviv university served as an obvious proof of qualitative and quantitative growth of intelligentsia". In the scientist's opinion, the university question became the indicator of the Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia and "acquired the value of the ethnic question".

The movement for the creation of a higher educational institution was joined by the Ukrainian students of the whole empire. The students' veche held in Lviv in July, 1899 had representatives of the Ukrainian students from all Austrian universities. Since then such

a students' veche became a traditional event and was organized annually. M. Grushevsky expressed his view regarding the students' veche on October, 8th, 1901. In particular, he said that though students demanded the creation of a completely Ukrainian university at that moment they were still ready to agree to the teaching of subjects in the Ukrainian language at medical, legal and philosophical departments. Speaking about the necessity of introduction of the Ukrainian language as the language of training at the Lviv university M. Grushevsky wrote that "while the language did not find its place in the higher school, while it did not begin to serve as a means of teaching in universities and other educational institutions, while it did not become the instrument of scientific work in teaching and literature, until then the society, the nationality which speaks this language, will feel itself in the position of a "lower", culturally unequal nation". The scientist rightly believed that the problem of the language becomes a question of life and death or, in other words, "to be or to not be to for "national existence". But the governmental circles of Galicia did not pay attention to the requirements of Ukrainian students and professors. Then students organized (1901–1902) an action which is known under the name of "secessio". The Lviv students-Ukrainians went to study to other universities. The university Polish management of university considered M. Grushevsky to be the main ideologist and organizer of these actions²⁹. Opposition between Poles and Ukrainians within the premises of the Lviv university was so aggravated that as M. Grushevsky wrote in his diary he "had to teach with a revolver in his pocket" for some time³⁰.

While actively struggling for the Ukrainian higher school, members of the SSNSh prepared a memorial for the establishment of the Ukrainian university in Lviv, which was presented to the Austrian government by a special delegation in 1902. However, due to the dominating Polish influence all these measures had no success and were realized only after the First World War in the form of the Ukrainian secret university in Lviv³¹. Galicia intellectuals tried to compensate the absence of the university organizing all-Ukrainian summer schools in Lviv. For example, in 1903 under the initiative of the SSNSh scientific lectures on archeology were organized while courses concerning Ukrainian studies for youth from the Trans-Dnieper Ukraine and Galicia were organized in 1904. The purpose of these courses was quite specific, namely, "... To enable to hear lectures in the Ukrainian-Russian language on the most important public disciplines; to teach classes on subjects which are not presented in the programs of the local higher schools but which are very important for our national condition; to assist with the preparation of courses in those branches of Ukrainian studies where they are still non-existent; to create a field for new scientific forces for future academic activities"³². These courses were used to teach the history of Ukrainian literature and cultural movement in Galicia, the history of Western Europe (in connection with Ukraine), linguistics, natural sciences, anthropology, ethnography, and ethnology. Classes were taught by leading Ukrainian humanists including Michael Grushevsky, Ivan Franko, Vladimir Gnatyuk, Nikolay Gankevich, etc.

Besides the higher school a lot of attention was paid to the reorganization of the Ukrainian secondary education in Eastern Galicia. Ukrainian intellectuals were extremely

worried by the miserable condition of the Ukrainian school. The printed media of that time gives vivid descriptions of lawlessness of Ukrainians in the sphere of education and criticizes schools³³. For example, in 1903/04 there were 25 Polish schools, four Ukrainian and two German schools in Eastern Galicia. In 1910/11 there were 420 comprehensive schools in Lviv province with only three schools with the Ukrainian language of training (Lviv, Peremyshl, Kolomiya). There was approximately one Polish high school per 30 thousand of the Polish population and one Ukrainian school per 820 thousand Ukrainians. Consequently, the indigenous Ukrainian majority of Eastern Galicia, which quantitatively exceeded Poles by 4 times, had 6 times less secondary schools. The reason of Poles to resist the education of Ukrainians was clear as the spread of the Ukrainian secondary education served as a powerful means for a cultural rise.

In these conditions it was decided to organize private educational institutions to which the Polish school administration would not have any access. The first person in Galicia to talk about it was the chairman of the SSNSh³⁴. He issued a call "We shall open our own private schools ourselves"³⁵. Setting an example, in 1904 M. Grushevsky used his own means to open the Ukrainian teacher's seminary in Kolomya and subsequently helped to build a grammar school in Rogatin. M. Grushevsky was convinced that this was the only way to create a school, free from Galicia school authorities, to invite the best Ukrainian teachers to teach at school, to provide a new direction of education. "By opening our private schools," he wrote, "we really put a not hand-made monument, we strengthen ourselves as a people, and we bring up own intelligentsia..."³⁶.

These ideas of an outstanding scientist-historian not only received a wide resonance, but also got their practical embodiment. In 1908-1914 in Galicia the general efforts of progressive Ukrainian intelligentsia with the active support of the public carried out a large-scale campaign for the organization of full-fledged private educational institutions of various types: grammar schools, teacher's seminaries, elementary schools. All this was of great importance for national construction.

Summing up, it is possible to say that the polycultural character of Galicia intellectual environment stimulated modernization processes in many spheres of the spiritual and political life of Ukrainians. The presence of the liberal Austrian constitution, the necessity to identify in the multinational competitive environment and to resist expansionist aspirations of Polish intellectuals were the factors that promoted the formation of a national organism and compelled to produce new forms of resistance, thus quite often copying them from opponents. These factors, in our belief, made Eastern Galicia the center of the Ukrainian national life at the end of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries.

Undoubtedly, the aspect considered by us in the article only outlines the topic declared in the title but it can be considered a perspective direction in modern intellectual history if we are to expand it up to the formulation "Intellectuals in the border zone". In our opinion, the following step on this way should be a comparative research of all national historiographies which developed in the region with the consideration of individual strategies of their development and the necessity of coexistence in a territorially lo-

calized competitive environment. Here, first, it is necessary to pay attention to Polish and Jewish historiographic contexts. At the same time, we shall say that modern development of the problematics of the border zone of Eastern Galicia allows to set the task much more widely emphasizing, for instance, the Armenian and Belarusian intellectual components in the polycultural polyphony of this region.

All this will help to reconstruct the civilization image of Eastern Galicia in the whole completeness of its all cultural and ethnic components.

Notes

- ¹ See det.: Chornovol I. *Polsko-ukrainska ugoda 1890-1894*. Lviv, 2000. P. 28–32.
- ² See det.: Telwak W. *Organizacja i działalność Lwowskiego Grona Komisji Historycznej Akademii Umiejętności // Rocznik Biblioteki Naukowej PAU i PAN w Krakowie. Rok L. Kraków, 2005. S. 13–25.*
- ³ Grushevsky M.S. *Avtobiografja, 1906 // Velikij Ukraineec: Materialy z zhittya ta diyalnosti M.S. Grushevskogo / Uporyad. ta pidgot. tekstiv ta fotomaterialiv / koment. ta primit. A.P. Demidenka. K.: Veselka, 1992. P. 201.*
- ⁴ Zhulinski M. *Koncepcija nacionalnoj kulturi Mihajla Grushevskogo // Kievaska starovina. 1992.6. P. 12.*
- ⁵ *Hronika NTSH 1909. Ch. 31. P.2.*
- ⁶ Grushevsky M. *Tri akademii // Visnik Akademii Nauk Ukrainy. 1991.11. P. 89–100.*
- ⁷ Grushevsky M. *Z nagodi 150-uj knigi “Zapiskov” // Zapiski NTSH. T. 150.1929. P. 1.*
- ⁸ Grushevsky M. *Naukova diyalnost Tovaristva im. Shevchenka in 1896 i 1897. Zapiska da zagalnogo zboru 1898. // Zapiski NTSH. 1898. T. 21. P.10.*
- ⁹ *Zapiski NTSH. 1899. T. 26. P.4.*
- ¹⁰ Krip’jakevich R. *Mihajlo Grushevsky ta Ivan Krip’jakevich (Za materialami neopublikovanogo listuvannya ta memuariv) // Ivan Krip’jakevich u rodninij tradicii, nauci, suspilstvi / Ukraina: kulturna spadshchina, nacionalna svidomist, derzhavnist. Zbirnik naukovih prac, 8. Lviv, 2001. P. 346.*
- ¹¹ Pasevich V. *Evolucia poglyadiv Mihajla Grushevskogo v pershij rik paslya pributtya do Lvova. // Mihajlo Grushevsky i Lvivska istorichna shkola. Materialy konferencii. New York-Lviv, 1995. P. 112.*
- ¹² *List prof. Grushevskogo do dekana Tvardovskogo zaraz po incidenti z dnya 11 sjogo mysyaca // Dilo. 1901. P. 260-261.3 grudnya.*
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SUBJECTIVE ETHNOLINGUISTIC VITALITY AND IDENTITY: SEVERAL BELARUSIAN-UKRAINIAN COMPARISONS*

In 1977 psychologists H. Giles, R. Bourhis and D. Taylor introduced the notion “vitality” that takes into account various factors interacting in the process of language preservation. Under ethnolinguistic vitality they implied a combination of such factors “which make a group likely to behave as a distinctive and active collective entity in intergroup situations” (Giles, Bourhis, Taylor 1977:308; cited from: Kraemer, Olshtain 1989:197). In accordance with this approach it was offered to unite three social structural factors, specifically, the status, institutional support and demography, into one whole that received the name of ethnolinguistic vitality. This model gives an opportunity to evaluate the objective vitality (OV) of a language. At the beginning of the 1980s R. Bourhis, H. Giles and D. Rosenthal introduced a new notion of “subjective ethnolinguistic vitality” (SEV) that defines the subjective evaluation of vitality of the group by the members of this group (Bourhis, Giles, Rosenthal 1981).

Since that time a lot of studies have been conducted in many countries. The research conducted concentrated on the analysis of the relationship between the objective and subjective vitality or establishment of relations between the vitality of different ethnolin-

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guistic groups being in the condition of competition (compare, for instance, Giles, Rosenthal, Young 1985; Ytsma, Viladot, Giles 1994). In 1994 a special issue of "International Journal of the Sociology of Language" was published. It was devoted to the problem of ethnolinguistic vitality (Landry, Allard 1994). The topic of ethnolinguistic identity also occupied its permanent place in different textbooks on sociolinguistics published in the West in last few years (compare, for instance, Fishman 1999).

Language development in Belarus and Ukraine during the last 15 years was quite ambiguous and at present it does not exclude the possibility of a considerable decay of the Belarusian language in future and weakening of the use of the Ukrainian language (in certain domains). These circumstances along with certain changes which have been observed in the language situation recently create favorable preconditions for studying the subjective ethnolinguistic vitality in this region¹.

In 1997 we conducted research of vitality and identity among the students of four Minsk higher education establishments. The results were presented at the conferences "The Belarusian Language in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century" (Minsk, 1997) and "Language and Identity at the Border of Cultures" (Białystok, 1998). In 2000 a similar survey was conducted with the use of the Ukrainian material in cooperation with Bohdan Azhniuk, the researcher at the Institute of Linguistics named after Potebnya of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The materials of the three conferences were published (see: Zaprudski, Lauzhal 1998; Zaprudski, Lauzhal 2000; Zaprudski, Azhniuk, Lauzhal 2001).

With the goal of receiving new data about the mutual relations between the subjective ethnic vitality and identity of Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians living in Belarus and Ukraine in 2000-2001 (in Belarus) and in 2004 (in Ukraine) we conducted a new survey¹.

Method

The questionnaire published as an attachment to the article by Bourhis, Giles, Rosenthal 1981 was used as an example during the process of preparation of this questionnaire. Following the analogy with the work by Ytsma, Viladot, Giles 1994 several points about the strength of the groups and languages were added. The questionnaire contained 30 questions. Informants expressed their opinions about the following factors influencing the ethnolinguistic vitality:

status variables – the historical and cultural prestige of the group, economic wealth, social and language status (there were 5 questions of this kind);

demographic variables – the number of the population, proportion of X-language population, endogamy, birth rate, level of emigration and immigration (6 questions);

variables of institutional support – representativeness of the language and community in government activities, in industry, business, education, politics, culture, religion and mass media (8 questions).

The questionnaire was filled in by 250 Belarusian and 152 Ukrainian students accordingly from 3 and 2 Belarusian and Ukrainian higher education establishments. Those questionnaires the respondents of which identified themselves as Belarusians (in Belarus) and Ukrainians (in Ukraine)³ and stated that their native languages were Belarusian/Ukrainian or Russian⁴ were selected for the main processing. Thus, the Belarusian sampling was shortened to 155 persons and the Ukrainian one – to 122.

The section of the questionnaire about the current and future strength and activity of Belarusians and the Belarusian-speaking community (respectively, Ukrainians and the Ukrainian-speaking community) consisted of 4 questions. The questionnaires were prepared in the Belarusian and Ukrainian languages. We used a 7-point scale with the minimal possible choice identified by the figure 1. Students filled in the questionnaire at the lessons. The average age of students of both groups was 19 years old. 92% of Belarusians informants consisted of females and 70% of Ukrainian informants consisted of females. The questionnaire also had a section devoted to identity. In the questionnaire the students rated the value for them of the ethnic identity, the native language and the command of this language possessed by their children. This section used a 10-point scale with a similar minimal possible choice identified by the figure 1.

Results

Subjective Ethnolinguistic Vitality (SEV)

We will consider the perceived vitality of Belarusians versus Russians in Belarus and vitality of Ukrainians versus Russians in Ukraine in this part of the article.

Belarusians. The means received in the Belarusian student group in each questionnaire point are shown in table 1.

Belarusian status. Students believe that the Belarusian people is not very proud of its history and culture (1), and the perceived status of Russians is higher. Belarusians are recognized as the ones whose economic status is lower than the average (2); the status of Russians is somewhat higher. According to the evaluations of the students Belarusians and Russians are equally well perceived in Belarus (3). The Belarusian language is not very prestigious in Belarus (4) with its prestige being even lower outside of Belarus (5).

Table 1. Mean Scores in the Belarusian Group (n=155)

		Belarusians		Russians	
		mean	sd	mean	sd
Status					
1	Pride for history and culture	3.56	1.48	4.46	1.71
2	Wealth	3.12	1.31	3.53	1.45
3	Evaluation of the group in Belarus	4.92	1.54	4.85	1.23
4	Evaluation of the language in Belarus	3.45	1.54	5.88	1.24
5	Evaluation of the language on an international scale	2.36	1.49	5.66	1.32
Demography					
1	Evaluation proportion	4.88	1.35	3.17	1.46
2	Evaluation language proportion	2.31	1.11	5.70	1.04
3	Marriages in one's own group	3.06	1.65	2.93	1.58
4	Birth rate	3.51	1.59	3.25	1.41
5	Emigration	3.21	1.41	3.11	1.52
6	Immigration	2.74	1.50	2.81	1.43
Institutional support					
1	Government activity	2.70	1.42	6.40	1.04
2	Economy	4.27	1.39	4.45	1.35
3	Business	1.94	1.34	6.59	1.03
4	Education	4.96	1.53	5.79	1.32
5	Political power	4.86	1.50	4.44	1.34
6	Cultural life	5.44	1.24	4.53	1.52
7	Religion	5.64	1.79	5.69	1.42
8	Mass media	5.17	1.53	5.49	1.50
General vitality					
1	Strength/activity (of the group)	4.66	1.33	4.66	1.35
2	Strength/activity (of the group) in 20-30 years	4.78	1.76	4.77	1.41
3	Strength/activity (of the language)	4.24	1.55	5.24	1.43
4	Strength/activity (of the language) in 20-30 years	4.78	1.78	5.01	1.43
Identification					
1	Importance of belonging to the Belarusian people	7.35	2.65		
2	Attitude to the language	6.76	3.05		
3	Children's command of the language	7.80	2.91		

Belarusian demography. In students' opinions, there are many more Belarusians in Belarus than Russians (1). What concerns the language proportion (2), then the Russian-speaking population is recognized as the majority. There is not a significant difference in the frequency of mixed marriages (3), birth rate (4), levels of emigration (5) and immigration (6).

Belarusian institutional support. Students believe that the Belarusian language is not strongly supported in comparison with the Russian language due to its minor use in state bodies (1) and in the sphere of entrepreneurship (3). What concerns economy (2) and presence of Belarusians and Russians in the political power (5) the difference between Belarusians and Russians is recognized as slight. Students think that the Russian language

receives a strong support in the education sphere (4) while the Belarusian language gets a considerably smaller attention. A stronger position of Belarusians (6) is observed by the students in the cultural life. The Belarusian and Russian languages are treated differently in the sphere of religion (7) with the balance clearly shifting in favor of the Russian language. Finally, there is not a significant difference in the perceived position of the languages in mass media (8).

General vitality of Belarusians. Belarusians have rather an average perceived strength and activity (1) and in this respect they almost do not differ from Russians. When one is to talk about the future strength of both peoples (2) the evaluation relative strength remains the same. Students assess the relative strength and relative activity of the Belarusian-speaking people (3) noticeably lower than the strength and activity of the Russian-speaking population. They predict some rise for the Belarusian-speaking people and a very small fall for the Russian-speaking people in future (4).

The block of status factors shows the highest assessments of the general perception of Belarusians and the lowest assessments of the international status of the Belarusian language and the economic status of Belarusians. Demographic factors are also evaluated differently. Respondents believe that a considerable part of Belarusians among the population of the country and a low level of emigration positively influences the vitality. However, a small quantity of the Belarusian-speaking population and a low level of immigration have a negative effect. Noticeable contrasts can be observed when one looks at the points concerning the institutional support. Students are likely to give quite high marks to those points which concern the representativeness of Belarusians in cultural life and the use of the Belarusian language in mass media. At the same time the frequency of the use of the Belarusian language in the entrepreneurial sphere and in state bodies is evaluated very lowly.

What concerns the direction of development of the general vitality in 20-30 years the Belarusian sampling becomes interesting due to the fact that the respondents-Belarusians and the respondents-Russians in general assess these parameters similarly. The only deviation is the question about the future strength and activity of the Belarusian-speaking people. While ethnic Belarusians see some positive dynamics in this respect ethnic Russians predict a small regress.

Ukrainians. The means received in the Ukrainian student group in each questionnaire point are shown in table 2.

Ukrainian status. Students believe that the Ukrainian people is proud of its cultural history (1). However, its perceived status statistically does not differ from the status of Russians. Ukrainians have an average perceived economic status (2), but it is slightly lower than the status of Russians. It is believed that as a group (3) Ukrainians are perceived much better than Russians. Students think that the Ukrainian language has a high prestige in Ukraine (4); the prestige value which they ascribe to the Russian language is somewhat

lower. The international status of the Ukrainian language is evaluated differently but always in favor of the Russian language (5).

Table 1. Mean Scores in the Ukrainian Group (n=122)

		Ukrainians		Russians	
		mean	sd	mean	sd
Status					
1	Pride for history and culture	4.86	1.32	5.06	1.35
2	Wealth	3.88	1.15	4.35	1.16
3	Evaluation of the group in Ukraine	5.84	1.23	4.39	1.32
4	Evaluation of the language in Ukraine	5.34	1.39	5.02	1.37
5	Evaluation of the language on an international scale	3.17	1.51	4.80	1.38
Demography					
1	Evaluation proportion	4.87	1.47	3.06	1.45
2	Evaluation language proportion	4.10	1.14	4.28	1.23
3	Marriages in one's own group	3.69	1.30	3.44	1.28
4	Birth rate	4.02	1.37	3.56	1.18
5	Emigration	4.98	1.18	3.80	1.46
6	Immigration	2.82	1.32	2.94	1.21
Institutional support					
1	Government activity	5.00	1.32	4.56	1.61
2	Economy	4.55	1.29	4.69	1.26
3	Business	4.25	1.54	5.30	1.18
4	Education	6.12	0.99	3.46	1.39
5	Political power	5.33	1.18	4.02	1.41
6	Cultural life	5.50	1.18	4.29	1.50
7	Religion	4.83	1.44	4.67	1.56
8	Mass media	5.57	1.19	4.74	1.51
General vitality					
1	Strength/activity (of the group)	4.96	1.40	4.41	1.33
2	Strength/activity (of the group) in 20-30 years	5.77	1.39	4.18	1.67
3	Strength/activity (of the language)	5.01	1.28	4.93	1.29
4	Strength/activity (of the language) in 20-30 years	5.85	1.31	4.12	1.67
Identification					
1	Importance of belonging to the Ukrainian language	8.14	2.58		
2	Attitude to the language	8.08	2.46		
3	Children's command of the language	9.07	1.87		

Ukrainian demography. Students believe that the proportion of Ukrainians towards Russians is definitely in favor of Ukrainians (1). They think that the number of the Russian-speaking people in Ukraine is a little bit higher than the Ukrainian-speaking people (2). What concerns mixed marriages (3) then one can notice that in students' opinions mixed marriages among Russians are more frequent than among Ukrainians. The perceived birth rate (4) among Ukrainians is evaluated somewhat higher than the birth rate among Russians. Students suppose that the level of emigration (5) is much higher among Ukrainians

than among Russians but what concerns the level of immigration (6) Ukrainians and Russians practically do not differ.

Ukrainian institutional support. Students believe that the use of the Ukrainian language in state bodies is on quite a high level and that the Russian language is used just a little bit less. Students do not see a significant difference between the two peoples from the point of view of their role in economy (2). However, the positions of the Russian language are higher in the sphere of entrepreneurship (3). Representation of the Ukrainian language in the sphere of education (4) is perceived as the representation much higher than that of the Russian language. Students also think that Ukrainians have more political power than Russians (5). In the opinion of the respondents Ukrainians prevail in cultural life (6). The Ukrainian language is used more actively in mass media in comparison with the use of the Russian language (8) but there is no significant difference in the use of the Ukrainian and Russian languages in the sphere of religion (7).


General vitality of Ukrainians. Ukrainians have a slightly higher perceived strength and activity (1) than Russians. What concerns the future strength of both peoples (2), the evaluated relative strength of Ukrainians should grow while the strength of Russian should decrease. Students suppose that the relative strength and activity of the Ukrainian-speaking people practically equals the strength and activity of the Russian-speaking people though, just like in the previous example, they predict the growth of strength and activity for the Ukrainian-speaking population and decay for the Russian-speaking population.

When it comes to status factors then one can see that the status of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine received the highest marks and the international status received the lowest marks. Demographic factors also spread differently. On the one hand, a great number of Ukrainians among the population and a noticeable proportion of the Ukrainian-speaking people positively influence vitality. On the other hand, a high level of emigration of Ukrainians has a negative effect. Answers to questions concerning the attitude towards the institutional support were grouped in a most close way. Here the use of the Ukrainian language in the education sphere was evaluated most highly and its use in the sphere of entrepreneurship received the lowest mark.

As for the direction of development of general vitality in 20-30 years then as it has been mentioned above there has been revealed an essential difference between the evaluations by Ukrainians and by Russians. While the Ukrainian respondents predicted positive dynamics for their group and, especially, for the Ukrainian-speaking part and simultaneously saw a decay for Russians and the Russian-speaking part of the population Russians assume that there will be a rise for their own group and they are quite skeptical about the possibility of a noticeable rise for Ukrainians.

Comparison of the Belarusian and Ukrainian “Profiles of Vitality”

Average evaluations of the points representing factors of vitality are given in the diagram which shows the comparison of the Belarusian and Ukrainian subjective ethnolinguistic vitality.



The diagram shows a noticeable similarity between the curves in the sectors dealing with status and general vitality. However, there is a considerable difference between the profiles in those sectors which have to do with demography and institutional support. As for the status factors both groups evaluate most highly the point of social status and most lowly the point of international recognition. Evaluations in the Belarusian group are much lower on all five points of the status block. Therefore, one can make a conclusion that the perceived Belarusian status is noticeably lower.

The part of the diagram in the demographic block shows that both groups obviously dominate from the point of view of the quantitative proportion of the population. Although, a low level of immigration is rather an unfavorable factor. The question of the immigration level turns out to be the only one in all calculations where Belarusian evaluations exceed the Ukrainian ones.

To a certain extent, all curves in the sector of institutional support coincide with the situation in the sector of status factors: the majority of Ukrainian evaluations exceed analogous Belarusian evaluations. All Ukrainian evaluations in the sector of institutional support are higher than the medium point of the scale showing a favorable combina-

tion of factors of institutional support. The Belarusian situation is different. An especially big difference is registered in the use of the Belarusian and Ukrainian languages in state bodies, in the sphere of entrepreneurship, in religion and education. At the same time differences in assessment concerning cultural life, economy and representativeness of the Belarusian and Ukrainian languages in mass media seem to be statistically unimportant.

Finally, the curves correspond to the received general regularity about stronger vitality of Ukrainians; the tendency to look more optimistically into the future is also typical of Ukrainians.

Identity and Vitality

Average identity evaluations for Ukrainians turned out to be very high (Me=8.43). Belarusian evaluations are lower (Me=7.30).

Intergroup comparisons were made to define the relations between Belarusian/ Ukrainian identity and subjective ethnolinguistic vitality (SEV). They showed that identity and SEV are connected with the help of positive correlation. The combination of the given figures with the figures concerning Ukrainian/Belarusian SEV shows that the identity is just as high as SEV was. In other words, high vitality of Ukrainians probably supposes strong identification while low (or medium) vitality of Belarusians leads to weaker identification.

Then we studied intragroup relations between identity and ingroup / outgroup vitality. For this purpose student groups that always evaluated the identification point highly (8 and higher) were selected in both samplings. By convention, we called the groups chosen "strong identifiers". In contrast, the groups which evaluated identification points lower (7 and lower) were, by convention, called "weak identifiers". The results of such group changes are presented in tables 3 and 4.

It turned out that there is a significant difference between Belarusian and Ukrainian SEV for weak and strong identifiers. On the whole, Belarusian (and especially Ukrainian) SEV is perceived as much weaker SEV by weak identifiers and *vice versa*. Most different conceptions are revealed when one looks at the questions about general vitality among the Ukrainian part of respondents.

Table 3. Correlation between Belarusian Strong and Weak Identifiers (Strong, n=68; weak, n=23)

		Strong Identifiers		Weak Identifiers	
		Bel.	Rus.	Bel.	Rus.
Status					
1	Pride for history and culture	3.71	3.59	3.73	4.64
2	Wealth	3.09	3.55	3.00	3.70
3	Evaluation of the group in Belarus	4.75	4.84	4.64	4.91

4	Evaluation of the language in Belarus	3.58	5.65	3.13	5.91
5	Evaluation of the language on an international scale	2.91	5.62	2.18	4.83
Demography					
1	Evaluation proportion	4.72	3.30	4.57	3.52
2	Evaluation language proportion	2.41	5.72	2.11	5.80
3	Marriages in one's own group	3.19	3.06	2.32	2.64
4	Birth rate	3.37	3.13	3.00	3.17
5	Emigration	3.26	3.00	2.86	3.23
6	Immigration	2.76	2.75	2.65	2.52
Institutional support					
1	Government activity	2.82	6.34	3.35	6.09
2	Economy	4.27	4.48	4.38	4.85
3	Business	2.04	6.62	2.09	6.52
4	Education	5.10	5.68	4.65	6.22
5	Political power	4.95	4.48	5.52	4.43
6	Cultural life	5.50	4.60	5.26	4.61
7	Religion	3.99	5.68	2.87	6.09
8	Mass media	5.35	5.46	4.96	5.43
General Vitality					
1	Strength/activity (of the group)	4.85	4.84	4.83	4.43
2	Strength/activity (of the group) in 20-30 years	5.18	4.75	4.62	4.52
3	Strength/activity (of the language)	4.30	5.37	4.22	5.22
4	Strength/activity (of the language) in 20-30 years	5.06	5.16	4.18	5.00

However, certain points display a negative correlation between the degree of identification and SEV. For instance, Ukrainian strong identifiers in comparison with weak identifiers perceive their own group as the group having lower vitality when it comes to questions dealing with economic status and proportion of Ukrainians towards Russians. As for strong and weak identifiers in the Belarusian sampling, negative correlation is found in points concerning institutional support. In comparison with weak identifiers, Belarusian strong identifiers gave lower points to the questions about the representativeness of the Belarusian language in state bodies and in the sphere of entrepreneurship as well as the representativeness of the Belarusian community in economy and political power.

Table 4. Correlation between Ukrainian Strong and Weak Identifiers (strong, n=8; weak, n=14)

		Strong Identifiers		Weak Identifiers	
		Ukr.	Rus.	Ukr.	Rus.
Status					
1	Pride for history and culture	5.03	5.09	4.57	5.15
2	Wealth	3.85	4.36	4.00	4.21
3	Evaluation of the group in Ukraine	5.91	4.33	5.23	4.92
4	Evaluation of the language in Ukraine	5.44	5.04	4.43	5.14
5	Evaluation of the language on an international scale	3.12	4.79	3.00	5.08

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Demography					
1	Evaluation proportion	4.88	3.07	5.00	3.23
2	Evaluation language proportion	4.32	4.02	3.38	5.23
3	Marriages in one's own group	3.78	3.46	3.93	3.86
4	Birth rate	4.11	3.51	3.71	3.93
5	Emigration	2.09	3.58	2.08	2.38
6	Immigration	2.90	3.00	2.23	2.69
Institutional support					
1	Government activity	5.10	4.47	4.64	4.57
2	Economy	4.53	4.78	4.38	4.62
3	Business	4.20	5.46	3.71	5.29
4	Education	6.17	3.48	5.86	3.29
5	Political power	5.35	4.07	4.62	4.23
6	Cultural life	5.56	4.26	5.15	4.31
7	Religion	4.89	4.74	4.31	5.15
8	Mass media	5.58	4.72	5.43	4.57
General Vitality					
1	Strength/activity (of the group)	5.16	4.42	3.54	4.43
2	Strength/activity (of the group) in 20-30 years	5.99	4.01	4.62	5.15
3	Strength/activity (of the language)	5.23	4.95	4.00	5.00
4	Strength/activity (of the language) in 20-30 years	6.11	3.98	4.62	4.69

As for the outgroup vitality then the Ukrainian sampling shows that unlike strong identifiers weak identifiers evaluate quite high the future strength of the Russian-speaking people and, specifically, to the future strength and activity of the Russian group in general. They believe that the future strength of the Russian-speaking people will decrease just slightly and the future strength of Russians will increase.

Concluding Remarks

It is rather hard to judge to what degree the discovered subjective ethnolinguistic vitality of Ukrainians and Belarusians corresponds to the objective language vitality proved by reliable scientific data.

Only in specific cases (for instance, concerning the proportion evaluation of the population) one can claim that such comparison could look well-grounded. For example, when transforming out data from the point “proportions of the population” into usual percentage relations we would get the results that Ukrainians make up about 65% of the population while Russians make up about 35%. (Similar figures are received in the Belarusian case). However, according to the data of the All-Ukrainian population census in 2001 Ukrainians made up 77,7% of the population of Ukraine and Russians made up 17,3%. (Pro kilnist' ta sklad... 2002). Thus, respondents clearly underestimate the quantity of Ukrainians and overestimate the quantity of Russians. This tendency is even more clearly seen in the Belarusian example as, in accordance with the last population census

Belarusians make up 81,2% of the population and Russians – 11,4% (Natsionalnyj sostav 2001: 38). The fact that Ukrainians and Belarusians overestimate the number of Russians living in their countries probably proves that there is an advanced level of Russification in Ukrainian and Belarusian societies (and, accordingly, high chances of vitality of the Russian community). Answers to the question about the proportions of the population show that respondents clearly realize that Russians in Ukraine have good chances of vitality.

The general picture in compliance with which the vitality of Belarusians is lower than the vitality of Ukrainians can be acknowledged true. Though evaluations of respondents depend not so much on the deep penetration into the problem, a thorough analysis (for which they had no time, anyway) but on the existing stereotypes and opinions spread in society. In this sense, the evaluation of the level of emigration given by Ukrainian respondents is very indicative. Probably, it is due to the fact that in real life in Ukraine the phenomenon of *zarobitchanstvo* (“temporary trips outside of the country for seasonal, temporary work or for small trade”) is widely spread. This phenomenon received a great coverage in the media; Ukrainian respondents in contrast to reality evaluated the parameter of emigration (which, first of all, takes into account the number of cases of leaving the country for *permanent* living in a different country) as an exceptionally critical one for Ukrainian vitality.

The specificity of Ukrainian subjective ethnolinguistic vitality can be understood better if we compare the data of respondents-Ukrainians with the data of respondents-Russians. As a result of this comparison we can see that Ukrainians probably overestimate their vitality (and, accordingly, underestimate vitality of Russians) by such parameters as the use of languages in state bodies (Ukrainians gave 4,56 to the Russian language in this case while the Russians gave 5,00), the use of the Russian languages in education (respectively, 3,46 vs. 4.2), in religion (4,67 vs. 5,10), mass media (4,74 vs. 5,30), the representativeness of Russians in cultural life of Ukraine (4,29 vs. 5,10).

There is a certain similarity of the Belarusian and Ukrainian profiles of vitality in relation towards status factors and partially, institutional support. At the same time, if the profiles in the part of status factors are very similar then the profiles in the part of institutional support greatly differ in relation to such points as the use of the language in the spheres of entrepreneurship, state bodies, religion and education. Active work on the inclusion of the Ukrainian language into the system of education and power has been going on in Ukraine, unlike in Belarus, recently. This activity was clearly noticed by Ukrainian respondents.

As for the relation between identity and SEV then the intergroup comparison shows that identification and SEV are connected by positive correlation. Higher vitality of Ukrainians seems to stimulate stronger identification while lower SEV of Belarusians leads to weaker identification.

The picture is more complicated when one deals with intragroup comparisons. Though in general, like in the previous case, positive correlation (i.e., respondents with weak identification perceived the vitality of their own group as weakened and vice versa) was seen (especially in the Ukrainian sampling). In a number of cases (especially in the

Belarusian sampling) one could see negative correlation (i.e., weakened vitality of their own group was felt by respondents with strong identification). Thus, our data confirm the supposition by Ytsma et al. that “in low (or medium) vitality groups ID may be negatively related to ingroup SEV” (Ytsma et al. 1994: 76).

In certain cases one can see an interesting difference between the data of the Ukrainian opinion poll in 2000 and, on the one hand, and the data of the opinion poll in 2004, on the other hand. For instance, in 2000 in comparison with 2004 respondents evaluated the parameter “pride of Ukrainians for their history and culture”, the prestige of the Russian language, the use of the Ukrainian language in state bodies higher. Unfortunately, due to the insufficient comparison of the respondents in 2000 and 2004 and especially due to the difference of measure scales it is difficult to say whether in the last four years the perceived use of the Ukrainian language in state bodies decreased simultaneously and the prestige of the Russian language diminished. If this were the case then one could make a cautious conclusion that the general perceived prestige of the language in Ukraine sometimes does not depend so much on the specific language practices but more on the “general line” declared by the government.

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Notes

- ¹ There is no shortage of contradictory and often very critical evaluations of the modern language development in Belarus and Ukraine in literature. For instance, B. Plotnikau believes that the Belarusian language at present "is forced out almost from all sphere of public life... is in its own house in the condition of Cinderella neglected by most of the population following the example of the heads of the country and majority of the officials" (Plotnikau 1998: 35). According to the head of the department of the heat and cold equipment of Mahilou technological institute A. Smalak, the situation in Belarus before and after the referendum (meaning the referendum of 1995) can be defined as follows, "Of-

officially the referendum restored the equal status of the Russian and Belarusian languages. Factually, it did not exist before the referendum. Protests against the “discrimination” of the Russian language were, in reality, protests against its losing its prevalent position. Factually, the referendum secured the prevalent position of the Russian language” (Smalak 1998: 92). In accordance with the words of A. Padluzhny, “the language policy now is dominated [...] by public organizations which consider the Belarusian language unnecessary or non-existent,” the Belarusian language “is almost completely forced out” of majority of such spheres as state administration and construction of public life, politics, law, education and national culture (Padluzhny 1997: 67, 72-73).

A. Pohribnyj states that “now the Russification on the biggest part of the territory of Ukraine has not only been stopped but *vice versa* has acquired new turns in many regions including the capital”, “the natural area of the existence of the Ukrainian language is being sharply narrowed” (Pohribnyj 2002: 145). L. Masenko writes about “the weakening of the position of the Ukrainian language”, about “the decay of the living speaking forms of the being of the Ukrainian language in the urban environment of Ukraine and spread of the Russian language instead of them” (Masenko 2004: 157, 158). According to O. Hryniv, “the sphere of use of the Ukrainian language is narrowed and its functioning is limited by the official ritual and home use” (Hryniv 2002: 11). In the opinion of the author of the well-known work “Internationalism or Russification?” at the change of millennia it is appropriate to say that in the promotion of the Ukrainian language “in many spheres we are thrown back even in comparison with the end of the 80s”, that “now in Ukraine the most liable to the threat of distinction minority that requires protection is the Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians” (Dziuba 2000: 5, 10). Though, other authors are not inclined to extremely dramatize the situation, “the modern status of the Ukrainian language is not really low and in contrast to former stereotypes it is considered to be a cultural language” (Bilaniuk 2001: 7).

- ² Originally we had a goal to questionnaire Belarusian students in 2004 too. However, unfortunately, this task was not fulfilled.
The wording of the questions in the questionnaire of the 2000-2001 patterns, on the one hand, and the 2004 questionnaire, on the other hand, did not differ significantly. For instance, the question about the attitude towards Belarusian/Russians was formulated in the following way: “How positively are the following national communities evaluated in Belarus?”. A similar question in the Ukrainian questionnaire had the wording: “What is the attitude to such national communities in Ukraine?”. We assume that these differences did not influence the answers of the respondents greatly.
- ³ Questionnaires of respondents-Russians were not ignored and were used as a comparative material.
- ⁴ Questionnaires that had simultaneously 2 languages identified as native were excluded from the sample.
- ⁵ In the opinion of Ukrainian scientists, “during the 90s of the past century the number of external migration flows from Ukraine constantly decreased. On the threshold of a new millennium the volumes of travel between Ukraine and the CIS countries and the Baltic States were seven times smaller than at the beginning of the 90s and with the countries of the so-called old abroad were more than two times”. See: Pirozhkov et al. 2003: 5.

CONSTANTS OF POLITICAL CULTURE AND EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS DURING THE PERIOD OF POST-SOVIET TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

In his time A. de Tocqueville prophetically claimed that “there is no more fruitful wonder than the wonder of freedom and there is nothing more complicated than to learn it.” Post-Soviet societies are the best proof of the correctness of this statement. In spite of the fact that the ways of modernization, economic emancipation and social and political democratization are known and accessible to all, their practical realization has been postponed for an uncertain period in the majority of the countries of the former USSR.

Even if there existed sincere governments with firm intentions to assist liberal reforms even then they would not have been able to prevent the society from making a reverse movement, just the way it happened in the Republic of Moldova during the elections in February 2001 when the communists came back to power in a constitutional way.

According to K. Marx, such turns could be interpreted as “the victory of the reaction”, “the dark man” of history that every time appears in the finale of social revolutions to compromise their achievements. But it does not matter whether we use Marxist *clichés* (or any others); the phenomenon of regress itself in post-totalitarian space is quite interesting and deserves researchers’ attention.

When analyzing difficulties in the processes of modernization of the Community of Independent States, ideologists of political and socio-economic reforms usually explain failures of reforms by the specificity of national character, peculiarity of Eastern (or South-Eastern) ideals of spirituality, distinctiveness of mentalities, “Soviet heritage”, but they do not deal with the essence of the problem, valences and contexts of the phenomenon. In the end, everything comes to the idea of the civil and political immaturity of Post-Soviet societies. However, the political class usually believes that the men-

tality of society will change soon, and it even entertains the hope of manipulating these changes. Nevertheless, in reality this does not happen. Many aspects of collective and individual mentality showed themselves not quite liable to changes; even if they did change, they did not change for the best. For instance, the experience of the last decade indicated that having lost fear of the state, the population of the former USSR lost respect for law, and this negatively affected the crime rate.

Contrary to the expectations the provision of the population with the economic and political rights did not significantly increase the growth of personal and collective activity of civil society. New social and political structures were only mechanically laid on the remanent structures of collective psychology. The consequence of this included the response of society, which directly depended on the existential codes, mental structures, and habitual patterns of prior experience.

The goal of this research (within the framework of historical and anthropological methodology) is to analyse certain remanent ideas of the population of the Republic of Moldova that prove causal relations between the crisis of public consciousness, in other words, the syndrome of *learnt helplessness* (Seligman) that is characteristic of societies in transition, and the *archetypes* (and/or *archetype constellations*) as the compensatory mechanisms of collective sub-consciousness.

Possibly, it will not be excessive to say once again that archetypes[№] are the elements of collective sub-consciousness, which sustain the aspiration for the habitual social environment (culture, history, traditions, time, space, personality, family, labor), i.e. a peculiar social and cultural reflex that has accumulated the experience of many preceding generations. The main feature of archetypes is their archaic irrational and rigid character. Political archetypes are often personified in the figures of politicians who manipulate the masses using myths and symbols.

The society of the Republic of Moldova is complex and heterogeneous. There exist considerable class, religious, and cultural differences aggravated by noticeable differences between urban and rural population. All this taken together leads to the presence of numerous types of *modal persons* in social and cultural structures. In addition to this, the extremely disconnected Moldovan society today (that used to be rather closed and homogeneous) is also predisposed to show homogeneous collective reactions which researchers can regard as characteristics of collective mentality.

It should be mentioned that with the collapse of the Soviet system the population of Moldova found itself in a deep political and socio-cultural crisis connected with the loss of effectiveness of institutes of social regulation, degradation of the unifying consolidating ideology, and increase in the number of deviant forms of behavior. All this led to changes in the character of social priorities and collective motivations. Norms, meanings, and institutes of social regulation became inadequate to the prevalent situation.

The changes that had been seen earlier as a triumph of democratic individualism over totalitarianism in reality turned out to be neo-romanticism and populism. In conditions of lack of democratic traditions society had to appeal (a compensatory mechanism) to

subconscious schemes when solving its problems. Naturally, today archetype structures have not managed to retain their primeval condition. But one of the basic features of archetypes is that within the course of time they can be restructured and make new combinations without losing their power of conviction and auto-suggestion. Let us look at an obvious example from the Soviet past. Communist ideology actively used the myth of the *Savior* (and its correlating archetype of an *Alien* meaning the intervention of foreigners and/or marginal persons guilty of everything) which together made up a powerful myth of *Conspiracy* or *a Sieged Fortress*. Combined with the archetype of *Actualization of the origins* the latter was able to provide the unity of the nation (the archetype of *Unity*) and offered the solution to escape from reality (the archetype of *Escape from history*) or social revolution (the archetype of *Rebirth and/or Resurrection*).

Origins of political myths in the collective consciousness of Moldovans can be found in both the historical tradition and the communist heritage. All the above-mentioned archetype structures, which were discovered by the French researcher R. Girardeti, revealed themselves in the Republic of Moldova (and also in Romania) in the last decade. Each of social or ethnic groups appealed to the myths which it needed to calm down social anxiety. Political leaders of different directions had enough opportunities either to deepen this anxiety or to arouse collective hopes reactivating various archetypes of social consciousness.

Being one of the most significant and influential archetypes in the history of humanity (on all its levels including the levels of an individual, community, nation), the “myth of malicious conspiracy” placed in the binomial “*I/the Other*” (accordingly, *We/Others*) was actively used to demonize *the other/marginal*. This depersonalized image always provoked negative unrest, fear, and aggression. Real features of *the other* were not important in relation to the imaginary symbol of the enemy, the breaker of the peace that threatened the integrity and inviolability of society. The dichotomy *We/Others* became the main instrument in the process of individual and collective identification of the post-perestroika period.

The archetype of *the other* effectively imposed itself on society on all its levels (social, ethnic, religious) turning into the collective image of a “*Conspirator*”. The Russian ethnic minority that makes up about 35% of the population of the Republic attributed Romania-phobia connotations to the *Conspiracy* myth. In the last few years this factor influenced decisively the evolution of political processes in the Republic of Moldova (and the geo-strategic orientation of Moldovan administration) as the results of Parliamentary, Presidential and local elections of the recent years confirmed the general tendency of the growth of Romania-phobia among ethnic and cultural minorities.

During the period from 1989 to 1991 the mythologeme of *the other Russian* was used for both the revival and the affirmation of national identity among a certain part of Moldovan Romanians. Consequently, the socio-political confrontation in the country aggravated; it revealed itself most severely in the separatism of the Trans-Dniester Region.

One of the characteristic features of post-Leninist political culture became the emergence of a kind of intellectual proletariat obsessed with the theories of conspiracies and able to continually generate “topical” slogans and tasks. Radicalism of such intellectuals (of the right and left kind) addresses the same reflexes of collective consciousness, the visible attributes of which are resentment towards pluralism, xenophobia, hypocrisy as well as self-interested attitude towards traditional values and private property. That is why populism became the most beneficial instrument for the intellectual proletariat because it allowed to exploit mass dissatisfaction easily through appeal to social demagoguery.

The myth of *Malicious Conspiracy* is actively supported by zealous advocates of “the Moldavian state system and language” that saw a threat in the perspective of the union of the Republic of Moldova and Romania. It was their efforts that provoked the coolness of the diplomatic relations with this country. Thus, one can state with confidence that the use of the conflict of imagological nature by different political forces led to serious consequences in the Republic of Moldova. They vividly show the danger of using archetype constructions for political struggle.

The myth of *Savior* in Moldova was brought to political life by the desire of the masses to have a charismatic leader. It is interesting to mention that during the post-perestroika period this myth was significantly transformed from the image of the *Savior* as a moderate patron (kind, amenable and democratic in the image of whom one can easily see the political image of M. Snegur) to the authoritarian *Savior*. Each of these saviors projected himself upon the image of this or that authoritative historical figure. The political image of *Savior* M. Snegur was nurtured by the image of Stephen the Great, the voevode of Moldova, the reconciler of the peoples, the protector of the integrity of the country and Christian values, who occupies an important place in the collective consciousness of Moldovans up to the present. (By the way, the political use of archetypes repressed by communist ideology became almost universal for all post-totalitarian countries⁴).

P. Lucinschi entered the presidential electoral campaign in 1996 as the catch-all savior (his slogan: “Order, Stability, Prosperity!”). He combined the connotations of the Soviet past (a brilliant career in the communist party, which was associated with *the Golden Age* among the part of the population that experienced nostalgia for communism) with the project of realization of the long-felt social problems. It was different from the political image of V. Voronin as his image had been completely legitimized through the myth of *the Golden Age* and the images of former great leaders who were strict, incorruptible and fair⁵.

Steep political ascents and abrupt descents of political leaders gradually formed in the Moldavian society the idea of the political process as a cynical show. Political corruption, material hardships, moral vacuum became the ingredients that encouraged eschatological expectations. That is why now the myth of the *Golden Age* (or “nostalgia for the lost paradise”) makes one of the main strategies of mass consciousness’s escape from reality into the happy past or future.

The myth of the *Golden Age* in Moldova reveals itself in three nostalgias simultaneously: 1) nostalgia for communism when Moldova was “the garden” of the USSR; 2) nostalgia for the Great Medieval Moldova; 3) nostalgia for the period between the two world wars (“when the nation was united and the country was one whole”).

The myth of the *Golden Age* is closely connected with the myth of the *United People*. The Moldovans have not yet selected either of the two theories of nation formation dominant on the European continent (contractual-civic and ethno-cultural). In addition, they continue to hesitate in the choice of Romanian or Moldavian national identity.

In this paper we did not try to cover all the archetypes activated in the political life of modern Moldova. It was important for us to identify those deep-laid reasons which feed up the social complex of “resistance to changes”.

The chance to learn the lessons of democracy and jural state lost in its proper time led to political arbitrariness on all the levels of the functioning of the state system in Moldova. This is the reason why today the population considers state institutions to be powers that are uncontrolled or controlled with difficulty. The best way of co-existence with them is submission, silence, and resignation. Such passivity stimulates the feeling of defeat and political apathy; it invalidates any possibility of positive prognosis for the near future. The shock caused by the observed “changes” blocks the initiative, paralyzes action, and distorts the objective understanding of the events among which the individual is placed. The feeling of helplessness accompanied by nostalgia for the communist times, fear, and “escape from freedom” made it possible for society to prefer what is basically the one-party system and “the strong hand”.

Undoubtedly, post-Soviet collective consciousness is a favorable environment for collective illusions, expectations, and disappointments. Democratic reforms that started in the Republic of Moldova in the 1990s gave a boost to social and economic changes. However, the price for social transformations turned out to be significantly greater than what the society was ready to pay. Consequently, the coming of communists to power in Moldova was a fact as much unexpected as predicted. In the situation of rigid economic changes and social instability archetype nostalgias are the last refuge for mass consciousness. The weakness of an ordinary person in relation to the chaotic powers embodied in the image of the “wild” market and capitalism became the common valence of post-Soviet collective ideas. In such conditions “the hope for the strong hand” that could “establish order”, bring back easily recognized social values is inevitable, but it can be softened by the constant many-sided integration of values of democratic liberalism the basis of which is rational thinking and individual initiative – opposite to the archaic constants of collective sub-consciousness.

Notes

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- ⁵ Ibid.

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